ANNUAL REVIEW OF CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

ARCP 9



MARXISM AND PSYCHOLOGY

editor Michael Arfken

Annual Review of Critical Psychology

Issue 9

Marxism and Psychology

Editor Michael Arfken

www.discourseunit.com

table of contents

Introduction

Articles

introduction

michael arfken

Marxist Scholarship and Psychological Practice

By Michael Arfken, University of Prince Edward Island

It is difficult to remember a time when so many people from such a variety of backgrounds took to the streets to draw attention to the widening disparity between the promises and the products of our economic and political institutions. As evidence continues to mount that our "advanced" nations not only accumulate massive amounts of wealth but also produce unprecedented inequalities in the distribution of that wealth, a vocal contingent of the working class has, for the last few weeks, occupied financial districts throughout the world. These protests have captured the imagination of a growing number of people who see neither their aspirations nor their sense of justice embodied in some of the fundamental structures of modern society.

In the wake of the near total collapse of the global financial system, we are also witnessing a growing number of activists, scholars, and practitioners who have begun to reflect on the relationship between certain academic disciplines and dominant economic and political structures. Yet for those working within the discipline of psychology, the connection between political economy and psychological knowledge is anything but transparent. For example, what are we to make of an article on the front page of the American Psychological Association (APA) website that, at the height of the global recession, urged psychologists to brace for recession depression? Or another article that gives psychologists the tools they need to assist employers with kinder, gentler layoffs? What do articles like this from a leading psychological organization say about the relationship between modern psychology and the existing economic order?

Perhaps all this suggests is that modern psychology, like any other academic discipline, must operate within the confines of the existing social order. Given that the financial market periodically goes through natural fluctuations, the best that psychology can hope to do is to alleviate some of the anxiety that emerges from these brief crises. From such a perspective, the APA headlines are evidence not of psychology's parochialism but of its willingness to ease the suffering of those who find themselves in an unfortunate set of circumstances.

Yet there is another dimension to the relationship between dominant economic structures and modern psychology that bears some scrutiny. It is clear that the roots of modern psychology are supported by the same enlightenment rationality that continues to sustain many of our modern institutions from liberal democracy to neoclassical economics. Given the symbiotic relationship that exists between psychology and these institutions, it seems inevitable that when one of

these institutions begins to exhibit certain weaknesses other institutions will step in to turn our attention to other matters. Thus, while the looming collapse of our financial structures could engender reflection on the legitimacy of the capitalist mode of production, the APA headlines shift our attention to matters that are less threatening to the existing state of affairs.

This suggests that a deeper relationship exists between our economic structures and our scientific pursuits. In other words, it is not only that psychological research and practice is financially supported by industries that have a vested interest in maintaining the existing economic structure of society. At an even deeper level, the very idea of a discipline such as psychology that attempts to understand the mental structures occupying the spaces between people and their environments or between people and other people expresses a logic that can only take capitalism as its point of departure. At this level, to make the relationship between economics and psychology thematic is to discover that what we refer to as psychology is simply a potent euphemism for alienation. The aim of this issue of the Annual Review of Critical Psychology is to identify and interrogate this alienation using the tools of Marxist philosophy and analysis.

While this issue certainly draws attention to the role that orthodox psychology plays in the reproduction of many of the dominant features of modern society, it also diagnoses the extent to which critical psychological scholarship has come to distance itself from all things Marxist. With some notable exceptions, critical psychologists suspicious of transcendental claims and secure foundations have often avoided Marxism opting instead to embrace less rigid forms of analysis. Perhaps such a lacuna is itself in need of a Marxist analysis particularly since the politics of recognition continues to demonstrate that simply appreciating the unique identity of marginalized groups in the final analysis does little to address the economic inequalities that support nearly every form of social injustice.

It should be noted that all the papers included in this special issue were originally presented at the first Marxism and Psychology Conference held at the University of Prince Edward Island in August of 2010. Sponsored by the Marxism and Psychology Research Group (MPRG), this conference brought together over 100 international scholars, activists, and students to discuss some of the most exciting issues at the intersection of Marxism and Modern Psychology. Ian Parkers contribution in this issue provides a comprehensive account of the conference activities

Given the overwhelming success of this first conference, it was agreed that every effort would be made to organize additional Marxism and Psychology conferences on a regular basis and in a new location each time. We are pleased to announce that the second Marxism and Psychology Conference will be held from August 9-12, 2012 at the Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, located in Morelia, Michoacán, Western Mexico. Further information regarding this conference can be found on the conference website - http://marxpsyconference.teocripsi.com/.

While the contributions to this issue draw on a wide range of intellectual traditions, the three that figure most prominently are hermeneutics, critical theory, and psychoanalysis. This is not surprising given the influence that Marxism has historically exerted on these traditions. What is truly striking is the breadth of topics that contributors address in this issue. Against the background of these traditions, contributors reflect on the role of ideology critique in modern society, on the heteronormative undercurrents of certain forms of criticism, on the experience of shame, embodiment, the use of technology, crowd behavior, and community and developmental psychology to name only a few.

We hope the range of topics dealt with in this issue serves as a reminder of the continued vitality of Marxist analysis and the urgent need for an interrogation of many of the dominant features of modern psychology. We also hope that critical psychologists who have wandered away from Marxist analysis or who have never encountered it in the first place will discover something of value in this form of critique.

introduction

ian parker

Marxism & Psychology Conference (2010)

By Ian Parker, Manchester Metropolitan University

The Marxism & Psychology conference took place from 5-7 August at the University of Prince Edward Island, Canada. Around 100 participants from around the world discussed the intersection between different traditions in psychology and different strands of Marxism. The Island is the site of a number of political-economic cultural forces, ranging from the minority "Acadian" community descended from French settlers (the Acadians were expelled from the Island by the British and some ended up in Louisiana where they become known as "Cajuns") to the Mi'q Maks who are now mainly confined to the much tinier Lennox Island off the coast of the main island (where they sell tacky souvenirs, including parmesan flavour dog biscuits in the shape of Prince Edward Island). These potent reminders of the history of colonialism and class were sidestepped in the conference by a focus instead on Anne of Green Gables (the musical is in its 46th year and "all things Anne" sustain the tourist trade). I put together the main sessions, so this is also a self-critique.

There were three plenary sessions, one on each of the days of the conference, which were organised thematically, around "Alienation", "Ideology" and "Methodology". Rather than have a long keynote "presentation" and then "questions", there were introductions to the theme in Marxism and then review of developments and intersections with psychology. The first session, on alienation, was guided by the following questions: What is the specific contribution of Marxism to understanding and overcoming alienation? Is the sense of alienation that sociology and psychology describes reducible to the "experience" that we have of it? Should a Marxist account of alienation rest upon a particular notion of nature and human species-being and estrangement from that nature under capitalism? Athanasios Marvakis from the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki started off by outlining what Marx had to say about alienation as a concept in his early writings that we now understand in the light of the later published work. Then Joel Kovel, a former psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and now well-known ecosocialist activist spoke about how the concept of "alienation" was related to other notions that Marx and colleagues were working with, and this helped us to step back a bit and focus on the context for the use of the notion in Marx's work. Then John Cromby addressed what notion of psychology "alienation" calls upon, and whether psychology as such could ever be more than a codified form of alienation.

The second session was on ideology, organised by the following questions: Why is the ruling ideology more potent and dangerous than simply being a set of ideas? What is the difference between ideology and a "belief system", and do people actually need to believe ideology for it to function? What is the role of "false consciousness" in ideology and should psychologists have anything to say about that?

Morten Nissen, who has been a key figure in the development of Kritische Psychologie in Denmark, kicked us off by saying what Marx had to say about the concept of ideology. Then Gordana Jovanovic from Belgrade, who, among other things, wrote the detailed preface to the translation of Wilhelm Reich's work into Serbo-Croatian, talked about how the concept of ideology is related to other notions that Marx and colleagues were working with. Raquel Guzzo, a developmental and educational psychologist in Campinas Brazil, took time out from her electoral campaign in Sao Paulo with Partido Socialismo e Liberdade, to talk about what notion of psychology the image of a subject beset by "ideology" calls upon. Hans Skott-Myhre, a Deleuzian Negri-style communist from Brock University in Canada talked about whether the notion of ideology must always necessarily suppose a subject deluded or trapped by it.

The final session of the conference was on methodology, that is: Is there a distinctive Marxist methodology that characterises the way Marx grasped the nature of capitalism? Must dialectics be the core of the methodological approach we take to social relations and can it then also be used to grasp natural phenomena? What is the impact of revolutionary methodology for the way we think about the place of psychology now and in the process of change? In this session Thomas Teo from York University, a historian and critic of mainstream psychology dealt with the question as to how Marx differed from idealist speculative philosophy elaborated by Hegel, and how Marx's dialectical approach introduced something new, something more revolutionary. Carl Ratner, a cultural psychologist from California spoke about how Marx's methodology differed from the positivist project in mainstream psychology to accumulate facts about society in order to simply improve it. And then Lois Holzman from the Social Therapy and Performance of a Lifetime Fred Newman group based in New York dealt with how Marx's practice of method works as an instrumental tool or epistemological framework, and how that transforms the way we think about methodology in psychology.

The more conventional paper sessions ranged from detailed exegesis of the work of theorists well-known in psychology (such as Lev Vygotsky), to not so well-known writers outwith the discipline (such as Herbert Marcuse), to some who should be required reading for all psychologists (such as Ignacio Martin-Baro). One can gather from this range that there were some full and frank exchanges over the contribution of the broad activity theory tradition (including Leontiev, Bakhtin and Volosinov), psychoanalysis (including strands in the Frankfurt School and those working in and alongside the Lacanian tradition), and liberation psychology (from Freire to Montero). The Holzkamp folk were there, as were some of the discourse people, but the discussion was energised by perspectives not usually included in psychology conferences, and we were thus able to step back from our rather parochial debates into thinking about the wider compass of subjectivity and social change.

The conference was sponsored by the Marxism and Psychology Research Group (http://discoveryspace.upei.ca/mprg/), and organised mainly by a small collection of people in the University, with much of the administrative work, ferrying around of speakers and general coordination undertaken by Michael Arfken. It was an ambitious project and an amazing success. The worst reward would be to press Arfken to take on (something like) "Marxism and Psychology II: Return of the Radicals" in a couple of year's time, though there have been threats to land this on him. Who will step in to save him from this, and take forward these debates?

Note: This conference report was originally published in PINS (Psychology in Society), 2010, 39, pp. 65-66.

gordana jovanović

Knowledge and Interest in Psychology: From Ideology to Ideology Critique and Beyond

By Gordana Jovanović, University Of Belgrade

Abstract

Contrary to prevailing beliefs in the main-stream psychology, I argue that interests are structurally embedded in a scientific rationality supposedly oriented toward universality, objectivity and neutrality. Relying on Marxist thought, I look for the socio-historical genesis of scientific claims and their ideological functions. The first task of critique is to acknowledge that the supposed objectivity of science is an ideological claim. The next task should be a critical examination of the interests themselves, and especially the interest for control operationalized as a quest for certainty and quantification, widely shared in psychology too. Ideology critique must have two main objectives: critique of conditions which hamper psychic wellbeing and self-critique, i.e. critique of interpretive tools which are formative for both subjective and social worlds. I will argue that epistemological requirements for an ideology critique from the standpoint of psychology can be fulfilled only within psychology as a hermeneutic science.

To raise the question on the relation between knowledge and interest in psychology is already a challenge to those positions, still strongly defended within psychology, which adhere to claims or - in the modest case – ideals of a pure and so called objective scientific knowledge which is supposed to neutrally represent reality "out there". These positions assume that cognizing should be considered as a specific mental process of knowing, different from experiences of feeling and willing, and normatively separated from the influence of other experiences. In this way an objective cognitive representation of reality should be secured.

Such atomistic positions, which take analytic divisions as ontological entities, have already a history of some centuries - they are closely related with the modern world picture. The same pattern could be found in explanations of the physical world, but also of the social and mental world, as pointed out by Kurt Danziger: "Just as societies were considered to be formed by the combination of separate and independent persons, so individual minds could be thought of as formed by the association of separate mental elements." (Danziger, 1994: 347). More precisely, there is also a connection between the mechanistic world view of the rising modernity and understanding of knowledge in mechanistic terms, as demonstrated by Charles Taylor with a reference to the basic cognitive process of perception: "The key to this is obviously perception, and if we see it as another process in a mechanistic universe, we have to construe it as involving as a crucial component the passive reception of impressions from the external world. Knowledge then hangs on a certain relation holding between what is 'out there' and certain inner states that this external reality causes in us. This construal, valid for Locke, applies just as much to the latest artificial-intelligence models of thinking." (Taylor, 1995: 3-4).

It is important to notice that, besides the field of artificial-intelligence, these positions have received a new impetus in new domains. Surprisingly or not, mechanistic atomistic construals have become favored also in the field of biology, precisely evolutionary psychology, an approach rapidly developing since the nineties of the 20th century, which tends to offer an explanation of the structure and functions of the psyche with a reference to the evolutionary principle of adaptation only. The mind is labeled as an "adapted mind" – and it is an outcome of successful brain solutions to adaptive problems encountered in the environment. But at the bottom there are only physical processes – as the first principle of evolutionary psychology states: "The brain is a physical system. It functions as a computer. Its circuits are designed to generate behavior that is appropriate to your environmental circumstances. The brain is a physical system whose operation is governed solely by the laws of chemistry and physics" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997, principle 1, para. 1)

As far as the structure of the brain as a physical system is concerned, evolutionary psychologists see it as a modular structure,

"composed of a large collection of circuits, with different circuits specialized for solving different problems…. There is, then, a sense in which you can view the brain as a collection of dedicated mini-computers - a collection of modules". (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997, principle 4, para. 4)

Except reductionism and atomism, characteristic of understanding cognition in many other approaches too, in evolutionary psychology we find also an outspoken denial of historicity of psychical functions. On the one hand, this is a logical consequence of atomism and reductionism which certainly cannot conceptualize any historical process. But on the other hand, evolutionary psychology excludes any change in psychical functioning since stone age contradicting in this way the core principle of the theory of evolution itself. "Our modern skulls house a stone age mind. The key to understanding how the modern mind works is to realize that its circuits were not designed to solve the day-to-day problems of a modern American -- they were designed to solve the day-to-day problems of our hunter-gatherer ancestors." (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997, principle 5, para.5

If we additionally take into account that the manifesto of evolutionary psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) coincides with another influential discourse - discourse of the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992), then the denial of historicity of human psyche has a broader meaning and implications that transcend the realm of a scientific theory. The fact that history has been suspended both from scientific and political discourses certainly deserves a closer analysis and a broader interpretation.

Though such views on human mind and more generally on human subjects have their long and influential history, there is also a history of critiques of such views. The most general critiques were directed against mechanistic models as inappropriate for conceiving of any life processes. A target of critique has been also a passive, mirroring role ascribed to subject which is supposed just to react to environmental stimuli (for example, Kant's critique of empiricism, or Piaget's critique of the myth of sensual origin of knowledge). The most demanding critique has as its object a general ahistorical understanding of human subjects. This is a critical position assumed by Marx and thinkers belonging to Marxist tradition of critical theory. Marx has radically historized both the object and subject of perception, thinking, feeling and acting. In *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* he states: "The development of the five senses is a labor of the whole previous history of the world." (Marx, 1932/1994: 75)

This is a conclusion from an analysis showing that senses and objects of sensation cannot be separated - objects need senses to be perceived, but senses need objects as the confirmation of their capacities. Historizing human senses means at the same time historizing human world. It is through historical embeddedness of human senses or any other psychic function that atomism, mechanicism and of course ahistoricism can be overcome.

Through historical reconstructions it becomes clear that human cognition is necessarily related to interests too – interests which draw attention to a specific subject-matter, which determine the approach to it, shape the interpretive horizon. But in the same way as knowledge is no direct copy of supposed real affairs, understanding of knowledge is also relative to some selected aspects of knowledge production. The fact that there are different accounts of knowledge - as pure or saturated with non-cognitive elements, for example, - is in itself a reason to go beyond the scope of knowledge. More generally, this approach relies on Marxist insight that consciousnesss is determined by social bein.

The Quest for Objectivity

The normative denial of any relation between scientific knowledge and interest is certainly an expression of the still prevailing self-understanding of science. But it is in itself an expression of the commitment to a value which is constructed as objectivity – or, in other words, it is an expression of the interest in objectivity. To be objective means to be guided by rational, possibly universal and formal, non-subjective, impersonal criteria. It is also supposed that to be objective means to be free and protected from prejudices. Such an attitude obviously belongs to a tradition of understanding of prejudice before Hans–Georg Gadamer started arguing for a "rehabilitation of prejudices" as a condition of possibility of understanding itself (Gadamer, 1960).

Though it might seem self-evident, the quest for objectivity has its own social history. In order to understand the commitment of science to objectivity and the construal of objectivity itself, I will argue, it is necessary to understand the meaning of objectivity within the broader context in which science takes part. Science as a form of consciousness is also determined by social being.

The quest for scientific objectivity is part of more general social requirements which were constitutive to the transition from medieval to modern times. Instead of the medieval focus on particularities, the modern world has required and developed a principle of universality. There were many different forms of medieval particularities – territorial, social, legal, conceptual. They were abandoned in the course of the formation of a new world and new order. For the new epoch a new foundational principle was needed. The new, modern world has started its self-formation on the principle of human self-determination (Blumenberg, 1988, Koyre, 1973/1981). In this way the previous theological heteronomy was replaced by the principle of human autonomy which has become the generative principle of core institutions of modern epoch: social contract, legal order, enlightenment project, free scientific inquiry. Within the framework of a new world understood as a human world attention was shifted to individual actors which were seen as the embodiment of the principle of human self-determination. It is only through the instantiation of the principle of human autonomy in ascribing and acknowledging auton-

omy and freedom to every individual actor that the universality of the principle of self-determination can be legitimately claimed. In other words, with modernity individuality has become a universal structure. This is not a contradiction, but a description of a mutual reciprocal relationship between individuality and universality. This relation is indeed a challenge to conceptualize it. Immanuel Kant met that challenge in a way which relates human individuals and human race. When elaborating his *Ideas For a Universal History From a Cosmopolitan World View* (1784) he stated in his second thesis: "In man (as the only rational creature on earth) those natural capacities that are directed to the use of his reason are to be fully developed only in the race, not in the individual (Kant, 1784). Similarly, though in a context of a critique of Hegel's philosophy of right, Karl Marx formulated the essence of man: "Man is the world of men, the state, society." (Marx, 1844/1994: 28)

The way of relating individuality and universality through a constitutive relation between society and individuals is actually the most productive way of conceptualizing that relation. As a matter of fact I would argue that this is a modern solution of that problem which was on the philosophical agenda from the Greek times to scholastic thought.

The profound changes in the world order and in the position of humans in modern times were reflected in different domains – economic, social, political, philosophical. Together these domains have shaped the new epoch as a modern epoch with a different social organisation, but also with a different world view and different anthropological beliefs. The principle of universality has been constitutive for most of them.

Without the principle of universality it would not have been possible to define all human beings as free and equal – as, for example, in Locke's philosophy. "Men being…by nature all free, equal and independent" (Locke, 1690/2010, par. 95). Such an understanding of human beings was not just a symbolic pronouncement - though even in that form it was a great achievement. It has become a principle of organization of political society – which is again a great historical achievement of the modern epoch. Additionally to its political operationalisation the understanding that all human beings are by nature free and equal builds a foundation for the modern legal system - equality before the law being the undisputable basic juridical principle.

The principle of universality is exemplified also in Descartes' inauguration of common sense as an epistemic instance. "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world; for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it… In this matter it is not likely that everybody is mistaken; it rather goes to show that the power of judging well and distinguishing truth from falsehood, which is what we properly mean by good sense or reason, is naturally equal in all men." (Descartes, 1637/1978, p. 7) It is on this assumption that Descartes elaborated a "method of rightly directing one's reason", which is actually the content of his Discourse on the Method.

However, it is important to remember that in spite of his commitment to the universality of reason, Descartes could not ignore the diversity of opinions among people. Following his very well known universalistic statements, Descartes added some sentences to explain the diversity among people, in spite of the supposed equality of common sense. " …the diversity of our opinion does not arise because some men are more rational than others, but only because we direct our thoughts along different ways, and do not consider the same things." (Descartes, ibid). Thus, Descartes drew attention to some neglected aspects accompanying universality claims, or more precisely he pointed out that the universality claims nevertheless presuppose some previous selection of the objects and ways of knowing. Thus, it would be justified to say that universality is not the whole truth of reason.

Another important project of universalization was transformation of a qualitative human activity into common human labour which can be described in quantitative terms and therefore detached from the subjectivity of the working person. "Only pure quantums are commensurable, the comparability of working quantums is therefore dependent on the reduction of all working qualities to common human labour, defined in purely quantitative terms. It is only by doing this that rational savings can be really made. And mechanics is, in essence, an exact science concerned with the comparison of labour effects. Accordingly, it may be said that manufacture is a presupposition of modern mechanics." (Borkenau, 1934/1983: 20)

In his study on *The Transition From Feudal to the Bourgeois World View* (1934), supported by the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt on Main, Franz Borkenau, described by his colleagues as a sincere Marxist, analysed the socio-economic roots of bourgeois patterns of thinking. Marxist theory offered him conceptual and explanatory tools to look for origins of modern thoughts in socio-economic changes that occurred after the dissolution of the feudal order. In other words, Marxist theory sees relations and interdependence where other approaches see presupposed autonomy and independence - be that independence of the individual from society or independence of thought from social being. Though a self-conscious individual cannot exist outside of society, it is possible to ideologically negate or ignore that and again ideologically postulate a kind of auto-poietic autonomy of individual and his/her thinking.

I share the Marxist standpoint in my analysis of the ways in which psychology understands its knowledge production. Therefore I look for roots of knowledge not in isolated ideas or other knowledge but in social being itself. It is there that interests are generated. But it is important to stress that social being itself is symbolically mediated, it is a self-interpreting kind, not an independently existing natural kind. Therefore social being is not isolated from thinking. It is, as Charles Sanders Peirce said referring

to the universe: " it is perfused with signs , if it is not composed exclusively of signs." (Peirce, 1931-58: § 5.448 fn)

Bearing that in mind I continue the reconstruction of social genesis of the quest for objectivity within the context of modern world. The epochal shift from a closed and hierarchical medieval order toward a new infinite cosmic and human order (the title of Koyré's book is very telling indeed *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*, 1957). required changes in all basic concepts. At the same time, the newly developed concepts contributed to further changes in other domains and in general beliefs and values. Concepts describing the physical world also changed – in medieval times Aristotelian qualitative physics reigned supreme while modern physics started in opposition to Aristotelian cosmological and physical conceptions, especially his teleology (Koyré, 1973/1981). With the Newtonian conception of absolute time, space, force and universal laws of motion milestones of the scientific revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries were laid down.

An essential feature of the modern scientific spirit has been quantification (see Michell, 2003). This was part of a general programme of mathematization, i.e. of translation of previous, especially Aristotelian and medieval qualities into quantities, and that in both the natural and the human world. Though there are important classical mathematical conceptions (for example, Pythagorean), and, though there is also a continuity in obsession with numbers, as stressed by Michell (2003), the modern epoch has given this old attitude the scope and status of a quantitative imperative.

The quest for quantification has also served the quest for objectivity. The appeal of quantitative language derives from its promise of taming the subjective, personal, local, in favor of objective, impersonal, universal as superior values. The quantitative language is suited to deal in an impersonal way and on a universal scale with human capabilities, needs, activities, relations as well as with natural phenomena. Additionally, quantification allows dealing with great number of items in a uniform way – «quantification is a technology of distance…reliance on numbers and quantitative manipulation minimizes the need for intimate knowledge and personal trust. Quantification is well suited for communication that goes beyond the boundaries of locality and community» (Porter, 1995: IX).

In this way, quantification was seen as a tool of overcoming the local and particular, on the way to the universal. Again, it should be remembered that universality in its different shapes, though favored by many powerful means, has its other side. For the sake of understanding the function of universality in modernity, it is important to take that other side into account.

In his reconstruction of the hidden agenda of modernity, Stephen Toulmin (1990) examined the forgotten or neglected aspects of the modern universal rationality and demonstrated that consequences of that neglect are quite dramatic – its logic has led to no lesser disaster than wars. He summarizes the dynamics which shaped the seventeenth century and also determined the most important phases of the later history in the following way: "Whatever sorts of problem one faced, there was a supposedly unique procedure for arriving at the correct solution. That procedure could be recognized only by cutting away the inessentials, and identifying the abstract core of 'clear and distinct' concepts needed for its solution. Unfortunately, little in human life lends itself fully to the lucid, tidy analysis of Euclid's geometry or Descartes' physics. (Toulmin, 1990: 200)

Nevertheless, history witneses that there have been relentless attempts to subject subjectivity to 'clear and distinct' concepts and accompanying disciplining praxis. Even more, both concepts and praxis have been justified with reference to the supposed best interests of the subjects themselves. For that purpose important semantic work has also been necessary - objectivity has become desirable as a kind of protection against the turmoils of subjectivity. At the same time objectivity has been understood as a way to deal with great numbers and distances – which were already on the agenda of the rising modernity and saturated with connotations of democratization. Thus, the quest for objectivity has its origin in social morality, as argued by Theodor Porter (1995).

Consequently, it is important to bear in mind that the pursuit of objectivity in sciences is part of a more general social project. In one word, Porter argued, not science but social morality is the birthplace of the quest for objectivity - contrary to the widespread belief. Relying on these insights by Porter, it would be fruitful, in my view, to reflect on their further consequences. As beliefs in the origin of the quest for objectivity in science are strongly defended by the sciences themselves, Porter's revision of the sources of the quest for objectivity must have implications for our understanding of science. Consequently, the adoption and representation of the quest for objectivity by sciences as their immanent quest is a misrepresentation of the social processes and an inadequate self-understanding of the science.

In epistemological terms, this is a very egocentric view – indeed, a view far away from the supposed pursuit of objectivity. It is not surprising then to claim that science functions as an ideology (Habermas, 1974) - in its literal sense as a false consciousness and in a broader sense as normalizing and justifying instance, i.e. powerful means of defining the normal and justifying the exclusion and repression of the deviation. Normalizing control is a good example of an ideological achievement. Or, as elaborated already by Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/1985) in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, idolatry of the existing and power is an omnipresent ideology. The supposed commitment of science to objectivity is certainly one of the most powerful ideological tools as it already linguistically suggests disinterest where interests are actually at work.

From the analysis offered here it can be concluded that interest is structurally embedded in a scientific rationality supposedly oriented toward objectivity.

There is another structural dimension of interest in science, embedded in its instrumental attitude toward nature as the object of knowledge. Yet, knowledge acquisition is not only led by the instrumental interest of control. As Habermas (1968/73) has demonstrated in his seminal book *Knowledge and Interest*, instrumental interest is a transcendental condition of the possibility of knowledge of nature, as developed by modern natural sciences. "Conditions of instrumental activity arose contingently during the natural evolution of humankind; but they also link, by transcendental necessity, our knowledge of nature with the interest in the possible technical control of natural processes… When we regard human being as belonging to the category of tool-making animals, we imply thereby a scheme of both an activity and comprehension of the world" (Habermas, 1973: 49; 55).

Within this framework it is important to refer to Habermas' critique of Marx. Habermas criticizes Marx because he interprets the process of the the self-constitution of humankind merely in terms of labour, understood as the material activity of instrumental operations applied to external nature, and thus abolishes interaction as another form of practice, i.e. interaction as communication motivated by the practical interest in understanding among the members of the community. It is within this broad perspective of the self-constitution of humankind that Habermas claims: the theory of knowledge is necessarily connected with the theory of society, or "a radical critique of knowledge is possible only as a theory of society. This idea is implicated in Marx's theory of society, even if it is not part of the self-understanding of Marx and Marxists." (Habermas, 1973: 9)

Even if we accept Habermas' objection against Marx and Marxists for an inadequate self-understanding, insights on the interdependence of thinking, knowledge and society can be found in analyses of many Marxists. Herbert Marcuse, for example, warned already a half a century ago: there is a logical link between instrumental rationality and dominance: "Not only is its application, but the technique itself is dominance (over nature and over people), methodic, scientific, calculated and calculating dominance. Certain goals and interests of dominance are not just afterwords and imposed from outside on the technique – they are included already in the construction of the technical apparatus itself; the technique is always a socio-historical project, in it it is projected what a society and its dominant interest intend to do with people and things." (Marcuse, 1965/1977: 207-208)

The emancipative outcomes of technique are essential elements of the modern project of progress. These outcomes strengthen the social status of science and serve as justification for further scientification of life. However, the very same technical progress has become also a target of critique, especially in a naturalistic romantic movement which opposed the rationalism of Enlightenment. Marcuse's critique draws attention to a deeper level of construction of technique, where human beings are projected as secondary to technique, as dominated by technique. Due to foundation of technique in scientific knowledge and instrumental interest not only to nature, but also to human beings, it is clear that science itself is at stake in critiques of technique.

To conclude, universality and objectivity of science are not neutral claims - on the contrary, they are very much saturated with interests. The first tasks of ideology critique is to acknowledge that the supposed objectivity of science is obviously an ideological claim. The next task should be directed toward critical examination of the interests themselves. And it is wise to be vigilant - dominance over nature has expanded into dominance over people. External dominance has become internalized. How then can subjected subjects reclaim their freedom?

If psychology is science of subjects, it should play its role in these processes - as it has played in those who has brought about docile subjects adapted to be adjusted..

It is clear, psychology is at stake here in many ways. It can continue ignoring the repression and requiring adaptation at any price or it can change its role and reclaim emancipative tasks.

Psychology as a Science

Psychology as a science was institutionally established in a context characterized by already well advanced processes of modernization - industrialization, urbanization, rationalization, formalization, scientific and technical progress. In a kind of social learning through modeling psychology was supposed to imitate the successful natural sciences – in their methods and goals, but then consequently also in their understanding of knowledge production and science itself. Though there were also defenders of a different psychology (for example, Wundt's Völkerpsychologie, Dilthey´s descriptive psychology, Giorgi´s phenomenological psychology), they remained marginalized or forgotten in the dominant historiography of psychology.

As the dominant historiography of psychology is itself built on a very simple individualistic and empiricistic epistemology, it is no wonder that certain epistemologies prevail among psychological conceptions remembered in the historiography of psychology (see Jovanović, 2010b). Dominant epistemologies are epistemologies of natural sciences constructed on the belief that there is an independently existing reality which can be known by the use of appropriate scientific methods. It is assumed that discovery of the causes of the processes allows for its control and control is a powerful tool for attaining certainty.

Logically speaking attaining certainty presupposes belief in the

deterministic nature of the world. In view of the fact that there are reasons and empirical evidence which contradict such a view, at least as far as the human world is concerned, it is reasonably to accept that there are no logically compulsive reasons to adopt the deterministic view. Despite the fact that there has been a strong tendency - especially over centuries in the modern times - to take determinism for granted not only in the sciences but also as a general world view, it could be concluded that there might be other than logical and empirical reasons to defend the deterministic position.

Stephen Toulmin considered the quest for certainty at the beginning of the modern epoch as a defense reaction against the devastating experiences of religious wars and other dramatic events which had shaken our trust in the world. Once established as a possible solution to catastrophic uncertainties, the quest for certainty has become a generative structure which delivered rules and norms for how to deal with all domains of life - not only nature. Certainty has become imposed even there where by definition no certainty is ever possible - in human actions and in social actions.

Paradoxically enough the consequences of the imposition of certainty were no less dramatic than the reasons which led to its formation. While the original conditions physically endangered human existence, the proposed solution tended to conceptually marginalize or even eliminate human agency. Kurt Danziger has analysed this peculiar eliminative trajectory: " …the determinants of human conduct are now seen in terms fashioned after Newtonian natural philosophy. Hume was a convinced determinist. Human action, he claimed, resulted from the workings of a mental machinery that followed regular and predictable patterns. There was no difference in principle between causality in the physical sphere and causality in the mental sphere. In both cases causal determination involved merely the regular succession of perceived events. No 'hidden powers' could be made responsible for the regularities presented in experience. On the psychological level this meant the elimination of any concept of human agency." (Danziger, 1997: 44)

At a social and societal level consequences were not just conceptual - they turned out to be very material. As critically pointed out by Stephen Toulmin, the logic of modern rationality as a vehicle of pursuing and attaining certainty led to wars as its radical form. What was originally meant as a remedy against the war turned out to be the recipe for it – is it possible to imagine a stronger repudiation of the quest for certainty?

In spite of that, the quest for certainty continued to be acknowledged as a legitimate goal which is then supposed to legitimate means employed to achieve that goal.

On its way to achieve that goal psychology was ready and often also enthusiastic to give up - first the soul, then the mind, and consciousness, and finally any possibility to conceptually preserve human agency.

Such beliefs have shaped a long lasting tradition of naturalism within psychology. "In both naturalism and objectivism there is an assumption that psychological events have fixed natural forms, which a few lucky philosophers and an army of systematic investigators have found and labelled. Thus, to each label there corresponds a fixed natural form[...] Where it is not simply secondhand repetition, naturalistic history tends to [...] suggest that the terms of current discourse have been determined by nature and not by art" (Danziger, 1994: 334 - 335).

The tradition of naturalism and objectivism of modern science in general, and specifically in psychology is closely linked with the dominant status of method in the production of knowledge. The focus has shifted to methods - to the extent that methods have prevailed over subject-matter. It is out of these beliefs that a very strong attitude of methodological imperative or methodolatry, as described by Kurt Danziger (1990), has developed. A rising methodological consciousness at the threshold of modernity was expressed already in Descartes' (1978) writing *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Directing One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, published in 1637.

In spite of its simplicity, there are many striking features in this epistemological model which require a closer analysis: a presupposed reality is subjected to methodical intervention in order to be known, but the influence of that intervention on the knowledge process and result is not acknowledged - quite the contrary, the objectivity of knowledge and truth is claimed. This discrepancy between the ongoing intervention (most clearly in experimentation) and a contrafactual assumption that knowledge products are free of any intervention of subjects should be in itself a sufficient reason to subject that model to a critical examination. But more than just that is at stake.

The striking features of this epistemological model become even more provocative when this model is applied to human sciences, and especially psychology. Epistemic situation is transformed in many ways in human sciences: subject-object relation is actually a subject-subject relation, all methodical capacities of the subject are present at both poles. Formally speaking, if classical epistemological model should be applied under such conditions two options would be possible: either no knowledge claims could be made at all, as the epistemic situation does not fit to the model, or the epistemic model should be changed in order to reflect the specific epistemic situation. I will argue for the second option for the following reason: as the knowledge in human sciences should be for the sake of building human world, epistemic situation should be shaped in such a way as to allow understanding what makes humans subjects in constructing human world, or what prevents them to be subjects. Only in such an epistemic situation would be possible to look for ideological transformation of consciousness

and develop an ideology critique.

Having in mind the goal of revealing interdependence of knowledge and interests behind the supposed objectivity and universality of psychological science. I'll turn to the analysis of epistemic situation in psychology whose outcomes should contribute to my main argument: interests are indispensable for knowledge production. Therefore, a critique of scientific knowledge should include interests too. Only in this way knowledge can serve as a means in emancipative transformation of society.

The domain in which psychology has constructed its subject-matters consists of phenomena which are available in many ways in everyday life activities. Even more, as the most specific domain of psychology belongs to the experiences from the first person perspective, subjects in their role as experiencing and acting subjects and agencies are already implicated in the subject-matter of psychology. However, from this starting configuration different methodological scenarios have been developed in the history of psychology. They encompass a full range from an exclusion of the first person epistemic perspective as a legitimate subject-matter of psychology, on the one hand, to elaborations of the foundational role of psychology among other sciences on the grounds of epistemic benefits of the first person perspective as psychological subject-matter, on the other hand.

As the first methodological scenario, which excludes the first person epistemic perspective, is actually characteristic of natural sciences, an analysis within the framework of psychology has to stress that the subject-matter of psychology belongs to human kinds, and not natural kinds. Thus, this epistemic position is constructed as a mismatch of subject-matter and method, and this mismatch is resolved toward privileging the method. As already said, Danziger has described that attitude as a methodolatry.

The opposite methodological scenario in psychology, which privileges the first person epistemic perspective, has been developed within different theoretical and epistemological frameworks. Nevertheless they share the same basic idea that psychology has a foundational role for other human sciences. The two best known representatives of the foundational thesis are Wilhelm Dilthey and Jean Piaget, who stand for hermeneutic versus naturalistic conception of psychology. This means that foundational thesis can be defended without reference to hermeneutics. A more radical, or stronger foundational thesis requires, however, a hermeneutic approach. Hermeneutic approach is necessary for understanding meaning-making processes which are essential for subject-matter of psychology. "It is the hermeneutic character of the objects of the human sciences that allows for critique. Critique means demonstrating the possibility of different hermeneutic relations. As critique is an interpretive endeavor applicable to issues of a hermeneutic character, it is understandable that the natural sciences do not criticize natural phenomena." (Jovanović, 2010a: 584) By adopting a naturalistic epistemological model, psychology is deprived of conceptual means of a critical science.

Though a defender of a strong, hermeneutic claim of foundational role of psychology Wilhelm Dilthey is hardly mentioned in histories of psychology as the history of psychology is dominated by naturalistic models. Dilthey's project had to complete the task Kant started in laying foundations for natural sciences, i.e. "to lay a foundation for the study of society and history", as it is said in the subtitle of Dilthey's *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. Dilthey's starting point is lived inner experience, as it is experienced by the subject, i.e. the specific domain, experience from the first person perspective, in which psychology constructs its subject-matter. "All science is a science of experience, but all experience has its original constitution and its validity in the conditions of our consciousness […] we lay hold of reality as it is only through facts of consciousness given in our inner experience." (Dilthey, 1983/1988: 72).

Following such argumentation Dilthey comes to psychology as "the first and most basic special science of the mind" (Dilthey 1983/1988: 95). But as Dilthey was already familiar with a psychology oriented toward natural science, it was clear to him that it was necessary to develop another kind of psychology that could fulfill the expected foundational task. "Psychology can solve the problem of such a fundamental science only to the extent that it stays within the boundaries of a descriptive science" (Dilthey 1983/1988: 95).

Dilthey's project of descriptive psychology presupposed a different subject-matter and different method comparing to existing naturalistic explanatory psychology. "The object of descriptive psychology as a *Geisteswissenschaft* was immediate lived experience *(Erlebnis)* given as a structural system *(seelischer Zusammenhang)* which cannot be reconstructed from isolated elements connected by hypotheses. *Erlebnis* is a distinct form of experience in which there is no distinction between the experiencing subject and the experienced. Our epistemic attitude to Erlebnis is understanding. *"Die Natur erklären wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir"*/We explain the nature, we understand the psychic life. (Dilthey 1974: 144)" (Jovanović, 2010b: 316).

In summary, Dilthey epistemologically emancipated psychology from its role of imitating natural sciences and argued for its uniqueness which establishes it as a foundational science for sciences of history and society, i.e. *Geisteswissenschaften*. It should be repeated once more that, surprisingly or not, history and historiography of psychology preferred the role of imitation instead of foundation.

Having that in mind I turn to Piaget's position as another version of foundational role of psychology. His argumentation in favour of a central position for psychology among all other sciences is also derived from the specificity of its subject-matter, though his understanding of the subject-matter of psychology is very differ-

ent from Dilthey. For Piaget (1970) "knowledge of the psychological foundations of a notion has implications for the epistemological understanding of this notion." (Piaget, 1970: 5). Thus, in Piaget's view, psychology can transform traditional epistemology as a branch of philosophy into scientific epistemology which is constructed as a genetic epistemology. "Genetic epistemology attempts to explain knowledge, and in particular scientific knowledge, on the basis of its history, its sociogenesis, and especially the psychological origins of the notions and operations upon which it is based....The first principle of genetic epistemology, then, is this – to take psychology seriously." (Piaget, 1970: 1; 9)
Analysing Piaget's claims about the foundational role of psychology it is clear that it is possible to defend a foundational thesis while remaining within the framework of naturalism.Even more, Piaget has salvaged the epistemic agency as he understands knowledge to be an active process of construction. This active, operational side of knowledge is indisputable. But knowledge, or more general mental activity is an intentional activity, it is directed toward objects, it is about objects. Piaget has no concept in his epistemology to conceive of that other indispensable dimension of mental activity.

The epistemic subject is not just active, as Piaget constructed it, it is essentialy meaning-making. "It is only this meaning-making subject that can make sense of the world in which it lives. Interpretations given by human subjects are not arbitrary supplements that can be added to or subtracted from the human world; they are constitutive of the human world. And it is only this meaning-making subject that lives according to norms and can subject the world to critique. Therefore, it is logically necessary to assume a hermeneutic approach aimed at grasping meaning (of intentions, activities, discourses, objectified works) as a precondition for a critical approach." (Jovanović, 2010a: 580)
Without such conceptual tools psychology is deprived of the possibility to take a critical attitude toward domains where it constructs its subject-matter, which is the human world - and toward psychological representations of that world as its inherent part..

Knowledge and Interest in Psychology

The past and the history of psychology could teach us that there are many ways that phenomena belonging to or associated with the domain of psychology could be approached, researched, explained or interpreted. This very fact calls for an analysis that will include more than just scientific knowledge. It is reasonable to assume that there must be driving and directing forces behind scientific choices - as it is the case with the individual psychic functioning too. An additional reason to go behind the knowledge stems from the fact that different scientific positions have different social status - some being main stream, while others are on the margins or even repressed, forgotten. It would not be very plausible to assume that these social differences are consequences of the differences in respective cognitive achievements only.

Given the fact that some knowledge of psychic phenomena is available to any subject from the privileged epistemic position of the first person, psychological positions can be differentiated with regard to their attitude toward that domain of experience. In this way it is reasonable to ask what lies behind the choice to respect or to ignore the subject's experience.

If we take the paradigmatic cases from the history of psychology -- namely introspective or phenomenological psychology, on the one side, and behaviorism, on the other side, then we can realize that these are not just different psychologies but different world views and different anthropologies. They are certainly not just neutral, objective accounts of the "reality over there". They rather construct the very reality – in the first case as belonging to human kinds or, in the second case, as belonging to natural kinds. These accounts are not two pictures of the same reality, they are very different realities as much as a self-conscious agency is different from a falling stone.

The analysis of the social origin of the quest for objectivity has shown that objectivity itself is a powerful interest derived from interests of social morality. Relying on the same analysis it can be understood that there is a link between the quest for objectivity and the quest for control. Or more precisely, objectivity itself already establishes a relation, an attitude which exercises control over the "objects" as it excludes the possibility of reciprocal interaction of subjectivities. There is no room for subjectivity either in the position of the subject of knowing or in the position of the object of knowing. In the case of human and social sciences objectivity means translation or reification of subjectivity at both sides of epistemic situation. It is indeed a strange claim - the most reliable way to know subjectivity is to deprive of it -both the subject and the object of knowing. But this claim is actually a performative claim directed toward control - it describes a procedure of controlling subjectivity by excluding it. Of course, these cognitive procedures are already practical programmes how to deal with human subjects.

It is easy to recognize that such an attitude prevails within psychology – in its theorizing, in its dominant research practice. Control is assumed as a legitimate goal and procedure. It is justified with reference to objectivity – it secures and serves objectivity of knowledge. In this way it is meant that it has no other function but to serve objectivity only. But after the disclosure of social interest behind objectivity, control within psychology cannot remain isolated from that broader social context. In other words, its function in promoting and strengthening the culture of social control cannot be ignored - and should not be exempted from critique.

In order to be able to fulfill that critical task psychology needs some profound changes - in its understanding of its subject-matter, in its methodological orientation, in its commitments. To con-

struct the subject-matter in the domain of human kinds instead of imposing natural kinds on human kinds is the first step. It is not possible to know the self-interpreting animal, i. e. humans (Taylor, 1985) by excluding, for the sake of objectivity, their self-interpreting capacities. It is not possible to know intentionality by researching causality. Meaning cannot be observed, it requires understanding. And understanding is not a monological introspection, but the construction of a relation between a sign and signified for an interpreting agency which is a member of a community using signs as means of communication and as tools of thinking, feeling, acting.

For these changes within psychology to be possible it would also be necessary to acknowledge that interest, specifically an interest in understanding, is not an obstacle that should be removed from the knowing process. Understanding intentions of subjects, understanding the meaning of expressions - linguistic or artistic ones – is a condition of possibility of knowing of interpretive and self-interpretive activities and actors. Understanding meaning cannot be replaced by establishing causal relations. Interest for understanding is not interchangeable for interest in control that prevails in psychological research and theorizing. Understanding cannot be achieved if it is not set and acknowledged as a goal. But the teleology of understanding is not an external goal, it redefines the whole epistemic situation. The epistemic situation oriented toward understanding is different in every single aspect Thus the interest in understanding is the condition of possibility of knowing subject-matters that belong to the domain of human kinds, i.e which require interpretation of meaning in order to be identified. This interest in understanding in a research epistemic situation has its foundations in the interest for understanding as constitutive for practical life. The interest for understanding is obviously indispensable for any common activity. Some shared understanding is necessary for the reproduction of society. That interest also includes understanding other interests in so far as other interests are discussed or negotiated. Even the prevailing interest for control is not exempted from a necessity to be understood - regardless whether it is for the sake of improvement of control or its critique.

