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Similarity is not meaningful until dissimilarity is also commonly shared: Toward a "new" theory of similarity as the mutual commitment to intersubjectivity

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Abstract

This paper discusses an inherent deficiency in mainstream psychological approaches to the concept of similarity in research on close personal relationships, which was an early hypothesis in research into the development of closeness between individuals. Critical psychology identifies limitations in the traditional views of individuals as self-contained. These views have led to less attention being paid to shared meanings of subjective experiences when relating to others. This paper briefly reviews how social psychologists have recognized similarity as a psychological construct facilitating the development of relationships, and draws attention to intersubjectivity as joint construction of meanings, a subject which has not been sufficiently explored in the mainstream psychological literature. The explanatory power of classical methodology of human subjectivity, assumed to act as an active agent of meaning-making, has been consistently highlighted by scholars of critical social psychology and communication theory.

Keywords: Personal relationships, similarity, critical psychology, intersubjectivity, communication theory.

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A very short introduction to psychology of close relationships

This paper aims to critique mainstream social psychological approaches to relationship research, specifically a failure to examine personal relationships as a joint construction. It proposes another theoretical perspective. Rather than a conventional individual-based evaluation of relational resources, this paper will highlight intersubjectivity through the lens of critical social psychology. This perspective attaches more importance to intersubjective experiences of mutual relational processes.

This paper primarily focuses on gaps in the literature on the similarity-attraction hypothesis. It is undisputed that research into close personal relationships was pioneered by social psychologists who examined perception of attractiveness in the 1960s, identifying similarity as a key component. Over the following two decades, researchers' primary interest shifted from the initiation of personal relationships (attraction) to satisfaction, which they recognized as a primary factor in maintaining relationships. They assumed that people chose partners who they perceived to be more likely to reciprocate (Montoya & Horton, 2013). Many social psychologists compared relational interactions to resource exchanges between business partners, assuming that lasting personal relationships could be accounted for by partners' cost-benefit analysis of their relationship. These hypotheses in the literature treated partners in close relationships as resources, that the other individual seeks to exploit to optimize their individual outcomes.

In his brief review of social psychological approaches to relationship research, Watts (2017) criticized mainstream social psychology for pushing the "relationship" aside and retaining the notion of self-contained individuals as units for research. The literature seldom focuses on relational selves, defined by social and personal relationships and constructed by various interactions. Rather, the focus is on self-contained individuals, for who social and personal relationships are nothing more than context: social environments which have the potential to influence behaviours. Within a relationship, these individual's behaviours should depend on their partner's behaviour. Although this state of interdependence describes power dynamics between partners and explains courses of relationships (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), each individual's subjectivity is assumed to be unchanged. This mainstream perspective pays little attention to how each relationship is meaningfully experienced. As it traditionally recognizes individuals independently of others, relationships are assessed independently, on the basis of an individual's values. Ironically, this research on relationships neutralizes the "relational" nature of relationships, as it by separates them into individuals (Watts, 2017).

Individualistic approaches are so problematic that their findings do not fully answer a simple question: how can we tell who will be a good match for a long-term relationship? Evidence has shown that we are very likely to be attracted to those who share similar responses to people or objects in our shared environment (Montoya & Horton, 2013). However, the same research on romantic relationships is clear that initial attraction does not necessarily translate to long term successful relationships. More recent research suggests that similarity matters for relationships when jointly seeking to complete tasks in a particular way (Bohns & Higgins, 2011); and that synchronicity of each partner's emotional trajectories strengthens commitment to the relationship (Eastwick, Finkel, & Simpson, 2019). However, these utilitarian views of interpersonal attraction do not explain shared meaning in relationships, but how useful individual qualities are to the other partner (Finkel & Eastwick, 2015). As an old Chinese proverb says, partners "sleep together in the same bed, and have different dreams individually."

Recently evolutionary social psychology, another branch of mainstream psychological research, has attempted to account for the similarity/attraction theory in a different way. They call this niche construction theory, arguing that people modify their social environments to maintain their sense of integrity. Thus, seeking similar friends is "a process of molding the social environment to create a desirable place for the self" (Bahns, Crandall, Gillath, & Preacher, 2017, p. 330). This approach treats social and personal relationships as one of the environments that are likely to provide individuals with the support that validates their identity by agreement and approval. According to this theory, then, relationships are formed and maintained based on each partner's interests in constructing their identity and sense of security. What it means to be in relation with others is not mutually constructed, in accordance with ongoing relational processes, but separately attributed to predetermined respective value systems of the self-contained individuals.