In the same way as the dominant culture in psychology, the culture of control, has been part of a more general project of control, any alternative project would require transformations in many domains. But without psychology that project cannot be accomplished – we have learned that lesson many times in history. However, psychological knowledge is necessary, but not sufficient. First of all, psychology needs to change in order to be able to be part of a broader change. For example, in order to be able to resist temptations and pressures of commodification it needs to make the conditions of commodifications "its own object of study so that it analyses them from a position that will also change them" (Parker, 2009). We could learn from Marx that commodification is a general process which includes also transformation i.e. reification of subjectivity. Commodification of psychology as science is part of the same process. By self-critical reflecting on its own commodification psychology could lay foundations for critique of conditions of commodification. A change from acceptance and reproduction of commodification to its questioning would be the first step in changing it.

Different conditions for ensembling social relations toward human beings have to be a common achievement for which mutual understanding is indispensable. At the core, whatever other goals might be, mutual understanding is their condition of possibility. But, conditions of possibility of understanding include much more than just command of linguistic and hermeneutic skills. Their origin is the same as the origin of the essence of human being, i.e. social relations. Vygotsky has convincingly shown that "all the higher functions originate as actual relations between human individuals" (Vygotsky, 1960/1978: 57). More generally, Marx resolved the human essence: "In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relationships" (Marx, 1845/1888/1994: 100) It is in and through social relations that knowledge is constructed and in these relations interest are articulated.

Thus, to build a different historical "human essence" it is necessary to change social relationships. Psychology can contribute to that by including them in its own object of study, instead of ignoring them or translating them into individual psychological matter. Naturalization and psychologization have proved to be powerful ideological means to prevent any idea of change. But at the same time they speak for the force of discursive means.

After discursive turn in human sciences it is necessary to acknowledge that discourse is itself a powerful practice. Interpretation and change of the world are not and cannot be separated – they are intrinsically linked. Interpretation is implicated in any change at the same time as change is implicated in any interpretation. To interpret psychology differently is not enough to change the world, but a liberated world certainly needs a different psychology. Both another world and another psychology are necessary.

References

Blumenberg, H. (1966/1988) *Der Prozeß der theoretischen Neugierde Dritter Teil von Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* [The Process of Theoretical Curiosity. Third Part of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age]. Frankfurt/M.:Suhrkamp.

Borkenau, F. (1983 [1934]. *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerli chen Weltbild.*[The Transition from Feudal to the Bourgeois World View] *(Prelazak s feudalne na građansku sliku sveta)* (O. Kostrešević, D. Basta et.al., trans. into Serbian). Beograd: IC Komunist. / references in the text are to the Serbian translation/

Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1997). *Evolutionary psychology: A primer.* Retrieved May 3, 2011 from http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/

research/cep/primer/html

Danziger, K. (1990). *Constructing the subject. Historical origins of psychological research.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Danziger, K. (1994). Generative metaphor and the history of psychological discourse. In D. Leary (Ed.). *Metaphors in the history of psychology* (pp.331-356). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Danziger, K. (1997). *Naming the mind. How psychology found its language.* London: Sage.

Descartes, R. (1978). Discourse on the method. In E. Anscombe and P. Th. Geach, (Eds. and Trans.), Descartes. *Philosophical writings* (pp. 5 -57). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing. (Original work published 1637)

Dilthey, W. (1957). Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie [Ideas on a descriptive and analytical psychology]. In W. Dilthey, *Die gestige Welt: Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens. Gesammelte Schriften:* Bd. 5. [The spiritual world: Introduction to the philosophy of life. Collected papers: Vol. 5] (pp. 139–240). Stuttgart, Germany: Teubner. (Original work published 1894)

Dilthey, W. (1959). *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Gesammelte Schriften:* Bd.1 [Introduction to the human sciences. collected papers: Vol. 1]. Sstuttgart, Germany: Teubner. (Original work published 1883)

Gadamer, H.-G.(1960). *Wahrheit und Methode* [Truth and method]. Tübingen, Germany: J.C. Mohr.

Giorgi, A. (1970). Psychology as a human science. New York : Harper & Row.

Giorgi, A. (2009). *The descriptive phenomenological method in psychology*. Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh, PA.

Habermas, J. (1968/1973). *Erkenntnis und Interesse*. [Knowledge and interest] Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Habermas, J. (1974). *Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie*. [Technique and science as ideology] Frankfurt/M.:Suhrkamp.

Jovanović, G. (2010a). The conditions of possibility of critical psychology, *Theory & Psychology*, Vol. 20 (4), 569-592.

Jovanović, G. (2010b). Historizing epistemology in psychology. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, Vol. 44 (4): 310-328.

Kant, I. (1784). *Ideas for a universal history from a cosmopolitan world view*. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/universal-history.htm. Retrieved, May 15, 2011t

Koyre, A. (1957). *From the closed world to the infinite universe*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.

Koyre, A. (1981). *Naučna revolucija* [Scientific revolution] (M. Šafarik, trans. into Serbian). Beograd: Nolit. (Original work published 1973).

Locke, J. (2010). *Second Treatise of Government*, Edited, with an Intro duction, by C.B. McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. The Project Gutenberg eBook Second Treatise of Government, www.gutenberg.org. eBook 7370 . Retrieved November 15th, 2010. (Original work published 1690).

Marcuse (Markuze), H. (1977). *Kultura i društvo*.[Kultur und Gesellschaft] (O. Kostrešević, trans. into Serbian). Beograd: BIGZ. (Original work published 1965).

Marx, K. (1994). *Selected writings*. (L. Simon, ed.) Indianopolis: Hackett Publishing. (Original works written 1844, 1845).

Michell, J. (2003) 'The quantitative imperative: positivism, naive realism and the place of qualitative methods in psychology', *Theory & Psychology* 13(1): 5-31.

Parker, I. (2009). Critical psychology and revolutionary Marxism. *Theory & Psychology*, 19, 71–92.

Peirce, C. S. (1931-1958). *Collected papers*. (Ch. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, eds.) Vol. 5. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Piaget, J. (1970) *Genetic epistemology*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Porter, Th. (1995) *Trust in numbers: the pursuit of objectivity in science and public life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Taylor, C. (1985). *Human agency and language*: Philosophical papers I. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. (1995). *Philosophical arguments*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L (1992). The psychological foundations of culture. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmodes & J. Tooby (Eds.), *The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture* (19-136). Ocford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (2005). Conceptual foundations of 4 evolutionary psychology. In D. Buss (Ed.), *Handbook of evolutionary psychology* (pp.5-67). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1960/1978). *Mind in society. The development of higher psychological processes.* (M. Cole et al., eds.) Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Wundt, W. (1900–1920). *Völkerpsychologie*, vol. 1–10. Leipzig: Engelmann.

Acknowledgment: This paper is part of a research project 179018, funded by the Ministry of Education and Science, Republic of Serbia.

thomas teo

Reconstructing the Critique Of Ideology: A Critical-Hermeneutic and Psychological Outline

By Thomas Teo, York University

Abstract *In this paper I outline a program for a critique of ideology (IC) that can be transformed into a psychological* gnothi sauton *(know thyself). Using Marx's metaphor of a* camera obscura *as a starting point for my theoretical reconstructions, I reinterpret the* Critique of German Ideology *as the source for social epistemologies. Various, apparently incongruous texts focusing on social categories such as class, gender, ethnicity, culture, modernity, and so on, can then be reinterpreted as belonging to the genre of IC. After this reconstructive move, I focus on human subjectivity and discuss how a broad concept of IC may contribute to psychological knowledge and practice. This entails an analysis of ideology-critical texts from the perspective of subjectivity, which involves an exploration of the ways in which a reflection on one's own social situation contributes to "know thyself" and to social change. On the background of a critical-psychological project, I concludethat an insight into one's own dependencies, biases, and prejudices, and into contradictory social realities – in which our subjectivities are embedded – can call us to act against various forms of oppression.*

The Problem

In this argument, I develop an outline for the *subjectivization* of the critique of ideology (ideology critique, IC). By the term *subjectivization* I do not mean the application of psychological concepts in order to understand ideology or IC, but I rather follow the question of what IC means from the perspective of an agentic subject. From this distinctly non-Freudian perspective I provide a psychological interpretation of IC. This interpretation follows Holzkamp's (1983) notion of a *psychology from the standpoint of the subject* without sharing the conceptual network developed in this program. Indeed, if one asks for a historical foundation, one could go back to the classical Greeks, who coined the slogan of *gnothi sauton* (know thyself).

Knowing yourself in this perspective does not imply focusing on the *false consciousness* of others, but rather looking at the limitations of one's own *horizon* (Gadamer, 1960/1997). Gadamer, who borrowed the term from Nietzsche and Husserl, introduced the term *horizon* to refer to everything that can be seen from a particular perspective. By *horizon* I mean the conscious and unconscious extent of one's epistemological and ethical-political perspective. Already in Gadamer's writings the term had a normative connotation: Having "no horizon" is not as good as having a horizon, and having a narrow horizon is not as desirable as having an expanded horizon. Because I do not think that it is possible for an adult person to have no horizon, the focus is indeed on the breadth and depth of one's perspective.

Normatively, from the perspective of an agentic subject, the goal would be to deepen and broaden one's horizon in order to develop a more extensive understanding of the social world, which would set the foundation for a better praxis. This assumption is based on the notion that a person with a broader and deeper horizon is able to contextualize various other perspectives and practices. It should be mentioned that Gadamer talked about the "right horizon of inquiry" (p. 302) and I suggest that various critical traditions are excellent candidates for such a horizon. Finally, I suggest that an extension of one's own horizon does not follow a linear or even a dialectical path but rather a path of search, failure, and rescue -- a journey exemplified by the story of Odysseus. In this sense, a self-reflection regarding one's own ideological limitations is not straightforward but rather a rhizomatic odyssey (see also Teo, 1998).

From such a perspective one can argue that history has demonstrated that social reality is more complex than was analyzed 150 years ago. In addition, one cannot and should not neglect the developments in the critical social sciences in the last 40 years. The question remains regarding which concepts should be integrated into an IC, which ones should be left out, and how does one develop a coherent theoretical system. The present outline

will not discuss a theory-based system of IC but rather avoids this task by centering on the perspective of the subject. From such a standpoint a conceptual, theoretical system is less relevant than concrete stepping-stones that help broaden and deepen one's horizon. Admittedly, it may turn out that some of these stones may be ideological themselves but this cannot be determined a priori. Thus, I give *various* traditions of critical thought the benefit of the doubt in suggesting that there is something to be learned from them for "my" own subjectivity.

Regarding a *reconstruction* of Marxist IC, I am inspired by two approaches that promise a heuristic engagement with the material. First, I am guided by Habermas (1976), who in his reconstruction of historical materialism, distinguished between restoration (restoring the original theory), renaissance (renewal of a tradition), and reconstruction. For the purpose of my argument (IC from the perspective of an agentic subject) a restoration would be too limited, and a renaissance would be unnecessary. Instead, in my view, the most appropriate approach is a reconstruction that analyzes IC with the goal of synthesizing something new. This is done in order to achieve one of the original theoretical goals of IC. It is based on the belief that IC needs a reconstruction because it has not realized its potential from a psychological point of view.

I am also guided by Derrida's (1993/1994) *Specters of Marx* that provide a *hauntological* reading of Marxist theory, a reading that looks at the specters that are haunting Marx, but also at all social scientists who attempt to follow in his footsteps. Derrida emphasized that Marx's texts show an "irreducible heterogeneity" (p. 33) and quoted Marx as famously saying: "What is certain is that I am not a Marxist" (p. 34). Marx (1983) and Engels pronounced in the *Communist Manifesto*: "all that is solid melts into air" (p. 207) – including their own theories. But Derrida also underlined in his reading of Marx one aspect that is relevant for my interpretation: "few texts in the philosophical tradition, perhaps none, whose lesson seemed more urgent today, provided that one take into account what Marx and Engels themselves say … about … their intrinsically irreducible historicity" (p. 13). Derrida argued (and I agree) that Marx was self-reflexively aware of the historical situatedness of his own ideas.

In terms of *ideology critique*, more current theoretical concerns regarding Marx's notion of *false consciousness* have been expressed. I am aware that IC has become problematic in critical thought with poststructuralists and especially with Foucault (2000, p. 119), who argued that ideology is a useless concept because it is in opposition to truth (and postmodernists no longer believe in truth), because it refers to a subject (and poststructuralists no longer believe in a subject), and because it is secondary to the material determinant (which clearly is too simple). My solution to this problem is that false consciousness indeed no longer requires Truth, but is based on the notion of a narrow and shallow horizon; that a narrow horizon (or consciousness, if one prefers) is experienced (often in hindsight) as a feature of "my" person, and as such, is of interest to psychology; and that a narrow horizon is not *determined* by economy but *embedded* in cultural-historical and political-economic realities.

Ideology Critique and Beyond

Historicity also means acknowledging that the "critique of ideology" has a long tradition in Western philosophy. Plato (427-347 BCE) made the distinction between appearance and essence in his *Allegory of the Cave* that ranks among the best-known accounts regarding the problems of knowledge (Plato, 1997, *Republic*, Book VII). Yet, false consciousness (the focus on appearances) in this narrative is a problematic concept from a critical perspective. The story has an elitist meaning because many of "us" will remain ignorant whereas *Truth* can only be embraced by a few. From a psychological perspective, it is easy to embrace the notion that "they don't get it, but I do; I embrace Truth, and in embracing Truth I will be persecuted." I should also mention, as is well known, that Plato was endorsed by Christians, who reconstructed the person who escaped the cave as Jesus Christ. In a theory of ideology critique from the perspective of agentic subjectivity one has to be alert towards tendencies to dismiss persons who have not embraced one's horizon as having a false consciousness and who need to be converted, or as in the past, even eliminated.

Aristotle (384-322 BCE) devised tools for what we would now call scientific thinking in philosophy, an approach that was predominant in Western thought until the rise of empiricism (see Aristotle, 2001, *Organon*). There still exist studies in psychology that point out that individuals do not display correct syllogistic thinking (see Wetherick, 2002). Ideology critique from this perspective means a critique of the lack of rigorous scientific thinking in the world that needs to be overcome through scientific education. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in his *Novum Organon* introduced the well-known *Idols of the Mind* that refer to biases in knowledge due to the philosophical system we endorse, seductions by language, cognitive biases that we have as humans, and biases that are rooted in personal preferences (Bacon, 1965). A critique of ideology would involve pointing to these biases.

What distinguishes Marx from such reflections, and the reason why one can argue that Marx introduced a paradigm shift into the discussion of false consciousness, is that Marx developed the idea that our *social situatedness* leads to systemic biases and proposed a mechanism for these biases. That our mind has distorted views of the social world (as in optical illusions) and works upside down as in a *camera obscura* (Marx & Engels, 1845/46/1958) is not a matter of cognition but of social embeddedness (see Teo, 2001). False consciousness belongs to society, divided into classes, but also to the individual because the consciousness of a single individual is in connection with the whole of society and part of the whole of society. On the subjective level it means that "my" mind has distorted views of the social world and "my" social situated-

ness leads to biases. It should also be mentioned that Marx argued that false consciousness has consequences in preventing social justice and that a critique of ideology enables us to do something about this when we commit to praxis.

In terms of a mechanism, Marx argued that societal and personal consciousnesses have economic roots and life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life. Because the ideas of the ruling class are always the ruling ideas, "morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of the mind, thus no longer retain the appearance of independence" (Marx, 1983, p. 170). This famous formulation suggests that a superstructure consisting of forms of social consciousness rises above an economic foundation. The mind changes and develops historically, with production (labor) being the carrier of this development.

For Marx, the starting point for all *social epistemologies* is that social knowledge (including knowledge in the social sciences) depends on social interests, in his case, in the interests of an economic class. Marx did not provide a general method in order to establish this argument but rather introduced a general heuristic. With this heuristic he challenged in the first step traditional accounts of human nature, for example in the *German Ideology,* or traditional accounts of the establishment of value and surplus value in *Das Kapital* (Marx, 1867/1962); and in a second step he provided alternative views on the same subject matter. His alternative ideas were intended to explain what traditional theories explained but also what they could not explain.

Marx focused on class bias in his social theory. But since Marx many more strands of critical thought have influenced what one could label a critique of dominant ideology, extending what it means to argue that social categories influence knowledge. This ideology-critical function cannot only be shown for critical–theoretical reflections, but also for texts from feminism and postcolonialism, all of which have added new reflexive dimensions to the critique of ideology. Even French postmodern thinkers, despite their own opposition to Marx, can be reinterpreted as belonging to an extended family of IC.

Labor and Beyond

For Marx, labor (production) was the central category in order to understand historical development, society, and even the consciousness of the individual. Yet, later theories have advanced the notion of ideology critique, going beyond the core concept of labor. *Critical theory* was developed by German philosophers and social scientists in the 1920s at the Institute for Social Research. Horkheimer (1937/1992) in the groundbreaking prewar article *Traditional and Critical Theory* argued that traditional theory (by which he meant a positivist theory that applied logic, mathematics, and deduction for the assessment of its ideas) was ideological in hiding the *social* function of science, the *social* formation of facts, and the *historical* character of research objects. As an alternative he proposed critical theory that would relativize the separation of individual and society, and reject the separation of value and research and of knowledge and action. As the social purpose of critical theory, Horkheimer recommended the reasonable organization of society that should meet the needs of the whole of society.

Whereas pre-war critical theory was indebted to a Marxist orthodoxy, post-war critical theory was critical of all forms of totalitarianism and authoritarianism, including the Soviet version, as well as of the Enlightenment project. Using a Kantian organization of the subject matter, Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/1982) criticized epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics as they developed in modernity. One of their main epistemological theses was that myth was already a form of enlightenment and that enlightenment fell back into myth. The authors used positivism as an example of how enlightenment fell back into a mythology itself. In their ethical ideology critique they argued that Kant is less representative of moral thinking in modernity than Nietzsche and De Sade. Enlightened individuals who succeed in this society would judge Kant's categorical imperative as ridiculous and would have a better spokesperson in De Sade's goals of self-preservation, self-interest, and personal pleasure regardless of the costs to others. Their aesthetic ideology critique targets mass culture as something that is consumed rather than experienced and deplores the transformation of art into a market commodity.

The final transformation of the labor paradigm occurred in critical theory with Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) who belongs to a second generation of critical theorists. Habermas (e.g., 1984) moved away from purposive-rational action (under which he subsumed labor) to the communication paradigm (interaction). As he pointed out, liberation from hunger (an economic issue) is not identical with the liberation from humiliation (a communicative issue). Such a reinterpretation was and is significant to many "new" social movements where oppression is not necessarily derived from the economic sphere but from the sphere of representation and the sphere of recognition (e.g., the gay and lesbian movement). Any current critique of ideology must include the domain of interaction in its conceptualization.

Psychologists have included ideological-critical studies, especially in the field of critical psychology. For example, Klaus Holzkamp (1972) argued in the late 1960s that the idea that the individual is concrete, while society is perceived as an abstraction, is ideological, that focusing on technical relevance (rather than focusing on liberation) is ideological, and that working for the powerful in society leads to those ideological biases. Ideology critique combined with praxis was advanced in Latin America with Paulo Freire (1997) who introduced *conscientization* as a tool of *deideologization*. This would allow for the oppressed to learn to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions,

and to take action against oppression. Problematization would enable a questioning of the existing order, the status quo, and the "normal," while at the same time considering alternatives.

Ignacio Martín-Baró (1994) endorsed many of Freire's ideas and contributed to deideologization by suggesting that truth should not be reached by learning from North America but by learning from the oppressed. Psychologists need to look at psychosocial processes from the perspective of the dominated, educational psychology from the perspective of the illiterate, industrial psychology from the perspective of the unemployed, and clinical psychology from the perspective of the marginalized. For the Jesuit priest, ideology critique entailed a shift away from calling atheism a sin -- but rather Martín-Baró underlined that poverty was a sin, or to be more precise, the conditions that lead to poverty are sinful. It should also be mentioned that the primacy of theory in many North American psychological approaches, as well as a focus on well paying clients in professional psychology, was rejected in favor of the primacy of practice and a focus on the oppressed.

But ideology critique should not only target capitalism and imperialism. Any advanced ideology critique must include a critique of patriarchy. The feminist literature and critique of ideology may begin with Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) (1792/1985) who suggested that sexist claims are the result of flawed reasoning (she invoked Rousseau). Feminist thinkers point out that in "science" the masculine is the norm and the feminine is the subordinate "other" (see also Teo, 2005). They are critical of the cognitive and applied consequences of living in a patriarchal society. They argue that we have a false consciousness in assuming that ideas and research about men are universal, and point out that theories and histories are written in the interests of patriarchy. Accordingly, social embeddedness means living in a patriarchal society, which should lead us to think critically about the association between objectivity and masculinity and ask whether scientific thought is based on masculine discourses, ideals, metaphors, and practices (see Keller, 1985). We should also ask whether psychology is (mis)representing women's experiences and voices and whether psychological theories are gender biased (see Gilligan, 1977). Ideology critique from this standpoint involves an extensive inquiry about the sexist ideologies in psychology in the past and present.

To a certain degree an extension of critical-theoretical, postmodern, and feminist ideas has been provided by postcolonial thinkers, who point to the Western-biased nature of psychological theories and practices. Social embeddedness means that the dominant ideology in the world is the ideology of the West and the construction of inferiority of the Non-West (see Said, 1993; Spivak, 1999). From a critical standpoint this involves an analysis of the ideological ideas of the West regarding the majority world. In psychology, this critique begins with the argument that not only the psychological subject matter is part of a wider historical and cultural context, but the theories that try to capture the subject matter are part of Western theorizing and, thus, must be understood as Western models of human mental life (Teo & Febbraro, 2003). It also challenges the idea that concepts developed in the West can be applied meaningfully to different cultural contexts. Danziger (1997) argues in psychology that the "cultural embeddedness accounts for the taken for granted quality that so many psychological categories possess" (p. 191). Ideology critique needs to address these shortcomings.

Although the French postmodern tradition is not Marxist in an ordinary sense it has been ideological-critical and has more connections to Marx than might appear. Derrida's debt to Marx has been articulated by Derrida (1994) himself and includes his deconstruction of some of the most deep-seated ideas of Western culture. Lyotard (1979/1984) who critiques modern thought includes an explicit rejection of Marxist ideology but his ideas become comprehensible only on the background of Marxist ideas. Most disciplines do not have a *political metanarrative* that suggests that through knowledge humanity could become an agent of its own liberation or that science would relieve humanity of superstition, bondage, ignorance, and oppression and emancipate it into freedom and dignity. Indeed, Marxism had this vision. For disciplines such as psychology the *philosophical metanarrative* of the progress of knowledge and the progressive unfolding of truth was much more important.

The most important figure for psychology is Foucault who provided a critique of established views on the self and was of course a member of the Communist Party of France (see Eribon, 1991). But from a current perspective I see his contributions as extensions of ideology critique. Form a general postmodern perspective, social embeddedness does not only involve class but also a historical time, an endorsement of grand narratives and the loss of their credibility, as well as phallocentrism and phonocentrism. Critical thought emanating from the postmodern perspective has been applied extensively to psychology (e.g., Gergen, 1985) and need not be repeated here.

I would like to add another discourse to the critical tradition, namely Frankfurt's ideas on bullshit and developments from thereon. A core feature of Frankfurt's (1986/2005) definition of bullshit is a lack of concern with truth and an indifference towards reality. Yet, bullshit is not false but phony, a bullshitter is not a person that lies but rather bluffs, and faking things does not mean that the bullshitter gets them wrong. The bullshitter misrepresents what he/she is up to. Although Frankfurt focused on public life, this can also be applied to the human sciences. What comes to mind are, for instance, scientists in the service of the tobacco industry. This leads me to the program of *agnotology*, which has been defined as the cultural production of ignorance (see Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008); in my view, this represents ideology critique in new bottles.

In terms of theoretical consistency it needs to be pointed out that some of the positions that I endorsed as ideology-critical are indeed contradictory to each other. But I do not believe that ideology critique is a fixed system, nor do I believe that it is a system that requires an origin or a primacy or a root. Instead I think that what Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) have described as a rhizome does a better job of capturing the essence of its meaning. They applied the term, borrowed from botany describing root systems, to the development of philosophical thought and the writing of intellectual texts. Accordingly, metaphysics can be understood as something where everything is derived from a single source; modernity as a system with many sources; and postmodernity as a situation where branches grow back into the soil, where old parts die out, and where new branches are formed continuously. A rhizomatic process then seems particularly relevant for human subjectivity that seeks to be critical of ideology. But rather than describing it as a root system I would like to describe this process as a journey, not straightforward to a single destination but laced with difficulties.

Ideology Critique and Subjectivity

Ideology critique in the context of subjectivity has dual meanings for my purposes. First, IC is about reflexivity regarding oneself, which refers to self-reflexivity of the subject, and second it may concern reflexivity regarding the discipline (i.e., the self-reflexivity in the discipline of psychology). For the former, I would like to substitute the metaphor of a rhizome (Teo, 1998) for a more concrete experience, and use Homer's (1961) *The Odyssey*, a core text of Western civilization, as a parable of the search for a more comprehensive ideology critique from the standpoint of the subject. The point is to use Odysseus as a metaphor for search. In contrast, Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/1982) identify Odysseus as a symbol of exploitation and patriarchal society.For instance, they suggest that the enjoyment of art for the ruling classes is only possible on the back of workers -- as illustrated when Odysseus is tied to the mast and listens to the songs of the Sirens while his working sailors must have their ears plugged with beeswax. Certainly, one could accuse these German-speaking authors themselvesof being tied to the mast of elitism.

In my usage of Odysseus, his journey could stand as a parable for the search of a broader and deeper horizon, in this context, regarding ideology critique. The journey involves many different paths, some taken with joy, others forced upon oneself, not knowing where the next step will lead. The only certainty is that Odysseus wants to come home to Ithaca, to a practical usage of IC. I suggest that a better understanding of ideology critique and epistemological peace is possible only after a long turmoil. Thus, Odysseus is the subjective part of the rhizome, which is understood as a network of ideology critiques that contain class but many other categories, some of them mentioned above. Focusing only on class would mean years of captivity on Calypso's island.

Ideology critique is a journey of trial and error. It is likely that one would begin with one's own social situatedness, beit class, gender, or race. But what I suggest is not to stop with one category but rather to use it as a stepping-stone for further explorations. I consider it useless from the perspective of subjectivity to spend time on discussions about whether class or gender should have primacy in this type of reflection. Of course, this does not mean *not* recognizing important conceptual and social nuances that distinguish gender and class. But, ideology critique from the perspective of the subject is about widening and deepening one's horizon about ideology. My assumption is that a wider horizon is a better horizon because it allows for a more complex understanding and for the drawing upon a broader array of sources for one's decisions and actions. Still this might include that a specific decision was wrong, even if it was based on a broader understanding of the complexities of human reality. It should be added that horizon can be understood as a feature of a subject, and even if a person's horizon is limited by cultural-historical and political-economic realities, it is not determined by it. Extending one's horizon includes engaging in a dialogue with oneself, a dialogue with texts, and a dialogue with the *other* and the *Other*.

Each journey has to start somewhere but if one does not want to begin with one's own situatedness, I recommend a journey that involves tradition – the tradition of critical thought in human history. I would suggest reading the classical texts of Marx and Engels who have achieved excellence in the critique of ideology, but I would add the text of "bourgeois" thinkers I. Kant and F. Nietzsche. Kant's critiques of human reasoning and in particular his *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, 1781/1998) laid out a process of investigation that challenged certain unquestioned assumptions. Friedrich Nietzsche's critical studies, for example, his reflections on the history of morality and his questioning of how morality restricts human development (Nietzsche, 1887/1998) laid out a program, critical of any self-misunderstandings. This textual engagement and learning by models of critique would allow for a better understanding of the many ideology-critical texts of the 20th and 21st century.

Regarding reflexivity and the critique of ideology of psychology as a discipline, one cannot avoid Habermas (1967/1988), whose critiques of positivism and of the notion that sciences and technology can themselves become ideologies are still relevant. Habermas's critique of positivism easily applies to the discipline of psychology in its abandonment of self-reflection, in suggesting that the meaning of knowledge is defined by what academic psychologists do, and in its removal of the knowing subject from any reflection. There are exceptions to such an assessment at the margins of the discipline. Morawski (2005) argued that the issue of self-reflexivity has historical groundings in more and less known psychologists. While William James reflected on this issue in the context of the psychologist's fallacy, in which the psychologist assumes the objectivity of his or her own psychological standpoint, Horace Mann Bond showed how one's own

social situation, such as one's own ethnicity or race (researcher or subject), can contribute to the findings of racial inferiority, and Saul Rosenzweig identified experimenter and subject effects during experimentation.

Other cases for the promotion of reflexivity have been proposed by the historian of psychology G. Richards (1996) to whom the concept is central for any historiography and the historian of the human sciences R. Smith (2005). Richards argues convincingly that psychology produces its own subject matter, and that psychological realities are constructed through the discipline of psychology, while Smith makes the case that psychologists always work with unfounded presumptions that can be challenged, or as I would add, need to be challenged in a process of self-reflection. Smith also argues that psychological knowledge of humans changes the subject matter, which follows the concept of the social kind quality of psychological categories and their looping effects (Hacking, 1994).

When it comes to challenging and critiquing the status quo of the discipline of psychology, I recommend a critique of the *context of discovery*. This involves an analysis of why researchers are interested in studying what they study and includes reconstructions regarding underlying cultural, political, economic, and personal interests and identifying or challenging the social origins of hypotheses, concepts, and theories (see also Danziger, 1997). It also includes an analysis of class, race, gender, heterosexuality, ableness, age, and its impact on research hypotheses, methods, and results. Self-reflexivity entails asking why "I" am interested in what I am studying, in my case why I am interested in the critique of ideology in psychology. I would also add that such analyses should include a reflection on the nature of concepts in psychology.

A critique in the *context of justification* involves identifying selective sampling or selective data reporting, as well as the reliability, validity, and objectivity of the concepts and instruments used, or the presentation of correlation as causation, and so on. A critique in this tradition investigates the logic of research. A critique in the *context of interpretation* entails an analysis of the relationship between theory, data and discussion and assesses the quality of the interpretation of data in psychological studies. In such a critique, one would look at how empirical findings of differences are interpreted and at the consequences of interpretations of differences on the Other, the public, or academic discourses (Teo, 2008). A critique involving the *context of practice* would look at the purpose of professional psychological practices in terms of power in society.

The Purpose of Ideology Critique and Praxis

The practice of ideology critique can never be static but must be dynamic, and critical thought needs constant revisions. It took Odysseus many years to return, but ideology critiques do not have an endpoint or a happy ending. Ideology critique from the standpoint of the subject means that "I" have false consciousness -- not "You" have false consciousness (or better, instead of false consciousness, "I" have a limited horizon). Although I suggest that a broad and deep horizon is the *condition for the possibility of meaningful knowledge* but does not guarantee it, the purpose of ideology critique from a Marxist tradition is not idle self-reflection, but rather the development of better ethical-practical activities. This is what the concept of an *agentic subjectivity* refers to. Indeed, Odysseus, the white, "upper class" male adventurer remains a limited figure. However, it would be wrong to accuse him of wasting time in his seemingly endless adventures. From the perspective of subjectivity the search for the extension of one's horizon, for the identification and critique of ideology, is not a vain enterprise. In advancing the critique of ideology as an epistemological project rather than a political-practical project, shortcomings need to be mentioned. Indeed, the extension of one's horizon regarding IC remains "bourgeois" if it is done for the sake of finding only personal peace and "coming home to house and wife."

This perspective must be combined -- in a critical tradition -- with the praxis of changing social reality and establishing social justice. What this means must be spelled out in concrete sociohistorical contexts. The focus here was on advancing the practice of ideology critique but not on a reflection on praxis itself or on how we could establish social justice. However, I believe that an insight into one's own dependencies, biases, and prejudices, an insight into one's ideologies, and into one's existence in contradictory social realities, in which our subjectivities are embedded, is a precondition to act meaningfully against various forms of oppression and are the stepping-stones for a better praxis.

References

Aristotle. (2001). *The basic works of Aristotle* (ed., R. Mckeon). New York: Random House.

Bacon, F. (1965). *A selection of his works* (ed. by s. Warhaft). Toronto: Macmillan.

Danziger, K. (1997). *Naming the mind: How psychology found its language.* London, UK: Sage.

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia* (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1980).

Derrida, J. (1994). *Specters of Marx: The state of the debt, the work of mourning, and the new international* (P. Kamuf, Trans.). New York: Routledge. (Original published 1993)

Eribon, D. (1991). *Michel Foucault* (B. Wing, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Foucault, M. (2000). *Power* (J. D. Faubion, Ed; R. Hurley, Trans.). New York: New Press.

Frankfurt, H. G. (2005). *On bullshit*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1986)

Freire, P. (1997). *Pedagogy of the oppressed* (new revised 20th-anniversary edition) (M. Bergman Ramos, Trans.). New York: Continuum.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1997). *Truth and method* (J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). New York: Continuum. (Original work published 1960).

Gergen, K. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. *American Psychologist*, 40(3), 266-275.

Gilligan, C. (1977). In a different voice: Women's conceptions of self and of morality. *Harvard Educational Review*, 47(4), 481-517.

Habermas, J. (1976). *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Material ismus* [On reconstructing historical materialism]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Habermas, J. (1984). *The theory of communicative action*. Volume 1: Reason and the rationalization of society. Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, J. (1988). *On the logic of the social sciences* (S. W. Nicholsen & J. A. Stark, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Original work published 1967)

Hacking, I. (1994). The looping effects of human kinds. In D. Sperber, Premack, D., and Premack, A. J. (Ed.), *Causal Cognition: A Multi-disciplinary Approach* (pp. 351-382). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Holzkamp, K. (1972). *Kritische Psychologie: Vorbereitende Arbeiten* [Critical psychology: Preparatory works]. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Fischer.

Holzkamp, K. (1983). *Grundlegung der Psychologie* [Foundation of psychology]. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Campus.

Homer. (1961). *The Odyssey* (R. Fitzgerald, Trans.). Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Horkheimer, M. (1992). Traditional and critical theory. In D. Ingram & J. Simon-Ingram (Eds.), *Critical theory: The essential readings*. (pp. 239-254). New York: Paragon House. (Original work published 1937)

Horkheimer, M., & Adorno, T. W. (1982). *Dialectic of enlightenment.* New York: Continuum. (Original work published 1947).

Kant, I. (1998). *Critique of pure reason* (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1781)

Keller, E. F. (1985). *Reflections on gender and science*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). *The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge* (G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1979)

Martín-Baró, I. (1994). *Writings for a liberation psychology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Marx, K. (1962). *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Erster Band) (Marx Engels Werke Band 23) [Capital: Critique of political economy (Volume I) (Marx Engels Works: Volume 23)]. Berlin: Dietz. (Original work published 1867).

Marx, K. (1983). *The portable Karl Marx* (selected, translated in part, and with an introduction by E. Kamenka). New York: Penguin Books.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1958). Die deutsche Ideologie [The German Ideology]. In K. Marx & F. Engels (Eds.), *Werke Band 3* [Works: Volume 3] (pp. 9-530). Berlin: Dietz. (Original work published 1932) (Written 1845/46)

Morawski, J. G. (2005). Reflexivity and the psychologist. *History of the Human Sciences*, 18(4), 77-105.

Nietzsche, F. W. (1998). *On the genealogy of morality: A polemic*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. (Original work published 1887)

Plato. (1997). *Complete works* (ed., J. M. Cooper; assoc. ed., D.S. Hutchinson). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

Proctor, R. N., & Schiebinger, L. (Eds.). (2008). *Agnotology: The making and unmaking of ignorance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Richards, G. (1996). *Putting psychology in its place: An introduction from a critical historical perspective*. New York: Routledge.

Said, E. W. (1993). *Culture and imperialism*. New York: Knopf.

Smith, R. (2005). Does reflexivity separate the human sciences from the natural sciences? *History of the Human Sciences*, 18(4), 1-25.

Spivak, G. C. (1999). *A critique of postcolonial reason: Toward a history of the vanishing present*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Teo, T. (1998). Prolegomenon to a contemporary psychology of liberation. *Theory & Psychology*, 8(4), 527-547.

Teo, T. (2001). Karl Marx and Wilhelm Dilthey on the socio-historical conceptualization of the mind. In C. Green, M. Shore, and T. Teo (Eds.). *The transformation of psychology: Influences of 19th-century philosophy, technology and natural science* (pp. 195-218). Washington, DC: APA.

Teo, T. (2005). *The critique of psychology: From Kant to postcolonial theory*. New York: Springer.

Teo, T. (2008). From speculation to epistemological violence in psychol ogy: A critical-hermeneutic reconstruction. *Theory & Psychology*, 18(1), 47-67.

Teo, T., & Febbraro, A. R. (2003). Ethnocentrism as a form of intuition in psychology. *Theory and Psychology*, 13(5), 673-694.

Wetherick, N. E. (2002). Psychology, psychologism and logic. *Theory and Psychology*, 12(4), 489-507.

Wollstonecraft, M. (1985). *A vindication of the rights of woman*. London: Dent. (Original work published 1792).

bogdan popa

Re-Imagining Non-Domination: Troubling Assumptions in Psychoanalytic Critical Theory

By Bogdan Popa, University of Michigan

Abstract

Psychoanalytic critical theory understands the strong association between the psyche and the social, and theorizes resistance to oppressive norms. Critical theorists such as Adorno and Horkheimer, Iris Marion Young and Jessica Benjamin believe that the imagination of a better society has to confront deep psychological structures of oppression. However, they draw on various psychoanalytic concepts without thoroughly investigating and critiquing the psychoanalytic theories that generated the concepts in the first place. "Paranoia" (Freud), "abject" (Kristeva) and "destruction" (Winnicott) are three examples of psychoanalytic concepts that carry problematic implications for a theory of non-domination. I show that paranoia builds on the view of fascists as repressed homosexuals; that abject presupposes separation from mothers as the only route to healthy child development; and that destruction derives from a model where citizens are modeled on the image of a "perseverating baby" caught in a developmental arrest phase. The goals of the paper are to re-examine the assumptions that inform the aim of social equality, and to suggest an alternative route. A relational theory of non-domination has to understand the complexity of gender development, incorporate the idea that mature dependence is healthy, and re-think the mother-child developmental model.

Psychoanalysis and critical social theory are movements that historically shared a particular type of intimacy: they were both "products of the traumatic and fertile encounter between central European Jewry and the German Enlightenment"; the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute was originally established as a "guest institute" within the Institute for Social Research; and Frankfurt theorists treated Freud on a par with Hegel, Nietzsche and Kant (Whitebook, 1996). Fromm, Reich, Adorno and Horkheimer used psychoanalytic thinking to investigate the circumstances of domination and oppression. After the Second World War, Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* and Habermas' *Knowledge and Human Interests* drew on Freud's and Marx's theories to analyze the deep inequalities of capitalism. Habermas (1972) saw exciting potential within psychoanalysis as "critique of ideology" because it would transform normal social science by bringing self-reflection to its own practices. More recently, Honneth (1996) theorized the struggle for recognition in Western societies drawing on Winnicott's concept of "good-enough mother".

However, many critical theorists use psychoanalysis without thoroughly investigating key assumptions underpinning psychoanalytic theories. Psychoanalytic critical theory is a part of critical theory, yet it refrains from analyzing psychoanalytic concepts. Marx's understanding of critical theory as "the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age" (Fraser, 1989) has to be applied more thoroughly to psychoanalysis. I argue that by importing flawed psychoanalytic concepts social theorists undermine their effort to understand oppressive norms. Flawed premises weaken the psychological force behind social theory. An important strength of psychoanalytic critical theory is that it grasps the strong association between the social and the psychic, without reducing the psychic to the social, nor the social to the psychic. Understanding how norms are internalized and what makes resistance to oppressive social norms possible requires an investigation of both the social and the psychic. I believe that an alliance between psychoanalysis and social theory is in a privileged position to sharply account for various sources of social oppression. Yet, I argue that key psychoanalytical concepts carry troubling assumptions, and any theory imaging resistance to social oppression has to address them. This is an intervention that calls for increased awareness about theorizing the psychological roots of social domination.

Psychoanalysis is a wide and complex field in an on-going

transformation. By systematically investigating human nature, psychoanalytic theories elaborated a vast range of concepts. Sigmund Freud's concept of paranoia described important pathological behaviors and opened exciting theoretical developments regarding unconscious processes. Julia Kristeva's abjection and Donald Winnicott's destruction brilliantly illuminated a range of experiences that captured early developmental processes of human mind. However, in their effort to construct powerful hypotheses about human mind, psychoanalytic thinkers paid less attention to some of their grounding premises. Freud's understanding of paranoia builds on a patriarchal view about women and gay people. Kristeva's abject assumes that separation from caretakers is an irreversible psychological process. Winnicott's theorizing of destruction is underpinned by a highly asymmetrical relationship as a model for escaping domination.

Psychoanalytic critical theory draws on different schools in psychoanalysis, and uses insights from classical Freudianism, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Object-Relations theory. While T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer make use of Freudian theory, I.M. Young draws on Kristeva's Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and J. Benjamin sees herself as a relational theorist. Their critical work imagines strategies of resisting social domination, and mobilizes paranoia, abject and destruction to locate oppression in psychological processes. They believe that the imagination of a better society has to confront deep psychological structures of oppression. They consider that human action is heavily dependent on the child's development, and that prejudices and authoritarianism are generated by psychological abnormality. They take into account relations of power and understand that different people are oppressed in different ways according to their class status.

The Frankfurt School theorists were particularly interested in the psychological conditions and the type of personality that supported the Nazi regime. In *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, and particularly in "Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment," Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) explored the rise of fascism with psychoanalytic tools. They believe that fascism is a reaction of repressed internal desires, and the form by which modern nature rebels against the demands of reason. Like Jessica Benjamin, they believe that not every rebellion is positive, and that a revolt of the repressed might strengthen a system based on domination. Moreover, they claim that paranoia is the symptom that serves the fascists to protect themselves, and that the anti-Semitic projections reflects the fascists' own essence. By stretching the idea of repression to any repressed content, Adorno and Horkheimer argue that fascistic personalities and homosexuals share an "inverted element"; this common symptom makes them particularly susceptible to Nazi ideology. Freud's assumptions about gays and women seep into their critique of domination, and undermine their critical analysis. Like fascists, gays and women cannot hate their father consciously -- they do not go through a "normal" Oedipal development, and would have to repress their hatred of the father as "endless rancor." By incorporating sexist and homophobic assumptions, Horkheimer and Adorno's critique upholds oppressive notions of gender and sexuality.

Like Adorno and Horkheimer, Young (1990) uses psychoanalytic concepts to analyze the source of social oppression. Unlike them, Young wants to articulate a full theory of social justice. Even though skeptical about Kristeva's brand of feminism, Young uses Kristeva's concept of abject to psychoanalytically explain a vast range structural inequality: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. To her, all the groups that experience oppression as groups –blacks, Latinos, Asians, gays, lesbians, disabled, old people and poor people— "occupy" a similar status as despised, ugly and fearful bodies, as a crucial element of their oppression" (Young, 1990, p.142). Different forms of prejudice would thus be explained as being partially generated by fear of the abject. Yet, Kristeva's abject designates any type of exclusion, regardless of its content: fear of rapists, fear of Nazis, and fear of food stem from the same abject. Consequently, if Young's theory borrows Kristeva's concept of abject without qualifications, then any group in Young's theory (including rapists and Nazis) might claim oppression. If oppression lacks clear boundaries and racists are as oppressed as gays, Young's democratic theory is seriously affected. By not explicitly challenging Kristeva's assumptions, Young's theory allows an import of troubling psychoanalytic assumptions.

Unlike Freud, who believes that rationality is needed to control our instincts, Benjamin (1998) thinks that repression is domination. To Benjamin, the Freudian father-son relationship, like the master and slave relationship, is a model that only reverses the victor, but not the pattern of domination. The son's rejection of the father is part of a cycle of domination, which reproduces the idealized authority even in the act of liberation. The son who overthrows the authority of the father becomes afraid of its own aggression, and revolt is followed by guilt and the restoration of authority. Yet, unlike Horkheimer and Adorno, Benjamin explores a second face of domination, which is not located primarily in rebellion and guilt, but in love. Domination is a two-way process, because it is based upon a system involving the participation of those who submit to power, as well as those who exercise it. Domination is not only exercised by the oppressor, but is also exercised by the oppressed. Because women are part of system of domination, they need to recapture agency and see their own contribution to structures of patriarchy. As such, women need to reject "the fantasy of perfect mother," because the idea that mother is perfect "expresses the inability to see the mother as an independently existing subject" (Benjamin, 1988, p.214). In this regard, Benjamin breaks with a Marxist model of domination where domination is primarily located in external factors (ruling class, capitalistic relations of production).

Benjamin claims that a viable alternative to domination can be re-imagined through a reconstructed relationship between the mother and the child. Winnicott's concept of destruction under-

pins Benjamin's theorizing of social non-domination. However, Benjamin's model—the mother-child relationship—has two major flaws. First, the mother-child model is powerfully asymmetric, yet stands as a model for equal relationships. The image of the adult within this model duplicates the image of a "perseverating baby" caught in a developmental arrest phase. Equal relationships among citizens have a distinct complexity, which parts company with the strong asymmetry involved in the mother-child model. In addition, her model presupposes a direct causality between early and adult life. Yet, a more complex understanding of causality would underscore the diverse and multiple paths by which child-rearing influences the life of adults.

What are the implications of my analysis for a theory of non-domination? What should we learn from understanding the limitations of important psychoanalytic concepts? First, a theory of non-domination needs to fundamentally re-think the Oedipus complex to allow for alternatives routes to the healthy development of women and gay people. In this respect, a theory that challenges domination, particularly domination that rests on the "primacy of the phallus," has to take at face value the complexity of the child's motivations and growth. Second, separation from caretakers needs to be conceptualized as a dual process, which involves both dependence and separation. Separation is not an absolute phase of ego formation. Maturation is, in this regard, the capacity to be dependent on parental objects; this dependence is a "mature dependence" (Fairbairn, 1952), where relationships with parents are based on differentiation from parents. Third, the mother-child model is flawed because it presupposes a strong asymmetry. The baby is thoroughly dependent on the mother. Yet, unlike the relationship between the baby and the mother, a relationship among equal citizens presupposes conflict and cooperation, and has a distinct complexity. Relational psychoanalysts have begun to show the way towards a new understanding of the therapeutic setting, which limits the strength of the asymmetry between the caretaker and the receiver of care.

Women, Gays and Fascism

In *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) analyze the historical and social conditions that lead to the rise of Nazism, as well as the features that characterize an authoritarian personality. Although they draw on research based on Freud's clinical descriptions, their work focuses primarily on social phenomena. For them, anti-Semitism, Fascism and Enlightenment are legitimate social objects for psychoanalytic analysis. By heavily using Freud's theory, they aim to construct an ideal-type, a model of a fascistic personality. Freud's particular analysis of Schreber is the theoretical framework on which Adorno and Horkheimer theorize about the fascistic personality. Consequently, Freud's assumptions about homosexuality and women's inferiority become Adorno and Horkheimer's premises in drawing the portrait of the fascist.

The Dialectic of Enlightenment's (2002) key thesis is that the Western reason is "inextricably entangled with domination" (p.218). Repression of internal desires and social domination are at work in Enlightenment, and more generally in the project of Western civilization. In psychoanalytic thought, repression is the operation by which the subject "repels and keeps at distance from consciousness representations (thought, images, and memories) that are disagreeable because they are incompatible with the ego" (Mijolla, 2005, pp. 1481-1482). To Adorno and Horkheimer, fascism is the form taken by the repressed nature to rebel against reason's demands. More specifically, fascism uses the revolt against domination to establish domination, because "it seeks to make the rebellion of suppressed nature against domination directly useful to domination" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002, p.185). Here, Adorno and Horkheimer's psychoanalytic argument is that the revolt of the repressed underpins a system based upon inequality.

Further, following Freud's distinction between a "normal" and a "pathological" projection, they elaborate the notion of "false projection," which represents the core of fascistic personality. The notion of projection is central to Freud's discussion of Schreber.[1] Freud's concept of pathological projection sees it as a particular type of a symptom formation of paranoia; it happens when "an internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing a certain kind of disorientation, enters consciousness in the form of external perception" (Freud, 1911, p.65). For Freud, the source of paranoia is the failure to remove the homosexual tendency (Freud, 1911, p.44). The paranoiac is unconscious about his feelings of hate. He does not know his hatred, and projects it on the environment:

"'I do not love him—I hate him.' This contradiction, which must have run thus in the unconscious, cannot, however, become conscious to a paranoiac in this form. The mechanism of symptom-formation in paranoia requires that internal perceptions—feelings—shall be replaced by external perceptions." (Freud, 1911, p.62)

Like Freud, Adorno and Horkheimer believe that false projection is fundamental to paranoiac's behavior. For the paranoiac, the external world becomes only a construction of the mind, without any checks from external objects or reality. Because of the paranoiac's confusion of inner and outer world, his desire is to control and dominate others. Anti-Semitism is a projective behavior. The fascist is unaware of his hatred towards Jewish people, and projects his own disowned feelings on the Jew. In short, fascism emerges from the desire to dominate and control the objects of fascists' projections.

1 Daniel Paul Schreber was a president judge at the Dresden Higher Regional Court when he suffered a severe breakdown; he spent about thirteen years in mental institutions and wrote a book about his struggle. Freud used the book to show that there is a causal link between homosexuality and paranoia.

Furthermore, for Adorno and Horkheimer, homosexuals and

women cannot hate their father consciously in the Oedipal stages, and do not go through the same developmental trajectory as male heterosexuals. A "normal" Oedipus stage presupposes that men hate their fathers, and gradually understand their repressed feelings. Like Freud, Horkheimer and Adorno believe that women and gays' aggression is not channeled by a male heterosexual route, but by the impossibility of reaching a "normal" Oedipal position. Because they cannot express their hate as men do, gays and women are obedient. Homosexuals fear their hate toward the father, and hate is converted into an urge to destroy:

"The proscribed material converted into aggression is usually homosexual in nature. Through fear of castration, obedience toward the father preempts castration by adapting the conscious emotional life to that of a little girl, and hatred of the father is repressed as endless rancor. In paranoia, this hatred is intensified to a castration wish expressed as a universal urge to destroy. " (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, p.159)

Women and homosexuals share the incapacity to be aware of hate. Women are attracted to, and follow the fascists in their hatred. They are constitutionally obedient to paranoiacs, because they have a similar paranoid element in their psyche. They follow the paranoiac blindly, and feel gratitude towards their persecutor:

"Just as women adore the unmoved paranoid man, nations fall to their knee before totalitarian fascism. The paranoid element in the devotees responds to the paranoiac as to the evil spirit, their fear of conscience to his utter lack of scruples, for which they feel gratitude. They follow the man who looks past them, who does not treat them as subjects but hands them to the operations of his many purposes (…) Their world is inverted..." (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, p.157)

Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that fascism develops from two key psychological routes. First, false projections and paranoia describe the fascist's pathological mind. Repressed hatred is projected to others, in order to control and dominate. Homosexuals repress their hate, and serve as the material for fascistic behavior. Second, homosexuals and women repress their aggression because they do not follow the classical Oedipus. While boys are more inclined to acknowledge their aggression towards their father, women and gay people are more vulnerable to unconscious hatred. As a result, the urge to destroy and the submission to authority are conducive to a fascistic personality. In their attempt to criticize domination and analyze the sources of fascism, Adorno and Horkheimer make use of strong homophobic and patriarchal assumptions. The strength of their explanation is undercut not only by vagueness of their terms, but also by their uncritical use of Freudian analysis. By importing Freud's assumptions about women and gays in their critique, they give support to processes of social domination, which they were critical of. Unlike Adorno and Horkheimer, I believe that domination is not only manifested through repression, but it also emerges when oppressive ideas are incorporated within one's critical theory.

A theory based upon an alliance between the social and the psychological has to re-imagine non-domination on different premises. When they draw on either Freud or Adorno and Horkheimer, critical theorists need awareness about the psychoanalytic implications of oppression. In this regard, the Oedipus explanation has to point towards more complex processes that lead to the acquiring of gender. Relational psychoanalysts have begun to show the way toward multiple and different processes of becoming "man" or "woman." Harris (2000) argues that there is no one developmental outcome, namely a teleological story that ends with having an Oedipal identity. A phenomenon like gender is not a structure, but, rather, "softly assembled" behavioral patterns whose form and stability depend on the context, individual life stories and particular relationships. As such, there is no strong causality leading to a "normal" Oedipus route. If developmental theory is attuned to the complexity of gender formation, then strong dichotomies such as gay-straight, and men-women, are challenged. In consequence, Adorno and Horkheimer's assumption about gays and women is not only false, because gays and women's aggression would not necessarily lead to fascism. Their assumption about a single developmental route – the heteronormative model—is false because it also ignores the multiplicity of developmental routes. The bedrock of classical psychoanalysis—the Oedipus complex—needs to be re-conceptualized to incorporate variability and difference.

Equally, a theory of non-domination has to take at face value the complexity of child's experience of gender and growth. Corbett's (2009) research on boys is important for re-thinking different developmental trajectories affecting gender formation. Like Corbett, I believe that resetting the terms of a psychoanalytic narrative is necessary. The terms of the narrative are set by (a) a married, heterosexual couple (2) gender binary, where masculinity and femininity are each defined by what the other is not (3) the focus on family without taking into account culture (4) anatomy is gender, and viceversa (Corbett, 2009, p.8). Equally, Butler (2004) argues that reconstructed psychoanalytic theory has to move beyond "mother" and "father" as the only positions available for caretaking roles. A new understanding of the gender formation challenges heteronormativity, and shows that various identifications, fantasies and behaviors do not fall within the limits of a classical framework. By re-interpreting *Little Hans*, Corbett (2009) argues that the Ur-boy of psychoanalysis, Hans, is part of a web of rivalry, aggression, dependence and desire left undertheorized by Freud. By challenging a theory underpinned by the primacy of the phallus, a more flexible understanding of gender illuminates the interplay of identifications, desire, and mutual recognition, which constitute its formation. A more flexible idea of gender seeks "to establish relations with others outside a dynamic of domination" (Corbett, 2009, p.49).

Yet, by strongly focusing on theory of gender formation, a theory of non-domination does not have to overlook class domination. Processes of gender formation are complexly intertwined with material realities of class. Class assumptions underpin any process of "acquiring" a gender, while particular assumptions about gender structurally define class positions. The married, heterosexual couple is not just an oppressive ideal because it defines the boundaries of legitimate sexuality. It is also oppressive because it limits the possibilities of imagining more equal class relationships. Heteronormativity has strong class implications, which need to be theorized and understood. For instance, Dora's lesbian desire threatens class relationships and Freud's own class assumptions. At the same time, class positionality has impact on the formation of gender. In Freud's cases about Hans and Dora, both patients are raised by middle to upper class families and their fantasies and desires are analyzed according to Freud and their parents' Oedipal expectations. Both Hans and Dora are supposed to occupy distinct heterosexual positions in their families, and class expectations powerfully influence their desires, identities and identifications. Middle class expectations shape Oedipal expectations. The intersection between class and gender provides an important standpoint for re-thinking a theory of non-domination by urging us to re-consider hegemonic assumptions.

What is Wrong with Kristeva's Abject?

Contemporary critical feminists use psychoanalytic concepts to articulate theories of social justice. In *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Young (1990) draws upon Kristeva's concept of abject in order to explain the roots of various forms of oppression and domination. Young is ambivalent about psychoanalysis, as well as about Kristeva's psychoanalytic feminism.[2] Kristeva is part of what Young (1985) describes as "gynocentric feminism." Kristeva's essentializes the opposition between masculine and feminine, and tends to reduce women's specificity to reproductive biology and the function of mothering (Young, 1985). More generally, the gynocentric feminism tends to see gender differences as a relation of inside and outside; the gynocentric reevaluation of traditional femininity can weaken the claim that women are oppressed; and gynocentric feminism inclines to reject too categorically the value of the activities and ambitions associated traditionally with masculinity (Young, 1985).

Yet, although Kristeva's approach is flawed in important ways, Young appropriates concepts generated by flawed theories. Young uses the concept of the abject to psychoanalytically explain her five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. For her, all the groups that experience oppression as groups—black, Latinos, Asians, gays, lesbians, disabled, old people and often poor people—"occupy a similar status as despised, ugly and fearful bodies, as a crucial element of their oppression" (1990, p.142). The refusal of the despised, the ugly and the abnormal generates different forms of prejudice. The despised and the abnormal derive from the abject, which defines a particular process of human development. The abject is located in the early processes of differentiation of the baby from the mother. It has a key developmental importance. Both repelling and fascinating, the abject establishes the border between oneself and others. It is "the fear of loathing and disgust the subject has in encountering certain matter, images, and fantasies- the horrible (…)" (1990, p.142). It arises from "the primal repression" in which the infant struggled to separate from the mothers' body that nourishes and comforts. Baby's fear is expressed in reactions of disgust to body excretions: blood, pus, sweat, excrement, urine, vomit, menstrual fluid, and the smells associated with each of these. The abject is constituted by a fundamental ambiguity. It marks the moment of individuation, of becoming 'the self,' but the very moment of separation is threatened by an attraction to the realm of unity with the mother. It marks a phobia and an "obsessive attraction," and is thus never stabilized. The outcome of abject is fear; the fear of the abject is "a dread of the unnamable" and brings out an "obsessed attraction" (1990, p.145).

Young's use of Kristeva's concept points to the fear of the other, who is excluded and oppressed by hegemonic norms. Groups who experience injustice do so because they provoke fear. Yet, Kristeva's concept has a complexity that is not accounted for in Young's use of the abject. For Kristeva (1982), food loathing, Nazi crimes, and the fear of rapists and killers underline the fear of other. We are horrified and attracted at the same time by the rapist and the killer: "It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection, but what disturbs identity, system, order (...) The traitor, the liar, the criminal, the shameless rapist, the killer who claims he is a savior..." (p.4). Kristeva's abject describes both the experience of fearing alternative sexualities and shameless rapists.

The abject becomes a name for everything that is excluded, regardless of the content of exclusion. Nancy Fraser (1992) pointed out Kristeva's anti-nomian bent, or "her tendency, at least in this early quasi-Maoist phase of her career, to valorize transgression and innovation per se irrespective of content" (p.62). In this regard, what is seriously problematic in the abject is that any kind of interdiction or separation points to abject. Any threat to the order or the norm is therefore an example of how the abject works. If the content of the exclusion is not important, then this assumption has devastating consequences for Young's theory of justice. Her premise is that injustice is institutionally exercised over specific social groups. Injustice works at the level of unconscious reactions and assumptions, as well as by being located within bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms. If one extends the attribute of oppressed to social groups such as rapists or Nazi sympathizers, then the whole concept of justice as requiring "institutions that promote reproduction of, and respect

2 Because psychoanalytic theorists "ignore concrete relations of domination," Young believes that they overlook relations of power and domination (1983, p.138).

for, group differences" becomes useless. Any group transgressing the norms may claim oppression. In Kristeva's theory, there are no boundaries distinguishing a legitimate fear of the other from an oppressive fear of the other.

Kristeva's understanding of the abject emerges from her transformation of Lacanian psychoanalysis. For Lacan, the symbolic register is similar to the paternal, and is a monolithic, rule-bound order to which the subjects submit when they resolve the Oedipal complex by accepting the father's Law. By re-thinking Lacan, Kristeva distinguishes between the symbolic – an axis of social practices that reproduce the social order by imposing linguistic conventions on desires, and the semiotic – a material, bodily source of opposition, which has the power to break through convention. The semiotic therefore becomes the realm of resistance to the symbolic. It is the pre-Oedipal, the maternal, and more generally, the oppositional feminine to the order of the symbolic.
However, Kristeva's semiotic preserves many of the patriarchal assumptions within Lacanian psychoanalysis. First, even though the semiotic resists to the hegemony of the symbolic, and momentarily disrupts the symbolic order, it does not constitute an alternative to the symbolic, because it is by definition transitory and subordinate, "always doomed in advance to reabsorbtion by the symbolic order" (Fraser, 1992, p.64). Second, the semiotic is "defined parasitically over against the symbolic as the latter's mirror image and abstract negation" (Fraser, 1992, p.64). The feminine realm, the locus of resistance, is a simple reflection of something more fundamental, which is the paternal. Third, in Kristeva there is a Lacanian deterministic structure to the development of subjectivity: the subject has to necessarily go through Lacan's Oedipal stage, and thus to submit to the phallocentric symbolic order (Fraser, 1992, pp. 56-57). There is no escape to the authority of the symbolic and only means of undermining it. Further, Nancy Fraser (1992) argues that Kristeva's theory is plagued by an oscillation between a regressive version of gynocentric essentialism and a post-feminist anti-essentialism. In the same vein, Grosz (1990) points out that Kristeva enacts and reproduces the roles of passivity and subordination dictated to women by patriarchy. In short, Kristeva's theoretical framework has little in common with emancipatory practices, nor her subject can be a feminist political agent.

What are the theoretical implications of Kristeva's flawed psychoanalytic structure for her abject? The abject is the necessary, deterministic moment shaping the ego through the separation from the mother. The first important consequence is that the abject is necessary to form an ego. Ego-development is conceived as separation from the mother and the tendency to move to pre-oedipal –or the semiotic—is an effort to undermine the symbolic (or the paternal). However, this subversion is neither an alternative to the symbolic, nor a territory that escapes submission to patriarchy. The mother is an obstacle to independence. In Kristeva's theory, ego development is constructed by disavowing the need for other. Separation from the mother is the moment of opening up the abject. Yet, feminist critics show that separation "denies the possibility of maternal nurturance which actually encourages autonomy" (Benjamin, 1978, p.51). A different notion of autonomy conceptualizes the tension between attachment and separation as necessary for human development. As various relational thinkers (Fairbairn, 1952; Benjamin, 1988) show, the ego develops not because is permanently threatened by the moment of differentiation, but because it better manages the tension between identification and separation.

More importantly, Kristeva's separation from the mother suggests that dependence is something that needs to be feared of. Yet, no one can truly extricate himself or herself of dependence, and many feminists (Gilligan, 1982; Ruddick, 1995) argue that dependence is a normal route to development. The stark dichotomy between dependence and independence obscures the different paths to healthy development. Dependency and autonomy are not incompatible, and Fairbairn's (1952) concept of "mature dependence" points toward incorporating dependence as a normal feature of human development. Fairbairn, like Freud, believed that homosexuality has a strong pathological element. However, unlike Freud, he argued that mature dependence is critical to mental health. Whereas the infant completely relies upon the caretaker to satisfy her physical well being and psychological needs, relative dependence is necessary for healthy development in later stages of human life. In contrast with infantile dependence, mature dependence is a stage where two mature individuals are dependent upon one another, and completely differentiated. In Fairbairn's words, a capacity for relationships implies "dependence of some sort," as well as an orientation to co-operation with different subjects (1952, p.145).

Young rejects many of the premises of Kristeva's abject in her theorizing. She strongly points out that dependence is the fundamental for human beings, because female experiences of social relations "tend to recognize dependence as a basic human condition" (1990, p.55). She suggests that feminist theory need to take into account those who are dependent, because they need justice and participation in decision-making. Although she sees the value of dependence, Young's theory is plagued by other troubling assumptions. The 'abject' is hard to integrate within a feminist theory of social justice because it values the excluded, regardless of its content. Young's theory of social justice needs to distinguish between social oppression and curtailing the rights of criminals and rapists. Similarly, the assumption that separation from the mother is the route to ego-development needs to be challenged. Because Kristeva's theory is flawed, critical theorists might think about ways of incorporating dependence as a strategy towards non-domination.

Benjamin, Winnicott and Social Oppression

Jessica Benjamin's theory about social domination draws upon

concepts from the object-relations psychoanalytic school. Like Young, Benjamin interrogates the conditions of social inequality from a feminist standpoint. Unlike her, Benjamin is a psychoanalyst who builds on, and reframes psychoanalytic theory, in order to re-think the experience of social domination. Benjamin's analysis brilliantly exposes the psychoanalytical underpinnings of gender inequality by tracing subordination from early infant life to adult sexuality. Focusing simultaneously upon the internalization of norms and the possibilities of resistance to oppressive norms, Benjamin's theory illuminates pathologies of individual development, as well as the roots of social domination.

How does Benjamin theorize domination? On the one hand, an important piece of social domination is the ideal of the autonomous individual who rejects dependence. The rough, independent man is a strong normative ideal, and is thoroughly gendered. It partially derives from the man's rejection of his mother. However, the rejection of the mother does not lead to liberation, because the man will be "threatened by his own destruction," and would fear his mother: "The more the individual repudiates the mother, the more is threatened by his own destructiveness and her all-powerful weakness or retaliation" (1988, p.215). On the other hand, women have their own oppressive fantasies. The ideal of perfect mother – and of perfect femininity– promotes domination, because it represents the other radical side of complete autonomy. If the ideal of masculinity emerges from the separation from women, the ideal of femininity becomes the realm of "true" feminine values: care, nurturance, and love. Women do not have independent needs because they have to care for their family. In both ideals, domination emerges from the exclusive identification with an ideal gender. It is also an effect of the identification with, or submission to, "powerful others who personify the fantasy of omnipotence" (1988, p.219).

Benjamin's central question is whether the bonds of domination could be broken without re-enforcing domination. Her answer derives the possibility of equal non-dominative relationship from Donald Winnicott's (1991) theorizing of "destruction." Winnicott was concerned with the question of what makes a person feel real. He argues that in order to become "real," one needs to be able "to use objects." There are two dimensions of experiencing an object: "relating," which is when an object is not experienced as external and independent, and "using," when one has the ability to enter in exchange with the outside world. When one cannot make the transition to "using" from "relating," then one cannot distinguish his experience from omnipotence. In the omnipotent stage, the object is not an object in "its own right," and merely functions as a projective entity. However, in order to feel the object as being different from one's own projection, Winnicott says that the object needs to be destroyed. The child has to destruct the mother in fantasy so that she would become an independent, external object in reality. Benjamin draws extensively on Winnicott's "The Use of an Object and Playing through Identification," where Winnicott builds his theory on the analogy between the analyst and the mother. Winnicott's theory focuses on the baby/patient' aggression and the mother/analyst's need to survive aggression. For Benjamin, the wish to assert oneself, the demand to have one's way, must "sometime crash against the reality of another who reflects back the intransigent assertion that the self displays" (1988, p.39). This insight is fundamental to Benjamin's theorizing of mother-child relationship. The child has to destruct the mother in fantasy in order to reach her as an independent, external object in reality. Destruction is an important element of a transitional experience. Transitional objects, like teddy bears, blankets, and special ways of humming are passages toward the awareness of the other. The child would establish therefore a good relationship between the inside world and the outside reality. The transitional realm is a significant part of the life of a human being, an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both contribute. This area is referred to as reality testing, and the transitional object is an object that "describes the infant's journey from the purely subjective to objectivity" (1991, p.5). Benjamin (1988) makes clear that for Winnicott destruction is a process located at the intersection between the child's aggression and mother's survival.

However, what is Benjamin's solution to social oppression? How is resistance possible? A first route to resisting domination is to acknowledge the need to fulfill our needs and the needs of the other as being complementary. Both ego assertion and the recognition of the other are important, particularly when they are kept in tension. If the tension between the two breaks down, then domination is actualized through the fantasy of omnipotence. Either complete independence or complete dependence would prevail. Men's omnipotence leads to the rejection of dependence, whereas women's omnipotence leads to the abandonment of their needs. A second route to tackling domination is to change the child-rearing practices. If the relationship between the mother and the child were the key to human relationships, then a better model of parenting would lead to abolishing gender domination. One can break the cycle of domination if one restores the balance between destruction and recognition. Babies need good-enough mothering. If they receive it, they would be in a better position to navigate a social system of inequality. Better child rearing practices may lead to radical change, or to what Benjamin calls "the social abolition of gender domination" (1988, p.176).

Does, however, the mother-baby relationship provide a good model for undermining domination? Does the mother-baby model represent a good normative model for equal relationships? On the one hand, I agree with Benjamin that the relationship between the baby and the caregivers shape psychic structures. On the other hand, my worry is that the mother-child model reinforces in important ways an actual dissymmetry of power, which establishes an unequal dynamic between two people. Her model of love is generated within a framework where early emotional life has been arrested. As Fairbarn (1952) pointed out, a baby is extremely dependent on the mother, in ways which part fundamen-

tally from the dependence of a patient to the analyst. If a baby is dependent upon satisfying basic needs such as food and safety, a normal patient is not in such position to his/her analyst.

Benjamin's mother-child builds on a model of arrested development. What assumptions underpin this model? First, the child suffers from important environmental failures, and breakdowns of maternal care generate the later neuroses. The child within the adult transfers infantile desires onto each interaction in an ongoing search for what was not provided by the mother. Environmental deficiencies result in highly specific developmental issues, as the adult in this model "becomes a kind of perseverating baby, stuck in developmental time" (Mitchell, 1988, p.149). The question is whether equal relationships among citizens could be imagined within this model. Benjamin believes that to transcend domination –or the experience of what she calls "gender polarity"—partners need to be equal: "To transcend the experience of duality, so that both partners are equal, requires a notion of mutuality and sharing" (1988, p.48). Yet, how can one imagine equal relationships when the relationship between a caring mother and a "perseverating baby" freezes in a developmental arrest? There is clear asymmetry between roles, as long the mother offers care and nurture to an unequal receiver. Further, inequality emerges from the mother's superior capacities. Whereas the baby is in a relationship of permanent dependence, the mother is able to interact with the external world. The fundamental metaphor of mothering implies an "infantilization" of citizens, who are now seen as being permanently dependent of their caregivers.

Further, Benjamin's model endorses inequality in a different way. Women need to reclaim their subjectivity and be able to survive destruction. Women offer to men, as they were offering to the babies, the experience of the "fresh, cold outside." Women, who act like good analysts, need to survive destruction and ensure that equality between men and women could be achieved (1990, p.221). The impetus for social change is located exclusively within women's experience, who became the only responsible agents of change. On the one hand, she claims that the burdens of oppression seem to be equally shared, because both men and women have internalized domination in distinct ways. On the other hand, social change becomes primarily a task for women. Placing to many expectations on one particular category ignores that domination flourishes primarily in relationships between people, and identifies one class -women- as the engine of change. Of course, the activism of feminism is an important source of change, yet essentializing women's experience limits the possibility of exploring alliances and tapping into men's own experience of sexism.
Relational psychoanalysts (Mitchell, 1996; Aron, 1996; Tansey 1992) imagine ways to re-think the psychoanalytic setting as a model for relationships of non-domination. They believe that a good relationship between a patient and an analyst emerges from the analyst's ability to engage the patient "in a collaborative effort" to find a way out of pathological dynamics (Tansey, 1992, p.311). In this regard, a relational model of equality moves beyond the deep asymmetries in the mother-child model, and finds ways to bring about collaboration and adult mutuality. Both the analyst and the analysand make mistakes in analyses, and psychoanalysts' reactions and feelings become critical for the patient in analysis. Disagreement and confrontation are healthy sources of insight during the therapeutic process. Unlike the mother-child relationship, the recognition of the other in adult relationships has a distinct complexity. Fairbairn (1952) argues that "the mature dependence" is a different developmental stage than infantile dependence. Recognizing the other as different in a good therapeutic setting involves a process of differentiation from the caretaker. If equality presupposes collaboration, disagreement and conflict, then a highly asymmetrical model does not fit well these conditions. A model that would accept the necessity of mature dependence would better address highly unequal positions of power.
Benjamin's theory focuses on gender dynamics and less on social structures and class inequalities that make domination possible. In many ways, it seems that she critically overlooks the class underpinnings of gender inequality. Benjamin does not take into account, for instance, who has access to therapy, and what are the conditions that actualize the economic and legal conditions of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Benjamin writes in The Bonds of Love as if anybody would have access to psychotherapy, yet access to mental health care is a function of class. The rise of managed care (HMO and PPO) plans in the US links mental health care to insurance companies who rationalize and limit the access to long-term psychotherapy. People who are jobless do not have to forms of specialized care, because health care is offered primarily through employers. Similarly, changes in child-rearing practices could not be imagined only as a function of individual response, because those practices emerge in a context where the division of labor is traditional. Tackling gender polarity is an social effort that could not be performed only through practices of self-transformation. In this regard, a stronger awareness about class inequality would help the imagination of dismantling gender domination.

Conclusion:

This paper is an effort to identify some important flaws in psychoanalytic critical theory, and suggest different alternatives to imagining non-oppressive practices. I draw on recent work in relational psychoanalysis to re-think non-domination. My first point is that causal mechanisms at work in psychoanalytic theory need to be re-conceptualized. The classical Oedipus complex allows little space for the healthy development of women and gay people. Yet, a more complex understanding of multiplicity and diversity would point to alternative routes to mental health. If the Oedipus complex is not the only developmental story in psychoanalysis, then alternative ways of tracing gender formation would challenge heteronormative assumptions. In addition, patterns of domination emerge from many factors, and a causal narrative that would trace them exclusively to early child development ignores

that human development is an on-going process. Pathologies of development are both rooted in interpersonal experiences, social conditions and childhood patterns. The class component of domination might also be easily overlooked in theories that offer too much emphasis on early childhood patterns. Class inequality structures the access to psychotherapy and class position has impact on acquiring gender identity. The effort of dismantling domination needs to be targeted not only to intra-psychic components of inequality, but also to larger social patterns such as access to health care.

Whereas attributing too much causal power to early years could be misleading, the notion that the separation from the caretaker is the only route to ego development distorts the importance of dependence. Unlike Kristeva who assumes that separation would necessarily lead to the formation of the abject, Fairbairn understands that separation from, and dependence upon, the caretakers represents normality within human development. If the abject is a mere complement to phallocentric symbolic order, then structures of oppression could only be resisted. However, a different understanding of ego formation leads to a different strategy toward oppressive practices. A new strategy of non-domination builds on the necessity of dependence in adult relationships. It conceptualizes the tension between attachment and separation not only as threatening, but also as being a healthy tension, which needs to be dealt with. A new understanding of non-domination does not only oppose patriarchy, but it also suggests a way of moving beyond oppressive practices.

My third point is that a theory of non-domination should re-imagine models of equal relationships beyond the mother-child model. A powerful asymmetry between the caretaker and the baby emerges within Benjamin's mother-child model. The notion of care is important in rethinking equality. However, mature dependence is different from infantile dependence, and a more equal relationship between citizens would presuppose a good degree of differentiation from the caretaker. A model that would allow for mature conflict, disagreement and cooperation addresses the strong asymmetry. Relational psychoanalytic theorists point toward a new model of mental development. In contrast with a classical model where the analyst had the privilege of interpretation, relational psychoanalysts argue that the work of interpretation is a constructed process where intersubjective understandings are critical for psychological development. Similarly, one may imagine equality among citizens as being generated by intersubjective processes where conflict and cooperation are strongly articulated.

References:

Adorno, T., Horkheimer, M. (2002). *The Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, trans. by Edmund Jephcott, Stanford University.

Aron, Lewis. (1996). *A Meeting of Minds: Mutuality in Psychoanalysis*. NJ: The Analytic Press.

Benjamin, J. (1978). Authority and the Family Revisited: Or, a World without Fathers? *New German Critique*, no.13, Special Feminist Issue.

Benjamin, J. (1988). *The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and The Problem of Domination*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Butler, J. (2004). *Undoing Gender*. London: Routledge.

Fairbairn, W.D. (1952). *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality*. London: Tavistock Publications Limited.

Fraser, N. (1989). *Unruly Practices. Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Fraser, N. (1992). The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theorists, in Fraser, N., Bartky, S.L. (Eds.), *Revaluing French Feminism*, Hypatia.

Freud, S. (1911). Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Volume XII (1911-1913); The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works, London, Hogarth, 1957, 213-226.

Habermas, J. (1972). *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Massachusetts: Beacon Press.

Harris, A. (2000). Gender as a Soft Assembly: Tomboys' Stories. *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, 1:223-250.

Honneth, A. (1996). *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Grosz, E. (1990). *Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction*. Routledge: London.

Gilligan, C. (1982). *In A Different Voice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kristeva, J. (1982). *Powers of Horror: An Essay in Abjection*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mitchell, S. (1995). *Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis: An Integration*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Mijolla. A (Ed.). (2005). *International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis*. New York: Macmillan Library Reference.

Ruddick, S. (1995). *Maternal Thinking*. Massachusetts: Beacon Press.

Tansey, M.J. (1992). Psychoanalytic Expertise. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 2:305-316.

Young, I.M. (1983). Is Male Gender Identity the Cause of Male Domination, in Trebilcot, J. (Ed.), *Mothering:*

Essays in Feminist Theory, Rowman & Allenheld.

Young, I.M. (1985). Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist Politics, published as a special issue of *Women's Studies International Forum*, 8, 231-38.

Young-Bruehl, E. (1996). *The Anatomy of Prejudices*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Whitebook, J. (1996). *Perversion and Utopia: Studies in Psychoanalysis and Critical theory*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.

james mcmahon

The Role of Technology in Herbert Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*

By James McMahon, York University

Abstract *The focus of this paper is Herbert Marcuse's* Eros and Civilization*. Of concern is the manner in which this particular text contains a simple concept of technology, relative to the rich thoughts on technology that Marcuse provides elsewhere.* Eros and Civilization*'s simple concept of technology undermines the balance Marcuse tries to maintain when he speculates about the creation of a less repressive society. Probably because Marcuse assumes the reader is already familiar with the ideas of historical materialism and the Frankfurt School, the role of technology, in* Eros and Civilization*, is under-theorized. This simple concept of technology, which suggests that technology could be the redeemer of political struggle in history, contrasts with one of* Eros and Civilization*'s strongest arguments: the overcoming of alienated labor and any post-capitalist reconciliation of opposites, like Eros and Thanatos, will not make politics or basic-repression superfluous to a liberated society. On this point* Eros and Civilization *actually reworks the idea of technological determinism, to the benefit of Marxist theory.*

Eros and Civilization is a landmark in Herbert Marcuse's body of work. In this text we see Marcuse skillfully work with the late writings of Sigmund Freud. From his analysis Marcuse sharpens the critical edge of Freud's metapsychology. From Marcuse's perspective a critical interpretation of Freud is necessary because our general historical condition is a stepping-stone for the creation of less repressive, alternative social forms. On this point *Eros and Civilization* is consistent with the critical theory of the Frankfurt School: there is a historical materialist foundation to the argument that under post-capitalist conditions Eros could be liberated and fulfilled to a greater degree through less-repressive social relations.

Eros and Civilization is politically valuable, but it would benefit from the rich thoughts on technology that Marcuse provides elsewhere. Ultimately, *Eros and Civilization* works with a simplified version of his historical materialism, which assumes the reader is already familiar with the general tenets of the Frankfurt School. The simplified version of Marcuse's historical materialism is the product of *Eros and Civilization*'s simple concept of technology. This simple concept of technology undermines the balance Marcuse tries to maintain when speculating about alternative social forms that do not yet exist. An optimistic pairing of technology and political liberation suggests that technology is the redeemer of political struggle in history, that technology in the last instance will deliver all of the goods. This is not to suggest that there is no instrumental dimension to Marcuse's revolutionary project. Rather a simple concept of technology contrasts with one of Eros and Civilization's strongest arguments: the overcoming of alienated labor and the post-capitalist reconciliation of opposites, like Eros and Thanatos, will not make politics or basic-repression superfluous. A more dialectical concept of technology helps demonstrate how *Eros and Civilization* reworks the idea of technological progress, to the benefit of Marxist theory.

Marcuse's Historical Materialism

Eros and Civilization, Herbert Marcuse's major work on Freud, is much like a tightrope walk. From one end to the other Marcuse balances his negative critique of Freud's metapsychology against his desire to preserve the general meaning of many of Freud's concepts. Thus, while *Eros and Civilization* is a text that has a sharp, critical edge, it also helps revitalize Freud's late theory of instincts, his metapsychology. At no point do Marcuse's critiques take him beyond the conceptual language that is originally given by Freud; Marcuse's new concepts—such as the *performance principle* and *surplus repression*—are meant to help push Freud's *pleasure principle* in new directions. Marcuse is friendly to the general framework of Freud's metapsychology because it takes us to the vantage point where it is possible to see the universal processes that underpin the development of the individual ego in society. Although *Eros and Civilization* reveals to what degree

Marcuse is not satisfied with Freud's answers, the former's book is a complicated balancing act because Freud is not wrong to investigate how repression, domination, productivity, and happiness are entangled on a larger, supra-individual scale.

Eros and Civilization is a revitalization of Freud, but with a twist. According to Marcuse, Freud's categories need to be injected with a theory about the historical nature of social organization. Left to its own foundations Freud's metapsychology is fatalistic to the extent that the configuration of repression and happiness is fixed throughout human history, as if this configuration were eternal. Marcuse concedes that Freud has good reason to be so general, to explain the long development of human history with a consistent set of universal concepts: "a repressive organization of the instincts underlies *all* historical forms of the reality principle in civilization" (Marcuse, 1966: 34). However, Marcuse must inject his critique because, with no historical relativity, the meaning of concepts like repression and scarcity never change with historical change.

In *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse does not mention Karl Marx, but any reader familiar with the philosophy of historical materialism would recognize that here, in this particular text, Marcuse still appropriates the ideas of the 19th century political economist for the purposes of theorizing about social organization. Published in the United States in 1955, it may not be surprising that Marx is never explicitly named in either the body, or the index of *Eros and Civilization*. However, *Eros and Civilization* is a product of Marcuse's critical theory of society, and there are clear connections between this text and other works that openly affirm Marx's historical materialism. Marcuse's critical foil, which pushes against Freud's metapsychology in 1955, is first developed in the 1930s, when Marcuse was first contributing to what is now known as the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. In "New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism," an essay first published in 1932, Marcuse looks to show how Marx's *1844 Manuscripts* fundamentally challenges any theory that reifies its own historical conditions. Seeing the foundations of historical materialism in the picture painted by the *1844 Manuscripts*, Marcuse states:

> If the objective world is thus understood in its totality as a "social" world, as the objective reality of human society and thus as human objectification, then through this it is also already defined as a *historical* reality. The objective world that is in any given situation preestablished for man is the reality of past human life, which, although it belongs to the past, is still present in the form it has given to the objective world.... Not only man but also nature "comes to be" in history, insofar as it is not something external to and separated from the human existence but belongs to the transcended and appropriated objectivity of man... (Marcuse, 2005b: 102)

Marx's theory about the historical nature of social organization—via the writings of Marx himself and Marxist philosophers such as Lukacs—is the springboard that Marcuse uses to develop his critique of modern capitalism. Like Lukacs (1968), Marcuse wants to overturn the sentiment that capitalism is the natural endpoint of all historical development hitherto. Marcuse's presentation of the argument emphasizes how modern capitalist societies exist (what is actual) according to how historical alternatives are simultaneously marginalized and hidden from consciousness (what is possible). The dialectic between actuality and possibility necessitates this emphasis on the historical conditions of capitalism, as political liberation can "only come into being on the basis and through the sublation of an earlier form already in existence" (Marcuse, 2005b: 102).

With respect to what is actual capitalism certainly casts its shadow over most of the globe—it would be pointless to mention that capitalism is a dominant political-economic system were it not for the fact that so many facets of capitalism are consistently under-analyzed. Yet, notwithstanding the empirical core of critical theory, analysis must go beyond recognizing what is immediately present. For Marcuse, the powerful, totalizing nature of capitalism is best comprehended through the dialectic of actuality and possibility. In other words, the dialectical method is even necessary for the affirmation of capitalism's existence. Following from Hegel, Marcuse argues that nothing is actual "which does not sustain itself in existence, in a life-and-death struggle with the situations and conditions of its existence" (Marcuse, 2005a: 446). The predominance of capitalism is sustained through negation; to influence so many aspects of our social existence, including our sense of individuality, capitalist institutions must actively reproduce themselves and undermine the growth of political alternatives. Importantly, dialectics helps a theory of society establish a critical distance from present forms of social organization, which would become a fetish if they were swiftly affirmed. Under dialectics, the realm of possibility is never completely off the table because what is actual is determined through the negation of potentiality. Thus, when the "underside" is given attention, when the question of what is historically possible is honestly tabled for theoretical analysis, there is room to manoeuvre because capitalism is only one project, one choice among real alternatives.

Dialectics is necessary for Marcuse's critical theory because it allows him to speak to historical alternatives even when it *appears* there are none. More specifically, Marx's dialectical materialism is valuable to Marcuse because the latter must be careful to keep his feet grounded in historical circumstance when he puts so much emphasis on the possibility of actualizing a qualitatively different form of social organization. As a formal concept potentiality is an empty concept; potentiality is given content and meaning through an understanding of a historical condition. Marcuse is not searching for a metaphysical realm of potentiality, for a golden kernel that has been eternally repressed, which thus has been here always and everywhere. The condition of modern capitalism is the starting point, as Marcuse's critical theory of society is inherently materialist: "The actual course of the transformation

and the fundamental measures to be taken in order to arrive at a rational organization of society are prescribed by analysis of economic and political conditions in the given historical situation" (Marcuse, 1969b: 135). While Marcuse's critical theory is metaphysical to the extent that his political ideas about the possible future of humanity are presently unrealized, his critical theory is historical *at its core* because "it always derives its goals only from the present tendencies of the social process" (p. 143).

Following from the general tenets of his critical theory, Marcuse looks for tendencies in capitalism and argues that the opportunity for historical alternatives is determined by the "inherited level of material and intellectual culture"--in other words, technology, broadly defined (Marcuse, 1991: xlviii). Differentiating between "form and content, essence and appearance, the concealed and the obvious" a historical materialist approach brings nuance and complexity to the technological basis of modern society. More specifically, these differentiations illuminate how the logic of capital abuses and sabotages "the actual process of production and reproduction, based on a given level of productive forces" (Marcuse, 1969a: 82). Sabotage occurs because many possible non-capitalist functions of our intellectual and material powers are circumscribed and made to resonate with the primary end of modern business: the accumulation of profits. Often this sabotage of technology manifests as a contradiction: developments in automation, for example, increasingly demonstrate that a more ethical utilization of our productive capacity—i.e., to ameliorate the human condition—would only be possible beyond capitalism and its vested interest in scarcity. Marcuse's argument that the accumulation of capital is not exhausting what is materially possible is corroborated by the work of Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy. With respect to technology it appears capitalism is a progressive system, maybe even a revolutionary system that is constantly innovating and destroying obsolete creations. However, as Baran and Sweezy (1966) point out, each new technological development under capitalism is entangled with the state of monopoly pricing and it is not possible "to utilize the fruits of increasing productivity for the benefit of society as a whole" (p. 71). Individual firms certainly benefit from any technological development that can help reduce costs, yet in the aggregate capitalism must control and choke productive capacity so as not to undermine profit rates. Baran and Sweezy describe modern capitalism as a long-standing state of stagnation; capitalism chronically underutilizes "available human and material resources" (p. 108).[1]

Technology and Eros and Civilization

Marcuse's critical theory attempts to theorize how a break of connection between technology and capital would allow the former to blossom under a horizon of "real possibility" (Marcuse, 1969a: 83). The possibility that our current intellectual and material capacities could be used otherwise in a post-capitalist society illuminates how these very capacities are repressed under capitalism. Potentiality is in conflict with our current organization of technology (p. 81). Where does *Eros and Civilization* stand in this project?

Eros and Civilization is Marcuse's attempt to link his critical theory to certain aspects of Freud's metapsychology. This link of historical materialism and psychoanalysis is productive: Marcuse demonstrates that a reified concept of the reality principle can be overcome, which frees Freud's own ideas about the pleasure principle from this reification. Pushed in this direction, aspects of Freud's thought can contribute to the philosophical and political task of upholding alternative, less repressive socio-political formations. How does Marcuse do this? *Eros and Civilization* is built from the combination of two arguments: "first, Freud's theoretical conception itself seems to refute his consistent denial of the historical possibility of a non-repressive civilization, and second, the very achievements of repressive civilization seem to create the preconditions for the general abolition of repression" (Marcuse, 1966: 5). Each argument needs its other: a philosophical inquiry into Freud would be pointless if there was no room to manoeuvre in his metapsychology; conversely, if play with Freud's ideas are to produce something more than abstract, utopian speculations, the technological capabilities of capitalist societies must be a primary factor in the question of how a post-capitalist society could ever be less repressive.

However, of the two fundamental arguments that shape *Eros and Civilization*, the first is given much more attention than the second. Almost all of its pages are dedicated to an analysis of Freud's concepts. This is no less the case in the second half of the book, when Marcuse begins to develop his own speculations on Eros. While he begins the last half with the reminder that the present reality principle has come up against its own historical limits, Marcuse's major concern in the text's last half is how his new constellation of ideas and outside references is compatible with Freud's framework. Marcuse's argument that phantasy has a cognitive value; his appropriation of Kant and Schiller to relink aesthetics to the world of Logos; the replacement of the Promethean myth with the images of Orpheus and Narcissus; and the concept of non-repressive sublimation—all are connected back to the underdeveloped layer of Freud's general theory of civilization.

Is this imbalance of attention problematic? Marcuse seemingly avoids running into problems because *Eros and Civilization*'s second argument—that our contemporary historical conditions have created the possibilities for qualitatively different, less repressive social relations—is the source of one of Marcuse's key psychoanalytic concepts: surplus-repression. The concept of surplus-repression helps de-mystify the notion that all delayed gratification for work and productivity is necessary because scarcity is a natural fact of life. For Marcuse, scarcity is a histori-

1 Baran and Sweezy make an important contribution to a topic that is studied by other heterodox political economists. For instance, see Veblen (2004), and Nitzan and Bichler (2009).

cal concept, something which is better understood in the terms of political economy. The meaning of scarcity is contingent on the political and technological circumstances of a society, of how that society organizes in light of its historical conditions: "The excuse of scarcity, which has institutionalized repression since its inception, weakens as [our collective] knowledge and control over nature enhances the means for fulfilling human needs with a minimum of toil" (Marcuse, 1966: 92). The developments of modern technology have made our contemporary excuses about social inequality that much more disingenuous: "The still prevailing impoverishment of vast areas of the world is no longer due chiefly to the poverty of human and natural resources but to the manner in which they are distributed and utilized" (92). Consequently, surplus-repression is the concept that highlights what is actual from the contrasting point of what is possible. Forms of surplus-repression are "the restrictions necessitated by social domination," which is "exercised by a particular group or individual in order to sustain and enhance itself" with respect to the current "organization of scarcity" (pp. 35-36).

However, the concept of surplus-repression does not rectify the imbalance of attention mentioned above because it is not a substitute for a concept of technology, which is a prominent point in Marcuse's theoretical constellation. To be sure, Marcuse's historical materialism is present, but it appears in a simplified form because *Eros and Civilization*, on its own, provides no more than a simple concept of technology. The importance of technology appears in a simplified form because the dialectical nuances of Marcuse's thinking are absent on this point. Devoting the majority of attention to an analysis of Freudian concepts, Marcuse assumes that the reader of Eros and Civilization already has some knowledge about the place of technology in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Consequently, technology, a key factor in *Eros and Civilization*, becomes, in the language of dialectics, a positive concept. Interestingly, Marcuse acknowledges this point in the book's 1966 preface:

> *Eros and Civilization*: the title expressed an optimistic, euphemistic, even positive thought, namely, that the achievements of advanced industrial society would enable man to reverse the direction of progress, to break the fatal union of productivity and destruction, liberty and repression—in other words, to learn ... how to use the social wealth for shaping [our] world in accordance with [our] Life Instincts, in the concerted struggle against the purveyors of Death. This optimism was based on the assumption that the rationale for the continued acceptance of domination no longer prevailed, that scarcity and need for toil were only "artificially" perpetuated—in the interest of preserving the system of domination (Marcuse, 1966: xi).