Research and associated theories in this area of social psychology, at least in the mainstream, have not been able to extricate themselves from individualist and utilitarian views of value to the individuals within relationships. This may explain why they have not given clear answers to the oldest and most challenging question posed by the earliest scholars on relationships, particularly romantic relationships. This dearth in the literature threatens the legitimacy of research on personal relationships. In 1975, a male US senator publicly criticized two female social psychologists for wasting governmental funds on their research on love. He did not believe that their findings were worth being shared (Guerrero, Andersen, & Afifi, 2018). More than forty years later, and the validity of relationship research is no longer challenged; the outcomes of the research may help us improve our relationships as social environments or as tools for achieving individual goals. However, each relationship is interpreted as one fragment of each partner's separate realities. As Acitelli and Duck (1987) argued more than thirty years ago, we have lost the meaning of a relationship as a whole.

In search of meanings of Similarity-Attraction Hypothesis

Traditionally social psychologists tended to neglect intersubjectivity, before social constructionist psychologists proposed an alternative to the psychology of self-contained individuals (Gergen, 1985). The Similarity-Attraction Hypothesis and other early theories of relationship initiation were developed on the assumption that closeness could be represented by the extent to which two selves could converge. Byrne's (1971) seminal experiments testing similarity-attraction hypothesis created "bogus strangers" who were similar to their research participants in terms of attitudes: that is, they constructed identities with value systems they assumed would represent similarity of human behaviours. The experimenters first asked each participant to fill out a survey on campus life, and created an answer sheet of a "bogus stranger," who apparently took part in the same survey. The findings indicated that interpersonal attraction was a reflection of the extent to which a potential partner's value systems were compatible with their own. In these experiments, participants were asked to imagine future interactions with these 'bogus strangers'; the results suggest that participants believed that it would be easy to communicate well, free of conflict.

Byrne's (1971) similarity-attraction hypothesis is usually called reinforcement theory because it is based on the assumption that others with similar value systems are likely to reward someone with a sense of consensual validation, reducing perceived fear of rejection and isolation, thus empowering them to express their thoughts to potential relational partners. The psychological construct of consensual validation originally derives from group dynamics to explain conformity and uniformity, and assumes that "people possess an inherent need to know that the things they see, feel, and understand are experienced in the same way by others" (McMillan & Chavis, 1986, p. 11). Studies on small groups and personal relationships have shown evidence that "people will perform a variety of psychological gymnastics to obtain feedback and reassurance that they are not crazy" (McMillan & Chavis, 1986, p. 11). Consensual validation contributes to members' or relational partners' faith in a cultural world view that enables them to participate in meaningful activities in a shared reality; enhancing their self-esteem and social identity as members or partners of a particular group or relationship.

Interestingly, the function of consensual validation as an old-fashioned concept is similar to a new evolutionary theory called Niche Construction Theory (Bahns, et al., 2017), introduced earlier in this paper. The more recent theory appears more traditional than the older theory, as niche construction theory pays less attention to group cohesion, including personal relationships and a sense of membership, as the goal of communication among members or partners. Niche construction theory presupposes that personal relationships with others are nothing more than social environments for self-contained individuals' survival. By way of contrast, similarity-attraction hypothesis, originating in research on group cohesion, contends that the sense of intersubjectivity, which perceived similarity guarantees, plays an important part in creating cohesion in a relationship and facilitating easier and smoother interactions between partners. If relational partners have already agreed on what is

meaningful for all parties, they would be able to spontaneously avoid things beyond their common interests when they are together. According to the traditional view of group psychology, since Festinger's (1950, 1954, 1957) foundational theories in 1950s, a personal relationship as a dyadic group is supposed to be an inherently meaningful relationship, the partners in which are always ready to mutually renew and update their commonality whenever they take part in joint activities.

Lost intersubjectivity in relationship research

Rather than developing intersubjectivity, traditional social psychology has attached more importance to stability within personal relationships, that is, whether partners would stay or leave and what parameters could better predict this. Valid indices representing the quality of relationships are typically generated by measuring the extent to which partners commit to joint activities and how they evaluate such activities and each other's dedication. For example, Berscheid, Simpson, and Omoto (1989) developed "Relationship Closeness Inventory (RCI)" comprised of three sub-scales measuring "frequency" and "diversity of joint activities," and the "emotional intensity" felt about such activities. Harold H. Kelley's Interdependance Theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), the master theory on which the RCI relies, suggests that a close relationship is maintained by both partners' interactions, based on the exchanges of resources that both partners value. Relational partners continue their exchange as long as they have control over their own and their partner's behaviours in joint activities. Interdependence Theory assumes that a meaningful relationship has a stable power balance between partners, who are satisfied with cost-efficiency as a measure of relational interactions.

In this view, conflicts between partners are recognized as the dark side of attraction, that is, what Levinger (1976) called "negative attractions" such as discomfort, irritation, and untrustworthiness that may make partners avoid each other. It is notable that ambivalence inherent in relations had already been observed in some of the earliest research on personal relationships, two decades before Relational Dialectics Theory as proposed by communication scholars (Baxter, 2012; Baxter & Montgomery, 1996). Unlike RDT, however, these conflictual forces had not been treated as ceaseless dialectical contradiction between partners, but interpreted as each partner's individual internal balance between positivity and negativity. This was ultimately transformed into cost-benefit ratio, which characterizes Social Exchange Theory, developed by Kelley's followers during the last two decades of the 20th century.

From another perspective, Levinger's (1976; Levinger & Snoek, 1972) illustration of relational development (depicting the overlapping zone of two selves, which waxes and wanes in accordance with the fluctuation of closeness) was adopted into the notion of "Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS)" of Self-Expansion Model (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). The IOS is measured and recognized as a valid and reliable index of commonality perceived by its partners. The Self-Expansion Model successfully

integrated the complementarity-attraction hypothesis with the similarity-attraction hypothesis and demystified the pseudo-contradiction between similarity and complementarity, represented by clichés such as "Opposites attract" (Bohns, et al., 2013). It is reasonable that we appreciate partners who can do things we value but cannot do well ourselves. In the Self-Expansion Model, relational partners are entitled to take advantage of their partners' individual resources as communal assets virtually and jointly owned by both.

Although Social Exchange Theory is not currently favoured in relationship research, this economical view of relational processes is sophisticated. It is further organized into Investment Model (Rusbult, Drigotas, & Verette, 1994), which designated "commitment" as the key factor determining the stability of a personal relationship. Indeed, while this model still produces many empirical research articles, communal characteristics and similarity of attitudes have been discarded and researchers' interests in mutuality are limited to the subject of resource exchange. Through this theoretical lens, commitment to the relationship is synonymous with engagement in goal-pursuit activities, and differences between partners are recognized as vigilant strategic preferences agreed to by them. Thus, it is not each of relational processes in itself, but the goals of relational interactions that matter to economy-based theories (Bohns, et al., 2013). These theories attach importance to relational partners' coordination and strategic timing of relationship trajectories (Eastwick, Finkel, & Simpson, 2019) rather than meaning-making processes.

Communicative approaches focusing on partners' commitment to intersubjectivity

In spite of their high publication rate, economics-based models have failed to answer what creates compatibility or incompatibility in relationships. These theories lack power to explain how relational partners negotiate to share their own meanings with one other and how to jointly construct meaning. It is, instead, communicative approaches originally developed in clinical, developmental and educational psychology that have become more prominent in the research to understand meaning in relationships (Duck, 1994). Although commonality tends to be seen as synonymous with similarity, it should be recognized as an identified intersection of interests of interlocutors participating in actual or potential conversation, a collective of objects to which both attend together, In other words, constructs of commonly shareable experiences. At least both partners' mutual declaration of an overlap of interests is required as the first step to assure mutual commitment to commonality. This is what Duck defined as mutuality.

The existence of shared experiences that partners discuss is not sufficient for mutuality as relational processes. Each other's explicit or implicit commitment to tasks ensures mutual recognition of what is shared between them. Without this self-awareness, communication between partners could be confusing and reduce the likelihood that they behave in accordance with either the communication or common

goals. Commonality without mutual commitment is nothing more than familiarity with a particular topic, a minimal intersection which both of the interlocutors recognize as a clue to a temporal interaction at an encounter (Duck, 1994).