Marcuse is specific when he reflects on how *Eros and Civilization* was the product of "positive thought." His optimism about the technological achievements of advanced industrial society is related to this absence of dialectical nuance. In dialectics an overly positive concept is a simple concept, and a simple concept is abstract, empty, and impoverished because a concrete concept "depends on the negation and mediation of something else" (Yovel, 2005: 81). As Marcuse notes in One-Dimensional Man dialectical thinking is a nuanced, complex type of thinking because mediation and negation are its primary tools. For dialectics "concepts have a transitive meaning: they go beyond descriptive reference to particular facts." Dialectical thinking works through "the tension, the discrepancy, the conflict between the concept and the immediate fact—the thing concrete…" (Marcuse, 1991: 106). Conversely, a simple, positive concept is the product of any manner of thinking that rejects or neglects the task of analyzing an object through its multidimensional relationships with other objects and universal conditions.

On the problem of positive thought there is much to be taken from the works of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School, especially Adorno and Horkheimer. Their arguments for a *negative* dialectics are supplemented with repeated critiques of what they find to be the many manifestations of positive thought. Positive thought is a broad, encompassing category, even if *positivism*, the modern philosophical trend that originates with Saint-Simon, stands as a prominent example. With no intention to efface the differences between the examples of positive thought—from philosophy to mass culture—there is a fundamental point that separates the critical theory of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School from any positivist method: behind the particulars of different forms of positive thinking is a commonly shared conformist and ideological quality.

The conformist and ideological quality of positive thought is not unrelated to a weak presence of dialectical mediation. To open the "established universe of discourse and behaviour" to critique requires a form of thinking that will not *in the last instance* affirm this established universe (Marcuse, 1991: 170). Dialectical mediation and the concepts that are produced by it are integral to resist the pitfalls of reification. Dialectics moves between appearance and essence, the particular and the universal, and the actual and the potential in order to know a particular thing to be more than how it appears immediately. Mediation is at the heart of Marcuse's definition of a (concrete) concept, which is

> "taken to designate the mental representation of something that is understood, comprehended, known as a process of reflection. This something may be the object of daily practice, or a situation, a society, a novel. In any case, if they are to be comprehended, they have to become objects of thought, and as such, their content and meaning are identical with and yet different from the real objects of immediate experience. 'Identical' in as much as the concept denotes the same thing: 'Different' in as much as the concept is the result of a reflection which has understood the thing in the context (and in the light) of other things which did not appear in the imme-

> *mediate experience and which "explain" the thing (mediation)" (Marcuse, 1991: 105).*

Mediation widens the scope of what is referenced. To arbitrarily arrest the process of mediation in thought is to indirectly affirm what is not included in the mediation between objects.

Take, for example, the habituation of instrumental rationality. Although instrumental rationality has a real purpose for technical tasks, where the end of a task is already presupposed in the operational question itself, thinking must beware of positively affirming an operational context that is historical. A thing, be it a knife, a human being, or society itself, when considered instrumentally according to a specific historical project, is framed within an operational context according to the practical, functional goals of that project. Instrumental rationality, for Marcuse, needs to be opened up to negative critique—which attempts to be reflective about one-sidedness, contradictions, and inadequacies—because the former is inherently positive. In other words, instrumental rationality merely reaches a level of mediation where it is sufficient to carry out a functional operation; consequently, the transitive meaning of a concept is deemed unnecessary at a certain point. For instance, to overlook the universality of alienated labour and uncritically ask how a wage labourer can come in today and help manufacture x number of pens, only some functions and capacities of the human species (our species being) are deemed to be valuable in this narrow, particular context. The more complex question of "What is...?" is suppressed as excess, and is superseded by the question of "How...?"; the latter, on its own, does not direct thought to the broader historical conditions of which the practical problem is a part.

This "thing" called technology is certainly not an isolated fact, and a concrete concept of technology is produced from a dialectical mediation with the social structures that condition modern technology. Therefore, what are the consequences of *Eros and Civilization* having a positive concept of technology? Modern technology has less of a role in negating Eros and Civilization's concept of non-repressive sublimation. Non-repressive sublimation is Marcuse's concept and it makes explicit what Freud partially suggests: that sexuality is not automatically "antisocial" or "asocial" (Marcuse, 1966: 131). How we change the "aim and object of the instinct" in order to repress what is incompatible with social values depends on the condition of these values. The question "What realistic social alternatives are there?" unfreezes the tripartite relationship between work, repression and sublimation. Non-repressive sublimation is the concept that allows Marcuse to link his liberatory ideas about Eros to its socio-historical content. But if a dialectical concept of technology is not carried over into *Eros and Civilization*, the remaining obstacle to the realization of non-repressive sublimation is not the technology of modern civilization but the control and ownership of this technology in capitalism. To be sure, Marcuse is striking at the heart of the issue—the ownership of production—but too much of a separation between capitalist ownership and the material world of science and technology suggests that the hegemonic principle of capital accumulation does not affect the content of our technological world. In this sense, *Eros and Civilization* is partly inconsistent with other writings of the Frankfurt School, including those of Marcuse himself. Let us now highlight this inconsistency by looking to some of Marcuse's other writings. By doing so we can get a better sense of how *Eros and Civilization* is too optimistic relative to the dialectical concept of technology that Marcuse develops elsewhere.

Marcuse's Dialectical Concept of Technology

Eros and Civilization is too optimistic not because it looks to launch its critique from the material conditions of capitalism, nor because it pushes against psychoanalytic concepts to the point where there is a visible theoretical discrepancy between what is actual and what is possible. *Eros and Civilization* is too optimistic because, as repeatedly argued by the Frankfurt School, our hitherto accumulated intellectual and material capacities are in fact not isolated and protected from the political and economic demands of our contemporary societies. In its attention to the details of Freud's metapsychology, *Eros and Civilization* does not carry over a dialectical concept of technology. In other texts Marcuse offers a more comprehensive picture of technology, where technology is never isolated from the form of social organization under which it develops. To be sure, at some level technology is a flexible power—Marcuse is suggesting that technological apparatuses produced under capitalism can be used for socialist purposes. However, there is an essential qualification attached to this grand political project because technology is not simply a world of physical objects. In the article "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology" Marcuse establishes that technology is a "social process in which technics proper (that is, the technological apparatus of industry, transportation, communication) is but a partial factor" (Marcuse, 2005c: 138). As a social process technology is just as much an ideology as it is a material world: "Technology, as a mode of production, as the totality of instruments, devices, and contrivances which characterize the machine age is thus at the same time a mode of organizing and perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behaviour patterns, an instrument for control and domination" (p. 139).

What *Eros and Civilization* does not develop comprehensively is a theoretical picture of how technology, as a material apparatus, is tied to a web of social relationships—to the point where it is understood that technology has always been a social relationship. Without a concrete social dimension, especially an ideological dimension, it is easy to infer that we can pool all of capitalism's mechanical products and retain them for life under socialism. Such an attitude overlooks how physical objects of technology are the objectification of established social relations. The dialectical rela-

tionship between the subjective and the objective elements of social life can be found in one of Marcuse's influences: Marx's 1844 Manuscripts. Marx gives primacy to labour when he outlines a concept of human nature because he wants to emphasize how our essence is attached to the material and intellectual processes that produce a social world. The production and consumption of a social world is the "realization or the reality" of human beings (Marx, 1988: 103). Our sensibility, for example, is expressed subjectively through an orientation to an object: "not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses—the practical senses (will, love, etc.)—in a word, *human* sense—the humanness of the senses—comes to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of *humanized* nature" (p. 108).

On this point Marcuse needs to be read against himself; in some of his writings he is impressively cognizant of how a *technological* ideology is instrumental in the reproduction and habituation of modern social relations. To be sure, in his more nuanced thoughts on modern technology, Marcuse never settles the matter once and for all. But that is the point. In "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," for example, Marcuse wants to heed the following two propositions: (1) "Technics hampers individual development only insofar as they are tied to a social apparatus which perpetuates scarcity, and this same apparatus has released forces which may shatter the special historical form in which technics is utilized" (Marcuse, 2005c: 160). (2) The "laws and mechanisms of technological rationality spread over the whole society, they develop a set of truth values of their own which holds good for the functioning of the apparatus—and for that alone" (p. 146). It appears that technological rationality is a separate substance because the word "rationality" suggests it may be the product of a *res cogitans*, an epistemological stance, or a psychological attitude. Yet, regardless of an idea's independence from action, the significance of technological rationality stems from the degree to which social values circumscribe and determine the ends of science and technology (p. 146). In other words, physical technological objects bear the marks of technological rationality. Technological development and scientific discovery develop in tandem with a larger social system; the merits of industrialization and the scientific world view cannot be judged as if their utility exists independent of its social context. The coconstitutive relationship of science and capitalism needs to be explored because one is perpetually puzzled how industrial society is richer, bigger, and better, yet is also destructive, violent, and wasteful (Marcuse, 1991: xli).

It must be considered how a post-capitalist society will be less repressive when it inherits a technological world that was developed under our current mode of production, which institutes repressive and alienating social practices. As Marcuse states: "A harmony prevails between the "spirit" and its material embodiment such that the spirit cannot be supplanted without disrupting the functioning of the whole" (Marcuse, 2005c: 149). The purpose of *Eros and Civilization* is to theorize how the negation of surplus-repression represents a major qualitative break with respect to the foundations of our social and political relationships. However, the surplus-repression of capitalism is putting demands on both the scientist and the labourer, the artist and the entrepreneur, and one cannot neglect to what degree various elements of our social world is a reflection of an instituted division of labour. Any new nomos, worldview, or rationality "can fully develop only in social groups whose organization is not patterned on the apparatus in its prevailing forms or on its agencies and institutions" (Marcuse, 2005c: 149). The rejection of the capitalist "spirit" necessitates that a new critical spirit would need to harmonize with a technological apparatus that would not in turn undermine and vitiate this spirit. We must therefore ask: what aspects of modern technology only hold good for capitalist ends?

Despite All This, Why Should We Still Read *Eros and Civilization*?

Importantly, a positive concept of technology conflicts with one of *Eros and Civilization*'s strongest contributions to Marxist theory. Marcuse's pairing of Freud and Marx is not a one-sided relationship, where Marx simply corrects Freud. For those determined to challenge the power of capitalist institutions, Marcuse emphasizes how Freud's dialectic of civilization is a cycle of domination and repression powered by the guilt feeling of failed liberation:

> The crime against the reality principle is redeemed by the crime against the pleasure principle: redemption thus cancels itself. The sense of guilt is sustained in spite of repeated and intensified repression: anxiety persists because the crime against the pleasure principle is not redeemed. There is guilt over a deed that has not been accomplished: liberation (Marcuse, 1966: 68).

Freud's concept of the primal horde is a figurative lesson about how the repressive past is carried forward into the struggles for a liberated future. It is a lesson that suggests to Marcuse that we can "avoid the fate of a Welfare-Through-Warfare State only by achieving a new starting point," where we have "the good conscience to make life an end-in-itself, to live in joy a life without fear" (p. xiv). For Marcuse a good conscience will only come about when the repressive past will one day no longer define the present.[2] Thus, as noted by Asher Horowitz (2008), because there is a desire to break the continuity between the repressive past and the present, it would be incorrect to infer that Marcuse is creating his own philosophy of history, where past sacrifices are finally redeemed by a liberated society (p. 348).

With respect to the concerns of this article, there is certainly a level of instrumental reasoning to Marcuse's argument that modern technology can serve as a foundation for social alternatives.

2 "The past defines the present because [humankind] has not yet mastered its own history" (Marcuse, 1966: 58).

However, an optimistic pairing of technology and liberation is out of place precisely because Freud helps Marcuse avoid setting up his own eschatology. To be sure, more than the other members of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse theorizes about new forms of subjectivity that could be actualized under qualitatively different social relations. And, because of his philosophical style, this part of Marcuse's critical theory appears to be utopic—his style opens the door to possible misreadings. For example, in *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse wants us to think of how play and work, Eros and Thanatos, reason and aesthetics can reconcile with each other. Yet, *Eros and Civilization* is also one of the best texts to discern how Marcuse keeps mindful of how the reconciliation of opposites will not make politics superfluous, as a theoretical, idealist reconciliation of conceptual opposites is not meant to suggest that this reconciliation cleanly translates into new social practises. For example, he turns to Nietzsche at the end of chapter five, titled "Philosophical Interlude", in order to emphasize how ideas of eternal peace, joy, happiness and even Logos are repressive because they are held out as substitutes for our finiteness, which includes death and suffering (Marcuse, 1966: 118-124). Therefore, Marcuse is paradoxically attempting to uphold a higher form of subjectivity, but without a teleology. In a new state, previously alienated human beings will not finally restore their lost identity. The negation of alienated labour is the negation of the surplus repression that is specific to capitalism. Basic repression is the remainder left, which is meant to signify how a life of peace is not a life without struggle or even death, but one that is less guilty and anxious.

Interestingly, Marcuse even faults Nietzsche for preserving the repressive past: "Nietzsche's philosophy contains enough elements of the terrible past: his celebration of pain and power perpetuates features of the morality which he strives to overcome" (Marcuse, 1966: 123). Yet, the same type of charge can be directed at *Eros and Civilization*'s celebration of modern technology. To be consistent with Marcuse's own intentions in *Eros and Civilization,* the repressive side of modern technology cannot be carried over into a new society that will consciously attempt to be less repressive, to be at peace. If the Life Instincts are to rule over the Death Instincts aggression must be reduced—and does that not suggest that many of our technological avenues for individual and social aggression need to be reformed or even rejected? It may be a simple example but surely modern weaponry, our advanced instruments of death, are incompatible with socialist principles because these weapons were never created to effect a *less-repressive* form of politics.

A rejection of parts of our current technological society does not mean that every technological object easily falls on one side of the split between surplus-repression and basic-repression; if the latter two concepts are at all dialectical then they contain traces of their opposite and do not facilitate analytic division. Marcuse does not pretend to offer an exact method, but he is clearly raising the issue when he puts his twist on the notion of technological progress. In an attempt to counter-balance the optimistic tendency of *Eros and Civilization* he states in the 1966 preface: "The rejection of affluent productivity, far from being a commitment to purity, simplicity, and "nature", might be the token (and weapon) of a higher stage of human development, based on the achievements of the technological society" (Marcuse, 1966: xviii). The value of technology is tied to a historical context, and technological affluence on its own, separate from the question of social organization, does not negate domination, repression, or heteronomy. While technology is central to his historical materialist project, this particular thread in *Eros and Civilization* follows from Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1961); the former likewise begins on a cynical note, from the assumption that the accumulation of more and more material stuff does not get to the root of repression.

This argument is carried over into *One-Dimensional Man*, which was written a decade after *Eros and Civilization*. It is important to note this consistency in argument, because in the time between the two texts it appears the bare facts disprove Marcuse: the repressive side of capitalist societies disappears from view as technological developments provide unprecedented levels of affluence and satisfaction through consumption. Capitalism appears to deliver the goods. Marcuse does not overlook this apparent fact and takes sexuality as an example: "It has often been noted that advanced industrial civilization operates with a greater degree of sexual freedom--"operates" in the sense that the latter becomes a market value and a factor of social mores. Without ceasing to be an instrument of labor, the body is allowed to exhibit its sexual features in the everyday work world and in work relations." One should acknowledge that this "is one of the unique achievements of industrial society—rendered possible by the reduction of dirty and heavy physical labor; by the availability of cheap, attractive clothing, beauty culture, and physical hygiene..." (Marcuse, 1991: 74). This explosion of liberated sexuality is also rampant in our art, in "O'Neill's alcoholics and Faulkner's savages, in the *Streetcar Named Desire* and under the *Hot Tin Roof*, in *Lolita*, in all the stories of Hollywood and New York orgies, and the adventures of suburban housewives"(p. 77). One only needs to watch television for a short while to confirm that sexuality is relatively uninhibited.[3]

3 With this specific talk about an explosion of liberated sexuality Marcuse meets Michel Foucault on thematic grounds. Foucault's *History of Sexuality*, Vol. I is concerned with how modern technologies of power have implanted an "entire sexual mosaic" through a proliferation of discourse on sex (Foucault, 1990: 53). For Foucault the age of modernity is the "age of multiplication" with respect to sexuality. In modern times, especially in the last two centuries, there has been "a dispersion of sexualities, and strengthening of their disparate forms, a multiple implantation of "perversions." Our epoch has initiated sexual heterogeneities" (p. 37). Foucault's absence from this paper, however, is not a comment on his relevance. Rather, the differences between Marcuse and Foucault are significant enough that my omission of Foucault is more practical than anything else: considering that *History of Sexuality*, Vol. I challenges the Freudian concept of repression explicitly, and Marcuse's politics of liberation implicitly, the puzzle

However, to hold these facts against Marcuse forgets that he is honest about the scope of his analysis: the issue of general affluence relates to the richest capitalist states, especially the United States, and the rise of affluence in a few countries does not necessarily reduce the level of physical aggression that is channelled towards pockets of these affluent societies, or to less affluent areas of the world. Moreover, on Marcuse's own terms, the value of technological development cannot be separated from the question of social organization. *One-Dimensional Man* follows Eros and Civilization and asks how increasing opportunities for immediate gratification—i.e., desublimation—is nevertheless repressive. *Repressive desublimation* is a concept in *One-Dimensional Man* and its psychoanalytic name is not incidental. Repressive desublimation emphasizes once more that increasing satisfaction through consumption does not liberate Eros if the latter is nevertheless "deprived of the claims which are irreconcilable with the established society" (Marcuse, 1991: 75). The point is not to deny the modern level of affluence its kernel of truth: that the number of avenues for individual satisfaction has grown in the last hundred years. Rather, desublimated satisfactions are nevertheless repressive because the liberty of pleasure in capitalism is not the product of autonomy, but is instead instituted and controlled. Marcuse wants to remind us that with the increasing individualization of libidinal consumption "a whole dimension of human activity and passivity has been de-eroticized. The environment from which the individual could obtain pleasure—which [he or she] could cathect as gratifying almost as an extended zone of the body—has been rigidly reduced" (Marcuse, 1991: 73). It is not insignificant that atomized, immediate forms of satisfaction predominate in a system where technological innovation is often barred from satisfying the whole of society as one community.

Conclusion

Therefore, in the interest of preserving the contributions of *Eros and Civilization*, the text would benefit from the rich thoughts on technology that Marcuse provides elsewhere—rich thoughts that help connect the form and content of modern technology to the logic of capital. A balance must be made somehow, where technology can still be the materialist foundation for Marcuse's project, yet where a simple concept of technology does not undermine *Eros and Civilization*'s argument that social change is more of an ethical demand rather than an instrumental and remunerative consideration. An optimistic pairing of modern technology and liberation undermines the argument that post-capitalist society is not something to fight for because we will finally be able to satisfy all of the wants and desires that have been promised in repressive societies. Redemptive narratives about radical social change are problematic precisely because they often are not critical enough about how the sales effort of capitalism has institutionalized and manufactured many of our desires.[4] *Eros and Civilization* is remarkably conscious of this pitfall, yet carries a concept of technology that inadvertently suggests such a narrative. Under truly democratic control an inherited technological apparatus may be better suited to the realm of necessity—it may be too optimistic to hope that technology would be the redeemer in a non-alienated, post-capitalist realm of freedom. This point is emphasized when Marcuse quotes Baudelaire: "True civilization does not lie in gas, nor in steam, nor in turntables. It lies in the reduction of the traces of original sin" (Marcuse, 1966: 153).

of what is reconcilable and irreconcilable between Foucault and Marcuse (and Left Freudianism) is complex enough that it is beyond the scope of this paper. The comparison, however, is important, as their theories of modern sexuality are each attached to programmatic ideas for political resistance—the comparison helps us ponder the political efficacy of transgression and the possibility of a transcendence of power. For a perspective that infers there is an opportunity for a favourable pairing between Foucault and Marcuse—primarily because of Foucault's argument for the emancipation of bodies and pleasures—see Whitebook (2002). Conversely, for a Marcusean critique of Foucaultian radicalism, in light of fundamental differences, see Gad Horowitz (1987).

4 "The sales effort" is a term I borrow from Baran and Sweezy (1966).

References

Baran, P. and Sweezy, P. (1966). *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order*. Monthly Review Press.

Foucault, M. (1990). *History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, Volume 1. New York: Vintage Books.

Freud, S. (1961). *Civilization and Its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Horowitz, A. (2008). *Ethics at a Standstill: History and Subjectivity in Levinas and the Frankfurt School*. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press.

Horowitz, G. (1987). *The Foucaultian Impasse: No Sex, No Self, No Revolution*. Political Theory, 15(1): 61-80.

Lukacs, G. (1968). *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Marcuse, H. (2005a). A Note on the Dialectic, p. 444-451. In Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E. (eds.). *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader.* New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005.

Marcuse, H. (1966). *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Marcuse, H. (2005b). New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism, p. 86-121. In Wolin, R. and Abromeit, J. (eds.). *Heideggerian Marxism*. University of Nebraska Press.

Marcuse, H. (1991). *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Marcuse, H. (1969a). Philosophy and Critical Theory, p.134-158. In Marcuse, H. *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Marcuse, H. (2005c). Some Social Implications of Modern Technology, p. 138-162. In Arato, A. And Gebhardt, E. (eds.). *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group.

Marcuse, H. (1969b). The Concept of Essence, p. 43-87. In Marcuse, H. Negations: *Essays in Critical Theory*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Marx, K. (1988). *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.

Nitzan, J. and Bichler, S. (2009). *Capital As Power: A Study of Order and Creorder*. New York: Routledge.

Veblen, T. (2004). *Absentee Ownership: Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Whitebook, J. (2002). *Michel Foucault: A Marcusean in Structuralist Clothing*. Thesis Eleven, 71: 52-70.

elliot buckland

Hidden Trends: Reason, Renunciation and Liberation in Marcuse's Appropriation of Hegel and Freud

By Elliott Buckland, York University

Abstract *In Herbert Marcuse's work on Hegel and Freud one sees some interesting parallels. Although writing in different eras and on different subjects, according to Marcuse both come to an impasse between gratification and pleasure on one hand, and societal progress on the other. This article will offer a brief examination of how Marcuse uses these two authors in his own writings on subject formation and what he has to say about the possibility of overcoming this historical impasse.*

Introduction

According to Herbert Marcuse much of modern thought has posited a conflict between pleasure and reason in which, in the interest of progress, pleasure is relegated to a supporting role, continuously left unrealized, forever deferred. This trend is apparent in both the psycho-social development of the individual as well as in the historical emergence of the species. Thus reason, moderation, renunciation and sacrifice become the dominant motifs in subject formation while pleasure and gratification are pushed to the historical sidelines—beneficial, perhaps, to the general well-being of the individual, but certainly not necessary for social, economic or political progress.

Marcuse explores these themes in the works of Sigmund Freud and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the subjects of two of his most influential books, *Eros and Civilization* and *Reason and Revolution* respectively. Although the concerns of Hegel and Freud diverge greatly—Hegel's being the movement of an abstract subject in history while Freud's focus was on the development of the individual psyche—in each we see an emphasis on renunciation and deferral; on individual sacrifice and on social demands haunted by a sense of pessimism about the prospect of happiness or gratification. In Freud's theory of instincts, for example, this is the process in which the subject has to continuously curb its natural inclinations in the name of progress and work; in other words, in order to build a society. In Hegel, the subject—initially an abstract entity—in the name of reason continuously strives to master its object, all externality. In both of these cases the renunciation of pleasure is paramount.

In both Freud and Hegel Marcuse sees a subject utilizing reason in the interest of mastery. A component of this movement of reason is its engagement in a principle of 'identity' in which all objects are submitted, categorized and classified under general concepts so that all can be fit into one unitary schematic with the subject at the apex; the object is the intellectual activity of the subject (Marcuse, 1974, pp.21-54; Marcuse, 1999, p.93; Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, pp.1-34; Adorno, 2003, pp.3-57).[1] This classificatory or 'identity' thinking, in the interest of emancipation, aims to make all identical to itself, to bring cognition in line with the mind's own internal logic and the maintenance of the system is what protects the power of the individual over a disorganized nature. Anything which escapes identification is perceived as a risk of pulling us back into the pre-conceptual chaos of the natural world. 'Pleasure' and 'gratification' are digressions for they necessitate either submission to an externality over which the subject is powerless or immersion into an immediacy that is potentially destructive, both cases as dangerous as the Sirens' song. Marcuse traces this back to Plato who, long before Kant's wish for a "self-directed" agent, free from the sway of external forces, argued for the supremacy of reason over the "lower appetites" as the sole pursuit of appetite satisfaction leaves us as slaves to nature. Even in ancient Athens, reason was tied to repression. And

1 This is also central to the work of Marcuse's former colleagues, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno

while Plato pointed to the sky and Aristotle peered at the ground, he too tied reason to domination, for in Aristotle, the work of reason is understood as ordering and classifying (Marcuse, 1974, pp.110-111).

Rather than seeing this divide as a permanent fixture, inspired by Marx, Marcuse reads it as actually an aspect of class society and as such there exists a potential for its undoing. Although the works of Hegel and Freud are grim with regards to the individual in both of their works Marcuse traces a possibility for a different historical phase in which the antinomies between reason and pleasure would not be so vast. Although this paper pays only minimum attention to the class character of subject formation, what is important to keep in mind is that if this is the case then there at least exists a historical possibility for the reorientation of these antinomies, one neither Hegel nor Freud would have anticipated. This is not a simple synthesis of but an opened call return to sensuousness, play, corporeality and creativity. Marcuse does not draw a blueprint for this changed orientation of the subject, he merely demonstrates its potential, using the works of Hegel and Freud as a point of new departure. Thus Marcuse's relationship to each of these thinkers is threefold; he begins by demonstrating their influence over his thought, then turns to a criticism of their work and thirdly winds up surpassing them—not in rejection but in a manner which directly unfolds from the liberating tendencies which Marcuse sees in their work.

Finally, the reader should bear in mind that this paper is not a comprehensive or critical engagement with the works of Hegel or Freud directly, not with the traditions—German Idealism and Psychoanalysis—of which they stand at the pinnacle. Rather, its intentions are vastly more modest; its hope, merely to offer an introduction to the thought of Herbert Marcuse focussing particularly on his relationship to Hegel and Freud—the manner in which he appropriates their work, his criticism of it and finally, his discovery of hidden trends in each which could point to liberating tendencies in the works of Hegel and Freud, beyond which either envisioned.

Hegel, Reason and Freedom

Hegel believed that philosophy was shaped by contradictions of human history; mind and matter, soul and body, etc. Picking up from Kant, the first concept Hegel re-examined dialectically was 'reason'. Similar to Kant he made a distinction between 'understanding'—which for Hegel meant common sense, immediate, undialectical reflection—and 'reason', which is speculative thought, dialectical knowledge. In other words 'understanding' is the everyday sort of thinking which an individual employs to make sense of and navigate the world. It is a 'common sense' understanding of the world which appears immediately logical. The world of understanding is governed by the law of identity in which all objects can be sorted and categorized (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, pp.1-34). Marcuse writes that "Common sense mistakes the accidental appearance of things for their essence, and persists in believing that there is an immediate identity of essence and existence" (Marcuse, 1999, p.45). Understanding is mired in immediacy, never able to penetrate the surface of phenomena and ask, for example, why a particular phenomenon arose historically. 'Reason', in Marcuse's reading of Hegel, aims to overcome this barrier. The reconciliation of essence and existence can come about only through the conscious deployment of reason, the primary condition of which is the abandonment of immediate, everyday 'common sense'. This is a form of thinking which strives to compare the surface appearance of things with their 'essence' or truer form, often understood as possibility or potentiality—the manner in which objects would appear under an ideal condition. Marcuse describes this speculative thinking as a thinking which "conceives 'the intellectual and material world' not as a totality of fixed and stable relations, but 'as a becoming, and its being as a product and a producing'" (Marcuse, 1999, p.46); as Marcuse writes, "the struggle against common sense is the beginning of speculative thinking, and the loss of everyday security is the origin of philosophy" (Marcuse, 1999, p.48).

In a sense, the first moment of reason is always the distrust of the given state of things. Ever since Plato the 'Idea' has been a critical concept, again denoting the real as (as yet) untrue. But for Hegel there is no realm of truth beyond the given in a mystical sense, so the idea is the "actual and man's task is to live in its actuality"—the Idea as a transformative imperative (Marcuse, 1999, p.162). Therefore in Hegel the adequate form of the idea is the unity of cognition and practice. According to Marcuse Hegel was never able to faithfully uphold this and in the end becomes ensconced in a realm of pure theory, but this kernel is crucial to Marcuse's thought.

For Hegel the goal of reason is freedom, but a freedom residing on a mastery of all externality. Freedom presupposes the subject's ability to unify subject and object, to develop the full potentialities of both. Hegel claims that the empirical principle retained in Kant still accepted objects in their given state. Thus, in Kant reason is limited to the subjective realm alone, powerless over the external world—hence, 'unfree'. For Hegel the human subject alone is able to transform objectives and external conditions which stand opposed to the subject, into elements which are a medium for the subject's own development; the subject "brings the truth into the world, and with it is able to organize the world in conformity with reason" (Marcuse, 1999, p.39). Hegel's subject, according to Marcuse, is not the individual consciousness observing the world, but an abstract subject transforming it. It is the subject which brings the object to its potentiality in history. Thus 'Reason' is that which brings together subject and object in the Absolute. The self-conscious subject is a thinking subject and thinking consists of the subject recognizing the objective world as actually a subjective one. 'Thinking' is an attribute of the independent subject, one who is in existence with others, but has

mastered all externality. In short, a subject who is self-sufficient is one who is thinking and free (Marcuse, 1999, p.118).

All conflicts for Hegel, all forms of alienation including the alienation from nature took the general form of subject vs. object.[2] Nature is always other, always finite; nature does not possess self-consciousness and thus cannot reach its potentialities through its own power. Again, the driving force of history is the human mind, actively and consciously transforming nature, making it into its truer form, which according to Marcuse, means taking nature out of the realm of pure objectivity and bringing it into that of the subject (Marcuse, 1999, p.140, p227). Nature is freed from its "blind necessity" by the subject. Marcuse writes:

> History, in turn, is the long road of mankind to conceptual and practical domination of nature and society, which comes to pass when man has been brought to reason and to a possession of the world as reason (Marcuse, 1999, p.168).

This means that nature only achieves its truth (the realization of its latent potentialities) once it enters history, once it has been worked on and brought into a cognitive identity with the subject.

This should not imply that there exists a prior separation between the human subject and the natural world for the subject is a part of nature and nature comes to be an object which can be identified as such only through the mediation of the subject. Neither 'subject' nor 'nature' are to be assumed or taken as ontologically stable categories. The subject consistently constitutes itself as over and opposed to nature, which in turn is progressively reduced to the mere stuff of domination. Therefore, my framing of the human/nature dialectic as an historical fixture is not meant to imply that it is a unidirectional movement which acts as some sort of philosophic foundation. As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno point out in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* the subject only constitutes its unity through the continuous posing of the multiplicity of nature as its antithesis (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, p.38). Thus this relationship has been paradoxical as on one hand the subject strives for unity in thought, and yet in doing posits a duality between itself and nature which intensifies. Pursuing a similar theme in *Reason and Revolution* Marcuse writes:

> The process of life, however, consists in continuously drawing these external conditions into the enduring unity of the subject. The living being maintains itself as a self by mastering and annexing the manifold of determinate conditions it finds, and by bringing all that is opposed to itself into harmony with itself. The unity of life, therefore, is not an immediate and 'natural' one, but the result of a constant active overcoming of everything that stands against it. It is a unity that prevails only as the result of a process of 'mediation' between the living subject as it is and its objective conditions. The mediation is the proper function of the living self as an actual subject, and at the same time it *makes* the living self and actual subject (Marcuse, 1999, p.38).

In this whole, all alienation is both justified and cancelled; the absolute idea represents both the culmination of desire and the redemption of suffering and misery. In Marcuse's words, "[Hegel's] *Phenomenology of Spirit* unfolds the structure of reason as the structure of domination—and as the overcoming of domination". In this movement, consciousness is constituted through both interaction with nature and by encountering other consciousnesses. In the end, these antagonisms are reconciled, but during the process, freedom is constituted through fear for one's own ego (Marcuse, 1974, pp.113-118).

Ever more repressive and alienating forms of domination come about to protect us from slipping back under the influence of nature—for as a species we collectively remember its uncertainty, its terror and wish to keep ourselves firmly ensconced as masters—just as the bourgeois mentality encourages us to come out from under the influence of others, to be 'free'. Yet, just as was the case with the independent bourgeois entrepreneur, this freedom is illusory, for we are still prostrating ourselves, not to another, but to the totality of the logical whole. In *One-Dimensional Man* Marcuse writes:

> The science of nature develops under the technological a priori which projects nature as potential instrumentality, stuff of control and organization. And the apprehension of nature as (hypothetical) instrumentality precedes the development of al particular technical organization (Herbert Marcuse, 1991, p.163).

And later, "The scientific method which led to the ever-more-effective domination of nature thus came to provide the pure concepts as well as the instrumentalities for the ever-more-effective domination of man by man through the domination of nature" (Marcuse, 1991, p.158).

'Nature' is a cipher for chaos, suffering and uncertainty. Ever more repressive and alienating forms of domination come about to protect us from slipping back under the influence of nature—for as a species we collectively remember its uncertainty, its terror and wish to keep ourselves firmly ensconced as masters. As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, close friends and colleagues of Marcuse, wrote, "It is the identity of mind and its correlative, the unity of nature, which subdues the abundance of qualities. Nature, stripped of qualities becomes the chaotic stuff of mere classification, and the all-powerful self becomes a mere having, an abstract

2 This in fact is the general schematic of all European philosophy from Descartes on, that, "Man's knowledge and will had been pushed into a 'subjective' world, whose self-certainty and freedom confronted an objective world of uncertainty and physical necessity" (Marcuse, 1999, p.36). For Hegel, only the most universal and abstract concepts could make sense of this divide. This is because the subject can overcome its particularity through its mediation of the objective world which at first appears external to it.

identity" (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, p.6). Human beings purchase their power at the cost of estrangement from this nature, and here lies the singular distinction of Enlightenment, the logical unity or *logos* of nature on one side, and the realm of human individuals on the other. The more congealed nature becomes as a concept, the farther removed from it we find ourselves.

Part and parcel of this logic, reason must be consistently steered away from temptation. In "On Hedonism" Marcuse argues that in the history of philosophy pleasure has always been relegated to an inferior role. 'Happiness' and 'progress' are posed as mutually exclusive. Reason becomes antagonistic toward those faculties, such as pleasure, which are purely receptive.[3] In Hegel's dialectic, fulfillment is in absolute knowledge, in the final reconciliation of subject and object. Hegel emphatically denied that the satisfaction of individual happiness would be a component of reason. He expected it to be quite the opposite in fact as the tragedy of late modernity is that knowledge of the whole—of its past and its repression; its bodily suffering, its unfulfilled desires, its potential and its inadequacies—is not conducive to happiness. This knowledge often has more akin to misery (Marcuse, 1974, pp.99-104). Progress is such that, as Hegel once wrote, "The History of the World is not the theatre of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it" (Hegel, 2001, p.41).[4] Hegel saw human history as burdened with this misfortune and argued that individuals must be sacrificed for the sake of the universal, for "the progress of reason realizes itself against the happiness of individuals" (Marcuse, 1988b, p.160). Hegel rejected eudæmonism, the centering of ethical life around the happiness of the individual as this principle is antithetical to historical progress. In happiness, the individual acquiesces to the present conditions—the realm of mere 'appearance', ruled by immediacy and 'common sense'—revelling in the moment, thereby halting movement. In pleasure, the subject is not master over the object but bound to it, under its spell.

The attainment of pleasure tends to be understood as available to us solely through objects, products and conditions which are available today, and always through the marketplace. Pleasure no longer points to or suggests that other, transcendent possibilities. Other social or political arrangements might perhaps be even more conducive to a truly pleasurable life. The current conception of pleasure freezes us in our immediacy. Our subjective pursuit of pleasure employs our faculty of reason only to aid us in determining the most efficient means to maximize the fulfillment of our desires and virtually ignores any question pertaining to the objects of pleasure themselves. Hedonism errs in accentuating the subjective side of happiness; it offers no critical evaluation of the objects of happiness, nor of the labour processes which produce such objects, not to mention the social structure which encourages the desire for said objects. In other words, hedonism champions happiness but does not challenge its content.

Hedonism, Marcuse reminds us, arose in slave societies when there was a recognized division between slaves and free people, making plainly obvious the distinction between labour and happiness as each concept was embodied by a different social class. For that incredibly small strata of the population for whom happiness was attainable, their conception of happiness was quite a beautiful thing; 'eudemonism', aiming to ground ethical life in a version of happiness which goes far beyond the limited moments of personal enjoyment we term 'happiness' today and was understood as a much larger philosophic principle (Marcuse, 1988b, pp.172-173). It articulated an allowance for a speculative way of life relatively autonomous of the dictates of production or the labour process, free from society's narrow focus on progress or survival.

The middle class of modernity is simultaneously slave and patrician, producer and consumer, straddles this divide, obscuring the boundary between toil and happiness. In industrial society the objects of happiness have been rendered into those which can be achieved through the labour process. This loss of the distinction between labour and happiness restricted it to consumption. Alongside this reason has become instrumental, a subjective faculty which can be wielded in simply "choosing among given possibilities" (Marcuse, 1988b, pp.172-173). Today we are all free, but our 'freedom' is narrowed into channels which service the established whole (Marcuse, 1988b, pp.169-172).

Although Marcuse is critical of Hegel in that he warns that any notion of progress which subsumes individuals entirely into the tides of history has its own imbedded authoritarian impulse, he does not want to go entirely to the opposing pole. Hedonism, in other words, is not false because it encourages individuals to seek happiness, for if that truly were the case individuals would be in constant rebellion against the labour process. In industrial society sensuality, not reason, is the source of happiness. Hedonism grasps this; this is its truth. However, the falsity of hedonism is that it does nothing to negate the root causes of suffering in antagonistic society, as reason—in a Hegelian sense—does. Thus, it accepts antagonism (Marcuse, 1974, pp.161-172).

So the real question, for Marcuse is to choose neither happiness nor reason as this very dichotomy itself is a product of antagonistic social relations. In other words, if the hedonistic impulse could be rechanneled against societal antagonisms, rather than being contrary to reason it could be reason's ally. Thus the happiness of all individuals, suggests Marcuse, could be seen as the most 'reasonable' of requests and hedonism the most radical of

3 This is not unique to Hegel. Kant rejects pleasure as something contingent and contrary to "the autonomy of the individual"; Fichte called pleasure "involuntary" and merely a result of the conjunction of the instincts and the external world, in either case, in pursuit of pleasure, individuals are not being true to themselves (Marcuse, 1988b, p.181).

4 Compare this with Freud: ""One feels inclined to say that the intention that man should be 'happy' is not included in the plan of 'Creation'" (Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents).

political critiques.

Freud, Pleasure and Renunciation

In Marcuse's appropriation of Freud's theory of instincts a similar process is at work in that the subject has to continuously and repetitiously curb its supposed 'natural' inclinations in the name of progress. In Freud, the instinctual drives which blindly grope for immediate gratification come into conflict with the material necessities and conditions of the natural world; the unfettered fulfillment of the basic human instincts is incommensurate with the requirements of civilization. In "On Hedonism", an earlier piece, Marcuse writes that pleasure is a moral problem in that it pertains to a 'rightly' ordered life. In maturity the interests of the general and the particular are meant to be coterminous. When this is not the case morality is the expression of this gap (see Horkheimer, (1995), pp.15–47), for society forbids the gratification of needs which threaten to shatter the whole. Early in *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse writes:

> According to Freud, the history of man is the history of his repression. Culture constrains not only his societal but also his biological existence, not only parts of the human being but his instinctual structure itself. However, such constraint is the very precondition of progress. Left free to pursue their natural objectives, the basic instincts of man would be incompatible with all lasting association and preservation: they would destroy even where they unite (Marcuse, 1974, p.11).

According to Freud, the history of man is the history of his repression. Culture constrains not only his societal but also his biological existence, not only parts of the human being but his instinctual structure itself. However, such constraint is the very precondition of progress. Left free to pursue their natural objectives, the basic instincts of man would be incompatible with all lasting association and preservation: they would destroy even where they unite (Marcuse, 1974, p.11).

In Freud, the two primary instincts are that of Eros, rechanneled into the impulse to create ever more complex social systems, and the death drive[5], the compulsion to return to a simpler state. Eros is the creator, the unifier.[6] There is some overlap between the two as both aim at reducing external stimuli—or at the very least keeping it constant. Thus the instincts are fundamentally conservative, struggling to maintain the inertial unity of the individual—a sort of equilibrium that we have been forced to abandon through our encounters with the external world. In the "Philosophical Interlude", Marcuse adds to this, stressing again that civilization began with the suppression of instincts; first, the sex instinct, whose inhibition enables the expansion of social groups, and secondly, the death instincts, whose inhibitions refocuses energy on the mastery of nature (Marcuse, 1974, p.106). Growth is paradoxically coupled with a persistent drive to return to the serenity of the womb. In attempting to achieve the Nirvana principle, the psyche moves even farther from it. In short, a repression of the instincts underlies all historical forms of the reality principle; civilization progresses through organized domination.

In Freudian terms the pleasure principle—the unsublimated gratification of instinctual drives—is transformed into the reality principle, the principle that governs the normal, progressive functioning of society. The reality principle, although it may appear as opposed to the pleasure principle, emerges out of it as the instinctually constituted individual learns to renounce immediate gratification in exchange for delayed, but perhaps further secured, gratification (Marcuse, 1974, p.13); both principles interpenetrate and modify each other and this complex, instinctual tapestry is the fount of human culture (Marcuse, 1974, p.13). Marcuse writes:

> The scope of man's desires and the instrumentalities for their gratification are thus immeasurably increased, and his ability to alter reality consciously in accordance with "what is useful" seems to promise a gradual removal of extraneous barriers to his gratification. However, neither his desires nor his alteration of reality are henceforth his own: they are now "organized" by his society. And this "organization" represses and transubstantiates his original instinctual needs. If absence from repression is the archetype of freedom, then civilization is the struggle against this freedom (Marcuse, 1974, p.14).

This whole process leads to the development of memory, judgment, and attention—in short, the development of the subject. All mental apparatus, with the exception of *phantasy*[7] which remains dedicated to pleasure, become geared toward reality principle; it is the guarantor of the subject's continued existence, the cost of which is a partial sacrifice of the self.

This mechanics of this move from the pleasure principle to the reality principle occurs due to the blind and unconscious bundle of drives, Freud's 'id', organizes an ego, whose job—like a toe testing the bath water—is to explore reality and ensure the continued existence of the subject. The id is the oldest portion of the psyche and is the seat of the primary instincts; it knows no morality[8] and has no interest in self-preservation. The id strives only for

5 Sometimes called 'Thanatos' by others.

6 In his "Philosophical Interlude" midway through *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse writes that, "The sex instincts are life instincts: the impulse to preserve and enrich life by mastering nature in accordance with the developing vital needs is originally and erotic impulse" (Marcuse, 1974, pp.26-27). Also see Sigmund Freud`s Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

7 More on this below

8 It should be noted that morality is tied to the third component of the psyche, the 'superego' which is partially the internalization of social norms and values. As the present discussion is only concerned with the tension at the heart of

gratification in its most immediate sense, no matter how destructive the consequences. In encountering the external world—the world of pain; of misery and starvation—the compulsion to seek out immediate gratification can prove harmful. The ego protects the id from annihilation by re-orienting the instincts toward different objects, objects in which the conflict between the id and the external world can be minimized. Thus pleasure is not eliminated, merely modified into socially progressive forms.

In Freud early human society was ruled by the father who had a monopoly on Eros—meaning, the women of the clan as they were considered the objects of pleasure.[9] The father, thus, also mediated the death instinct by blocking the return to the tranquility of the womb. Marcuse writes that, "On the basis of renunciation, Eros begins its cultural work of combining life into ever larger units"; aim-inhibited love, affection, exogamy (Marcuse, 1974, pp.62-63, 79). This society was characterized by an unequal distribution of pleasure and pain, rational in the sense that the father ensured the propagation of the life of the clan. The father set the precedent of curbing the instincts to guarantee the continued existence of the whole. According to Marcuse, he does the work of Eros, not only by suppressing the death instinct but by curbing both into socially constructive endeavours.

In the first act of historical liberation the father is challenged by the sons who both hate and wish emulate him and this band of brothers establishes a new order after his assassination. For a brief time after this regicidal/patricidal act the instincts flow more freely. However, the sons feel guilt because of their crime and repression comes about to safeguard society against slipping back into the chaos of prehistory. The father's monopolization of pleasure becomes the basis for all later taboos. With or without him, the work of the father is done, in the prohibitions on Eros and aggression, in guilt and progress (Marcuse, 1974, pp.62-63, 79). A new order is established to once again protect the survival of the whole and the rule of the dead father is deified; his omnipotence returns as monotheism. Marcuse writes:

> The overthrow of the king-father is a crime, but so is his restoration—and both are necessary for the progress of civilization. The crime against the reality principle is redeemed by the crime against the pleasure principle: redemption thus cancels itself. The sense of guilt is sustained in spite of repeated and intensified redemption: anxiety persists because the crime against the pleasure principle is not redeemed. There is guilt over a deed that has not been accomplished: liberation (Marcuse, 1974, p.68).

In re-establishing the order of the father and in his deification the domination-liberation-domination dialectic is set in motion. In a dual sense, for the sons the pleasure principle becomes a source of both anxiety and terror and every successive stage of domination takes an ever more insulating attitude toward pleasure, until finally, in our era, a shift in the instinctual relations themselves comes about (Marcuse, 1974, pp.63-67). The more progress, the more guilt—as can be seen in both Freud's theory of instincts and Hegel's conception of subject formation—as there is guilt attached to both the revolutionary act, the murder of the father as well as the reinstitution of his power; a betrayal of their revolutionary ideals (Marcuse, 1974, pp.77-80).[10]

Due to the enormous amount of progress that is enjoyed in the late industrial era the various means in which the instincts are curbed appear rational, so much so that today the life and death instincts no longer seem at odds. Marcuse writes:

> …the instinctual energy thus withdrawn does not accrue to the (unsublimated) aggressive instincts because its social utilization (in labour) sustains and even enriches the life of the individual. The restrictions imposed upon the libido appear as the more rational, the more universal they become, the more they permeate the whole society. They operate on the individual as external objective laws and as internalized force: the societal authority is absorbed into the 'conscience' and into the unconscious of the individual and works as his own desire, morality and fulfillment (Marcuse, 1974, p.45).

This move is so totalizing that it in fact no longer registers as repression but as the objectively determined, 'normal', or 'common sense'—in so far as nuclear armament, mass poverty and environmental degradation, to name but a few, are 'normal' or 'common sense'—order of the social world; its rationalization can be shown empirically, in the material comforts we experience every day, and its unitary schematic expressed in the language of scientific rationality appears theoretically sound. In modernity the overabundance of means and objects give repressive society the power to regulate enjoyment as never before; an entire coercive apparatus exists to ensure that enjoyment occurs only in avenues which are not ultimately disruptive of the labour process. This labour process is itself continuously creating new objects of enjoyment, further fusing individuals to its alienating nature in the pursuit of the limited pleasures it guarantees. Hence, according to Marcuse, 'culture' for Freud, is the curbing and rechanneling of instinctual drives into their socially useful forms which promise greater pleasures, although a pleasure which is never fully realized. In other words, the very fact that the instincts strive for gratification is also the root of its continual deferral. In concrete terms, this means that immediate satisfaction becomes delayed satisfaction; pleasure becomes restraint, receptiveness becomes

subject formation I will not venture into a detailed discussion of the structure of Freud's tripartite psyche.

9 For a more detailed discussion of this in Freud see his *Totem and Taboo*: Resemblances Between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics.

10 For another interesting parallel see Marcuse's discussion of Hegel's take on the French Revolution in his *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*.

productiveness and nonrepression becomes security.

But this is where Marcuse breaks with Freud. Although he agrees with him that immediate gratification is incommensurate with the reality principle as material existence necessitates work, he argues that specific historical formations ensconce forms of repression over and above what is required to meets material demands. In other words, Marcuse accepts the general schematic of Freud's theory of instincts but criticizes him for ignoring the class character of instinctual gratification, as well as the shifting historical dynamics which alter specific configurations of the reality principle, adding that perhaps social conditions could be altered, and societal progress and instinctual gratification are perhaps not, as Freud assumes, forever doomed to incommensurability.

In Freud there is a lack of distinction between what is historical and what is biological. Marcuse argues that without an appreciation for history, Freud reifies historical repression as biological thereby concluding that it is inevitable. In introducing the distinction between what is required biologically and historically, Marcuse introduces two new terms: 'surplus-repression', the restrictions dictated by the social form, over and above the basic repression required for the individual to perpetuate existence, and the 'performance principle', the prevailing historical form of the reality principle (Marcuse, 1974, pp.2-35). Marcuse writes:

> Throughout the recorded history of civilization, the instinctual constraint enforced by scarcity has been intensified by constraints enforced by the hierarchical distribution of scarcity and labour; the interest of domination added surplus-repression to the organization of the instincts under the reality principle. The pleasure principle was dethroned not only because it militated against progress in civilization, but also because it militated against a civilization whose progress perpetuates domination and toil (Marcuse, 1974, p.18).

In other words, the hostility of nature and the scarcity of resources require a certain level of repression but specific manifestations of the reality principle, the performance principle, arise to serve the interests of a particular group. This would suggest that if the root causes of suffering are at least partially historical then perhaps there exists a chance to alter them. Marcuse writes:

> Does the interrelation between freedom and repression, productivity and destruction, domination and progress, really constitute the principle of civilization? Or does this interrelation result only from a specific historical organization of human existence? In Freudian terms, is the conflict between pleasure principle and reality principle irreconcilable to such a degree that it necessitates the repressive transformation of man's instinctual structure? Or does it allow the concept of a non-repressive civilization, based on a fundamentally different experience of being, a fundamentally different relation between man and nature, and fundamentally different existential relations? (Marcuse, 1974, pp.3-4)

In introducing this notion of surplus-repression Marcuse is fusing Freud with Marx. In Marx, historically classes arise who have antagonistic material interests, and culture is the expression of both the dominant economic interests—the specific mode of domination—and also as the expression of the desire of the underclass to transform the world into a shape that will allow the intellectual and material interests to be better managed. Marcuse writes:

> …various modes of domination (of man and nature) result in various historical forms of the reality principle…These differences affect the very content of the reality principle, for every form of the reality principle must be embodied in a system of societal institutions and relations, laws and values which transmit and enforce the required 'modifications' of the instincts (Marcuse, 1974, p.37).

Surplus-repression refocuses the discussion onto the institutions which make up the social body as it is this which appears differently in different versions of the reality principle. To once again invoke Marx, Marcuse writes that "alienated labour is the negation of the pleasure principle" (Marcuse, 1974, pp.44-45). Under the performance principle, pleasure is only released under very specific time constraints and is only allowed to unfold in ways that support the perpetuation of the labour process (Marcuse, 1974, p.47). This is not to say that work is contrary to Eros, for all societies require work, but it is the version of work embodied in the performance principle to which Eros is the antithesis. Thus alienated labour, in the Marxian understanding of the concept, *is* the performance principle (Marx, 1978). A full portrait of what society would look like without alienated labour is not provided by Marx or Marcuse but we can surmise that it would attempt to reconstruct work in a manner which allows a freer exposition of human creativity. It would also be an organization of work aimed solely at satisfying the needs for societal progress—basic repression—and not aimed at the perpetuation of the dominance of one class over another.

In previous epochs when toil was still necessitated by scarcity, happiness, sexuality, art and entertainment all enjoyed a place as escapes from the drudgery of work. Today, when the need for toil is greatly diminished (at least theoretically diminished due to automation) surplus repression turns these escapes into their opposite and they enter into its service. In a sense, the individual is never left alone for, in Marcuse's words:

> …left to itself, and supported by a free intelligence aware of the potentialities of liberation from the reality of repression, the libidinal energy generated by the id would thrust against its ever more extraneous limitations and strive to engulf an ever larger field of existential relations, thereby exploding the reality ego and its repressive performance (Marcuse, 1974, p.48).

Only in "the perversions", those aspects of sexuality which are not aimed at genital reproduction and which share an affinity with phantasy, does the psyche clash with the reality principle. They threaten to establish libidinal relationships which are hostile to work and are "…a symbol of the destructive identity between freedom and happiness" (Marcuse, 1974, pp.49-50).

Yet, the very fact that these alienated modes of thinking exist suggest that the trauma of the replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle occurs again and again, indicating that its victory over the pleasure principle is never complete. Marcuse argues that the pleasure principle in fact survives as the "tabooed and subterranean history of civilization", thus necessitating ever increasing repression (Marcuse, 1974, p.15). In Marcuse surplus-repression arises as a function of the reality principle's incomplete victory over the pleasure principle and its latest guise has become increasingly rationalized and directed at a singular purpose more so than ever before the stratification of society according to competitive economic interests, and the universal expansion of the marketplace.

In both Hegel and Freud the ego develops as the agent of "reflexive foresight" and has an interest in its own productivity and economic autonomy. Reason is a "purely formal entity"; it is neutral with respect to ends, its essence is calculation. Consequently, the individual's understating unfolds on the ground of individual self-preservation and mastery over the object; self-interest underpins epistemology and the bourgeois mentality is framed as logical and natural, powerful over the objects of nature, powerless to alter this arrangement of domination. The mind/body dualism of modernity plays into this as the material world is one of contradiction, repression, irrationality. In "Concept of Essence" Marcuse writes:

> As long as philosophy does not adopt the idea of a real transformation, the critique of reason stops at the status quo and becomes a critique of pure thought. The uncertainty and unfreedom of the external world is countered by the certainty and freedom of thought as the individual's only remaining power base (Marcuse, 1988a, p.50).

From Descartes on the mind alone is the realm of freedom and certainty while everything external to it is transitory and uncertain. We react to this precariousness by seeking a unity or harmony in thought when such harmony is not available to us in our material existence. As Marcuse points out in "On Hedonism", knowledge of the 'whole', the ensemble of social relations, is antithetical to happiness, more akin to misery and individuals of the bourgeois era feel unable to change it and resign themselves to the limited gratifications which are attainable. As a correlate to this, Marx was always clear that industrial society is both progressive and liberal compared to what came before, but its tolerance can only extend to those pursuits which are in line with the functioning of the market. For example, Western society has greatly expanded in its tolerance for relatively liberated sexualities as long as it is expressed in channels which do not aim to shatter the whole, or at the very least forms of sexuality which are as yet deemed radical, stay hidden. Psychoanalytically we afforded higher degrees of a release of instinctual energy, but only in increasingly sublimated forms.

Conclusion: Reconciliation, Reason and Happiness

And yet, 'Reason; and 'Happiness' share an affinity as they both look to the unrealized potentiality within present historical conditions; reason speaks of the development of productive forces allowing for the free, rational shaping of the conditions of life and happiness seeks the fulfillment of individual wants and needs and emancipation from an inhuman labour process (Marcuse, 1988b, pp.162-167). Marcuse is hopeful in suggesting that this growth of happiness has happened in conjunction with shifts in this labour process, freeing more and more people from toil, potentially leading to a boiling point where the continued demand for happiness can no longer be met by the market, forging a demand for something beyond our present conditions. Thus the demand for happiness is actually among the most radical. Marcuse writes that in the Marxian dialectic happiness is manifested as the positive content of materialism. He continues:

> Historical materialism appeared at first as a denunciation of the materialism prevalent in bourgeois society, and the materialist principle was in this respect a critical instrument of expose directed against a society that enslaved men to the blind mechanisms of material production. The idea of the free and universal realization of individual happiness, per contra, denoted an *affirmative* materialism, that is to say, an affirmation of the material satisfaction of man (Marcuse, 1999, p.295).

All Marxian concepts unfold on two levels, both the critique of actually existing conditions and their eventual dissolution into something new. This two-fold approach determines Marx's analysis of the labour process (Marcuse, 1999, pp.295-296). Since alienated labour appears as such only in light of its dissolution, then an analysis of the labour process is also an analysis of its abolition. Marx is thus always examining contemporary society with a view to its destruction. Referring to Marx's categories of analysis, Marcuse writes:

> His categories are negative and at the same time positive: they present a negative state of affairs in the light of its positive solution, revealing the true situation in existing society as the prelude to its passing into a new form (Marcuse, 1999, p.295).

As outlined above, the reality principle's victory over the pleasure

principle is never complete and the pleasure principle lives on as the "subterranean history", fantasy, dreams, memory (Marcuse, 1974, p.15). In each successive stage of repression, its promise is unfulfilled and true progress—by 'true', meaning progress that would have a more non-repressive flavour—is forever deferred. The "subterranean" history is the remainder of the incomplete identification of the individual and the whole. The unconscious is the drive for "integral gratification"; it is the immediate identity of necessity and freedom. In Freud, this identification is tabooed by the conscious, but upheld in the unconscious. Marcuse writes that "its truth…continues to haunt the mind"; it preserves the memory of past stages when gratification was more readily or immediately available, and it generates a wish for a time when this paradise will be resurrected (Marcuse, 1974, p.18). "The memory of gratification", as Marcuse describes it, "is at the origin of all thinking, and the impulse to recapture past gratification is the hidden driving power behind the process of thought" (Marcuse, 1974, p.31). The past is never entirely forgotten; memory explodes the rationality of the reality principle. "The *'recherche du temps perdu'* becomes the vehicle of future liberation", this, according to Marcuse, is the hidden trend in psychoanalysis (Marcuse, 1974, p.19).

References

Adorno, T. (2003). *Negative Dialectics*. New York: Continuum.

Freud, S.(2002). *Civilization and its Discontents*. London: Penguin Books.

Freud, S. (2003). *Modern Classics: Beyond The Pleasure Principle*. Penguin Books.

Freud, S. (2009). *Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics*. Eastford CT: Martino Fine Books.

Hegel, G.W.F. (2001). *The Philosophy of History*. Kitchener, ON: Batoche Books

Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T.W. (2002). *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Horkheimer, M. (1995). Materialism and Morality, *Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Marcuse, H. (1974). *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Marcuse, H. (1969). *An Essay on Liberation*. London: Allen Lane.

Marcuse, H. (1988a). Concept of Essence. *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*. London: Free Association Books.

Marcuse, H. (1988b). On Hedonism. *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*. London: Free Association Books.

Marcuse. H. (1991). *One-Dimensional Man*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Marcuse, H. (1999). *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. Amherst: Humanity Books.

Marx, Karl. (1978). R.C. Tucker (Ed.). Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. *The Marx-Engels Reader*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

gregory c. flemming

Meditations of the Socialist Dream: Psychoanalysis, Psychology, and the Political Organization of a Discipline

By Gregory C. Flemming, York University

Abstract *Many Marxists have argued that social organization is that by which practical and theoretical problems are mediated. It becomes clear that this is not only true of strictly political problems when looking at the history of the Canadian Psychological Association in the context of a general history of the creation of psychology as a discipline. Professional associations act as means of differentiating one discipline from another, of determining its objects of knowledge, and securing markets for its products. Organizational questions are thus not secondary for the theories and practices of psychology, but something to be kept constantly in view. Knowing this to be so it becomes imperative to critique the governing principles of these bodies. In this paper this is done with reference to professional ethics. Where in Canada these are clearly a liberal, rather than socialist, discourse, psychoanalysis is evoked for a suggestive alternative. Turning to the work of Fenichel and Lacan, it is possible to forefront the relation between theory, practice, and the aims of psychology as the relationship between people rather than as one between subjects and objects. The implication of this assertion is the need to reorganize professional associations in line with the needs of human interaction rather than market imperatives.*

Organization is the form of the mediation between theory and practice. And, as in every dialectical relationship, the terms of the relation only acquire concreteness and reality in and by virtue of this mediation (Lukács, 1971: p. 299).

There's absolutely no reason why we should make ourselves the guarantors of the bourgeois dream (Lacan, 1997: p. 303).

I begin with these two quotes – one from a practicing Marxist, the other from a practicing psychoanalyst – as a way to articulate a thesis: It is not merely a question of how a patient is treated or cured, or of the theory that informs what is done in the clinical setting; It is also very much a question of how the profession and therefore the psychological disciplines are organized. The question of organization is precisely the question that helps properly formulate these other two. This is so because it is tightly tied to the problem of ends. It's tied to the problem of *political* ends.

To elaborate this thesis I first attempt to establish that the ends of psychological practice are indeed political, that they do not involve merely the individual but also the individual's constitution through their social world. This is followed by a discussion of the work of German psychoanalyst Otto Fenichel and his suggestion that psychoanalysis could serve as a basis for the creation of a dialectical materialist psychology – not as a replacement of other psychological practices, but as a means to explain their effectivity and their relation to society at large. I critique his position for leaving out a discussion of how the prevention of neuroses could be achieved via the practice of psychoanalysis, of how the clinic and the rest of the social world might be mediated in such a way to effect each other. As a means to elaborate how this might be the case, the history of the Canadian Psychological Association is briefly discussed to show that the way the discipline of psychology is organized at the national level in Canada affects what the discipline is and how it is practiced. I rely largely on the work of John Dunbar, in which he suggests the introduction of the CPA's *Code of Ethics* in 1977 transformed the CPA and what it meant to be a psychologist in Canada. While acknowledging some of the progressive elements of this development, I critique it for its limitations. Based as it is in the discourse of human rights the CPA's *Code* does introduce the question of the social role of psychology into the practice of the profession; without acknowledging the limits of this liberal discourse, however, and the way it is put into practice, these rights can never actually be achieved.

Knowing that the organization of the discipline affects what it is and how it is practiced, and that there are real political limits to

the efficacy of liberal forms, I consider a potential Marxist alternative to the question of organization and the outcomes of psychological practice. Here I turn to the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. It was Lacan's contention, made with reference to the thought of Marx, that the ends of analysis were not to integrate people into the bourgeois world and help them achieve the 'American dream', but to have them confront the truth of their existence. The end of the analytic treatment was thus, for Lacan, the creation not only of an individual who did not rely on the 'big Other' to furnish the elements of the 'good life', but also thereby another psychoanalyst who would work to help others achieve the same approach to the world. The end of analysis was thus the creation of a new sort of individual *and* a new sort of community. This is evident not just in Lacan's theory, but also the history of his tussles with the psychoanalytic associations of his day. All of this suggests that an alternative to liberal-democratic organization is possible and worth serious consideration when discussing the practical and theoretical issues that arise in the psychological disciplines.

Psychoanalysis, Psychology, War, and Politics

To assert that the ends of any psychological endevour are political is not something particularly new. This is most clearly discernible in relation to war: in an Austrian court During the First World War Freud testified against the nationalist commitment of army doctors whose analyses were used as a means to send soldiers back to the front or deny them their pensions. Freud wrote that in this way 'medicine was serving purposes foreign to its essence.'[1] That is, rather than helping soldiers – who today might be diagnosed with PTSD – overcome their traumas, German and Austro-Hungarian army psychologists 'aimed above all, at restoring his [the soldier's] fitness for service.' In the hands of the state the psychologist becomes a weapon: '[T]he physicians were put into a role like that of machine guns behind the front, of driving fugitives back' (Freud in Brunner, 2000, p. 311).

In another better known example, French psychiatrist Frantz Fanon offered analyses of colonialism that didn't separate the questions of political domination, liberation and the psyche, but articulated them as a complex whole. In his *Wretched of the Earth*, for example, his treatment of France's colonization of Algeria culminates in a discussion of its psychological effects in terms of both the colonized and the agents of colonization. It was his contention that the task set for the psychiatric institutions that proliferated with the colonial project in Algeria – the task of 'making him [the colonized subject] thoroughly fit into a social environment of the colonial type' – was 'difficult' because the colonial project reduced the colonized population to objects, to a humanless part of the environment that was no different from land or camel (Fannon, 2004: p. 181-2). The answer to curing the psychological afflictions wrought by colonialism was thus not simply psychiatry or psychoanalysis, but revolution and the overthrow of the European occupier. This was not just Fanon's analysis – in the course of his work he joined the national liberation movement. (For a short overview of Fanon and some of his contemporaries, see Hook, 2005; see also Teo, 2005).

More recently, an American psychoanalyst attempted to organize against the unethical involvement of members of the American Psychological Association (APA) in the ongoing torture of political prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. He reported that psychologists are there being used not to ensure that prisoners are being properly treated, but aiding in the torture of detainees. Here the question of organization starts to become clear: while the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Association publicly urged its members to refuse to do such work, the APA fought to protect its members' ability to participate in such matters of 'national security' (Summers, 2007). As a result, the Pentagon reported a preference for members of the APA for its interrogations (Soldz, 2007).[2]

In a related and uncanny example – uncanny in that it stands as an inverted image of the myriad attempts of Marxists, psychologists and psychoanalysts to bring the two together – Naomi Klein (2008) argues that the work done by American psychologist Ewen Cameron at McGill University in Montreal became the psychological backbone of American economic and military imperialism. In her account, the psychology pioneered by Cameron and used by the CIA is homologous to the logic underlying the neoliberal economic theories of the likes of Volker: raze the economy, raze the individual, and rebuild them to your liking. She outlines how the US has used this vicious method – what she calls the 'shock doctrine' – all over the planet, from Eastern Europe to South America to the Middle East.

But the politics of the psychological disciplines are not limited to its relationship to colonialism, imperial projects and war: Morawski (1982) discusses how some of psychology's early practitioners and theorists – G. Stanley Hall, Hugo Münsterberg, and John B. Watson in particular – saw their work as consistent with and part of a larger project to transform their own societies. It is only more recently that psychology's political role has been neglected. Speaking of this forgetfulness in relation to postmodernism and the rise of evolutionary biology, Conway (2010) explores the political economy of psychology to explain the turn away from an understanding of the social etiology of psychological disorders (i.e. poverty). He concludes that it is in part the result of governments' unwillingness to see the social depth of the problem coupled with drug companies' interests in selling a cheaper, alternative individualist solution (i.e. medication) that

1 Freud's testimony makes it clear that this essence is some form of liberal humanism. This will be problematized later in this paper when the discourse of human rights is discussed.

2 For an interesting take on the relationship of psychology and torture, see De Vos (2011).

allows it to be avoided in practice.

Further in this vein, in his discussion of the historical roots of psychology Danziger (1990) shows that the discipline's pretensions to scientism disguise its social nature and genesis. Danziger argues that psychology's roots in philosophy and its search for the causal mechanisms behind individual human psychology (as seen in Wundt's Liepzig laboratory) were displaced by functionalism and statistical analysis of aggregates abstracted from social reality in part because of the demands of the capitalist market: The development of statistical methods and their adoption by psychologists enabled them to 'convince their publics that they represented the sacred spirit of Science' (p. 119), publics which in the 1920s in the United States were administrators who were looking for means of social control. In particular, this trend took hold in relation to education, which people in power wanted to transform in order to meet the needs of a burgeoning corporate industrialism. One of the major effects of this, according to Danziger, is that what were initially taken to be 'participants' in psychological inquiry quickly became 'subjects' – passive elements upon which the psychologist (experimental or otherwise) acted. This has had effects on psychological research that are still very visible today. All of this points to the fact that the ends, theories, and practices of the psychological disciplines are an interrelated political problem. We are not just dealing with a scientific – or more accurately, technocratic – question, that of the correct pill or physical regimen, but also that of the relationship between the individual, the psychological disciplines per se, and the social.

Prevention = Psychoanalysis + the Professional Associations

The work of psychoanalyst Otto Fenichel puts an interesting spin on this, one that takes us from the theatre of war and the economy to that of the clinic. He was a practicing analyst who wrote a highly influential textbook entitled *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses* that was published in English in 1945. In its final chapter he outlines how treatments that do not take into account the relationship between the physician and the patient – a relationship, as I noted, that has become one of expert and object – can lead to substitute neuroses that perpetuate, aggravate or only temporarily alleviate the problem at hand (Fenichel, 1945, p. 557-9). While focusing his discussion on transference effects, he also argues that the neuroses are not merely the result of the biological disposition of the patient, but also the contradictions present in their social world. He takes several pages to note that the lived contradictions of capitalism are in great part what makes neuroses what they are. In decidedly Marxist fashion, he writes 'it is characteristic of the present day society that many people are not able to satisfy their needs, although the means for their satisfaction are present' (p. 587). In this way he is able to say that neuroses are as such a 'social disease' (p. 586).

There is perhaps nothing terribly original in this either, considering it appeared during the thirties and forties. As Harris (1996) notes, in the United States at this same time psychologists from many orientations claimed their own theoretical bend as compatible with Marxism. The reason Fenichel in particular is given space here is because he held that while other psychotherapies could at times be more effective than psychoanalysis, it was only psychoanalysis that could give an account of 'the effectiveness of *all* psychotherapies' (Fenichel, 1945, p. 554). Knowing Fenichel's Marxist disposition (which he for the most part kept hidden – see Jacoby (1983)), it's not hard to take this in the spirit of a Marxist dedication to the understanding of 'the totality.'[3] Psychoanalysis might be taken as the means to best understand human psychology because it is a conceptualization that sees the individual as constituted through the particular metabolism established between itself and the social and natural world.

This can more clearly be seen in another piece written by Fenichel around the time of the English release of *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses*. In a paper unpublished in his lifetime Fenichel (1967) wrote that psychoanalysis was the only human science that 'could be considered the nucleus of a dialectical-materialist psychology' (p. 300). His primary concern when he wrote this was to point out the need for 'prophylaxis' (i.e. prevention) at the social level rather than simply treatment at the personal level. However, while he raises the question of the economic interests of clinicians and their relation to this end, while he addresses the question of the applicability of a supposedly 'bourgeois science' to the working class,[4] while he raises questions about the organization of the state's 'ideology mills' in relation to the psychology of those living under capitalism, Fenichel's take is somewhat mechanical. He doesn't answer the question of how prevention might actually be achieved in practice, how the clinic and the social world might be *mediated*. As such, he builds a door that opens onto an understanding of 'the totality,' but forgets to add the hinges.

It seems to me that the question of the relation of the clinic and the political can be posed in three ways. First, there is the question of political advocacy outside the clinic. A practitioner could be a member of a political group, even one composed solely of other practitioners, and not have it directly affect their clinical practice in the least. Second, there is the question of how politics is approached within the analytic/clinical situation. This might mean including a *political* history of the patient in their overall history, and attending to transferences in this light. Thirdly – and this is the more dialectical option, the hinge on the door that will be taken up in the most detail – there is the question of how the

3 I.e. the assertion that reality is not composed of unrelated parts, but is composed of reciprocally mediating 'distinctions within a unity' (Marx, 1973, p. 99-101).

4 On this question Fenichel briefly brings up the free clinics that were organized in Vienna and elsewhere. For a much fuller treatment of the subject, see Danto's *Freud's Free Clinics* (2005).

psychological professions are organized. This last option opens the question of the profession's relationship to the economy, the state, fellow practitioners, different racialized groups, social classes, and last but not least their patients. As a result it also aims at what happens in research and clinical practice and the ends of that research and practice.

The first of these possible approaches is fairly familiar. Examples include Psychoanalysts for the Prevention of Nuclear War in Britain in the 1990s, Physicians for Human Rights today in the United States, or some such other group found in civil society. Here one's professional standing is used as a means to influence wider goings-on. This solution to the problem of prophylaxis is an external one: actions outside the clinic are aimed at changing society, which would presumably in turn positively affect all members of it and their psychological wellbeing. While such groups serve a purpose, here the clinic and the political world are separated from each other in practice; Here politics is 'outside' and bringing it in forbidden.

Politics *could*, of course, directly affect what happens in clinical practice, could be brought 'in' – hence its mention in the Canadian Psychological Association's code of ethics (see for instance article III.31). Here the vulnerability of the patient is at issue, as one's interests might influence clinical outcomes in negative ways: patients could be unscrupulously manipulated by their physicians for the latter's own personal economic and political ends – consciously or not. As Botticelli points out in a review of *Psychoanalysis, Class and Politics*, bringing politics directly into the clinic raises complications as the spectre of transference: In many of the clinical examples presented in the book, 'patients came to express views or act in the world in a way that moved them closer to the attitudes of which they might imagine their therapist would approve' (Botticelli, 2007, p.198). This is to suggest that the transference was not adequately dealt with, and as such the political outcomes of these analyses suspect.

A means of properly addressing this concern is proposed by Samuels in *The Political Psyche* (1993). He suggests that it's not only a matter of discussing political topics as they arise, but also constructing a *political* history of the analysand. In this way any particular political topic is tied into their psychological history, and provides a greater basis by which to work through the transference when it arises. In a discussion of an ad-hoc survey that he sent out to 11 psychological/psychoanalytic associations around the globe (including Brazil, Israel, Russia, The U.S. and Britain), Samuels shows that there are three approaches that analysts took to political question as they arose in practice: they either ignored the political content of analysands' statements and took them merely as symbolic grist for the transference, acknowledged the political concerns as such (e.g. the bombing of Iraq being a terrible thing), or did both. This suggests that political content in analysis could be dealt with progressively by 1) acknowledging that politics is not merely a sign to interpret but exists as a real concern outside of the clinical setting; 2) the analysand has a particular relationship with those political questions and events and this relationship is tied into the analysand's political history; 3) the analyst's political position – both material (i.e. class, race, gender…) and theoretical ("I'm a Marxist") – and those of the analysand meet in the transference and must be taken into account when working through it.

There are some problems with this formulation, however: Samuels suggestions are conceptualized at the individual level (i.e. that between a clinician and a patient), and not that of the collective. In addition, Samuels (1993) announces his is a libertarian project (p. 50), and so the outcomes of clinical practice are couched in terms of the 'development' of the individual's ego – yet another example of the importance of politics in relation to clinical ends. He does, however, point towards the possibility that group therapy is perhaps a better type of treatment in general, and gestures towards the question of organization in acknowledging that the training of professionals needs to take into account the political. He saw the lack of discussion on this topic at the level of the official organs of the discipline as particularly marked, often times calling psychoanalysis a conservative profession.

It is professional associations that in large part maintain the standards of training and practice in a discipline, and therefore what is practiced and how. This points in the direction of the third possible approach to the political ends of clinical and experimental/theoretical work: changing the professional organization of the psychological disciplines. With this in mind I now turn to the history of an actually existing professional body – the Canadian Psychological Association (CPA).

Liberal Organization, the Market, and Ethics

Dunbar (1992)[5] shows that in the beginning the CPA was a means to consolidate psychology as a profession *per se*, one that was separate from and no longer subject to psychiatry. In post-war Canada there was an increase in the demand for psychological services by governments and private interests, but it was unclear what a psychologist did (as opposed to a social worker, teacher, or a member of the clergy…), how they were trained to do it, and who could rightly call themselves a psychologist. As a result, those who practiced psychology were subordinated to psychiatrists and paid substantially less. Professional organization was thus a means to secure not only the legitimacy of one's discipline and define its scope against other practitioners, but also the economic worth of that discipline.

As in other Western countries, Canadian professional associations and their stated standards of practice were a means to establish psychology as a legitimate discipline with a legitimate commod-

5 For a condensed account of this history, see Dunbar (1998).

ity to offer to the public.[6] In Canada this took the particular form of using the American Psychological Association's standards and its ethics code, in part to secure a place for Canadian researchers and practitioners at home as well as in the marketplace and psychological journals south of the border.

Other particularities of the Canadian case include elements of the British North America Act that left the regulation of professional conduct to the provinces – thereby precluding a national association from doing this – and the Canadian government's financial support of psychological research in Canadian universities. While the former made it difficult to establish nationwide standards, the latter circumstance led to the privileging of pure rather than applied research. In effect, it encouraged the development of a theoretical psychology that had little or no relation to practical psychology. This in turn led to the marginalization of practitioners within the CPA and their concerns about training standards.

Practitioners, too, had a close relationship with the state that caused problems for them: where many worked in publicly run institutions (for example hospitals and prisons) there arose a conflict between practitioners' desire to aid their patients in terms of communication with multiple stakeholders and *community* welfare, and the state's bureaucratic machinery – a machinery that demanded more immediately measurable goals and outcomes.[7]

According to Dunbar, the code of ethics devised by the CPA in 1977 addressed (though perhaps did not solve) all these problems, thereby ending the CPA's struggle to become the national representative of Canadian psychology. While provincial and territorial regulatory bodies are left to certify individual practitioners, the CPA has the role of accrediting training programs, publishing professional journals, and advocating on behalf of the discipline. The *Code* enabled this with reference to the discourse of human rights: where previous codes and of ethics were *reactive* in the sense that they outlined what not to do, this code was *productive* in that it could be used 'to actively generate new normative conceptions of what constitutes socially responsible professional practice' (Dunbar, p. 333-334). It can thus be used as a starting point from which to devise standards of practice, justify certain conceptions of psychology to both the public and the state, as well as solve particular ethical cases as they arise. What gives the Canadian *Code* this unique characteristic, according to Dunbar, is that it concerns itself with social responsibility. This is manifest in its inclusion as the last of its four principles.

A comparison with the code currently used by he APA is instructive here: the APA's code almost immediately asserts (in article 1.02) that in questions of ethics, the law and the state trump ethical considerations (APA, 2002). By contrast, the Canadian Code demands that a psychologist speak out or act against laws and policies that are unethical (article IV.29); it includes the political injunction to 'encourage others, in a manner consistent with this *Code*, to exercise responsibility to society' (article IV.30); it demands that psychologists be aware of social and political climates (article IV.25), and that all research, service development, interpretation, information gathering and teaching material be 'sensitive to the needs, current issues, and problems of society' (article IV.20) (CPA, 2000).

What begins to become clear from this is that the question of organization affects not only the economic place of the discipline in society, but also its perceived goals, its research, and its practice. The work of Bazerman (1988) is further instructive on this point: he shows that the development of both the natural and social sciences is tied to the rise of the scientific journal and the forms and standards of knowledge production that it reinforces. Beginning with the publications of the Royal Society, for example, he shows the gradual move from the simple reporting of natural phenomena to the writing of tracts on particular theoretical problems and hypotheses, attributing the change – and the development of experimental science itself –in large part to the act of debating over results. Doing so demanded more precision in the reporting of scientific activity, thereby giving experiments 'an argumentative function' in place of the past practice of giving what were thought to be 'transparent' reports of phenomena (p. 68).

This form of knowledge production was taken over by the social sciences, and in some instances rigidly codified. He argues that the extensive *Publication Manual* provided for authors who wish to write for the journals published by the American Psychological Association 'offers a programmatically correct way to discuss the phenomena under study; moreover, it stabilizes the roles, relationships, goals, and activity of individuals within the research community in ways consistent with the community's belief about human behaviour' (p. 275). As noted above, journals produced by the CPA are a means to secure its legitimacy as a profession in the eyes of the public and the state. The implication to be emphasized in this regard is that to be considered a legitimate psychologist one must follow the rules set by the professional association and produce the types of knowledge that have been deemed fit by means of it (See also Danziger, 1990, p. 179-197).

In this light it should then be considered highly significant that in 1977 the CPA took an explicit turn towards the social and political in its newly minted code of ethics. Before patting the back of the CPA for doing so, however, there are several things to be noted,

6 The CPA recently reported that this year it has been, among other things, lobbying the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council to allow graduate students in clinical psychology to apply for funding, talking to the Federal Government about providing psychological services to its thousands of civil servants, and preparing briefs on government budgets with other national professional associations (CPA, 2010).

7 For a discussion of how public employees more generally embody the contradiction between human welfare and the economic and political needs of the state, see Stephanie Ross's history of the founding of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (Ross, 2005).

each of which point to the limits of liberal conceptions of the subject and reveal an opening that can be developed in a Marxian direction. First, there is the question how the *Code* is used. In a comparative study of psychologists' relation to professional ethics in Canada and Cuba, Rossiter et al. (2002)[8] attempt to show that the approach to ethics in the two countries differs widely: Canadian practitioners see ethics as a set of technical procedures that are used to solve ethical problems as they arise in clinical situations, and to maintain the 'reputation or the security of the organization' in which psychology is practiced (p. 541). In this way ethics is limited to the clinical situation and separated from 'outside' politics and social problems. Cuban practitioners, by contrast, see the practice of psychology as itself an ethics, as the attempt to 'implement the values of the revolution in everyday life' (p. 543). Where in Cuba the practice of ethics as the practice of psychology is seen as a contribution to national values of solidarity and social justice, in Canada 'outcome-based ethics constructs practice as a neutral professional endevour' (p. 542). That is, in Canada ethics are subordinated to the logic of liberal 'neutrality' and the logic of the market.

Further, as Dobson and Breault (1998) suggest in their brief review of the regulation of ethics in Canada, the *Code* is not used to the same degree by each provincial psychological association: It is often used in conjunction with other codified standards and provincial laws, and in British Columbia has not been officially adopted at all. In their view, the *Code* functions mostly as a useful educational and training tool, an 'aspirational document,' and a minimum standard to consider in the event of complaints – legal and otherwise.

This is the point at which one need be reminded that the ethics developed by the CPA is used as a means to provide the CPA with legitimacy: the *Code* is used as a means to negotiate the way psychologists deliver their services for the government; the *Code* is an ethical basis from which to lobby for research monies; the *Code* provided the means of securing the unification of the national *market* for psychological services by establishing a set of national standards that could potentially replace the myriad, conflicting training and other standards set by the provincial associations. As such it is not a neutral tool that can do no harm, but a one that is used to further goals within a capitalist society.

The second problem is that this is clearly an organization based on liberal ideals, and as a consequence suffers from liberalism's failures. The CPA's ethics code includes in writing what Badiou, in his *Ethics* (2002), argues is one of the limits of the liberal discourse of difference and human rights: it allows only differences that do not challenge the status quo, that do not really make a difference. The CPA's ethics code constantly calls for a respect of difference, including the political injunction to 'encourage others […] to respect the dignity of persons and to expect respect for their own dignity' (article I.46). However, it also states that this respect need not be adhered to if doing so contravenes the *Code* (article IV.16). Where the *Code* is based on the liberal discourse of human rights, anything that is not compatible with it (i.e. different conceptions of what it means to be human in the first place; the idea of a collective or a non-liberal subject) are ruled out from the beginning.[9]

This isn't to say that the discourse of human rights is without a progressive element. For example, in his fight against the APA's position in regards to the involvement of psychologists at Guantanamo (referred to above), Summers argues that the absence of any reference to human rights in the APA's ethics code serves as a reactionary loophole. Similarly, István Mészáros (1986) argues that in capitalist society the discourse of human rights serves as a means of advocating for self-realization in opposition 'to the forces of dehumanization and increasingly more destructive material domination' and as such 'remains a concern of paramount importance for all socialists' (p. 210). This because any Marxist must acknowledge the material effects of thought, ideology, and political institutions, and not brush them off as 'mere' components of the superstructure. In part, then, the liberals have it right: the question of organization is an important one and the social needs to be included in any organizing principle. But the limits of the liberal discourse of human rights are very real, and demand a move beyond it.

There are at least three failings that can be seen in the CPA's *Code* in this regard. First is in the contradiction between reliance on the subject of science (i.e. the subject as object) and on the liberal subject of ethics (i.e. the autonomous individual). As noted above, Danziger makes much of this, showing that the move from Wundtian to Galton-stlye psychology involved the move from 'participant' to 'subject' (see also Walsh, 1985, p. 26-40; Walsh-Bowers, 1995; for a liberal attempt to overcome this division, see Martin et al, 2010). Second is the assumption that the individual is a separate, mechanical piece of a larger whole. For example, the *Code* talks about respect of other cultures and of politics, but not the social etiology of problems, and 'social responsibility' is the last in a hierarchy of four principles (i.e. it is subordinated to the individual). Lastly, it fails to account for the economic and class imperatives that undermine its ethical goals at the social level, and belie the discipline's practice itself: how can the dignity of the person be respected if they are left destitute by the society they live in? How can psychologists take into account political

8 The limitation of this study, however, is that it relies on practitioners' perceptions of their use of ethics, not their actual practice.

9 John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* – considered an important benchmark of modern liberal thought – is instructive on this point: free speech and liberty hold only for those in 'civilized' countries who have reached the age of majority. Anyone else is considered a barbarian, and can thus justifiably be 'improved' by violent paternal means. It's not incidental that Mill, like his father, was an employee of the East India Company, which had a major role in colonizing India and attempts to 'liberalize' China in the Opium Wars.

climates and problems when funding structures and the imperative to 'publish or perish' favour quantitative, positivist research over qualitative social and political research?

Understanding the importance of professional organization in regards to the discipline of psychology as a discipline and the limits of liberal forms demands that one ask what a socialist psychology might look like at the level not only of its goals, but also at the level of its organization.

A Socialist Alternative?

A potential answer lies in another actually existing theory and practice: that which can be seen in the ideas and career of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. Much as with the development of the professional associations of psychology, the question of the organization of psychoanalysis in France centred on the refusal to be subordinated to other disciplines and a differentiation from them. This included questions of who was allowed to practice, who was allowed to teach, and who should be doing any certifying. In France in the late forties and early fifties this revolved around the question of 'lay analysis.' Following in Freud's footsteps, Lacan argued that psychoanalysis should not be reduced to a medical or neurological science, but include knowledge of the arts and humanities, and be a creative endevour rather than simply a certified, acquired skill (Macey, 1988, p. 87-89; Turkle, 1978, p. 104-5;).

This was no mere passing fancy. Lacan had much to say on these questions, and they appear throughout his *Écrits* and elsewhere. To for a moment sing a rather familiar refrain through the chorus of Hegel and Marx, Lacan held that language stood as Moses and the Profits, the discovery that Freud had made but none of his followers (in Lacan's view) adhered to, at the peril of both psychoanalysis and its analysands. This was a problem not just at the level of theory or practice, but also of organization. In the latter half of 'The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956', for example, Lacan argues that in creating the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) before realizing the role of ego identification in group formations such as the army and Church (i.e. before the writing of *Group Psychology*), Freud undermined 'the objective of tradition and discipline in psychoanalysis', which is 'to call into question their [i.e. tradition and discipline *per se*] very crux, along with man's relation to speech' (Lacan, 2006, p. 397). He goes so far as to suggest that the setting up of the structure of psychoanalytic institutions as a 'democracy' of masters who decided who could become members of the community is what precipitated ego psychology: '…let us not forget that entry into the community of analysts is subjected to the condition of undergoing a training analysis; and there surely must be some reason why the theory of the end of analysis as identification with the analyst's ego first saw the light of day in the circle of training analysts' (p. 398). This is to suggest that it is practice and its organization that *preceed* theory, or at least have a hand that reaches deep into its genesis: 'It is not, in fact, that conceptual rigor and developments in technique are lacking in psychoanalytic works. If they remain so sporadic and even inefficient, it is because of a more profound problem that is due to a singular confusion in the precepts of practice' (p. 386).[10] That is, an organization based on identification with a master's ego (i.e. that of Freud) perpetuated a theory consistent with that organization and the stifling of growth. It is in this light that we should read Lacan's remarks (as in, for example, the 'Rome Discourse') that psychoanalysis had come to resemble a Church.

The problems did not only lie with the organization of psychoanalysis and its theories. In his *Ethics of Psychoanalysis* he takes aim at the demands of the *analysand* that they be provided with the means to properly enjoy commercial goods, that they be cured in such a way as to enjoy the fruits of capitalist society. In turn, he was critical of what he saw as American-style psychoanalysts (i.e. 'ego psychologists') who were willing to validate that expectation by strengthening the ego as a means to better integrate their patients into the American (or bourgeois) dream. In his view, the end of analysis was not happiness and integration, but a confrontation with truth. To push this point Lacan makes use of Marx: The ends of analysis are not 'the good,' nor 'the goods' (i.e. commodities) but instead a challenge to *jouissance* and power. Marx's critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, said Lacan, was of interest because it showed that there was a structural limit that prevented such a idealist state from coming to realization (Lacan, 1997, p. 208-9). This limit is jouissance in its double sense of both affect and access to private property: not only does capitalism prove a limit to the achievement of utilitarian fantasies of 'happiness' and material wealth, to mistakenly associate jouissance with objects rather than *relations* between 'objects'[11] is to mistake the nature of human affect. It is not the object that provides enjoyment, but the processes of desire and drive that do so.

This line of thought is developed in different parts of Lacan's career. Whereas in his *Ethics* he argued that Marx misunderstood the elements of enjoyment that made up affect, in 1968-9 he argued that, in fact, 'surplus-value' and his own conception of 'surplus-enjoyment' were homologous (Lacan, 2002).[12] It was also around this time that Lacan further elaborated his argument that the end of analysis is the end of subjection to both the master – ego psy-

10 Or, as Roudinesco (1990) puts it, in the late forties Lacan hoped "The training analyst would be a theoretician of therapy since technical training governs theoretical intelligence" (p. 225-226).

11 Working out the relation between object and drive in regards to sublimation, Lacan argues that what is at stake is not a mere replacement of one object by another, but a change in the nature of the existing object itself. I.e. 'objects' are not unchanging facts (Lacan, 1992, p. 293).

12 It is this link that becomes the basis of the theories developed by Slavoj Žižek. See the first two chapters of *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (1989) on this point.

chologist and otherwise – and mastery *per se*. That is, the end of analysis is not an egoistic self-mastery, but the end of one's belief in the big Other (institutions, assumptions, and guarantees – a list which Marxists would include capitalism in its various forms[13]) and the creation of a psychoanalyst (Lacan, 2007).

The end of analysis is, as a consequence, the creation of a new sort of subject who is a member of a new sort of community. And seminal to this is psychoanalysis as a 'discourse', a 'social link' that was different from any other to be found in society.

As noted above, this is not apparent only in Lacan's theory but also in his practice, infamous in its challenges to the organization of psychoanalysis as a discipline. This begins with a break with the IPA and the Psychoanalytic Society of Paris (SPP) in 1953 and continues with the repeated creation, transformation, and dissolution of new associations – all of which happened both for, with, and against Lacan. As Turkle points out, in this first break Lacan was not the driving force, but served as a flash-point for discontent in the French psychoanalytic movement. That is, not all those that left the SPP at this time did so because they agreed with his theories. Some did so because he represented a challenge to the medicalizing and bureaucratizing currents in the SPP, as well as its contradictions. Indeed, Roudinesco (1990) points out that a big part of the puzzle of the original break was something of a student revolt (involving Roudinesco's mother) against the way the SPP was treating its trainees (p. 244), rather than a move organized by Lacan. It was only after the break that he resigned from his position at the SPP. What all this points to is that once you conceive of analysis as a something other than a means to strengthen the ego and integrate people into the 'bourgeois dream,' once you conceive of the ends of analysis as the challenging of power and its various masters, clearly you present a problem for an organization that does neither in theory nor in practice. More importantly for socialists, you raise the question of how to collectively organize those whose primary aim is to eliminate reified social systems.