Identifying similarity is a cognitive process of understanding something unknown - uncommon or unfamiliar (Duck, 1982). Suppose we have to talk to a stranger. First, we attempt to attract their interest in the subject we are discussing. We must make sure that they are paying attention to the same thing that we are. Without shared attention, even the most cursory communication is difficult, let alone sharing something more meaningful. Thus, any communication between two people is designed to construct a kind of primary intersubjectivity similar to that of an infant-caregiver interaction, where the infant learns meanings of the targeted object in a common social context through his or her caregiver's structured knowledge about them (Cipolletta, Mascolo, & Procter, in-press). Even in a conversation between two adults, there will inevitably be some discrepancy in terms of engagement with or knowledge about the topic; and therefore, the commonality in conversation is also an intersection of two individuals' different personal constructs. Commonality does not guarantee a static status of pre-established harmony; rather it should be regarded as if it were the epicentre where two personal constructs clash with one other.

Meaning is not created just by the topic of conversation, but also the manner of communication. Commonality in itself does not unite two people so they recognize themselves as partners based on a commonly shared understanding of their status; their relationship is not meaningful until they implicitly or explicitly adhere to norms or obligations which lead them to appropriate relational interactions (Graumann, 1995). It is natural that you struggle to find a common topic in front of someone you have just met, even when you know why both of you find yourselves in a shared situation. In most cases, small talk before a more meaningful discussion is preferable, and tends to lead both parties into smoother interactions. Through the ritual of small talk, both parties are prepared to begin deeper conversation in mutually acceptable ways: in other words, how each partner sees the other valuing the subject.

This interpretation is in line with classical works in social psychology, such as Asch's (1951) experiments of conformity: participants attempted to adjust their judgements to the majority of the group, who were recognized as peers in the activity. In addition to the conformity experiments, other canonical works such as those illustrating the bystander effect and obedience to authority displayed research participants' innate tendencies to behave during unfamiliar and extraordinary situations, alongside those whom they apparently shared the experiences. A frequently quoted episode from Milgram's (1974) experiments is an angry participant who walked away from the laboratory, saying that he could not bear the situation; for him, the order given by the experimenter was totally meaningless; he did not share meaning with those conducting the experiments.

As it turns out, I would argue, canonical experiments and classical theories already raised an issue of responsibility for meaning-making in implicit ways. Apparently,

events in those experiments could not have been meaningful without their participants' involvement in the predetermined situations. McNamee and Gergen (1999) posited a hypothesis called relational responsibility, which liberates each partner from isolated responsibility within their respective moral system and invites them to a common ground sustaining their dialogical processes, ensuring each other's values on their relationship. This does not necessarily mean that partners are supposed to interact with each other as they had already planned to do. If relational interactions were completely predetermined, there would be no room for interpreting them and reconsidering their significance. An action in relational interactions is not fully controlled by partners' intentions; rather, it usually performs a role of an active agent for creating a new joint construction, which is largely unpredictable (Billig, 2016; McNamee & Gergen, 1999, Shotter, 2008).

Meaningfulness of unshared as well as shared

While two individuals partially share each other's subjectivity, intersubjectivity as result of joint actions is not objective reality, but a process of creative exploration of shared meanings grounded in common-sense understanding (Grossberg, 1982). Each partner anticipates their partner's construction of events; but they also face uncomfortable experiences which may distance them from the partner's view. According to Matusov (1996), intersubjectivity does not necessarily rely on agreement, and participants are able to "coordinate their contributions in the joint activity through agreement and disagreement" (p. 26). The diversity and fluidity of multiple voices characterizing disagreement constitutes intersubjectivity among all participants in a joint activity. In other words, intersubjectivity is sustained and repeatedly reconstituted while members are able to take part in coordinated meaning-making processes.