Dolar (2008) takes up this point, arguing that the end of the belief in the big Other is *the* point that psychoanalysis becomes political. Where the end of analysis is the creation of an analyst who is part of a community of analysts who all challenge the Other, the question of the form of that community becomes unavoidable. He glibly asserts that this is the same logic that inheres to the Leninist Party. Zizek, Dolar's comrade, makes a similar comment, writing that Lacan's repeated reformulation of his 'schools' were a 'Leninist move' (Zizek, 2008, p. xcviii). He goes so far as to argue that the form of the Leninist Party is homologous to the form of the analytic relationship.[14] He argues, in a similar vein that has been suggested throughout this paper, that the form of one's activity is not a neutral addition to a social and political horizon, but is instead the creation of a new kind of knowledge and interaction with the world that has transformative power (Zizek, 2002, p. 178-191).[15]

This suggests a way of understanding Fenichel's remarks that psychoanalysis can be used to explain 'the effectiveness of *all* psychotherapies' and 'could be considered the nucleus of a dialectical-materialist psychology,' raised above. This is so because psychoanalysis is at base the question of the relation of the individual to the social. 'From the very first,' Freud wrote in his *Group Psychology*, 'individual psychology […] is at the same time social psychology as well' (Freud, 1959, p. 1). When placed within the context of a Marxist analysis of the social, 'social psychology' becomes the question of how to create a socialist community by creating a new relationship with the world we currently inhabit. Where conditions change, so too must organizations and ways of thinking. Here organizational means, social realities, and political ends mediate each other: a socialist organization must constantly modify its form in response to the immediate social and political contexts in which it finds itself. It must constantly ask and act on the following: what is to be the form of the organization through which we approach the world in order not only to change it, but to best understand it and ourselves in order to properly do so?

This was the question that Lacan posed in regards to psychoanalysis. Like Fenichel, he too asserted that psychoanalysis had something particular to offer the psychological disciplines: 'If psychoanalysis […] is neither the only psychotherapy, nor applicable in all cases, it alone has brought a general theory of psychotherapies and ensures the psychotherapist satisfactory preparation whose basis is the training analysis' (Lacan in Roudinesco, 1990, p. 226). It mustn't be forgotten, however, that similar assertions were also being made in the United States. Shorter (1997) relates the following remarks made by a child psychiatrist who questioned the scientific basis of psychoanalysis at a medical educator's meeting in 1962: 'Just about every eminent figure present rose to defend the primacy of psychoanalysis as "the basic science" of psychiatry' (quoted in Shorter (1997), p. 181). It was in the U.S., from the 1940s to the late 1960s, that psychoanalysts held many of the major chairs in psychiatry, and 'took over much of the apparatus of the American Psychiatric Association' (p. 172). These were the ego-psychologists against which Lacan railed, and who

13 Not everyone draws this conclusion, of course. French Canadian analyst Willy Apollon has what sounds like a liberal understanding of the ends of analysis. For him it is to achieve 'no other regard for the demands of the Other than the symbolic limits of social or citizen coexistence' (Apollon, 2002, p. 140). This can easily be read as liberal negative-freedom, in which one is to let well-enough alone until well-enough infringes on the rights of others.

14 In contrast to the Stalinist version of the Leninist Party, or the misrepresentations that have been offered of Lenin's own efforts (see Lih 2008 on this latter point) Zizek argues that the 'form' of the Party is such that it does not operate as a new 'master' but as a means through which workers come to the truth of their class position by their own work, as does an analysand in Lacanian psychoanalysis. That is, one can not realize oneself without an 'other' with which to interact.

15 This is also, of course, the position of Lukács, with whom I opened the paper. Lukács, too, makes this argument with reference to Lenin and the Party.

dominated psychiatry not by dint of their numbers but because they 'wrote the textbooks, staffed the university departments, and sat on the examination boards' (p. 173). Shorter contends that this happened in no small part because of the desire to move psychiatry away from institutional settings into private, individual practice, and the popularity of psychoanalytic ideas in post-war America. He also excoriates psychoanalysis for dogmatism and an unwillingness to integrate scientific measure and discovery,[16] locating the cause in European émigrés who had close ties to Freud and who were unwilling to let go of the master's ideas – against Freud's own theoretical words (though not organizational actions) to the contrary, which encouraged a more limited role for psychoanalysis and an openness to new discoveries. Shorter thus labels psychoanalyst's post-war hegemony a 'hiatus' rather than a development (See also Engel, 2008 on this history).

Lacan was perhaps then justified in his attacks on the IPA and ego psychology. By some accounts, however, Lacan's own organizational answer to the role of psychoanalysis was a miserable failure: what began as an attempt to create a non-hierarchical organization ended in a tacit hierarchical valuation of theory and practice, and the instatement of Lacan as the 'absolute master.'[17] Even if this is the case, one shouldn't draw the conclusion that the question was wrongly posed. Rather, it points to the difficulties of organizing the new within the context of the old, and the weight of the struggle.

Echoes of the history of the CPA are found in the history of the psychoanalytic movement in France: in both cases there was a fight for legitimacy of the psychological professions, in both the relationship between theory over practice was an issue, and in both cases organizational questions were part of the problem and part of the result. The work of Bazerman, Danziger, Dunbar, and Walsh-Bowers *et al* shows that an important factor in the history of the psychological disciplines more generally is their organization, and the French and the Canadian cases provide two directions that history can and has taken. In the case of the CPA, a liberal approach channeled through ethics and the discourse of human rights enabled the organization to establish itself as a national body that acts as a lever to ensure access to the psychological 'marketplace.' The inevitable problem in a capitalist society is that a nominal political dedication to human rights is subordinated to and stymied by this marketplace, making its realization impossible. The Lacanian case points to the possibility of countering the demands of a marketplace that creates 'consumers' who wish to be integrated into it and an organizational structure willing to accommodate that demand. It also points to the problems in creating a non-hierarchical body adequate to the task: an organization dedicated to the destruction of organizations as we know them runs the risk of becoming its own enemy.

Marx once wrote that 'the world has long since possessed something in the form of a dream which it need only take possession of consciously, in order to possess it in reality.'[18] The bourgeois dream is impossible in that its individualism is based on collective production and the social nature of wealth, on the exploitation of communal existence. What we potentially posses are the means to human emancipation, against their domination and inequitable division: immense wealth, knowledge, and passion. To transform this reality, organization must be considered not a secondary *element*, but a primary, necessary, *mediation* – one to be fought both for and with.

References

American Psychological Association. (2002). Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct." http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx

Apollon, W. (2002). From Symptom to Fantasy. *After Lacan: Clinical Practice and the Subject of the Unconscious.* Hughs and Malone, eds. New York: State University of New York Press: 127-140.

Badiou, A. (2002). *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. Peter Hallward, London: Verso.

Bazerman, C. (1988). *Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the Experimental Article in Science*. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Botticelli, S. (2007). Psychoanalysis, Class and Politics: Encounters in the Clinical Setting (Book Review). *Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society*, Vol. 12: 195-199.

Brunner, J. (2000). Will, Desire, and Experience: Etiology and Ideology in the German and Austrian Medical Discourse on War Neuroses, 1914-22. *Transcultural Psychology*, Vol. 37(3): 295-320.

Canadian Psychological Association. (2000). *Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists*: Third Edition. http://www.cpa.ca/publications/

Canadian Psychological Association. (2010). *Psynopsis: Canada's Psychology Magazine*. Vol 13(3). http://www.cpa.ca/publications/

16 For an example of exactly the opposite, see Noble Prize winner Eric Kandel's *Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis and the New Biology of Mind* (2005). See also the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society at <neuropsa.org.uk>.

17 See in particular chapters four and five of Turkle's *Psychoanalytic Politics*, as well as the final section of its second edition. Also of interest is David-Menard (1982).

18 The above is the rendering given by the translator of Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* (1971, p. 2). The Padover translation gives the following: "The reform of consciousness consists only in making the world aware of its own consciousness, in awakening it out of its dream about itself, in explaining to it the meaning of its own actions" (Marx, 1979).

Conway, J. F. (2010). The Political Economy and Etiology of Psychopathology: an Essay and Selected Bibiography" presented at *Marxism and Psychology: Conference of the Marxism and Psychology Research Group*.

David-Menard, M. (1982). Lacanians Against Lacan. *Social Text*, No. 6 (August): 86-111.

Danto, E. (2005). *Freud's Free Clinics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

De Vos, J. (2011). Depsychologizing Torture. *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 37 (Winter 2011): 286-314.

Dobson, K. & and Breault, L. (1998). The Canadian Code of Ethics and the Regulation of Psychology. *Canadian Psychology. Special Issue: Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists*, Vol. 39(3) (August): 212-218

Dolar, M. (2008). Freud and the Political. *Unbound*, Vol. 4(15): 15-29.

Dunbar, J. (1998). A Critical History of the CPA's Various Codes of Ethics for Psychologists (1939 – 1986). *Canadian Psychology. Special Issue: Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists*, Vol. 39(3) (August): 177-186.

Dunbar, J. (1993). *A Critical History of Codes of Ethics: Canadian Psychological Association 1939-1986*. PhD dissertation, York University, Toronto, Ontario.

Engel, J. (2008). *American Therapy: The Rise of Psychotherapy in the United States*. New York: Gotham Books.

Fanon, F. (2004). *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press.

Freud, S. (1959). *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. James Strachey, trans. London: The Hogarth Press.

Fenichel, O. (1945). *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Fenichel, O. (1967). Psychoanalysis as the Nucleus of a Future Dialectical-Materialistic Psychology. *American Imago*, Vol. 24(4)(Winter): 290-311.

Flemming, G. (2008-9). An Hysteric on Strike: Marx, Lacan and Wealth Under Capitalism. (a): *The Journal of Culture and the Unconscious*. Volume 7, No 2.

Flemming, G. (2008). From Marx to the Act. *International Journal of Žižek Studies*. Volume 2, No 1.

Harris, B. (1996). Psychology and Marxist Politics in the United States. *Psychology and Society: Radical Theory and Practice*. Ian Parker and Russell Spears, eds. London: Pluto Press.

Hook, D. (2005). A Critical Psychology of the Postcolonial. *Theory & Psychology* Vol. 15(4): 475-503.

Jacoby, R. (1983). *The Repression of Psychoanalysis*. New York: Basic Books.

Kandel, E. (2005). *Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New Biology of Mind*. Washington: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc.

Klein, N. (2008). *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. Toronto: Vintage Canada.

Lacan, J. (1997). *Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*. Dennis Porter, Trans. London: W.W. Norton and Company.

Lacan, J. (2002). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XVI: From an other to the Other*. trans. Cormac Gallagher. London: Karnac Books.

Lacan, J. (2006). *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Lacan, J. (2007). *Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Russell Grigg. London: W.W. Norton and Company.

Lih, L. (2008). *Lenin Rediscovered: What is To Be Done? In Context*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Lukács, G. (1971). *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. trans. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Macey, D. (1988). *Lacan In Contexts*. New York: Verso.

Martin, J., Sugarman, J. & Hickinbottom, S. (2010). Persons: *Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency*. New York: Springer.

Marx, K. (1973). *Grundrisse*. Martin Nicolaus, trans. London: Penguin Books.

Marx, K. (1979). *The Letters of Karl Marx*. Saul K. Padover, trans. and ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Mészáros, I. (1986). *Philosophy, Ideology, and Social Science*. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books.

Morawski, J. G. (1982). Assessing Psychology's Moral Heritage Through Our Neglected Utopias. *American Psychologist*, Vol. 37(10): 1082-1095.

Ross, S. (2005). *The Making of CUPE: Structure, Democracy and Class Formation*. PhD dissertation, York University, Toronto, Ontario.

Rossiter, A., Walsh-Bowers, R. & Prilleltensky, I. (2002). Ethics as a Located Story: A comparison of North American and Cuban Clinical Ethics. *Theory & Psychology*, Vol. 12(4): 533-556.

Rousinesco, E. Jacques Lacan and Co.: *A History of Psychoanalysis in France*, 1925-1985. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Samuels, A. (1993). *The Political Psyche*. London: Routledge.

Shorter, E. (1997). *A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac*. Toronto: John Wiley and Sons.

Soldz, S. (2007). Psychology and Coercive Interrogations in Historical Perspective Aid and Comfort for Torturers. *Common Dreams News Centre*, Sunday, April 15, 2007. http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/04/15/527/

Summers, F. (2007). Psychoanalysis, the American Psychological Association, and the Involvement of Psychologists at Guantanamo Bay. *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society*, Vol. 12: 83–92.

Teo, T. (2005). *The Critique of Psychology: From Kant to Postcolonial Theory*. New York: Springer.

Turkle, S. (1992). *Psychoanalytic Politics: Jacques Lacan and Freud's French Revolution*. Second Edition. London: Free Association books.

Walsh-Bowers, R. (1995). The Reporting of Ethics of the Research Relationship in the Areas of Interpersonal Psychology, 1939-89. T*heory and Psychology,* Vol. 5(2): 233-250.

Walsh, R. (1985). *A Social History of the Research Relationship in Community Psychology*. PhD dissertation, York University, Toronto, Ontario.

Žižek, S. (2008). *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor*. Second Edition. London: Verso.

Žižek, S. (2002). Lenin's Choice in Vladimir Lenin, *Revolution at the Gates: Selected Writings of Lenin from 1917*. Žižek, Slavoj, ed. London: Verso. 167-336.

Žižek, S. (1989). *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso.

david pavón-cuéllar

Marx in Lacan: Proletarian Truth in Opposition to Capitalist Psychology

By David Pavón-Cuéllar, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo in Morelia (Mexico)

Abstract *In Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytical theory, there is a precise place for Marx in relation to psychology. It is the place of truth in opposition to capitalism. It is also the place of subversion against adaptation. According to Lacan, psychology adapts people to the capitalist system, while Marx reveals the subversive truth that underlies the system. This truth emerges as the real symptom of a purely symbolic system. It is the symptom of a proletarianized subject reduced to the workforce that makes the work of the system. If this work can be psychoanalytically conceived as the work of the unconscious, its force can be Lacanianly conceived as the enunciating workforce that expresses the discourse articulated by the Other. This suffering workforce is a symptom that implies frustration and reasonably motivates workers' struggle against liberal capitalism.*

In Lacan's psychoanalytical theory, there is a precise place for Marx in relation to psychology. It is the place of truth in opposition to capitalism. It is also the place of subversion against adaptation.

According to Lacan, psychology adapts people to the symbolic system of capitalism, while Marx subverts this system by revealing the revolting truth that underlies it. This truth emerges as the symptom of an exploited, alienated and proletarianized subject reduced to labour, labour power, manpower, real workforce that makes the work of the symbolic system.

If the work of the symbolic system can be psychoanalytically defined as the work of the unconscious, its real workforce can be Lacanianly described as the enunciating workforce that expresses the discourse articulated by the Other. In the Lacanian reading of the Marxian analysis of capitalism, the subject reduced to this workforce appears as a symptom that implies frustration, brings about class consciousness and reasonably motivates worker's struggle against capitalism. However, in a Lacanian critique directed to both liberal and communist capitalisms, it is asserted that such a symptom can only be embodied by the proletarian condition in itself, as different from the proletarian condition for itself, whose class consciousness constituted a new capitalist psychology that concealed again the truth that had been revealed by Marx. Just as the old capitalist psychology, the new one would have been aimed at adapting the subject to the symbolic system of capitalism. Actually, for Lacan, this adaptation is always the essential aim of psychology. This is why Lacan rejects psychology.

Reality of the Capitalist System and Possibility of the Human Subject

Lacan is not a psychologist, but a psychoanalyst. He is a radical psychoanalyst who drastically rejects psychology. This rejection of psychology is constitutive of Lacanian psychoanalysis, which has been aggressively constructed against psychology, especially Ego-psychology and other psychological deviations from psychoanalysis. For Lacan, psychoanalysis must resist psychology. Psychoanalysis must not let itself be absorbed, employed, or contaminated by psychology. In short, psychoanalysis must avoid psychology.

The term "psychology" usually has a negative connotation in Lacanian discourse. Here, as the case may be, psychology implies misinterpretation, misrepresentation, illusion, deception, manipulation, trivialization, and so on. These implications synthesize elaborate Lacanian denunciations of psychology. Among these denunciations, there is one that seems to be directly connected to the position of Marx in Lacan. It is the denunciation of the complicity between psychology and capitalism. This complicity is emphasized in 1965, in the twelfth seminary, when Lacan ex-

plicitly maintains that "all modern psychology is made to explain how a human being can behave in the capitalist structure" (Lacan, 1964-1965, 09.06.65). Lacan does not simply say that psychology explains how a human being *behaves* in the capitalist structure. What Lacan says, is that psychology explains how a human being *can behave*, or how it is possible for him to behave in the capitalist structure. At stake here is the *possibility of human behaviour* in the *reality of the capitalist structure*.

For Lacan, the capitalist structure is the reality assumed by psychology. When psychology approaches behaviour, capitalism is that which is given. It is taken for granted. It is presupposed as that which is what it is. It is just the way it is. It cannot be otherwise.

For psychology, capitalism is a closed reality. On the contrary, our behaviour is an open possibility. Our behaviour is still possible and not yet real. It is not yet what it is, but it is still what it can be thanks to psychology. However, for psychology, our behaviour can only be in the capitalist reality. So our behaviour *is only what it can be* in the capitalist reality, while this reality *can only be what it is*. The capitalist structure is the only conceivable context for our behaviour, which is only what it can be in order to be adapted to the capitalist structure. This adaptation of a flexible behaviour to a rigid capitalist structure is the central aim of psychological practice.

For psychology, paradoxically, the historical reality of capitalism is supposed to be something fixed and unchangeable, while the universal possibility of human behaviour is limited to the specific reality of capitalism. So, in fact, for psychology, human behaviour is only possible in capitalism. In other words, the capitalist society is the only place where it is possible for a human subject to be. Therefore the conditions of possibility of this subject are limited to the capitalist society.

The conditions of possibility of a human subject in the capitalist society are precisely what we get from psychology. Actually, as Lacan has remarked in 1965, "psychology is here to give us the conditions of possibility of a subject in a society dominated by the accumulation of capital" (Lacan, 1964-1965, 16.06.65). Once again, this capitalist society is a taken-for-granted reality whose conditions of possibility are not at issue. The only conditions of possibility at issue are those of the subject. For the subject, it is possible to be. So it is also possible for him to stop being, or to fade away. But capitalism has to subsist. It is not possible for capitalism to stop being or to stop being what it is.

For psychology, by definition, capitalism *is*, while a subject *can be*. The problem here is that a subject, for psychology, can only be in capitalism. And how can a subject be in capitalism? This is the question that psychology must answer. By answering this question, psychology does not only *state* the conditions of possibility of a subject in capitalism. As Lacan has remarked, psychology *gives* these conditions. By giving these conditions of possibility of a subject in capitalism, psychology makes possible the existence of a subject in capitalism. Psychology helps capitalism to have a subject at its disposal. This disposable human subject is what the capitalist system receives from the psychological ideology.

Psychological Ideology and Adaptation of the Human Subject to the Capitalist System

In the Lacanian representation of an essentially religious psychology (Lacan, 1953-1954, 23.06.54, pp. 394-395; 1974-1975, 15.04.75), as in the Marxian representation of an essentially psychological religion (Marx, 1843, p. 202; Marx & Engels, 1844, VIII, II, p. 620), there is a sort of pious spiritualist ideology through which the materialist capitalist system equips itself with an appropriate subject (Marx & Engels, 1844, VI, II, pp. 546-547). What is at stake here is not a human being in general, but a subject for capitalism, suited for capitalism, adapted to capitalism. It is the subject "alone", the "bourgeois", the human being submitted to "inhuman elements", the "religious" and "alienated man" who is "lost for himself", the "private man" who "reduces the others to mediums, reduces also himself to a medium, and become the toy of unknown powers" (Marx, 1844b, pp. 356-363). This adapted being is the human being of psychology.

For psychology, as Lacan (1955-1956) has pointed out in his third seminary, "human beings are adapted beings, since they are alive, and therefore everything has to fit" (11.01.56, p. 95). Everything has to fit for human beings to be alive. Now, in view of the fact that human beings are alive in the capitalist system, everything has to fit in this system. So everything has to fit this system. Everything has to be adapted to the system. So human beings have also to be adapted to the system. Their adaptation to the reality of the system is their fundamental condition of possibility in the system.

To subsist in the capitalist system, subjects have to be adapted to it, suited for it, good for it, useful for it, usable or exploitable by it. This exploitability of the subjects is just the potentiality implied in the actuality of their adaptation. When psychology facilitates *adaptation to the system*, it also enables *exploitation by the system*. Economical exploitation is assisted by psychological adaptation. Adaptive psychology helps the exploiting system. Correlatively, the system uses psychology for the purpose of exploitation. We may say that *psychology is exploited to exploit*. We may also say that social exploitation is that for what psychology is used. With good reason, Lacan (1960) explicitly accuses "psychology" of this "vile use for social exploitation" (p. 278). This use is a "social mission of psychology" (Braunstein, 1975). Psychology fulfils this social mission when it correctly functions as an "ideological device" that maintains the "reproduction of relations between the exploiters and the exploited" (p. 342), not

only in the "economical domain", but also in the "ideological and juridical-political domains" (pp. 357-358).

In order to exploit, the exploiting system uses its psychological device. Capitalism uses psychology. The fact remains that capitalism may be conceived as a kind of psychology, or as an *ideological-psychological system*, which would use the capital and other economic resources to dominate. But this conception of capitalism obviously overflows the limits of psychology. Beyond these limits of consciousness, internal mental processes, motivation, cognition and so on, the capitalist system rather corresponds to a *meta-psychological system*. And this system uses psychology. So we may say that psychology is subordinated to capitalism. This subordination of the psychological device to the capitalist meta-psychological system governs the complicity between psychology and capitalism. The complicity is between different levels or dimensions. In a sense, we might say that it is between a psychological content and a meta-psychological form. In traditional Marxist terms, we would say that it is between the superstructure and the base. The economic base of the capitalist system uses the ideological superstructure of psychology for the purpose of exploiting people. To be more specific, the economic infrastructural exploitation by the capitalist system is reached through the psychological superstructural adaptation to the same system. In Lacanian terms, we might say that the real exploitation by the symbolic system of capitalism is reached through the imaginary adaptation to the same symbolic system.

Psychological Adaptation and Marxian Subversion

For Lacan, the imaginary adaptation to the capitalist symbolic system is the dubious success of psychology. Also for Lacan, but in the opposite direction, there is the real subversion of the same symbolic system of knowledge, which is the patent achievement of Marx (Lacan, 1968-1969, 04.12.68, pp. 64-65; 1970-1971, 16.06.71, p. 164; 1972-1973, 09.01.73, p. 42). Therefore, in the Lacanian psychoanalytical theory, the relation between Marx and psychology amounts to an opposition between *Marxist subversion of the system* and *psychological adaptation to the system*. This is an opposition between confrontation and resignation, resistance and compliance, revolt and complicity.

From a Lacanian point of view, Marx is in revolt against the same system that is in complicity with psychology. Psychology looks after resignation to the system and compliance with it, while Marx promotes resistance to the system and confrontation with it. Finally Marx achieves the real subversion of the same symbolic system that uses psychology for the purpose of social exploitation.

Social exploitation is enabled by adaptive psychology and prevented by subversive Marxian theory. This theory prevents social exploitation by achieving a real subversion of the exploiting symbolic system. The subversion is achieved through the subversive revelation of a truth that underlies the system. This truth of the system lies in the exploitation by the system. By revealing this exploitation, Marx has been able of preventing exploitation under certain circumstances. Under these circumstances, he has been able of subverting the exploiting system by revealing its exploiting nature. On the contrary, by concealing this exploiting nature, psychology enables the adaptation to the exploiting system and the resulting survival of the exploiting system. Therefore, psychology enables social exploitation by concealing it, while Marx prevents it by revealing it.

Marxian Revelation of the Truth

In Marxian theory as in psychoanalytical practice, the truth may be something deplorable and susceptible to be prevented by being revealed. The Marxian revelation of exploitation *will thus have entailed* a certain Marxist recovery from exploitation. We actually know that a symptomatic truth of exploitation has been practically cured by Marxists, in specific situations, thanks to its theoretical revelation by Marx.

Now, the truth revealed by Marx is not only the truth of exploitation, but also the truth of alienation and proletarianization. All things considered, Marx reveals the truth of exploitation, alienation and proletarianization of a subject completely reduced to the labour power of the system. In the Marxian perspective, this subject is the worker reduced to the workforce that makes the work of the capitalist system, of the "alienating language of material values", of "objects in their mutual relations", which has become the only "comprehensible language that we can speak between us" (Marx, 1844a, p. 32). In the Lacanian perspective, the same subject is every subject, as "each individual really is a proletarian", a subject reduced to the enunciating workforce that makes the work of the unconscious, of the symbolic system, of language, which is always an alienating language of material values (Lacan, 1974, pp. 186-187; 1974-1975, 18.02.75; Pavón Cuéllar, 2009, pp. 58-61, 131-132; 2010, pp. 89-120). In both Lacanian and Marxian perspectives, "the work made by the subjects does not belong to the subjects", but is "exterior in relation to the workers" (Marx, 1844a, pp. 60-61), who are just the "workforce" of the system, the "labour power" that is "bought" and "used" by the system (1867, I, II, VI-VII, pp. 130-153). The system owns and organizes the work executed by the subjects. The subjects are just the executors. They are "submitted" to the "means of production" of a system that is "personified", appears as the Other of the subjects, and "employs" them as if they were "things" (1865, II, p. 384). The workers become "living extensions of the machine" (1858, II, p. 288). The "machine" becomes an "animated monster" that "unifies" the "individual works" (p. 287). The work made by each subject "belongs" to the system (1865, II, p. 383). It belongs to the capitalist system in Marx. It

belongs to the symbolic system in Lacan. It is the work of language and not the work of the enunciating workforce. It is not the work of the subject, but the work of the unconscious.

In the Lacanian perspective, the work of the unconscious is made when the enunciating subject expresses the discourse articulated by the Other. This discourse of the Other is nothing more than the historical existence of the symbolic system. So the system can be defined as a language that exists through each discourse expressed by the subjects, by their speech, but also by their attitude, their behaviour, their interactions, or their creations, including institutions, buildings, and all the other exteriorizations of the discourse of the Other. As for this discourse, it can be described as an enunciated knowledge (*savoir*) that conceals its truth (*vérité*), which is the truth of its enunciation. Now, for Lacan, this truth can only be revealed through a subversive revelation. This revelation has to be subversive because the revealed truth cannot be absorbed by a symbolic universe of knowledge that is supposed to absorb everything.

The enunciated knowledge is supposed to grasp everything, but it cannot grasp the truth of its real enunciation. It cannot enunciate its truth as cause. The truth of the stolen labour power that sustains the capitalist system, for instance, cannot be known by the system. It cannot be assimilated into idealist philosophy, utopian socialism, or classical political economy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Nor can it be assimilated into hegemonic psychologies of the twentieth and twentieth first centuries. So this knowledge of the system cannot bring the truth under control. This uncontrollable truth revealed by Marx resists a knowledge that has to be disrupted by that which resists it.

The Lacanian opposition between Marx and psychology turns to be an opposition between the symptomatic *resisting truth* and the hegemonic *irresistible knowledge* of the system (Lacan, 1970-1971, 16.06.71, p. 164.). It corresponds to the Marxian opposition between the *revealed workforce* and the *disrupted working conditions* of the capitalist system: an opposition between the "living work" and the "objectified work", the subversive "creation of values" and the adaptive created "values", the "living labour power" and the "value's autonomous being for itself", the real "person of the worker and the capitalist" and the psychological "personification" of capital "with will and interests" (Marx, 1858, II, p. 282). It is the opposition between "the subjective" and "the objective condition of work", the "work itself" and the "means of production" (1865, III, p. 412). In this perspective, psychology can be included among the other means of production, as *it produces something*. Psychology produces wellbeing, comfort, adaptation. It produces adapted workers, or happy workers, that is to say, *good workers*. But these good workers are also real subjects whose interest proves to be, thanks to Marx, opposed to that which produces them as good workers in order to enable their exploitation. Thus, in the Marxian pole, the workers are essentially "opposed" to the pole of psychology and other "means of production" as "form of existence of capital" (ibid).

Ultimately, the Lacanian opposition between Marx and psychology expresses the Marxian fundamental conflict between Work and Capital, which can also be lacanianly understood as a conflict between the *truth of work* and the *capital of knowledge*. But this conflict is not reducible to an opposition. Capital is not only opposed to Work, but also generated by Work. The truth of work is the truth of capital. It is the truth of the capital of knowledge. Yet knowledge cannot know its truth. It cannot control or manage it, even if it is supposed to control and manage it. Even if the truth should theoretically not resist knowledge, it intrinsically resists knowledge. So the resisting truth appears as a symptom, a hysterical symptom of the irresistible knowledge. It emerges as a real symptom of a purely symbolic system. This symptomatic emergence is just another name for the subversive revelation. Actually, in a Lacanian perspective, we may say that the Marxian revelation of truth is subversive because the revealed truth is a hysterical symptom that has no place in the obsessive normality of Modern knowledge.

The revelation of truth is subversive because it is symptomatic. But there is another reason why the revelation is subversive. It is subversive because the revealed symptomatic truth of enunciation is also the unbearable truth of exploitation, alienation and proletarianization of a real subject completely reduced to the suffering workforce that generates the enunciated symbolic value. This truth is obviously frustrating. It is also comprehensibly revolting. This is also why its revelation may be subversive. The Marxian revelation of the truth is subversive, for example, because it cannot reveal the generation of capital without revealing the revolting situation of exploitation, alienation and proletarianization of those whose workforce generates capital.

As any other enunciation or generation of a symbolic value, the generation of capital involves a derealisation or degradation of the real subject who is exploited, alienated and proletarianized by a symbolic system. Thus, in the symbolic system of capitalism, the worker cannot generate capital without becoming capital, a "living capital", a "working capital", a "human commodity" (Marx, 1844a, p. 106). In general, the real human subjects cannot generate a symbolic value without becoming it, and therefore "losing" their real being, "devaluating" and "dehumanising" themselves (pp. 57-106). For Lacan, this frustrating and revolting truth was revealed by Marx. And its revelation was not without consequences. It reasonably motivated unions, strikes and many other forms of worker's struggle against capitalism. It also led to denunciations without precedent, as well as economical, political and intellectual revolutions. In all these cases, the symbolic system of capitalism has been subverted by the Marxian emergence of its real symptom. Up to now, this symptomatic revelation of the truth of capitalism still subverts all normal and normalising capitalist knowledge, including *the psychological knowledge of the conditions of possibility of a subject in a society dominated by*

the accumulation of capital.

The Exploitable Human Beings and Their Adaptive Psychological Knowledge

The Marxian revelation of the truth shows how *conditions of possibility of subjective existence in capitalism* amount to *conditions of possibility of subjective degradation by capitalism*. Take for instance our adaptation to capitalism. Thanks to Marx, this fundamental condition of possibility of our existence in capitalism proves to be the fundamental condition of possibility of our degrading exploitation by capitalism.

To be exploited by the system, we have to be adapted to the system. The possibility of the exploitable subject has to be adapted to the reality of the exploiting system. This adaptation is ensured by psychology. Psychology helps us to be adapted subjects. Unfortunately, by helping us to be adapted to the system, psychology helps us to be exploited by the system. So it rather helps the system to exploit us.

To exploit human beings, the exploiting system just needs exploitable human beings. It just needs adapted human beings with an adaptive psychological knowledge. It just needs these human beings who know how they can behave in the exploiting system. So the system needs psychology, because psychology is here, as Lacan has remarked, to explain to human beings how they can behave in the exploiting system. By explaining that, psychology really explains to human beings how they can let themselves be exploited by the exploiting system. So, again, psychology helps the capitalist system to exploit, or, to be more precise, psychology helps the exploiting system to have exploitable subjects at its disposal. These subjects are not only found by psychology, but they may also be shaped by psychology. As we know, psychology shapes the exploitable subjects by adapting them to the exploiting system. Adapted to the exploiting system, the subjects are adapted for exploitation by the system.

A subject is adapted to the system when he "obeys" this "system of relations of society" (Cf. Leontyev, 1977). This adaptive obedience already involves the determination, motivation and execution of an activity, and the exploitation of it, and not only the adaptation of an already existing activity to the system. As Leontyev observes, "in society man finds not only his external conditions to which he must adapt his activity, but also these very social conditions carry in themselves the motives and aims of his activity" (ibid). The motives and aims of the activity have to be already adapted to *the system of relations of society*. The subjects have to be deeply and sincerely adapted, *psychologically adapted* at the level of their feelings and wishes, to the exploiting symbolic system. This is the only way for the subjects to be adapted for exploitation by the system.

To be adapted for exploitation by the system, the subjects have to be frankly resigned, from the bottom of their heart, to the reality of the system. They have to sentimentally comply with the system. They have to be in profound complicity with the system. This is why the system needs psychology. It needs psychology because psychology puts the subjects in this psychologically adapted position of frank resignation to the reality of the system and sentimental compliance and complicity with the system that bases its power on its reality. On the contrary, by revealing the frustrating and revolting truth of the system, Marx puts the reality of the human subjects against the possibility of the inhuman system, in a subversive position of confrontation instead of resignation, resistance instead of compliance, and revolt instead of complicity. In so doing, Marx endangers the system. He jeopardizes the possibility of the inhuman system precisely by demonstrating that it is nothing more than a possibility, the possibility of "dehumanisation" of "the moral existence, the social existence, and even the intimacy of the human hearth" (Marx, 1844a, p. 20). This possibility of the system is the possibility that governs psychological practice in its complicity with the system. It is the historical possibility of "separating from the human being its substantial being, and turning it into a material, exterior thing", without admitting "the fundamental human being as its true reality" (Marx, 1843, p. 962). Now, by admitting this fundamental human being as the true reality that underlies the possibility of the inhuman system, Marx logically weakens this possibility of the inhuman system, strengthens the reality of the human being, and refutes the necessity of adaptation of the human being to the inhuman system, which is a basic premise of psychology.

The Proletarian in Itself and the Proletarian for Itself

If the misleading psychological knowledge belongs to the system and adapts people to the system, the Marxian revelation of the truth impedes this adaptation by subverting both the system and its misleading psychological knowledge. The Marxian revelation of the truth amounts to the emergence of a symptom that disrupts psychological normality. This symptom is embodied by the proletarian condition, which proves to be shared by all human beings, as all of them are reduced to a pure enunciating workforce that makes the work of the unconscious by enunciating the discourse of the Other (Pavón Cuéllar, 2010, pp. 89-120). By expressing this discourse articulated by the symbolic system of language, all subjects are exploited, alienated and proletarianized in the system (pp. 189-193). Here is the frustrating and revolting truth of the system, a truth that reveals itself as the real symptom of the symbolic system, a symptom that is embodied by the proletarian condition in itself. This proletarian condition is the universal condition of the subject of the unconscious. As pure workforce of the unconscious, every subject of the unconscious is a proletarian in itself.

Now, according to Lacan (1968-1969), the *proletarian in itself*, as a subject of the unconscious, has nothing to do with the *proletarian for itself*, as a subject of consciousness (12.02.69, pp. 172-173). This subject of consciousness is deceived by the class consciousness of a Communist Party (*ibid*). For Lacan, the appearance of this class consciousness, in different communist environments, was the occasion for the development of a Marxist psychology that concealed again the truth revealed by Marx. This truth, which concerns "existence and not consciousness" (Marx, 1846, p. 1209), would have disappeared behind the Marxist psychology of a "consciousness" that was still conditioned by the "material conditions" of the system (p. 1056).

Just as non-Marxist psychology, the Marxist psychology would have been aimed at adapting people to the symbolic system, in this case the symbolic system of a communist environment. At least Marxist psychology, as we know, did not confuse this cultural environment with a natural environment, and understood that people should actively adapt *to and through* a symbolic system, and not passively adapt *to* a real environment. For Marxist psychology, active adaptation passed through consciousness, and consciousness was inseparable from technical activity, language and other forms of cultural mediation by the symbolic system. In any case, from a Lacanian point of view, consciousness implied deception, and deception enabled adaptation, and adaptation was considered necessary for the satisfaction of people. Even a theoretician as Vygotsky (1934, 2, §3), who goes far beyond simple adaptive psychology, assumes that "a need can be truly satisfied only through a certain adaptation to reality", and this adaptation "is always directed by needs".

It is certainly true, as Vygotsky (1934, 2, §3) points out, that "the drive for the satisfaction of needs and the drive for adaptation to reality cannot be considered separate from and opposed to each other". There is not an opposition and a separation, but a dialectical relation between the two drives. But this does not imply, as Vygotsky thought it did, that there is a similar dialectical relation between "the pleasure principle and the reality principle" (*ibid*). If the reality principle can be conceived as a drive for adaptation, the pleasure principle cannot be reduced to a drive for the satisfaction of needs. Besides these needs, which can be satisfied through adaptation, there is desire, which is that which seeks satisfaction through the pleasure principle. Now, from a Lacanian viewpoint, desire "has no adequate object", and so it causes a "fundamental 'inadaptation' of the subject", an "essential inability of the subject to adapt" (Van Haute, 2002, p. 294). Subject cannot adapt because his desire cannot be satisfied. More precisely, desire cannot be satisfied through adaptation, but only through transgression, contravention, subversion. So there really is an opposition, and not a dialectical relation, between the transgressive pleasure principle and the adaptive reality principle. As for the Vygotskyan dialectical relation, it is not between these two opposed principles, but it is between two correlative components of the adaptive reality principle.

The adaptive reality principle is the only principle that is taken into account by conventional Marxist psychology. This psychology aims at adapting people to the reality of the symbolic system that governs the communist environment. Actually, for Lacan, this symbolic system still was a capitalist system. Therefore, in a Lacanian perspective, we may say that capitalism still exploited psychology to adapt and exploit people in communist countries. So, in these countries, the Marxist revolution revoked the Marxian subversion of both the capitalist system and its misleading psychological knowledge. A new Marxist psychological knowledge covered again the subversive truth uncovered by Marx (Lacan, 1965, pp. 349-350).

Conclusion

The subversive truth uncovered by Marx has no place in psychological knowledge. This knowledge is impervious to the truth. The truth cannot pierce psychology without subverting psychology. Psychology is intrinsically allergic to the truth, and so it is also intrinsically allergic to Marx, since Marx is inseparable from his truth.

If being Marxist means to be faithful to the truth discovered by Marx, then there cannot be, strictly speaking, a *Marxist psychology*. The only valid Marxist psychology, as it were, would be a psychology that would constantly subvert itself through the truth discovered by Marx. This truth would prevent psychology from consolidating itself as an accomplished knowledge. The accomplishment of a spiritual knowledge would be disturbed and thwarted by its own corporeal truth. The practical truth embodied by the *proletarian in itself* would burst into the theoretical knowledge acquired by the proletarian for itself. But this ideal knowledge of consciousness would also arise again and again from the material truth of the unconscious. Then we would carry out the "repetition of the process", well described by Mao Zedong (1963), that "consists in passing from matter to spirit, and from spirit to matter, that is to say, from practice to knowledge, and from knowledge to practice" (pp. 260-261). Thanks to this process, the truth would be always there to question any general representation of the psyche. Psychology itself, as a discourse (*logos*) of the psyche, would constantly be criticized by itself. This seems to be the only way to develop a psychology of Marxist inspiration, which implies "to brandish the weapons of critique and auto-critique" (Mao Zedong, 1957, p. 154).

A psychology of Marxist inspiration has to be a critical and auto-critical psychology. To be really auto-critical, this psychology must refuse to become a psychology in all the sense of the word. Instead of being a Marxist psychology, it would be the "Marxist practice" of those "Marxists in psychology" who "work in and against the discipline" (Parker, 1999). *In the discipline*, because they will not resist to ascend "from being to thought, or from

practice to theory", but also *against the discipline*, because they will not resist to descend "from thought to being, or from theory to practice", a practice of the truth that will "test the truth" of psychological knowledge, a Marxist practice that will only be consistent if it is critical in relation to psychology (Cf. Mao Zedong, 1963, p. 260).

The "social practice", which is our only "criterion of truth", is not only fulfilled in "material production" and in "class struggle", but also in "scientific experience" (Mao Zedong, 1937a, p. 27). In psychology, this scientific experience can only be fulfilled in the experience of concreteness and particularity, materiality and individuality, which challenges the theoretical abstract generalities of psychological knowledge. These generalities always arise from a particularity to which they have to return. Here, in this particularity, generalities are enunciated and subverted, demonstrated and refuted, founded and suffered. Here lies the symptomatic truth of every psychological normality. But this truth of psychology is in contradiction with psychology. So psychology is challenged by its own truth. This is why the truth of psychology can only be recovered by a critique of psychology, which constitutes the essence of critical psychology. Then critical psychology functions simultaneously as a kind of anti-psychology that fulfills what Mao Zedong (1937b) expects from science, that is to say, to "reflect" the "contradiction" inherent in its object in order to "stimulate the development of ideas" and "solve the problems of human thought" (p. 59). Otherwise, when psychology is not critical, it is "dogmatic", and its dogmatism would show the "laziness" of psychologists who do not see the contradiction inherent in their object and their discipline because they "refuse any kind of effort in the study of concrete things" and "they conceive general truths as things that fall from heaven" (p. 65).

It is clear that no truth falls from heaven. Actually, for us, there is no heaven other than the one of the symbolic universe. And the only thing that falls from this heaven is knowledge. But dogmatic psychology takes this knowledge as a general truth, and tries to adapt the social and individual subjects, with their own particular truth, to this supposed general truth. And, as we already know, this adaptation enables exploitation. This is why we need a critical psychology of Marxist inspiration in order to hinder exploitation by showing to the exploitable subjects that their particular truth should not necessarily be adapted to the general knowledge, but that it is this knowledge that should be adapted to the particular truth of each subject.

Subjects must have the fundamental human right to adapt knowledge to their truth. Now, to adapt knowledge to their truth, subjects must adapt the environment to themselves, since they are their truth and the environment is that which deploys knowledge for them. So knowledge can only be adapted to a subject through the material adaptation of the environment to this subject. Through this adaptation of the environment to themselves, subjects create their cultural surrounding and in this way they distinguish themselves from animals. As Vygotsky (1925, §2) categorically asserted, "Whereas animals passively adapt to the environment, man actively adapts the environment to himself". To this we may add that, whereas animals have to be exploited by the environment, man is able to exploit the environment. He is able to exploit it by adapting it to himself. But this adaptation of the environment involves, not only a risk of destruction of the environment, but also the necessity of transformation of the environment. Here, instead of developing some knowledge of the environment and adapting to this knowledge, it is a question of adapting this knowledge to myself through a transformation of the environment that deploys knowledge for me. It is a question of "transforming the world" instead of "interpreting it" (Marx, 1845, p. 1033). Instead of enabling the knowledge of the system to interpret itself again and again in order to justify itself and so justify the adaptation to it and the exploitation by it, it is a question of revealing a truth that may burst into this knowledge and so subvert it and start a revolutionary transformation that needs to be permanent in order to be effective. This "permanent revolution" has to be relentlessly achieved by a critical psychology that must uncompromisingly refuse any kind of "reconciliation" with the system that governs dogmatic psychology (Cf. Marx, 1850). Instead of a reconciliation with the system, there must be a "transformation" of the system, a transformation that has to be "permanent", or "uninterrupted", because it could never be limited to a "jump", but it has to consist in a concatenation of "increasing conflicts" (Trotsky, 1928).

References

Braunstein, N. (1975). Introducción a la lectura de la psicología académica. In: N. Braunstein, M. Pasternac, G. Benedito and F. Saal. *Psicología: ideología y ciencia* (pp. 329-360). México D.F.: Siglo XXI, 2008.

Lacan, J. (1955-1956). *Le séminaire. Livre I. Les écrits techniques de Freud*. Paris: Seuil, 1975.

Lacan, J. (1955-1956). *Le séminaire. Livre III. Les psychoses*. Paris: Seuil, 1981.

Lacan, J. (1960). Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir. In: *Écrits II*. Paris: Seuil (poche), 1999.

Lacan, J. (1964-1965). *Le séminaire. Livre XII. Problèmes cruciaux de la psychanalyse*. Unpublished.

Lacan, J. (1965). La science et la vérité, in *Écrits II*. Paris: Seuil (poche), 1999, pp. 335-358.

Lacan, J. (1968-1969). *Le séminaire. Livre XVI. D'un Autre à l'autre*. Paris, Seuil, 2006.

Lacan, J. (1970-1971). *Le séminaire. Livre XVIII. D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblan*t. Paris, Seuil, 2006.

Lacan, J. (1972-1973). *Le séminaire. Livre XX. Encore*. Paris: Seuil (poche), 1999.

Lacan, J. (1974). La troisième, intervention au Congrès de Rome. *Lettres de l'École freudienne*, 1975, 16, 173-203.

Lacan, J. (1974-1975). *Le séminaire. Livre XXII. Réel et Symbolique et Imaginaire*. Unpublished.

Leontyev, A. N. (1977). *Activity and Consciousness*. Source: *Philosophy in the USSR, Problems of Dialectical Materialism*. Moscow, Progress. Online Version: Vygotsky Internet Archive (marxists.org) 2000. In: http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1977/leon1977.htm (accessed July 12 2010).

Mao Zedong (1937a). De la pratique, in *Les transformations de la révolution* (pp. 23-45). Mulhouse: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1970.

Mao Zedong (1937b). De la contradiction, in *Les transformations de la révolution* (pp. 47-104). Mulhouse: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1970.

Mao Zedong (1957). La critique el l'autocritique, in *Le petit livre rouge. Citations du président Mao Tsé-Tung*. Paris: Seuil, 1967.

Mao Zedong (1963). De la pratique, in *Les transformations de la révolution* (pp. 259-261). Mulhouse: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1970.

Marx, K. (1843). Critique de la philosophie politique de Hegel, in *Œuvres philosophie* (pp. 863-1018). M. Rubel (trans). Paris: Gallimard (Pléiade), 1982.

Marx, K. (1844a). Économie et philosophie, manuscrits parisiens, in *Œuvres économie* (pp. 1-141). M. Malaquais and C. Orsoni (trans). Paris: Gallimard (Pléiade), 1968.

Marx, K. (1844b). A propos de la question juive, in *Œuvres philosophie* (pp. 347-381). M. Rubel (trans). Paris: Gallimard (Pléiade), 1982.

Marx, K. (1845). Thèses sus Feuerbach, in *Œuvres philosophie* (pp. 1029-1033). M. Rubel (trans). Paris: Gallimard (Pléiade), 1982.

Marx, K. (1846). Idéologie allemande, in *Œuvres philosophie* (pp. 1037-1325). M. Rubel (trans). Paris: Gallimard (Pléiade), 1982.

Marx, K. (1858). Principes d'une critique de l'économie politique, in *Œuvres économie* (pp. 171-359). M. Malaquais and M. Rubel (trans). Paris: Gallimard (Pléiade), 1968.

Marx, K. (1865). Matériaux pour l'économie, in *Œuvres économie* (pp. 361-498). M. Malaquais and M. Rubel (trans). Paris: Gallimard (Pléiade), 1968.

Marx, K. (1867). *Le Capital*. Paris: Flammarion, 1985.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1844). La Sainte Famille ou Critique de la Critique Critique. in *Œuvres philosophie* (pp. 419-661). M. Rubel (trans). Paris: Gallimard (Pléiade), 1982.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1850). *Adresse du Comité Central à la Ligue des communistes*. http://marxists.org/francais/marx/works/1850/03/18500300.htm (accessed 3 March 2010).

Parker, I. (1999) Psychology and Marxism: Dialectical Opposites?, in W. Maiers , B. Bayer, B. Duarte Esgalhado, R. Jorna, and E. Schraube (eds), *Challenges to Theoretical Psychology* (pp. 477-484). Toronto: Captus University Publications.

Pavón Cuéllar, D. (2009). *Marxisme lacanien*. Paris: Psychophores.

Pavón Cuéllar, D. (2010). *From the Conscious Interior to an Exterior Unconscious. Lacan, Discourse Analysis and Social Psychology*. London: Karnac.

Trotsky, L. (1928). *La revolution permanente*. http://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/revperm/rp.html (accessed 3 September 2010).

Van Haute, P. (2002). *Against Adaptation. Lacan´s Subversion of the Subject*. New York: Other.

Vygotsky, L. (1925). Consciousness as a problem in the psychology of behavior. Source: Undiscovered Vygotsky: Etudes on the pre-history of cultural-historical psychology. *European Studies in the History of Science and Ideas*, 1999, 8, 251-281. Online Version: Vygotsky Internet Archive (marxists.org) 2000. In: http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/consciousness.htm (accessed October July 2010).

Vygotsky, L. (1934). *Thinking and Speaking*. Source: Thought and Language. Boston, The M.I.T. Press, 1962. Online Version: Vygotsky Internet Archive (marxists.org) 2000. In: http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/index.htm (accessed 12 July 2010).

brad piekkola

To Sell Marx in North America Is To Not Sell Marx

By Brad Piekkola, Vancouver Island University

Abstract *It is argued that in order to introduce Marxist psychology into North America it is best to evade mention of Marx lest one evoke an emotional, conditioned rejection of the presentation. Enculturation into, and introception of, anti-communist sentiments on the part of American psychologists is a barrier to reception that has to be surmounted. To do so is to approach one's audience with sound psychological principles, despite their Marxist pedigree. An examination of the work of the cellular biologist Alex Novikoff, the victim of anti-communist purges, is drawn upon as an example of how someone may present dialectical and historical materialist theory in a major North American journal--Science, have it accepted, and receive accolades for doing so. By disguising its Marxist affiliation, the soundness of the theory was afforded an audience. This, as the example proffered demonstrates, is the way to make inroads with an audience prepared for prejudgment.*

As the stated purpose of this conference (Marxism & Psychology, 2010) is to "reflect on the role that Marxism can play in psychological theory, research, and practice" I have chosen to reflect on how Marxist psychology may make inroads in North America, specifically the USA, and the problems that are bound to confront it. As the title suggests, the selling of Marxist psychology in North America will be more successful if the connection to Marx is implicit rather than explicit. To be forthright with one's Marxist affiliation is likely to evoke outright rejection, without consideration, when the ontological and epistemological position may well be appealing otherwise. The ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu suggested, 2,500 years ago in *The Art of War*, "Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting" (Tzu, 1984, p. 2). Further he counseled, "If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat" (p. 18). To gain an audience in America I believe that American resistance to the perceived evils of communism has to be broached and to do that is to address the *American ethos*—the fundamental character and values of America. I will begin there. Following that I will introduce the successful breaching of that resistance on the part of the late Alex Novikoff (1913-1987), a cellular biologist, as an indication of how the battle may be won, of how Marxist ideas may be introduced and made palatable to Americans, without invoking resistance.

The American Ethos

That contemporary Western psychology is deeply embedded within positivistic traditions will not surprise anyone familiar with Marxist critical psychology. Nor will the fact that this is a problem that has to be confronted. As students, candidates for inclusion into the psychological community are enculturated in, and imbued with, its assumptions, such as the asocial, ahistorical nature of psychology that Danziger (1990) criticized, and with its procedures—the variable psychology that Holzkamp (1991) so derided in his Critical Psychology. Certainly, these must be shown to be empty, sterile, and fruitless but it is not enough to know that and to show it. An alternative must also be offered and that alternative could be a psychology based on dialectical and historical materialism. All will come to no avail for Marxist psychologists, however, in presenting their alternatives, if they do not pay heed to the cultural problems that stand in the way of historical materialist solutions being welcomed in North America.

Our starting point in this endeavor should be the sociocultural conditions within which the American psychologist is enmeshed. Historical materialism informs us that individual consciousness was based on the capacity of the brain to reflect the conditions of existence, and these conditions are socially and historically determined (Yurkovets, 1984). In the *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels, (1846, in Selsam and Martel, 1963) wrote that,

> The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. (p. 190)

Individual consciousness, for Marx and Engels, reflects the sociohistorical conditions in which the person is embedded.

Vygotsky (1978) developed this in his *general genetic law of cultural development*—the proposition that higher mental functions, including values and beliefs, were first interpersonal and social before they were interiorized and rendered intrapersonal. To Leont'ev (1978), too, human consciousness was embedded in social relations. This is a cornerstone of Marxist psychology. Each person develops in social-historical circumstances and these are reflected in their consciousness. This is no less true of psychologists, including American psychologists. Before they were trained in the accepted practices of mainstream, positivistic psychology, American psychologists were Americans, enculturated by, and integrated and embedded within, a system of American values. As Mead (1912), noted "Inner consciousness is socially organized by the importation of the social organization of the outer world" (P. 406). Vygotsky (1978) wrote of the cultural behavior being internalized, of the interpersonal becoming the intrapersonal. Appropriated and internalized, and continuously reinforced through ongoing social processes, these values likely become automatic in their influence and, being automatic, without consciousness, yet an influence nonetheless. According to Carpenter (1874/1896), actions that are originally under conscious direction may, in becoming habitual, be repeated involuntarily and without consciousness. In the process, one develops an *acquired* or *secondary automatism* as Hartley in the 18th century first noted. Psychical habits, as Carpenter expressed it, develop and become automatic. Mental life is conditioned and shaped by family and by custom or what we might now refer to as culture. According to Carpenter, "It is transmitted by tradition from parents to children, and it is imbibed by the latter almost unconsciously from what they see and hear around, without any special season of teaching or special persons to teach" (P. 363). One could say then that these values become instinctual (impulsive, affective, but not rational) in their operation. So what are these values?

In their book *The American Ethos*, McCloskey and Zaller (1984), pointed out that Americans have two traditional beliefs—democracy and capitalism. Democracy, as a political ideology, is intended to protect the people from inappropriate authority, like the monarchy that the American Revolution expelled. Consistent with this is the high value Americans place on `freedom' (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton, 1985). The recent debate in America over health care reform, for instance, revealed the degree of some American's distrust of government and their rancor at any incursion of the government into their freedom, such as the freedom to have health care or not. Democracy and capitalism developed alongside each other as safeguards against monarchism, feudalism, and mercantilism (McCloskey and Zaller, 1984). The practices and values associated with capitalism are the private possession of the means of production, the pursuit of profit free from government intervention (the laissez faire free market economy), and a stress upon the ideal of competition as progressive. This connected well with the original Pilgrims' *Protestant Ethic* of hard work and personal achievement, and the value of individualism, of each person being responsible for him or herself, in isolation from the larger mass. Toqueville introduced the description of 1830's Americanism as individualism and wrote that "Such folk owe no man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody. They . . . imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands" (in McCloskey and Zaller, 1984, p. 111).

A phrase which encapsulates this all was introduced by James Thurlow Adams in 1931 (Cullen, 2003) and it is a major part of the American psyche. That phrase was the `American Dream.' It represented the ideal existence as one of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" (Cullen, 2003, p. 4). This was a life that was better, happier, and upwardly mobile, both socially and financially. It was to be achieved by competing against others for the riches that were there if one would only apply oneself. The founding fathers did not promote such competition but in the early 1800's *laissez faire* economics and, later on, social Darwinism (which is implicit in the American ideology) gained prominence. Between 1870 and 1910, social Darwinist catchphrases like `survival of the fittest' and `struggle for existence' were being adopted in arguments about social policy and business practices (Hofstadter, 1944/1955).

The political economist William Sumner, a major proponent of social Darwinism, argued against socialist policies of collective welfare (Hawkins, 1997). The individual, he proposed, struggled in two arenas—against nature in terms of subsistence and socially as a struggle for existence against others. Among the business classes, this was expressed in the promotion of *laissez faire* capitalism, free market economy, and individualism (McCloskey and Zaller, 1984). Individualism allowed industrialists to justify their accumulation of wealth because of its emphasis on private achievement. Unchecked economic competition was good for business and for the individual. Let workers, as much as businesses, compete with each other. Success or failure is the responsibility of the individual and they should not seek or obtain government help if they fail to thrive. Individuals were responsible for themselves and for their families (Hawkins, 1997). Charity, as instituted politically, was a violation of that precept; it "distorted nature's laws by shifting the burden of the struggle from some

classes on to others" (Hawkins, p. 111). The government should defend the state, liberty, justice, and the free market, but it was up to the individual to satisfy personal need. Failure to thrive was the individual's responsibility.

Such views are seldom so explicit today. Individual rights have been gained at the expense of individual responsibility, such as with social security reforms, and yet, "Social Darwinism maintains its hold on the American mind despite the best intentions of the neo-liberals" (Knowles, 1977, p. 59). On occasion social Darwinism does achieve explicit expression. South Carolina Lt. Governor, Andre Bauer, for instance, in January of 2010, advocated not feeding the poor since they breed like dogs—referring to school lunch programs for the disadvantaged. People, he contended, as individuals, are responsible for themselves. If someone is too lazy or unfit to compete, why should the state or, more specifically, the individuals comprising the state, bear the responsibility for them.

The American ethos is an anti-communist, anti-socialist system of values. Communism, in the minds of Americans, is equated with totalitarianism, tyranny, loss of freedom, and economic failure. The politics of Marx are anathema to Americans and they have and do resist it. The high point for socialism, for instance, in the U.S.A. was 1912 (Bell, 1952) which is a date antecedent to the communist revolution in Russia. In the aftermath of the First World War (1919-1920), Americans went through a period known as the Red Scare (Coben, 1964). The American people had consented to some government control over the economy during the war period, but these were in ways that were inconsistent with the accepted value of economic individualism. This was not the only post-war, political concern of the populace. With peace, individualist values were perceived to be under threat from the proclaimed intention of the Russian Bolsheviks to export Marxist ideology. Millions of Americans feared the spread of such ideas as a threat to their liberty and their individualistic values long before the tyranny of Stalin was known to them. Communists and communism were perceived as a menace. Prior to the Second World War, 71% of the populace voted to outlaw the Communist Party (Walsh, 1947). After World War II, despite having been allies, most Americans distrusted the Soviet Union. Stalin was perceived as the embodiment of the communist ideology and he was a dictator who squashed freedom. People believed, and continue to believe, that communism was a threat to freedom and the American way of life (Schrecker, 2004). It is this atmosphere that Marxist psychology has to contend with.

I believe, given the foregoing, that any hint of a connection to Marx, on the part of advocates of Marxist approaches to psychology, is bound to invoke animosity and immediate dismissal on the part of many North American psychologists who have appropriated the *American ethos*. Any such attempt will provoke a gut-reaction of rejection. On the other hand, I also believe Americans would be receptive to the tenets of historical materialism if it was not connected in their minds with communism. To make my case, let me share how Alex Novikoff succeeded in that regard.

The Concept of Integrative Levels

Alex Novikoff was a cellular biologist who became a political activist during the 1930's and who joined the Communist Party in 1935 (Holmes, 1989). He was investigated by the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1938, was brought before the Rapp-Coudert Committee in 1941, and the National Institute of Health investigated his loyalty in 1973. An informant identified him as a member of the Communist Party and he was dismissed by the University of Vermont in 1953. In the midst of all this he still managed to publish two papers (Novikoff, 1945a, 1945b) that embodied Marxist principles in the prestigious journal *Science*. Not only that, he received a letter of appreciation for this work from the *American Association for the Advancement of Science*, the journal's publishers, for his contribution's being a significant achievement.

Novikoff's Marxist principles were framed within the context of what he referred to as the '*concept of levels of integration*.' The concept of levels of integration, he wrote, is a general description of the evolution of matter through successively higher orders of complexity and integration. It describes the progress of the evolution of matter in terms of increasing organizational complexity from the inanimate, to the animate, and, lastly, to social levels of organization. From the opening paragraph he was advocating *realism, materialism* (an implicitly dialectical materialism), and, in the transitions from inanimate to the animate to the social, the *Quantity/Quality Dialectic*. (To be clear, the laws of dialectics were not mentioned as such by Novikoff.)

The evolutionary progression that Novikoff espoused is considered to be continuous because it is a never-ending process of matter combining and recombining at greater levels of complexity. It is also concurrently discontinuous because at each new level of organization qualitatively new phenomena emerge which are not reducible to, nor explicable by, the laws of the lower level. The levels are distinct but not completely delimited from each other. One can differentiate, as Novikoff did, the physico-chemical, the biological, and the sociocultural as qualitatively different from each other, as emergent one form the other, and as having historical priority with respect to each other. Over the course of the historical evolution of matter, inanimate matter becomes animated, alive. This was the moment of the emergence of the biological level. Subsequently, the biological evolves and there emerges a new form of being, the social, and in time a new stage in the evolutionary progress is marked by the appearance of the societal/cultural. Cultural evolution is a new type of evolution. The transmission of change is social (through communication and learning) rather than biological (through reproduction). In terms of its impact on human conduct, cultural forces come to dominate the

biological in directing human action. There is a new historical progression in human conduct in terms of technological advances from stone tools to computers. This is accompanied by new forms of existence and of historical consciousness as a reflection of the changing sociocultural organization.

Even though the emergent, higher levels are distinct from the lower forms of matter they are not independent of them. The biological incorporates within it the physical and the chemical. Our bodies, beyond their organic qualities, are still composed of atoms and chemicals and are still under their influence, as with organic abnormalities due to genetic mutations produced by radiation or chemicals. At the same time, new laws become operative which transcend the physico-chemical level, such as evolution by natural selection. The same holds for the sociocultural. The chemical leaks at Bhopal India in 1984 or the Chernobyl radiation leaks of 1986 had severe consequences for the life (biological) and lifestyle (sociocultural) of the people effected. Human labor and technological developments, on the other hand, are what produced the conditions—the chemical and nuclear plants—of these disasters.

Novikoff was thus discussing, implicitly, a *unity of opposites* and the *negation of the negation* in the notion of the evolution of matter as involving both continuity and discontinuity, as well as advocating the concepts of *emergence*, and *anti-reductionism*. Speaking as a biologist, Novikoff accepted that physical and chemical forces were operative in cells; but to account for the cell in those terms alone was to miss something important that reduction to that level missed. The organization of the living cell was a new order imposed on its physico-chemical constituents. The maintenance of life through metabolism, for instance, involved the extraction of life-supporting energies through a series of chemical reactions (Keeton and Gould, 1986). Cells unlike their chemical constituents are capable of reproducing themselves and of being responsive rather than just reactive. The laws behind chemical reactions are not sufficient to explain life processes. Atomic bonding does not explain mitosis or coitus. In that regard, Novikoff wrote,

> When molecules become part of a highly integrated system, protoplasm, it is important to know the properties of the molecules, but protoplasmic behavior needs description in terms and laws which have no meaning for molecules, in specifically biological terms and laws. (Novikoff, 1945a, p. 210)

Reduction of the biological to the physico-chemical would result in the loss of the biological phenomenon that it was one's intent to give an account of.

With regard to emergence and anti-reductionism, each level of integration has properties which are unique to it alone. The properties of both structure and behavior at one level, while unique, are dependent on the properties of the constituent elements—those of the lower level—which make up the higher level. Higher level phenomena always include phenomena at lower levels. What were wholes on the lower level become parts on the higher. More than that, knowledge of the laws operating on a lower level are necessary to an appreciation of higher level laws; but these lower level phenomena cannot be used to predict what those higher level laws will be. Nor is the higher level reducible to the lower.

Social relationships are at a higher level than the biological, and of greater complexity. In human societies, in particular, qualities are present which render reduction to animal social order inadequate and deficient. Animal societies never rise above the level of the biological. Only human societies operate in accordance with the laws of societal and cultural phenomena (economics, politics, sociology, psychology, semiotics, and so on). Human behavior differs from that of animals due to a different morphological structure, such as the developed brain and hand, and behaviors involving thought, speech, and labor. (Unknown to Novikoff, recent research into comparative psychology no longer excludes thought, speech and labor as a rudimentary developments in some species-see Bonner, 1980; Byrne, 1995.) Unlike animal behavior, human behavior is governed by changing technological forces, and by changing forms of social and cultural relations. In fact, cultural and socioeconomic forces dominate biological factors in directing human action.

Human social behavior is operative at a level that is above that of biological functioning. Relative to sociocultural change, biological change has remained essentially unchanged and, what change has occurred, resulted from social development rather than causing it. According to Washburn (1959), "Biological changes in the hand, brain and face follow the use of tools, and are due to the new selection pressures which tools created" (p. 31). That is as true of our evolutionary past as of our ontogentic present. "Our brains," as Doidge, (2007) pointed out, "are modified by the cultural activities we do—be they reading, studying music or learning new languages" (p. 288). Cultural activities determine neuroplasticity. As a result, any reduction of the social to the biological would be greatly amiss. Novikoff's whole treatment of the social, while not made explicit, is clearly consistent with *Historical materialism*.

Many Marxist principles were presented by Novikoff in his paper on levels. Not only were these principles not spotted, the paper was hailed as an important achievement. All this was in spite of the close scrutiny he was under as a suspected communist. Novikoff had an effective strategy that may be a prescription for future attempts to circumvent the irrational defences erected by indoctrination.

A Final Point

Having made the case that Novikoff has pointed a way to intro-

duce Marxist thinking to a North American audience, I want to close on one further American belief that can be worked on with profit—that of *exceptionalism*. This is the idea that the United States of America is unique in its history and in its destiny (Kammen, 1993; Tyrell, 1991). Exceptionalism has led Americans to the belief that America has as its mission the spreading of its values to the rest of the world (Agnew, 1987). This suggests to me a further strategy.

American psychologists, such as John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, James Mark Baldwin, Gordon Allport, and others, have independently espoused ideas that are consistent with dialectical and historical materialism,. Their work can be built upon and developed. The idea of exceptionalism leads Americans to value what is American over all else, and notions that appear to be American in origin will likely be more attractive and palatable than those that are foreign.

In conclusion, then, to bluntly affront the American psychologist's psyche with what they may intuit as offensive and un-American is not likely to be an effective strategy, in the selling of Marxist psychology. One must present them with ideas that would be appealing if only they were stripped of the `sign stimuli' (the Marxist terminology) that elicit conditioned responses of rejection.

References

Adair, J. G., Paivio, A., & Ritchie, P. (1996). Psychology in Canada. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 47, 341-370.

Agnew, J. (1987). T*he United States in the world-economy: A regional geography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bell, D. (1952). The background and development of Marxian socialism in the United States. In D. D. Egbert & S. Persons (Eds.), *Socialism and American life* (pp. 213-405). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985). *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. New York: Harper & Row.

Bonner, J. T. (1980). *The evolution of culture in animals*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Brock, A. C. (2006). Introduction. In A. C. Brock (Ed), *Internationalizing the history of psychology* (pp. 1-15). New York: New York University Press.

Byrne, R. (1995). *The thinking ape: Evolutionary origins of intelligence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carpenter, W. B. (1896). *Principles of mental physiology (7th ed.)*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Company. (Originally published 1874.)

Clarke, F. K. (2002). "Keep communism out of our schools": Cold war anti-communism at the Toronto Board of Education, 1948-1951. *Labour/Le Travail*, 49, 93-119.

Coben, S. (1964). A study in nativism: The American red scare of 1919-20. *Political Science Quarterly*, 79, 52-75.

Cullen, J. (2003). *The American dream*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Danziger, K. (1990). *Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Doidge, N. (2007). *The brain that changes itself: Stories of personal triumph from the frontiers of brain science*. New York: Penguin Books.

Hawkins, M. (1997). *Social Darwinism in European and American thought, 1860-1945: Nature as model and nature as threat*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hofstadter, R. (1955). *Social Darwinism in American thought (revised ed.)*. New York: George Braziller. (Originally published 1944.)

Holmes, D. R. (1989). *Stalking the academic communist: Intellectual freedom and the firing of Alex Novikoff*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.

Holzkamp, K. (1991). Experience of self and scientific objectivity. In C. W. Tolman and W. Maiers (eds.), *Critical psychology: Contributions to an historical science of the subject* (pp. 65-80). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kammen, M. (1993). The problem of American exceptionalism: A reconsideration. *American Quarterly, 45*, 1-43.

Keeton, W. T. & Gould, J. L. (1986). *Biological science* (4th ed.). New York: W. W. Norton.

Knowles, J. H. (1977). *The responsibility of the individual*. Daedalus, 106, 57-80.

Leont'ev, A. N. (1978). *Activity, consciousness, and personality* (M. J. Hall. Trans.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

McClosky, H. & Zaller, J. (1984). *The American ethos: Public attitudes toward capitalism and democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mead, G. H. (1912). The mechanism of social consciousness. *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, 9, 401-406.

Novikoff, A. (1945a). The concept of integrative levels and biology. *Science, 101*, 209-215.

Novikoff, A. (1945b). Continuity and discontinuity in evolution. *Science, 102*, 405-406.

Schrecker, E. (2004). McCarthyism: Political repression and the fear of communism. *Social Research, 71*, 1041-1086.

Selsam, H. & Martel, H. (1963). *Reader in Marxist philosophy*. New York: International Publishers.

Tyrell, I. (1991). American exceptionalism in an age of international history. *The American Historical Review*, 96, 1031-1055.

Tzu, S. (1984). *The art of war* (J. Clavell, Ed). New York: Delta. (Original work circa 500 BC.)

Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). *Mind in society: The development of higher mental functions* (M. Cole, V. John-Steinner, S. Scribner, and E. Souberman, Eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wagner, E. (2006-2007). The peaceable kingdom? The national myth of Canadian peacekeeping and the cold war. *Canadian Military Journal, 7*, 45-54.

Walsh, W. B. (1947). American attitudes toward Russia. *The Antioch Review, 7*, 183-190.

Washburn, S. L. (1959). Speculations on the interrelations of the history of tools and biological evolution. *Human Biology, 31*, 21-31.

Yurkovets, I. (1984). *The philosophy of dialectical materialism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

steve larocco

Ideology beyond Marx: Shame, Disambiguation, and the Social Fashioning of Reparation

by Steve Larocco, Southern Connecticut State University

Abstract *Marxist theories of ideology typically emphasize cognition at the expense of affect, undercutting the ability of such theories to fully imagine revolutionary practices and their impediments. This paper argues that the lived interplay between shame and thumos, the ancient Greek term for the affect that drives aggressive self-assertion, has a crucial impact on sociopolitical possibility. Both emotions take shape through the complex, dynamic interactions between infants and primary caregivers. The relational interplay of arousal, assertion and shame fashions affective templates that shape habitual responses to the other and the social world. Potentially, these templates motivate a drive for interactive repair, allowing shame and thumos to energize constructive progressive revolt. Capitalism, however, uses ideology to conscript these emotions so that their function is either limited and socially conservative or destructive. Enabling shame and thumos to spur social revolution that remains responsive to interactive repair is crucial for truly progressive social change.*

When, towards the beginning of *The German Ideology*, Marx wrote that the "first premise of all human history" was that "life involves before all else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things" (1845) he was articulating a common sense notion of human need—what drives human production fundamentally is the need for physiological subsistence. Satisfying these needs is the first crucial step in social and historical production: "The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself" (1845).Only after such needs have been satisfied do other needs arise and real social life and history commence (1845). These assertions form part of the epistemological critique upon which the young Marx focuses in the text, a forceful attack on German idealism, embodied in the contemporary young Hegelians, which privileged the realm of ideas and spirit (and abstraction) over material life. Marx's first premise is that human life begins in the concrete struggle with matter, which he sees as actualized in hunger and physiological need. Such a focus, he reasoned, would allow him to found his analysis of human social life on "definite individuals, not as they appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are" (1845). Such is Marx's aim and fantasy.[1]

Almost precisely a century later, in 1943, the psychologist Abraham Maslow published "A Theory of Human Motivation," which asserted that there exists a basic hierarchy of human need. Most fundamental, or to use Maslow's language, most "prepotent," is physiological need—hunger, thirst, warmth, etc. Maslow dramatically makes his point: "For our chronically and extremely hungry man, Utopia can be defined very simply as a place where there is plenty of food" (1943). Humanity, for Maslow, also has other basic needs (and he assembles them in their order of "prepotency:"safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization), but his controlling idea is that a person's most fundamental wants need to be satisfied before that person feels able to gratify less fundamental ones. Gratification, he believes, "releases the organism from the domination of a relatively more physiological need, permitting therefore the emergence of more social goals"(1943). In this way he paralleled Marx, who argued that only after a person's need for clothes, food, water and shelter were satisfied could the person fully exist in social life.[2]

Marx and Maslow are most strange bedfellows. I don't want to overemphasize the parallel, however, except to suggest how it manifests powerfully the very thing Marx was trying to critique—the ubiquitous work of ideology, manifest in commonplace assumptions. For both Marx and Maslow, human life begins with a fundamental need for a certain kind of consumption—individual, appetitive, rooted in physiology. As much as

1 For a Marxist-Heglian (dialectic) critique of the notion of animal needs as fundamental for what is human, see Kojeve (1980: 39-41).

2 The holocaust survivor Primo Levi makes a similar point: "the need man naturally feels for [freedom] comes after much more pressing needs: to resist cold, hunger, illnesses, parasites, animal and human aggressions" (1989: 151).

our consciousness might be a historically produced phenomenon, an effect of sociohistorical forces, as Marx did not restrain himself from emphasizing in his writings, certain "bodily" needs remained natural, that is, somehow, at root, prior to or beyond sociality. Curiously, or perhaps not so curiously, Maslow himself questions this momentarily, arguing that a precondition or prerequisite for even the most basic physiological need is freedom—a person needs to feel free to speak and to express oneself in order to really respond to hunger. The oddity of this assertion seems less odd if one views Maslow's hierarchy as an unconscious effort to reify a bourgeois version of social life. With freedom and food in one's belly, one is prepared to take on the fray of daily life and pursue higher needs. The fact that the young Marx starts his own genealogy of need in a similar place points to his own difficulty at that time to fully think his way outside of some of the more deeply rooted commonplaces of nineteenth century habits of thought. Marx has his own founding myth, or premise, at least in *The German Ideology*, which articulates an appetitive version of fundamental human need. A critical appraisal of this premise, however, as he himself would suggest, might begin with the notion that "phantoms formed in the human brain are...sublimates of their material life processes" (1845). To draw out the connection: Marx's account of human need cannot be separated from the material conditions in which he wrote, which foregrounded the struggle for subsistence among the working class. His focus on this struggle strongly invests (and troubles) his notions of human need and desire.

What both Marx and Maslow neglect in their accounts of basic human need is the fundamental significance of interpersonal life—attachment, attunement, interpersonal engagement. Maslow would be confronted with this issue a little over a decade after positing his hierarchy of needs, when Harry Harlow began to perform his significant but inhumane experiments with very young rhesus monkeys, which showed that at least for that species, the need for attachment frequently dominated hunger as a motive for behavior. John Bowlby (1983) and others' work on infants followed in this vein, strongly suggesting that a need for social life may be more basic for humans than most forms of physiological requirements. This is something Marx, one might think, would have championed as a founding premise, but, at least in *The German Ideology*, he didn't. When he posited his version of human nature, as limited, hedged and flexible as it was, the version he posited, at least in its physiological account of fundamental human need, echoed the appetitive individualism of his contemporary ideology.[3]

Much of the reason for this anomaly—that Marx, the brilliant inquisitor of ideology, did not, at least in this text, escape its influence and taint--is because Marx thought of ideology predominantly as working at the level of ideas, as producing "forms of consciousness" (Marx 1845). In escaping what he would have considered the bourgeois sentimentalism of certain forms of 18th century thought, such as that of Adam Smith, he replicated the Hegelian mistake—he largely abandoned affect as a significant form of motivation. Rather than analyze feeling, except perhaps as class resentment, he focused on need and thoughts and largely ignored the feelings that mediate and condition both of them. Material life is sensuous life, as Marx recognized, but this is life produced by feeling, by affect, by emotion, by the registering of the social world in the welter of impassioned experience. Yet when Marx thought analytically about the socioeconomic forces that produced familiar forms of human life, he imagined thinking as the primary place where ideology registered and performed its work, not the realm of emotion.[4]

Such a privileging of the cognitive, even for radical Western thinkers, has been and is surprisingly hard to resist. After a brief flurry of interest in emotion, particularly sympathy, by 18th century bourgeois individualist thinkers such as Adam Smith and Frances Hutchinson, theories of sociality and human life have typically failed to offer a salient account of the significance of affect in collective life.[5] Marx followed this pattern, as did Marxism more generally. As Megan Boler (1997: 258) has argued, "In some sense what we lack is a Marxist account of emotion..." The reason for this is twofold: first, until the last two decades or so, there has been a relative dearth of interest in the emotions in the human sciences as a whole. The social field has been construed as being predominantly relational and structural; that is, it is imagined and studied as a dense, complex configuration of organizations and systems (rather than, say, as an ensemble of attachments and affective interrelations or flows). The effort to engage in systematic analysis imagines the social field itself as, not surprisingly, systematic, as a relatively stable configuration of what can be construed in some sense as formal elements. The epitome of this way of thinking is manifested in works such as Claude Levi-Strauss's *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (1969: 29-41), which treats

3 In Capital, Marx made needs much more provisional: "[T]he number and extent of his [the worker's] so-called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are themselves the products of historical development" (qtd. in Rubin 2004: 773). Gayle Rubin, from a feminist perspective, critiques Marx for largely assuming that needs are inherently masculine (2004: 773-774). I think Rubin's critique is accurate and that Marx's relative non-consideration of female labor issues is also an effect of his inability to escape being interpellated by ideology.

4 Slavoj Zizek has argued, following Lacan, that Marx saw ideology as a symptom, registering its functioning at the junction of material and symbolic reality. While Zizek may be right, this doesn't mean that such a symptom had anything to do with affect. Rather, in Zizek's Lacanian framework, the symptom results from a "deadlock" of desire, and desire, for Lacan is an effect of symbolic castration and attendant lack, not affective life in its complexity. See Zizek (2004: 712-713, 723).

5 See Terry Eagleton's attempt to create a Lacanian-Marxist theory of the relationship between ethics and emotions in Trouble with Strangers (2009: 1-82). The problem is that using Lacan as a theoretical touchstone engages him with a psychoanalytic framework that tends to harrow the rich complexity of the role of emotions in social life.

relations of affinity and affiliation as formal structures rather than as complex precipitates and distributionsof feeling or as regulated flows of emotional entrainment, investment and circulation, and in Niklas Luhmann's *Social Systems*,[6] which imagines society as a network of distinct communicative systems in which persons (and their emotions) are, at best, incidental and ancillary. Both works manifest a sense that the social order doesn't include affective life, at least not as a determinative component. This attitude reflects a habitual neglect of emotion as a generative social force.[7] If society is imagined as a social system or *order*, and if emotion is imagined as being an impediment to order or outside it, then emotion typically won't be part of the analytic calculus that strives to master the structure of social life. Second, Marx's critical effort to understand social life privileged the lens of economics as a mode of analysis. This centered his thinking in notions of exchange, transaction, the commodity, labor, capital, etc., which was both productive and limiting. It allowed him to foreground the particular transactive organization and structures of social life within capitalism, but it simultaneously caused him to underemphasize the affective energies and patterns that shape life in common and which pervade whatever consciousness and cognitions that any particular version of material life produces.

This problem with fully acknowledging or theorizing emotion extends well beyond Marx and affects postmarxist thought, even when such thought focuses in part on the body itself. Michel Foucault, for example, in his notion of biopower, strives to register the effect of social discipline in bodies. In his earlier writings on disciplinary societies, he argues that such discipline works, to borrow a phrase from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, "by structuring the parameters and limits of *thought* and practice" (2004: 143, my italics). But in what Hardt and Negri see Foucault defining as societies of control, by which they all mean to designate the late modern/ postmodern West, a shift in the production of discipline occurs. "Mechanisms of command" become "more immanent to the social field, distributed throughout the brains and bodies of citizens... Power is now exercised through machines that directly organize brains (in communication systems, information networks, etc.) and bodies (in welfare systems, monitored activities, etc.)..." (2004: 144). In Hardt and Negri's version of Foucault, the information society pervades us down to our axons and dendrites. Yet this regulating immersion in biopower remains uneven, for while biopower influences affect, both Hardt and Negri's and Foucault's focus is on cognitive regulation and systems, which only secondarily engage with affect, privileging the cognitive over the affective. Ideology works primarily structurally, not affectively. Thus, even in this strand of postmarxist analysis, which ought to fully theorize the relationship between mechanisms of social regulation and affect, ideology is conceived as predominantly doing cognitive work, regulating the imagined executive role of cognition in social practice at the expense of affect.

A dearth of theorizing about affect, then, is a problem in Marxist social analysis and its offspring, and this dearth largely stems from the cognitive bias that still tends to dominate philosophical and theoretical Marxism. The very word "ideology" derives from the Greek roots *idea*, meaning a form, kind or class, and *logos*, meaning discourse or reason. Both roots foreground cognition. In theory and in practice, ideology is typically conceived as a system of thought (of the ruling class, of power, etc.), but paradoxically, I would assert that this notion of ideology is itself the work of ideology.[8] Social regulation and production do not *primarily* work by limiting or scripting what we think.[9] Instead, as Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 52-52; 1991: 80-81) has emphasized, social systems exert their control by normalizing practices, by coercing actions, by producing motivations, not simply or predominantly by commandeering thoughts.[10] A primary way social orders exert such normalizing force is by defining and determining the field of feelings, the dispositions that competent social persons possess. Such dispositions and the emotions that inhabit them invest cognitions with values, producing valencies and intensities that determine the relative significance, focus and force of appraisals, judgments and recognitions. Social orders work, that is, produce and reproduce themselves, in part by habituating people and populations to emotional profiles and dispositions, and it is a person's consequent emotional responses to situations that typically rouse, animate and shape what he or she thinks, and more importantly,

6 Luhmann. (1995: 12-58). For another example, see Pierre Bourdieu's work on taste and distinction (2004), which ought to offer an account of emotions given its focus on the embodiment of social life in persons "below" the level of consciousness.

7 The work going on currently in microsociology is an exception to this tendency, developing from the work of Emile Durkheim and Erving Goffman. See, for example, Randall Collins (2004); Jack Katz (1999); Thomas Scheff (1994); and Jack Barbalet (2001).

8 In later Marxism, as Fredric Jameson has argued, ideology is conceptualized not as a problem of thought, but rather as a problem of practices; it doesn't register so much in what one thinks as in what one does (Jameson, 2009, 336-348). This reformulation, manifest in different ways in the work of Louis Althusser , Pierre Bourdieu and others, doesn't countermand the dearth of attention to affect in descriptions of ideology, however. And although Marx himself wished to oppose the overemphasis on thought in the German Idealism of his time with history and materiality, his conception of ideology does not escape the cognitive bias of analytic thought, even when construed dialectically.

9 Zizek argues that one's behavior and one's thoughts may be radically different, and that even if one becomes aware of ideology, one's behavior may not change at all. To use Zizek's phrase: "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it." He sees this as part of the basic functioning of ideology, which he sees as operating beyond consciousness: "The fundamental level of ideology, however, is not of an illusion masking the real state of things, but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself" (2004: 721).

10 See Bourdieu (1990: 52-65). Although as I argued earlier, Bourdieu's recognition of the connection between forms of social control and action does not lead him in any way to a robust account of the role of emotions in the social field.

how he or she acts. One doesn't have to agree fully with Arlie Russell Hochschild's (1979: 563-66) notion that emotions are managed by a social palette of "feeling rules" to recognize that the normalizing production of emotions and dispositions has an enormous effect on how individuals act, constructing, modulating and regulating the range of competent performance across the social field.[11]

One of the crucial ways through which social orders reproduce themselves is by creating templates of emotional life and feeling patterns, which have crucial effects on what is perceived as competent social life. These templates are initially generated and inscribed through an infant/toddler's early interaction with a primary care giver (or givers) (Schore, 1994, 2003a, 2003b). This crucial relationship, and the precise lived interactions that specify what it is, attempt to work upon the child's temperament and adapt it to the conventions of the social order, fashioning and refashioning temperament through and as dispositions.

In early life, the primary emotion that underlies this interactive process is shame. Shame occurs when an infant or child cannot appropriately regulate his or her affect. As Allan Schore (1994: 200-212) has argued, shame is one aspect of the crucial developmental process that all children go through in the process of socialization: learning to compose and modulate affect, both internally and in relation to others. In this developmental process, affect and cognition become coupled and enmeshed, but not quite merged or fused. They become interactive, recursively implicated, each shaping the other, as cognitive processes expand and get composed by the social environment—by relations with others—and the infant's affective repertoire registers this social shaping without simply yielding to it. One might call this process affective-cognitive intermingling without synthesis, a process that permanently entangles affect and cognition in the production of social practices. Moreover, as an infant's affect attunes to cognitive shaping, that modified affect in turn influences and shapes the infant's assimilation of socially generated frames and patterns, which register as both restricting and facilitating cognitions. This entire process occurs in and through repeated affective interactions, exchanges and transactions with others, involving an infant/toddler in situations of emotional arousal, which come to be continually modulated or adapted to the emotional tenor as well as the interactive and relational patterns of the social environment in which such arousal occurs.When the infant's emotional state is not attuned with that of the primary care giver or the social surround in general, especially when due to excessive arousal, loss of cognitive/affective composure, or a misalignment with the affective state of others, it creates stress for the infant and shame, which need to be managed or dissipated.

11 Hochschild's interactive account of emotions posits that emotions emerge in social process, not as organismic responses that are merely managed or constrained by social forces. For Hochschild, feeling rules are crucial in the very production of emotion (1979: 551-554; see also 2003).

According to Schore (1994: 336), the primary place where this learning occurs is in the intensely interactive matrix of the mother-child dyad. This is the initial matrix of attachment, but it is important to recognize that attachment is an ongoing, dialectically calibrated process, generated and continually revised in the ongoing specificity of that relationship, and not some reified "thing" that can be detached or separated from the dynamics of the relationship itself. In Schore's words: "[a]ttachment can ...be conceptualized as the *interactive regulation of synchrony* between psychobiologically attuned organisms" (2003a: 64, my italics). Because the infant or child desires a rough synchrony of emotional feeling with the primary care giver and the social surround, it must learn to read the emotional state of the other, and to modify its emotional condition, whether it be joyful arousal or agitation and stress, to create or restore the rough synchrony that underlies attachment. In order for this process to go well, the primary caregiver needs to also modulate her or his arousal and affective disposition to synchronize with that of the child. Especially important is the caregiver's ability to help the infant manage accelerating and aymmetrical arousal, whether it is positive, as in joy, or negative, as in rage. According to Schore (2003a: 142), much of this synchronizing of affect is not a conscious process in either caregiver or child. The primary caregiver, when effectively engaged with the child, responds to the "rhythms" of the child's affect as well as to the particular quality of that affect and its interpersonal communication. Although the caregiver's ability to recognize the child's affective states is crucial, it is his or her interactively aligned response to the temporal qualities of the child's emotion that facilitates synchronization.

However, since the problem of otherness inhabits the caregiver-child matrix, asynchrony of emotion is a constant part of the very process of attachment. As the child's affect accelerates or retreats into dormancy, or as the caregiver overrides the child's affective states with his or her own emotional condition, or becomes non-responsive, affective misalignments and disruptions occur. One role the caregiver has in helping the child to learn to manage his or her affective states is in guiding the child through the process of what I would call "active reattunement," that is, the process through which the child and caregiver repair the breach in their interaction caused by emotional misalignment and restore some form of affective synchrony. Schore calls this process "interactive repair" (2003a: 143). Such repair is crucially the way in which the child learns to manage and quell the feelings of primitive shame that attend emotional dissonance.

Normally, primitive shame is the result of the child's recognition that his or her emotion is somehow too much for the situation or the other. Through interactive feedback, the child feels emotionally *exposed*; that is, the child feels as if its emotional arousal, rather than participating in some kind of dialectic of engaged, interactive sharing with the other, manifests its affective being in a way that is not reciprocated, that isolates that emotion from social interchange. Such exposure can occur either

through the caregiver's resistance to or rejection of the emotion, or more paradoxically, through his or her ignoring of it. In the latter case, the emotion is exposed in its very non-reflection; it is exposed as an unmet possibility of affective attunement. The typical response to this is emotional deceleration, deflation and/or withdrawal. And this emotional subsidence is the core of primitive shame. Ideally, the child learns to modulate his or her affect prior to the exposure and misalignment that produces shame by attuning to the affective condition of the primary caregiver and learning to respond emotionally in ways commensurate to the caregiver's own affect and behavior. In return, the caregiver ideally modulates his or her affect in response to the child's. This dynamic interplay provides continual microfeedback for the infant or child about what type and intensity of emotion will sustain the interplay, what emotion-driven performance will not quell or quash the other's interest; to put it bluntly, such microfeedback guides the child in how to avoid the shame of non-reciprocated emotional exposure. However, when the infant responds aggressively, gets too excited, rages over separation or weeps without a cause the caregiver can understand, the interplay breaks down. And because the infant is primarily, at this point, affectively and socially driven, such a breakdown involves, however briefly, a stunting of affective assertion, a diminishment of self or protoself, a subsidence of emotional assertion or even arousal—shame. The pattern of each particular child's affective attunement and failed attunement with the primary caregiver and the social surround fashions the foundation of the child's emotional life, generating a template of emotional assertion, shame and reparation that will powerfully influence a person's later interactions with others and with the social field. Later emotional regulation and management builds upon the templates and affective repertoires inculcated in this early interplay. This process is also recursive, in that these early templates shape how one behaves (as well as how one thinks), which shapes how others interact with a person, which can either reinforce or modify the earlier templates, which then influences further interaction, and so on. Reinforcement of templates is probably the dominant effect of interpersonal interaction, with modification as a secondary effect. This structuring of affective templates provides the motivational infrastructure upon which ideology will later encroach and attempt to settle.

Crucial in these early interactions are the ways a child learns to repair the problems created interpersonally by his own and the other's non-attuned or inappropriately regulated emotion. At the core of this interaction is a kind of struggle for recognition, in which the infant and caregiver interact in self-assertive ways, each seeking to have her or his own desire dominate the interplay, or at least to have his or her desire fully acknowledged. In ways that partially parallel Hegel's master/slave dialectic, both parties want the other to affirm the significance of their own affective gestures and performances.12 Part of the problem of failed attunement has to do with the volatile, often fugitive, aggressive assertions of affect that each party advances and wishes would control the other, or at least which would generate a mirroring response. The fantasy is that the other would become simply a mirror for one's own desire rather than an other, a fantasy that always meets with some degree of frustration. The failures of attunement and mirroring that inevitably occur and must occur in such intimate, contentious relations generate shame, the affect that registers the other's and/or the social world's non-attunement to or rejection of one's narcissistic fantasies and claims. However, if the shame produced by the affective misalignments and affronts that inhabit the relations between the primary caregiver and child can be tolerated, such relational dissonance can create fluid, desiring attempts to reattune to the other. Over time, these practices of reconnection can cohere and jell, forging templates of what Schore calls "interactive repair." In this process, the child learns particular forms of submission of his or her affective assertiveness, agitation and/or ebullience to the needs of the other or the social situation. There is in these templates a specified interplay of what Plato in the *Phaedrus* called *eros* and *thumos*, that is, between the urge for connection and attachment and the passions of self-assertion and a desire for recognition. Early interaction creates patterns for the proportional relation between affective self-assertion and the desire for attachment, both elements of one's desire for recognition. To some degree, this proportion is determined by the frequency and kind of interactive repair that occurs between caregiver and child. A caregiver who actively reattunes with a child's often conflicted affective experience will create a different template of shame, self-assertion and attachment than one who exacerbates or neglects the child's affective sallies and responses.