It is thus not what to share, but rather how to share it, that partners should agree on to assure themselves of their intersubjectivity based on shared meanings. Matusov (1996) referred to "prolepsis," that is, communicative moves based on temporal structures of cultural schema, or scripts of anticipatory ends. Prolepsis in his work is not just an argumentative strategy to anticipate objections to their impact. Prolepsis, rather, is comprised of a set of cultural representations of temporal relationships between individual and cultural structures which lead them to a culturally prototypical future end (Rommetveit, 1974; Cole, 1994, 1996). In educational settings, prolepsis is teachers' use of communication to assist their students' understanding or ability to accomplish tasks by presenting anticipatory triggers of comprehension. Matusov clearly explained the usage of prolepsis as follows:

> "The term 'prolepsis' refers to a communicative move in which a speaker presupposes or takes for granted something that has not yet been discussed by the time of move. For example, prolepsis can take the speaker's form of assumption about the listener's background knowledge of the topic, about the listener's perception of how serious the conversation is, and so on." (emphasis added) (Matusov, 1996, p. 26).

He argued that conversations should be recognized as dynamic processes in which speakers incorporate the understandings and misunderstandings, and the agreement and disagreement of all parties into a mutually committed intersubjectivity.

Matusov's (1996) argument relies on Lotman's (1992/2009) interpretation of communication as a struggle to integrate discrepancies into mutual understandings, which parties identify as limited intersections of subjectivities. Lotman claimed that interpersonal communication would be impossible if two persons' subjectivities were identical. He further emphasized that an extended world view as the achievement of interactions is developed through negotiation over the contradiction between two different views, fully amplified by their dialogues. He suggested that "the value of dialogue is linked not to the intersecting part, but to the transfer of information between non-intersecting parts" (Lotman, 2009, p. 5). Interestingly, he argued that insoluble contradiction does not discourage two individuals from sharing each other's subjective worlds because something unshared attracts them:

> "Moreover, the more difficult and inadequate the translation of one non-intersecting part of the space into the language of the other, the more valuable, in informative and social norms, the fact of this paradoxical communication becomes. You could say that translation of the untranslatable may in turn become the carrier of information of the highest value." (Lotman, 2009, pp. 5-6.)

However, such approaches in communication are not free from inherent political or hegemonic problems. Even if equality is a defined prerequisite of certain types of close relationships such as friendships, no relationship can be truly equal in terms of privilege or empowerment. States of intersubjectivity are "contingent upon the dyadic constellation of speaker's privilege and listener's commitment: The speaker has the privilege to determine what is being referred to or meant whereas the listener is committed to make sense of what is said by adopting the perspective of the speaker" (Rommetveit, 1983, p. 99). "The temporary commitment to a shared social world can only be accounted for in terms of the inbuilt circularity of fully fledged acts of speech and the complementarity of speaker's privilege and listener's obligation" (Rommetveit, 1983, p. 100). Interestingly, it is Social Exchange Theory, an economics based model in social psychology, that has most successfully been able to portray power dynamics between relational partners. This is slightly different from communicative and hermeneutic approaches; social psychologists using Social Exchange Theory have not paid sufficient attention to meaning-making processes but only to fixed meanings of resources to be exchanged and the structures of exchanges as observed from an external and neutral standpoint.

I do not mean to negate traditional social psychological views of relational dynamics. Rather, it seems evident that greater weight should be given to an alternative view of commitment to ongoing intersubjective processes through communal activities, instead of the more conventional focus on the outcomes of individual actions in relationships. Farr and Rommetveit (1995) argued that commonality is not a

precondition of relational interactions between those who are recognize each other as similar; on the contrary, it is the consequence of ongoing dialogue, involving attention to similarities and intentions to relate to each other. Their commitment to the exchange based on similarity enables them to "become a 'we' as opposed to all others ('them') who are not so engaged" (p. 271). Thus, dialogue with another is not open to all; rather it draws a temporary boundary enclosing the parties involved.

In this sense, relating to others is a way of creating meaningful community through discussion; meaning occurs when communication clearly establishes or represents shareable social order. Whether temporary or enduring, a relationship is a social construct negotiated by partners based on each other's pre-existing social order. Any relationship can be meaningful even if one partner sees something completely different from the other's expectations. Disappointment with the relationship or a partner is not a failure but a potential consequence of mutual ongoing negotiation over discrepancy between individual personal constructs of relationships. Those relationships deemed meaningless should be ended, as breakdowns in communication and commitments to communicate mean that the relationship's construct of "us" will no longer be further developed.

Potential of classic methodology for illustrating human subjectivity

As Duck's (1994) Serial Construction of Meaning Model clarifies, personal relationships are not meaningful until both of partners mutually evaluate their commonality in equivalent ways. His model proposes constructivist perspectives on how relational partners attempt to have their individual experiences turned into shareable constructs. Duck (1982, 1994) applies G. A. Kelly's (1955, 1970) Personal Construct Theory to his theory of relational communication. The Sociality Corollary, one of the most important corollaries in Kelly's theory, is premised as follows: "To the extent that one person construes the construction processes of another, he may play a role in a social process involving the other person" (Kelly, 1955, p. 95). Sociality in a relational process does not imply that individuals achieve convergence of their perspectives through mutually construing experiences. Kelly's sociality is a way of understanding the other's interpretation of events to the extent that it is believed to be mutually shareable.

Sociality is not simply synonymous with perspective-taking but also commitment to intersubjectivity; it is more like field trials for adapting oneself to a partner's style of behaviours. Consider protagonists of body-switching comedies. In these stories, they are astonished by hidden or unfamiliar aspects of everyday life, some of which they had assumed to be familiar to them. In most cases, this genre has a denouement filled with mutual understanding, celebrated by harmonious, secure, and steady partnerships. When returning this analogy to our understanding of sociality, you do not become another person, but you can assume his/her framework for interpreting the world, which has not been shared with you; and you can attempt to make it meaningful (Broome, 1991).

It is clear from my analogy to body-switching comedies that there are inherent limitations of individualist approaches when seriously committing to intersubjectivity in action. If you claim empathy for your partner, you are supposed to think and behave as if you could see the world as they do. However, it is impossible to discard your original cognitive structure and replace it with theirs. Showing empathy is reproductive engagement (Stewart, 1983); and therefore, perspective-taking is a way of expressing the extent to which common experience is shared. Sociality is not mind-reading in observation of partners, but the practical skills of commitment to the partner's life for the length of the relationship.

Thus, discussing mutual similarity does not necessarily guarantee consensual validation; if similarity in your partner's characteristics is reassuring, caution should still be exercised lest difference remains. Both personal constructs do not automatically converge on a jointly constructed state of intersubjectivity without a mutual commitment. Traditional social psychology has presumed that relational partners' mutual self-disclosure, that is, sharing about each other, allows partners to delve more into their own subjectivity, as Social Penetration Theory illustrated (Altman & Taylor, 1973). However, this view has focused on how closely relational partners come to the essence of their partner's self, and also how much information is available about each other during further interactions. Social Penetration Theory does not pay attention to joint construction of meaning in personal relationships, because meanings are assumed to be predetermined by each individual before self-disclosure.

Coming back to Watts's (2017) criticism of mainstream relationship research based on cognitive social psychology, remember that he blamed this for ignoring individuals' ways of relating to others. His alternative approach is to analyse each partner's relational experience by Q methodology, developed to describe the structures of human subjectivities. In their monograph on this method, McKeown and Thomas (2013) stated that subjectivity is not substantive but communicable, and that subjective processes are not behaviours driven by a priori knowledge of common sense but "operant" behaviours exploring meanings of events. What Q methodology means by a classic term such as "operant" is the nature of human subjectivity which is reflective and naturally occurring. Through processes of "operant" conditioning, each partner plays a role of an active agent in changing their relationship in accordance with cultural premises and as a consequence of mutual interactions. Watts's use of Q methodology is appropriate for mapping the nature of relational communication as an ever-changing process.

Interestingly, Q methodology shares common features with Kelly's (1955) repertory grids as a method of his Personal Construct Psychology. This is in terms of describing knowledge structures in ways that express their meanings to share with those relating to them. Considering the fact these two methods have been developed by 1970, it is surprising that there has been such methodological difficulty for researchers of relationships, considering how relating to others can be recognized as mutually meaningful experiences. In his book Meaningful Relationships, Duck (1994) blamed mainstream social psychology for following H. H. Kelley rather than G. A.

Kelly. Kelley, as discussed earlier, used neither mutuality nor meaning as technical terms in his theories. Rather, he only referred to bilateral interactions based on resource exchange and individual-based evaluations of resources. Because of this, meanings of relationships were represented by outcomes of exchanges, that is, success or failure as objective evidence determined by people outside a partnership. It seems apparent that mutuality is a promising methodological alternative, which has been neglected for half a century. It seems high time to take it more seriously.

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