The child's own effort at interactive repair and the responses it receives is a crucial element in the setting of interactive patterns into affective templates. Reparation in the wake of shame is the child's first effort, often ambivalent, at recognizing himself or herself in and through the feelings of the other, and attempting to return to an emotional field that is recognized as *social*. As Jessica Benjamin (1988: 68-74) has pointed out, such reparation is a process that involves not mere submission, but assertion and recognition of the other as other. But because that other has expectations that the child behave in accord with affective conventions, this experience of emotional misalignment, shame and the attendant desire for affective reattunement and repair begins the process of the child's subjection to and subjectivation by the social order. Non-attunement is the infant's first experience with something

12 The dialectic in the infant mother case is not as purely conflicted as in Hegel's account of the master/slave relation, which Alexander Kojeve has interpreted as a fight to the death that must be modified into a dialectic struggle that sublates rather than destroys the other (1980: 15). Rather, as Jessica Benjamin has argued, the relation is at once conflicted and sympathetic, individuated and deeply relational. It oscillates between the kind of struggle that Hegel's dialectic outlines, and moments of alignment and consonance that do not involve subordination. See Benjamin (1988, 51-84). Axel Honneth (1996) and Patchen Markell (2003) have tried to draw out the political implications of Hegel's dialectic

akin to negation, and reattunement/affective repair is the child's first attempt to negotiate that negation.

Emotional life, however, is not so simple or fully socially controlled. For the interplay between infant and caregiver (especially the oscillations of attunement that surround and pervade the struggles with affective assertion, agitation, ebullience, shame and reparation) generates a complex palette of feelings that lays the groundwork for often ambivalent but potentially powerful and spontaneous connections to and care for the other. What the child may learn from the mother, mimetically, is how to manage feelings when one is *beset* by the emotions of the other, how to value connection with the other when the other *exposes* affective difference or when one goes unrecognized. What a child may also learn is that emotional assertion and connection are not incompatible, that good social life involves an abundance of both, and that one can attune (an early form of care) and be emotionally assertive simultaneously. Early child/caregiver interactions may not merely generate templates, but also emotional resources and aptitudes, a default feeling repertoire that senses that the means out of affective troubles induced by the other as other occurs through interactive and *social* return to the other's affective distress/difference. Much of later childhood development involves the effort to conventionalize and limit these feelings because they often complicate social and perhaps, even more powerfully, economic behavior.

How much and for whom a person cares is a driving but typically unacknowledged focus of social management and control, and this is an area where ideology, particularly capitalist ideology, explicitly attempts to compose emotion. Such ideology provides ideas, conventions, schemas and habitual practices about how we are to respond emotionally, to whom, and for what reasons. The social order is anxious about certain kinds of feelings of attachment and care that tend to impede or hinder the needs of social and economic exchange and the maximization of profit. For example, as the owner or manager of a company, a disposition to attune affectively (rather than strategically) to the feelings and needs of employees may make that manager more likely to make labor concessions (such as paying higher wages, being more accommodating about work scheduling or conditions, or providing better health care options) that would adversely affect profits. Similarly, a deep attachment to family may make it difficult for an employee to work the amount of hours that would maximize production, creating feelings of shame if the employee privileged work above family-focused emotional needs. In both cases, the difficulty stems from a potential dissonance or misalignment of affect. Though early caregiver/child interaction gives a person some resources to manage or contain or "survive" the feelings that arise in such situations, capitalist ideology works to compose the range of response, delimiting if not quite scripting possibilities for improvisational performance. Such ideology gives the owner/manager in my hypothetical scenario motivation and behavioral templates to act as if maximizing profits is a necessary and good aspect of running a business that ultimately benefits employees; ideology also will make it feel right (or at least necessary) for the worker who labors for long hours to advance his or her professional life to act as if this "self-actualization" will attend to his or her family's emotional needs by giving each member the possibility of greater consumer power (each child can have his or her own room and his or her own TV and computer and video games and ipod, etc., to take care of his or her emotional needs while the parent/worker is at work). Contemporary ideology wishes to fashion attachments and one's affective palette according to the needs of capital, hoping to build on the templates laid down in early life, but since the caregiver/infant relation shapes affective life largely in relation to composing feelings and passions in a situation of deep intimacy (at least in the current postindustrial west, though this may be changing with the advent of commercial childcare), it adventitiously privileges deep attachment as a primary aim of social relating, rather than the efficiency of exchange. In this particular way, intimate, shame-tolerating early attachment often surreptitiously works against the needs of capitalist ideology.

Deep, dynamic attachment, as a consequence, poses a significant obstacle to the smooth, efficient running of the postmodern world. As Anthony Giddens (1992: 58) has argued, the new social ideal is for relations to be *at will*, so to speak; that is, they are to continue only so long as they are gratifying. They are to be *pure*, not complicated by obligation or duty or dependency, and consequently they are to be unconstrained and autonomous; more importantly, they are not to impinge on a person's freedom or mobility. For a person to get to this emotional condition, however, involves transforming the emotional templates and habituations that will have been generated in early life (if the primary caregiver effectively modeled reattunement and active repair as salient aspects of interpersonal interaction). Ideology exerts its influence in this domain by providing predominant customary templates (and more formally, rules and policies), attitudes, habits, comportments, postures and practices that refashion, adjust and normalize a person's affective repertoire and responses, modulations that typically truncate the complexity of a person's emotional templates or that cultivate some degree of detachment from them. Contemporary ideology allows attachment, but produces it as provisional and attempts to specify its trajectories, intensities and other dimensions. In the words of Daniel Siegel (1999: 253), ideology creates "windows of tolerance" for emotions; that is, it creates bounded "spaces" in one's mind in which "various intensities of emotional arousal can be processed without disrupting the functioning of the system." Siegel refers here to the mind as the system to be disrupted, an implicitly idealist conception. But the notion of "windows of tolerance" also could define the limits and levels of affect that can be socially tolerated and under what conditions, with the possibility of shame functioning as the internal register of a potential misalignment with the other, and thereby of the social field as a whole. In this effort to temper the range and intensity of emotion, ideology does attempt to use thought (and practices) to regulate affect. It especially strives to limit or

compose dispositions to attachment, reparation and reattunement that emerge in response to the distress of the other. Though we live in societies that supposedly privilege attachment and care for others, in practice the implicit and explicit pressures and interests of the economic sphere typically curb and adjust attachment and care. Our very "intersubjective orientation," to use the words of Daniel Stern (2004: 106), is dramatically affected by the tensions, conflicts and complicities between early templates of attachment and shame, and ideological scripts, habituations and practices. In late modern/postmodern capitalism, forms of attachment and interpersonal dependency need to be effectively channeled, adjusted or restructured; otherwise, they might adversely impact the mobility and extreme individuation that capitalism requires of its labor force. Facebook and similar social media, with their loose, at-will networks of attachment and connection, seem to be a manifestation of such ideology at work.

Ideology, then, attempts to intervene in situations of emotional ambivalence, ambiguity, intensity and complexity, situations where attachments conflict with social mobility and freedom, and *disambiguate* those situations in favor of "socially appropriate" levels of affective feeling towards the other—deep perhaps, but not controlling. It accomplishes this by splitting shame away from its early involvement in attachment and reparation, as a feeling that is interpersonally *negotiated*, instead transforming it into the affect that registers the forces of social control. Shame, which is grounded in the other's (and the social world's) inability or unwillingness to mirror one's exposure of feelings of affective investment, upsurge or elation, becomes instead an affective registering of the inadequacy of one's entire social being (Schore 1994b: 155-56). Shame shifts from being an affective manifestation of emotional dysregulation in an interpersonal situation or an effect of unreciprocated emotional exposure that induces a desire for repair to the annihilation of self that shame becomes as the disciplinary appendage of the social order. In this sense, shame becomes, as Thomas Scheff (1990: 79) asserts, "the primary social emotion in that it is generated by the virtually constant monitoring of the self in relation to others." Shame takes on its disciplinary social function by generalizing the threat of exposure and consequent nonrecognition; from the problem of emotional misalignment with the other in early childhood (which often generates impulses to interactive repair) it extends to any salient violation of social convention or norm, including feeling rules. And in this extension it becomes more adverse, more toxic, as the social world itself is less interested in affective repair than in affective control and normalization. The ideological aim is to use shame to sharply curtail more open-ended emotional responses to distress or the other's need (or even to one's own desire for affective attunement), and to facilitate those responses that are commensurate with the smooth functioning of a given social order. Shame becomes the affective mechanism by which persons accept their subjectivation (and subjection), because shame makes them feel as if socially transgressive being is no being at all. Ideology and disciplinary shame disambiguate the affective complexity of situational response, and this facilitates socially conventionalized practices.

The ideological conventionalization of shame and reparation works hard to channel and regulate the powerful ethical possibilities that attend the impulse to attune to others in distress, which emerge from and through the dynamics of engaged, mutually synchronized infant/caregiver relations. This conventionalization (one might say delimitation) of reparation also powerfully influences other emotions that drive unconventional social possibilities, including revolutionary ones. Thumos, the ancient Greek concept of emotional self-assertion, often manifested as rage, is one significant example of this effect. In early childhood, as D. W. Winnicott (1989: 73-78) has argued, the good-enough caregiver is able to tolerate and survive the child's rage, the child's uncomposed self-assertion. Rage doesn't by itself negate attunement, except perhaps momentarily. Rather, a goodenough caregiver responds to the child's rage with possibilities of reattunement and/or modulation. This allows the child to pair rage and reparation, and to structure his or her disposition to rage with only enough shame to "protect" the other from rage's annihilating possibilities. This hedging of rage with moderated, tolerable shame leaves rage in a place that is potentially useful interpersonally and socially. For through the construction of such an emotional template, rage can involve reparative feelings and possibilities, and the potential for destruction in rage doesn't have to be rigorously censored. Instead, it can be loosed. This, of course, is not the revolutionary rage of someone such as Pol Pot, where the template for rage involves the annihilation of the other. Instead, it is the rage that, even if it arises in humiliation or nonrecognition, can direct its energy into revision and construction, a rage that can remain attuned to the other, even in its mode of destructiveness. It is a rage that sees reparation and reattunement as a necessary part of revolution, in whatever situation revolution occurs.

Capitalist ideology typically fights against this sort of rage, trying instead to conscript thumos into energizing each subject to police the social order and shame those who transgress.[13] This version of emotional assertion or rage is fueled by the social, toxic version of shame, by a need to cleanse the social order of adverse possibilities of affect. Thumos, along with disgust and contempt, become agents of shame as social humiliation, saturating the social field, or more specifically, social interaction, with emotions of social control, judgment and exclusion, rather than those of reattunement or reparation. When bound to such a version of shame, thumos has a social function, a "window of tolerance," so to speak. Otherwise, thumos is to be either very tightly contained or suppressed.

What one can see from all of this is that human life doesn't begin in any simple way with hunger or appetite or a hierarchy of needs. Rather, it begins in the material specificity of life with others; it

13 Peter Sloterdijk's *Rage and Time* sparked my interest in thumos.

begins in socially engaged contact; it begins in the shaping and modulation of affective life; it begins in the social development of needs, in which affect has a primary role; it begins in a desire for recognition that entails mutuality and reparation rather than domination. Ideology, in addition to structuring thought, as Marx argued, and practices, as later Marxism has asserted, also strives to compose and fashion acceptable emotional profiles and templates. It aims to dominate the place where affect and cognition meet and become entangled. However, in spite of ideology, each person potentially forms a repertoire of emotional possibility in early life that plants the seeds for relationships between shame, reparation, interpersonal attunement and, yes, rage that make social transformation and humane revolution a viable, complexly impassioned possibility. And this may be our most fundamental need of all.

References

Barbalet, J. (2001). *Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure: a Microsociologial Approach*. NY: Cambridge University Press.

Benjamin, J. (1988). *The Bonds of Love.* NY: Pantheon.

Bowlby, J. (1983). *Attachment.* Boston: Basic.

Boler, M. (1997). Taming the Labile Other. In *Philosophy and Education Society*. (Eds.) Laird. (pp. 258-270) Champaign, Ill.

Bourdieu, P. (2004). Distinction. In *Literary Theory: an Anthology, 2nd ed.* (Eds.) J Rivkin and M Ryan. (pp. 237-252) Malden, MA: Blackwell.

- - - (1990). *The Logic of Practice.* Trans. R Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- - - (1991). *Outline of a Theory of Practice.* Trans. R Nice. NY: Cambridge University Press.

Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction Ritual Chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eagleton, T. (2009). *Trouble with Strangers: a Study of Ethics.* Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Giddens, A. (1992). *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hardt, M. and A. Negri. (2011). Biopolitical Production. In *Cultural Theory: An Anthology.* (Eds.) I. Szeman and Antonio Negri. (pp. 143-149) Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Hochschild, A. (2003). *The Commercialization of Intimate Life: Notes from Home and Work*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

--- (1979). Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structures. *The American Journal of Sociology*. 85(3): 551-575. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/pss/2778583.

Honneth, A. *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Trans. J. Anderson. Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press.

Jameson, F. (2009). *Valences of the Dialectic.* London: Verso.

Katz, J. (1999). *How Emotions Work.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kojeve, Alexandre. (1980). *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.* Ed. A. Bloom. Trans. J. Nichols. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Levi, P. (1989). *The Drowned and the Saved.* Trans. R. Rosenthal. NY: Vintage.

Levi-Strauss, C. (1969). *The Elementary Structures of Kinship.* Trans. J. Harle Bell, J. R. von Sturmer and R. Needham. Boston: Beacon.

Luhmann, N. (1995). *Social Systems.* Trans. J. Bednarz, Jr. and Dirk Baeker. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Markell, P. *Bound by Recognition.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Marx, K. (1845). *The German Ideology.* Retrieved from www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01.htm.

Maslow, A. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. *Psych. Review 50* (4) 370-96. Retrieved from psychclassics.yorku.ca/Maslow/motivation.htm.

Rubin, G. (2004). The Traffic in Women. *In Literary Theory: an Anthology, 2nd ed.* (Eds.) J. Rivkin and M. Ryan. (pp. 770-794) Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Scheff, T. (1990). *Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion and Social Structure.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schore, A. (2003a). *Affect Dysregulation and Disorders of the Self.* NY: Norton.

--- (1994). *Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: the Neurobiology of Emotional Development.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

--- (2003b) *Affect Regulation and the Repair of the Self.* NY: Norton.

Siegel, D. (1999). *The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact To Shape Who We Are.* NY: Guilford.

Sloterdijk, P. (2010). *Rage and Time: a Psychopolitical Investigation.* Trans. M. Wenning. NY: Columbia University Press.

Stern, D. (2004). The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life. NY: Norton.

Winnicott, D. W. (1989). Psycho-analytic Explorations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Zizek, S. (2004). The Sublime Object of Ideology. In Literary Theory: an Anthology. (Eds.) J. Rivkin and M. Ryan. (pp. 712-724) Malden, MA: Blackwell.

clifford van ommen
vasi van deventer

The Malleable and Open Body: Emancipatory or Oppressive?

By Clifford van Ommen, Rhodes University, and
Vasi van Deventer, University of South Africa

Abstract *The turn to the body in the social sciences is typified by the articulation of a particular kind of corporeality. It is argued that the soma shows remarkable variation across history and context. This counters attempts to universally define the body's parameters and render it controllable and predictable, a project identified with patriarchal and racist agendas. The demonstration of the un-circumscribable body thus promises to be essentially emancipatory. Some have argued that this celebration is short-sighted and that this articulation is in line with the ambitions of neo-liberal geoculture. Here we ask whether the current reading of the body inevitably dances to the machinations of the capitalism of Empire. We argue that as much as the open and malleable body accommodates these toxic ambitions, it also provides a vista for emancipatory and critical agendas, one where we however have to take possession of the inevitable violence required.*

Introduction

The turn to the body in the social sciences across the last few decades is typified by the articulation and celebration of a particular kind of corporeality. Across various instances it is argued that the soma shows remarkable variation across history and social context; that it is a radically malleable materiality that emerges from its surroundings. This conceptualisation counters attempts to fix and isolate the body, to universally define its parameters and render it controllable and predictable. This latter program is often identified with particular ideological agendas, particularly those of patriarchy and racism. The demonstration of the un-circumscribable body thus promises to be essentially emancipatory. A counter-response has argued that this celebration is short-sighted and that this contemporaneous articulation is well in line with the ambitions of neo-liberal geoculture. In this article we take up this debate and ask whether the current reading of the body dances inevitably to the machinations of the capitalism of Empire. The argument is that as much as the open and malleable body accommodates these toxic ambitions it also provides a vista for emancipatory and critical agendas, one where we however have to take possession of the inevitable violence required and distance ourselves from the delusions of beautiful souls.

Conceiving Corporeality

A prominent theme emerging out of recent body studies is the celebration of a corporeality that is multiple and open (Blackman, 2008; Blackman, Cromby, Hook, Papadopoulos & Walkerdine, 2008). This is expressed through a number of entwined themes. The one, referred to here as the *embedded body*, accentuates its socio-historical location. Drawing on sociological analyses, anthropological ethnography and historical scholarship, a malleable body is revealed, one showing remarkable variation across time and context. It is also then a body that cannot be separated from or understood outside of its surroundings. For example, as per Foucault (1976, 1979), the body is disciplined into morphologies and confessed into subjectivities through power/knowledge formations whose emergence may be traced historically, or, as per Bourdieu (1993, 2004), a habitus is inculcated through social processes which allow varying forms of capital in different social fields. A body then emerges that is classed, sexed, raced,

etcetera. Focussing on contemporary society, some argue, as we will shall see, that modern disciplinary society has been left behind in the passing of industrialisation; the emergence of complex information networks establishing a society of control where the body-subject is constituted and regulated in diverse and nuanced ways unimaginable in modern institutional society (Hardt & Negri, 2000).

With a second theme, that of the *extendable body*, corporeality's boundaries become fluid as, noted by Merleau-Ponty (1996), the technologies it utilises expand beyond mere additions to prostheses that trouble the dermis as limit. More radically, recent work construes the body as more than a variable perimeter but as a changeable identity emerging through its immersion in assemblages (Blackman, 2008). Any claim to essence is troubled as the body's conjunctions with objects, technologies and others are contingent, that is, temporary and situated, and thus endless in possibility (Marcus & Saka, 2006). The body-subject continuously and constantly (re-)emerges through subtle shifts in context (van Ommen, 2009).

In considering both of the above themes, the issue of the *vital body* becomes relevant; the concern here being with articulating a body that is not merely the product of social processes, an inert and passive substance awaiting external animation, but rather one that is capable of activity, an agency that is then more than one equated with intentionality and consciousness (Blackman, 2008).

Recent body studies have also placed in the foreground the temporal aspects of the soma in discussions of the *enacted body* where corporeality as process is emphasised (Blackman, 2008). Here again the malleability of the soma is emphasised as the body is always an en route materiality, forever unfinished and in the process of becoming. Notions of stasis are cast aside as the body is performed into being. Essential to this is that the body is open to that beyond itself, interest in the *communicative body* revealing the ways our corporeality is able to engage with the other in ways beyond the emphases on discourse developed by the turn to language. Here we find the turn to affect and non-conscious processes, studies of how the body is affected and affects others, resulting in, for example, synchronised and attuned bodies (Blackman et al., 2008). Biology finds a place here in the recognition of the role of hormones in such subtle and powerful forms of communication (Brennan, 2004). In neuroscience we find a striking similarity to the body studies of social science in turns to emotion and unconscious processes (e.g., Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 2002).

Thus, across these entwined themes of social science's recent engagement with the body we may discern the emergence of a set of contemporary emphases in understanding corporeality: This includes conceptualising it as dispersed, interconnected and multiple rather than rendered in dualistic or singular terms (Blackman et al., 2008). The open and 'molecular' body in process, relation and flux is preferred and pursued rather than a 'molar' substance that is fixed, static and closed.

The Limits of the Limitless

In the midst of this celebration of fluid boundaries and morphology, Blackman et al. (2008, p. 19) respond with concern to the 'widespread contemporary tendency within the social sciences to simply avoid, by largely rhetorical means, the phenomena of fixedness and continuity'. For them the celebration of variability and multiplicity fails to recognise the socio-political context of many who have to deal with continuous and stable oppression and exploitation. As Hardt and Negri (2000) point out, what stays constant through shifts from modernism to postmodernism, from industrial to information societies, is the exploitation of capitalism. Furthermore, such practices have embodied effects since, as Blackman et al. (2008, p. 19) put it; 'the body is also a place where social influence gets stuck…' They also acknowledge the body's 'relative spatio-temporal boundedness and inescapable mortal finitude' (Blackman et al., 2008, p. 19). But in contemporary science even mortality is no longer construed as fixed. For instance, Turner (2006) discusses the predicted ability of medical technologies to radically extend the life span. He does, however, point out how the individualist fantasies of hypermodernity are problematic in that they fail to consider the ecological and ethical consequences of such readings of aging as pathology. For example, aside from the extreme likelihood that only the very wealthy would be able to afford such longevity technologies, what would be the consequences for ecologies and economies, especially for young employable populations, of having increasingly larger groups of people with drastically extended age ranges?

The contemporary emphasis in body studies on fluidity and multiplicity resonates with the current global social order as described by Hardt and Negri (2000). Hardt and Negri are associated with the Italian autonomous Marxist tradition, a diverse and dynamic movement that share in common a shift in emphasis from understanding capitalist exploitation to theorising the autonomous struggle of the working class as an essential factor in bringing about transformative crisis (Mentenis, 2006). This 'living labour' represents an expansion of the traditional conceptualisation of class to refer to all exploitable forms of labour that embody the impetus and creativity to rupture capitalist attempts to circumscribe and control and reduce this multiplicity to 'dead labour' (Mentenis, 2006, p. 45).

Hardt and Negri (2000) contrast the imperialism of modernity with the 'imperial' morphology of Empire. The former is characterised by the nation-state, the centralisation of power, and the maintenance of fixed boundaries, whilst the latter is typified by decentralisation, flexible hierarchies and boundaries, hybrid and fragmented identities, and a distributed form of power which infiltrates all aspects of the public and private. Stating that imperialism is over, they describe the material re-figuration of industrial

society through a metaphorics and technology of information networks, this constituting global flows of products, production, humanity, consumption, and (unidirectionally) wealth. For them this is a shift from a disciplinary to a control society: In the former the body-subject is disciplined within the boundaries of various institutions, constituted through processes of normalisation structured by binary logics. In the latter, these control mechanisms exceed institutional boundaries and are distributed and ubiquitous, a biopolitics that 'regulates social life from its interior' as processes of subjectification become more nuanced and intensive, functioning especially on the level of affect (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 23).

In similar fashion, Tronti (cited in Mentinis, 2006, p. 44) describes the development of the contemporary 'factory-society' where society is now thoroughly saturated with the capitalist relations of production. This means that the 'industrial proletariat' has been decentred as the 'extraction of surplus value' has now expanded to every nook and cranny of the social field. Again, as described above, the disciplining of worker's body has been exceeded as the vast multiplicity of corporealities and subjectivities come under the control of capitalist logic. Mentenis (2006) further describes the logic of representation (comprehensive definition) upon which contemporary capitalism relies in order to achieve this ubiquitous control.

Rose (2007) notes a similar social change, tracing a shift from eugenic rationalities, associated with nationalism, to the biopolitics of liberal democracies which explicitly promote the 'freedom' and self-determination of the global citizen. Here the emphasis shifts from the population to the individual, from a concern with evolutionary fitness to the quality of life, from public to domesticated spaces, from the logics of mortality (death) to that of vitality (life), from a politics of population quality to risk management. At the same time we have, since the 1980s, the promotion of an 'ethics of enterprise, responsibility, and self-actualisation' (Rose, 2007, p. 109) and a contemporary body-subject who is 'free yet responsible, enterprising yet prudent' (Rose, 2007, p. 111) aiming at improving its own and its family's well-being. For Rose (2007, p. 130) this is a move from the depth-ontology typical of twentieth century Psychology, characterised by concern with the nature of our psychological interiors, to a post-ontological view where the world is 'flattened' into surfaces, all aspects of being human becoming 'relays in complex, ramifying, and non-hierarchical networks, filiations, and connections'.

Associated with this are the direct mappings by neuroscience of cognition, emotion and desire onto the surfaces of the brain, constituting what Rose (2008, p. 460) variably calls 'cerebral subjectivity', 'somatic individuality' or the 'neurochemical self'. Given that '[m]ind is [then] simply what the brain does', Rose (2007, p. 192) wonders whether neurobiology will replace Psychology in the twenty-first century as the principle discipline for understanding our conduct. This means that Neuroscience becomes the new '"social"' science, the new dubious control technology. It is however here not intended that the neurochemical self be understood as a passive or determined entity but rather as an active agent who is required to take up new responsibilities and engage in new forms of self-surveillance and regulation in the light of new forms of biological interrogation and revelation.

Moreover, Rose (2007, p. 39) traces how the infiltration and excavation of the corporeal by the biological sciences, especially at the cellular, genetic and molecular levels, has resulted in the decontextualisation, de-culturalisation and de-personalisation of the body reducing it to a 'utilitarian object'. He quotes Andrews and Nelkin: 'Body parts are *extracted* like a mineral, *harvested* like a crop, or *mined* like a resource. Tissue is *procured*…' (cited in Rose, 2007, p. 39, emphases in original). In this way the soma has been comprehensively claimed, in its dismemberment and dissolution, by capitalism as corporeal constituents are copyrighted and biological micro-technologies are patented under the profit motive. It thus becomes apparent that the opening, decentring and mobilising of the body not only enables an embedded and contingent reading but also, ironically, opens it up to exploitation in radically dehumanising ways never before imagined.

The Dark Side of Difference

With regard to critical analysis, Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 138) indicate that the strategies, the 'old weapons', utilised in modernity to counter discriminatory and exploitative practices and rationales are no longer effective in the contemporary order which in fact thrives on and is constituted by such logics. The assault on metaphysics and its essentialist binaries 'in the name of difference', in this way undermining the hierarchical structures and distinct boundaries of modernity, constitute the politics of difference, fluidity and hybridity of Empire. This critical form has thus been assimilated into a new global exploitative matrix. Rose (2007) concurs; in a world in flux destabilising the present is no longer a radical move but a conservative act, a contribution to the maintenance of the status quo. It is an observation also made by Papadopoulos (2003, 2004) in his consideration of embodiment theories and the contemporary global order.

Papadopoulos's lineage may be traced back to the critical psychology developed by Klaus Holzkamp in Germany across the latter part of the twentieth century. Holzkamp had embraced the Marxism of the German worker's movement not only as an activist but also as a significant resource in the development of his own theoretical work (Papadopoulos, 2009). In Holzkamp's 'science of the subject', the subject emerges from concrete social existence where repression refers to that which limits its involvement in altering the realities of its existence. Although drawing from this mediated Marxist tradition, Papadopoulos is critical of 'traditional Marxism', arguing that it shares some basic assumptions with liberalism, including the conceptualisation of a self-conscious and autonomous subject, the centrality of the state in both

repressive and emancipatory action, and a fairly uncritical faith in technology (Papadopoulos, 2003). Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos (2008) echo Holloway (cited in Mentenis, 2006) in distancing themselves from faith in the Revolution as event, describing instead a commitment to revolution as a continuous process of imperceptible micropolitics conducted by diverse agents through a multiplicity of emancipatory routes. Ultimately these people 'have nothing in common apart from the fact that their positioning as productive subjects makes them variously exploitable in the regime of embodied capitalism' (Papadopoulos, Stephenson & Tsianos, 2008, p. 258).

When Papadopoulos (2004, p. 9) states that embodiment theories are 'active forces in the transformation of social and material conditions', we, as critically oriented social scientists, can only nod in agreement; after all in deference to Marx the aim of theory is not to interpret the world but to change it (Balibar, 2007). Where things become unsettled is when we realise that he links this ability to change to an anti-revolutionary agenda. Papadopoulos (2003, 2004) argues that contemporary celebrations of embodiment theory, connectionism models and 'post-structural' systems frameworks should be treated with suspicion as they can all be linked to the conservation of the current neo-liberal social order.

Emerging since the 1970s is a distinctive 'self-creating body' partly constituted and given scientific legitimacy by the discourses of connectionism, embodiment theory and biotechnology. The opening and penetration of the body articulated by these discourses resonate with attempts, since the 1960s, of North-Atlantic emancipation movements to counter essentialist, determinist, impermeable, decontextualised, universalist and formulaic notions of the body. This has resulted in the celebratory discourses of hypermodernity and postmodernism which concede to liberal individualism by ignoring 'the facticity of the present' (Papadopoulos, 2004, p. 20) where military and social forms of technostructural violence normalise exclusion and create 'people who do not even figure' (2003, p. 74). For Papadopoulos (2004, p. 23) then the emancipatory notion of the open body 'hinges on the belief in a self-reliant and self-assertive individual' which is neo-liberalism's chief ideology and technology in terms of subjectivity. It is important to note that here the assemblage through which the self emerges is identified as that of the market where in the individual then strives to reach a particular improved and improving social position. Papadopoulos (2004, p. 24) concludes that although embodiment is 'a radical challenge to western thought' it is also an element 'of the prevalent social and political governmentality in this particular historical moment'.

It is hard to see from Papadopoulos' account how any critical agenda can be pursued since all attempts at reflexive action only proliferate the subjectivities on which liberal geoculture thrives. We argue that what is required in the face of this seeming paralysis is to consider the version of the 'self-creating body' that is offered here. If it is a self-creationism that recognises its constitutive embeddedness then it seems to be one that erases all aspects of this aside from that of the market which is inflated to a totality; all that then matters is one's place in this particular power grid. Such a limited reading of one's circumstance is then effective in maintaining the status quo and particular ideologically embedded ideals, be it the independent male of patriarchy, the endlessly exploitable world of capitalism, or the autonomous individual of liberalism.

Surely what is at stake here is the interpretation of identity as emergent: It seems reasonable to claim that it is possible for the individual to simply use the other as competitive comparison without recognising any constitutive dependence. It is however also possible to recognise one's emergence from context more radically thus revealing the illusion of autonomy, self-reliance and self-definition. We argue that the 'self-creating body' is a particular economic (ideological) imposition on the malleability articulated in embodiment studies. It is one that reintroduces a postmodern version of the liberal agent and erases context by placing responsibility with the individual to cope with travesties of geo-political aetiology such as 'changing climates', 'economic recessions' and 'stress'. Such a notion may be regarded as a simultaneous attempt to close down and exploit openness through the asocial rationale of liberalism. Openness does not belong to or, rather, is not totalised by any ideology no matter how ubiquitous the geoculture through which it is constituted. Such a notion exceeds comprehensive colonisation and is therefore an opening for multiple political agendas. It brings home the point that no concept (including openness, stability, anti-essentialism, and essentialism) is inherently emancipatory or oppressive. Rather, in a world of multiple agendas such notions cannot be atemporally fixed but offer ongoing resources to enact emancipations and oppressions through the imposition of various economies.

Hardt and Negri (2000, p. xv) recognise this; for them a system that produces a profound multiplicity of singularities offers new routes for emancipatory action. Through their 'resistances, struggles, and desires', the multitude are able to independently construct a counter-Empire; consisting of alternative and innovative democratic forms of global flows and exchanges. Where for Papadopoulos the 'self-creating body' of liberal geoculture is unavoidably and dangerously conservative, Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 25) refer to the paradox of the plurality and multiplicity of biopower:

> while it unifies and envelops within itself every element of social life (thus losing its capacity to mediate social forces), [it] at that very moment reveals a new context, a new milieu of maximum plurality and uncontainable singularisation – a milieu of the event.

Their view is thus positive: 'Empire creates a greater potential for revolution than did the modern regimes of power…' (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 393).

For Rose (2007) it is a similar circumstance; recognising that the contemporary situation requires the revisiting of critical strategy. When all is in flux then we need to recognise and utilise continuities and stabilities as much as change. Change in itself is not emancipatory, stability is not essentially oppressive. Or, in the case of one posthuman nightmare where it is believed that the body will be reduced to codes and commodities, we must recognise this as an economic imposition where the aneconomic of life will resist such attempted containments (Gane, 2006; Rose, 2007). As previously indicated, Rose argues, as Hardt and Negri do, that critical analysis needs to move beyond the assault on traditional binaries for these do not function as radical interventions in a society of control. What he recommends is similar to the questions Prilleltensky and Fox (1997) and Painter, Terre Blanche and Henderson (2006) advocate: Irrespective of its origin (mainstream or critical) what does a figuration offer, what benefits and losses for whom, how can this rationale function as an agent of control or emancipation?

Post/binary Logics

In this section we argue that more is needed than the form of critical analysis advocated by Hardt and Negri (2000). It is not only a matter of needing a post-binary logic but, rather, a logic that is both post-binary and binary, where, on a contingent basis, from one matter to the next, we have to ask ourselves which is being or which can be utilised.

In contemporary life rigid binaries can be (and are) reasserted. To give a brief example; an article on the 'psychopath' in a recent edition of an award winning popular glossy magazine bluntly states: 'Abhorrent as it is, true psychopaths are born not made' (Malherbe, 2010, p. 37). Here, quite plainly and with violent simplicity in the realm of popular discourse, a person is construed in binary fashion as the product of nature, biology, and genetics. As much as such a construal allows society to wash it hands of the violent and immoral other, more subtle and resistant readings of the self as both biological and social, both determined and agent, are possible. We need to remember that scientific practices still hide their politics (and their morality) through claims of objectivity as they circumscribe bodies through oppressive (binary) notions of the normal and the complete. This continues to lead to legitimate concerns by those pursuing emancipatory agendas with unsettling such claims (often using the contradictory and nuanced claims of science itself against these agendas), showing the finished as unfinished, the inert as vital, the static as in motion, the fixed as contingent, and the normal as instance (Diprose, 2002).

The opposite (post-binary) claim also warrants critical attention: Our own research involving deconstructive (mis)readings of several texts from the neurosciences suggests that, aside from some metaphysical (binary and information processing discourse) remnants (where we feel encouraged to shake the inertness out of these readings) we are in the midst of a neuroscience in line with the logic of a postmodern politics, that of imperial sovereignty (Hardt & Negri, 2000). For example, the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (2002) articulates a profoundly plastic brain constituted of various conscious and unconscious systems in continuous dynamic relations of dominance and submission whilst embedded in and emerging from complex contextual layers. Following Papadopoulos' aforementioned argument, such 'critical' readings of contemporary neuroscience could be seen as wolves in sheep's clothing, radicality that simply serves the new version of old exploitative orders. But, as indicated above, what is important is that should this social order now be different to that where binaries and disciplinary regimes once held exclusive sway, then critical movements need to acknowledge this shift through the development of new construals of analysis and resistance within this contemporary landscape.

The Omnipresence of the Metaphysical Closure

Given this, what is most important is that we recognise the omnipresence of the metaphysical closure. In the current celebration in body studies and social theory of the open against the closed, the plastic against the fixed, process against stasis, immanence against transcendence, we must simultaneously recognise in these examples the inescapable (re)emergence of binaries that need their 'presence' interrogated. The difficulty with readings sensitive to the fixings (the stasis) of the Law (and its various synonyms; secondary violence, metaphysics, order, information processing cognitive science, conventional connectionism) is that in bringing the other face to bear (the aneconomic, originary violence, the excess, *différance*, radical connectionism, and other quasi-synonymic nicknames) a simple inversion remains where 'philosophy' (the system, the economy) is replaced by 'literature' (the play of signification, the aneconomic) (Hurst, 2004). That is, here we find the fantasy found in Rorty's (mis)reading of deconstruction as the free play of signification where the oppressive dualities (binaries) of metaphysics have been overcome (Hurst, 2004). The trouble with this is that it reveals a naiveté, a postmodern optimism, an instance of new age (bourgeois) obscurantism, that slips wholesale into the post-history and post-political ideological ruse of the neo-liberal social order, blind to the dualism that is simultaneously reinserted in the very moment of its constitution. As Derrida pointed out; the metaphysical enclosure cannot be escaped (transcended) but only (interminably) exceeded (Bennington, 2000).

Take as an example Lux's (2010) analysis of the politically problematic (conservative) notion of biological determinism: Historically genetics has provided an influential source of legitimation for this form of determinism. One would imagine that the complex nature of genetic inheritance revealed by contemporary genetic research, where the gene as basic unit of inheritance has been deeply troubled, would marginalise this notion allowing for

more complex readings of the human condition. However, as Lux (2010) argues, instead a new (systemic) form of biological determinism has emerged wholly compatible with the individualism of the neoliberal agenda. Thus we have the return of a notion transformed but still operating in conservative and binary fashion.

A further example, from the opposite side of the political spectrum, is the welcoming of postmodern Empire by Hardt and Negri (2000), the imperial realm of the post-binary, where the multitude, despite being subject to ubiquitous control are liberated from the transcendental impositions of modernity, and can now bring about a new social *order*. Postmodern such a society may be, freed from the imposition of the economic it is not; the multitude still require an agenda (the constitution of a 'new proletariat' detailed in *Empire*) where the capitalist order's programme is to be overthrown. Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 217) argue that '[h]ybridity itself is an empty gesture, and the mere refusal of order simply leaves us on the edge of nothingness – or worse, these gestures risk reinforcing imperial power rather than challenging it'. Difference for the sake of difference suits the capitalist postmodern and assimilative machinery, which can then impose (as obvious and natural) its economy on this love affair with the aneconomic. The need for direction, agenda, organisation, strategy, and order remains. The celebration of the aneconomic still requires the secondary violence of the economic to be effective and truly emancipatory (as this economy, in turn, needs the tertiary violence of being caste into play through interminable critique) (Beardsworth, 1996).

Unavoidable Contamination, Interminable Critique

To conclude, Olivier's (2007) distinction between the postmodern and the post-structural is useful here: By drawing this distinction he frees critical conceptualisation from conflation with the pseudo-emancipatory relativism of the former whilst simultaneously reminding us of the logic of constitutional contamination (the inescapability of the other) of the latter (as articulated in the previous section) (Staten, 1984). The notions of transcendence, of escape, of purity, even event, is that of beautiful souls; those that believe that some position can be achieved where we will finally be released from the contamination and violence of the reviled other. But, as Wilson (1998) points out, the pure/fallen and transparency/violent binaries cannot hold since contamination and violence cannot be avoided. The attempts to secure such positions cripple the critical project, first, by excluding essential areas (e.g., the essential, the closed, the biological) and theoretical resources (e.g., biology, neurology) associated with the nefarious other and, second, by introducing another form of violence, that of the *belle me* where one denies one's own capacity for violence and thus smothers both the 'evil' and 'oppressed' other in the 'truth' of one's projections. The politics of utopia needs the contamination of the politics of aporia (Stavrakakis, 1999).

It is here that Hepburn's (1999) point needs to be kept in mind; that if we have the insight and courage to recognise that the other always returns (in the very moment where we imagine ourselves liberated, post-binary, pure, essence, and so forth) then we should also not mistake it for what it was but should articulate the displacement (the otherness of the other) at hand. In more Foucauldian terms, new knowledges are not essentially emancipatory but all transformations bring about *new* freedoms *and* dangers (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). That is, if the ostracised always returns, then we need to ask in what form it has made its comeback. As much as the open and malleable body of contemporary body studies opens up dangers we should also exploit these developments for the emancipatory actions they allow.

References

Balibar, E. (2007). *The philosophy of Marx*. London: Verso.

Beardsworth, R. (1996). *Derrida and the political*. London: Routledge.

Bennington, G. (2000). Deconstruction and ethics. In N. Royle (Ed.), *Deconstructions: A user's guide* (pp. 64-82). New York: Palgrave.

Blackman, L. (2008). *The body: The key concepts*. Oxford: Berg.

Blackman, L., Cromby, J., Hook, D., Papadopoulos, D., & Walkerdine, V. (2008). *Creating subjectivities*. Subjectivity, 22, 1-27.

Bourdieu, P. (1993). *The field of cultural production*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bourdieu, P. (2004). Bodily Knowledge. In A. Blaikie, M. Hepworth, M. Holmes, A. Howson, D. Inglis, & S. Sartain (Eds.), *The Body: Critical concepts in sociology.* Vol. 2. Sociology, nature and the body (pp. 52-82). London: Routledge.

Brennan, T. (2004). *The transmission of affec*t. New York: Cornell University Press.

Damasio, A. (1994). *Descartes' error: Emotion, reason and the human brain.* New York: Quill.

Diprose, R. (2002). Writing in blood: Response to Helen Keane and Marsha Rosengraten, 'On the biology of sexed subjects.' *Australian Feminist Studies*, 17(39), 279-282.

Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1983). *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics (2nd ed.)*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, M. (1976). *The history of sexuality (Vol. 1)*. New York: Pantheon.

Foucault, M. (1979). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Gane, N. (2006). Posthuman. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 23(2-63), 431-

434.

Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2000). *Empire*. London: Harvard University Press.

Hepburn, A. (1999). Derrida and Psychology: Deconstruction and its ab/uses in critical and discursive psychologies. *Theory & Psychology*, 9(5), 639-665.

Hurst, A. (2004). Derrida's quasi-transcendental thinking. *South African Journal of Philosophy*, 23(3), 244-266.

LeDoux, J. (2002). *Synaptic self: How our brains become who we are*. New York: Penguin Books.

Lux, V. (2010, August). *Changes in biological determinism: Observations from the perspective of German Critical Psychology.* Paper presented at the Marxism and Psychology Conference, University of Prince Edward Island, Prince Edward Island, Canada.

Malherbe, K. (2010). *Gutted.* Private Edition, 9, 32-37.

Marcus, G. E., & Saka, E. (2006). Assemblage. *Theory, Culture & Society,* 23(2-3), 101-109.

Mentinis, M. (2006). *Zapatistas: The Chiapas revolt and what it means for radical politics*. London: Pluto Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1996). The synthesis of one's own body. In A. Blaikie, M. Hepworth, M. Holmes, A. Howson, D. Inglis, & S. Sartain (Eds.), *The Body: Critical concepts in Sociology.* Vol. 1. Knowing bodies (pp. 56-61). London: Routledge.

Olivier, B. (2007). Postmodernity, globalisation, communication and identity. *Communicare: Journal for Communication Sciences in Southern Africa*, 26(2), 36-55.

Painter, D., Terre Blanche, M., & Henderson, J. (2006). Critical psychology in South Africa: Histories, themes and prospects. *Annual Review of Critical Psychology*, 5, 212-235.

Papadopoulos, D. (2003). The ordinary superstition of subjectivity: Liberalism and technostructural violence. *Theory & Psychology*, 13(1), 73-93.

Papadopoulos, D. (2004). *North-Atlantic self-creationism. On the perils and promises of embodiment and connectionism.* Unpublished chapter, Free University of Berlin, Berlin.

Papadopoulos, D. (2009). Klaus Holzkamp's critical social science. *Theory & Psychology,* 19(2), 161-166.

Papadopoulos, D., Stephenson, N., & Tsianos, V. (2008). *Escape routes*. London: Pluto Press.

Prilleltensky, I., & Fox, D. (1997). Introducing critical psychology: Values, assumptions, and the status quo. In D. Fox & I. Prilleltensky (Eds.), *Critical psychology: An introduction* (pp. 3-21). London: Sage.

Rose, N. (2007). *The politics of life itself: Biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Rose, N. (2008). Psychology as a social science. *Subjectivity*, 25, 446-462.

Staten, H. (1984). *Wittgenstein and Derrida*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Stavrakakis, Y. (1999). *Lacan and the political*. London: Routledge.

Turner, B. (2006). Body. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 23(2-63), 223-229.

van Ommen, C. (2009). Body/Other: The body as 'smudge'? In T. Teo, P. Stenner, A. Rutherford, E. Park, & C. Baerveldt (Eds.), *Varieties of theoretical psychology: International philosophical and practical concerns* (pp. 41-48). Ontario: Captus University Publications.

Wilson, E. A. (1998). *Neural geographies: Feminism and the microstructure of cognition.* New York: Routledge.

radu neculau

Identity Recognition and the Normative Challenge of Crowd Psychology

By Radu Neculau, University of Windsor

Abstract *Recent social psychology (Graumann, Moscovici, Rouquette) offers convincing descriptions of crowd behavior without providing an equally satisfactory account of its normative infrastructure. Marxist philosophy, under the influence of early Critical Theory, successfully deals with the normative component of crowd behavior at the price of reducing its psychological dimension to impersonal socio-economic forces. This paper uses Axel Honneth's conception of recognition to work out a comprehensive account of crowd phenomena that can integrate the superior descriptive capacity of the psychodynamic analysis of crowd behavior into the normative analysis of practical attitudes of misrecognition. The result is a normative explanation of crowd behavior from within the psychologically experienced attitude of social disrespect that promises to reconcile the empirical research of contemporary social psychology with the theoretical aspirations of post-Marxist critical social theory.*

Typical manifestations of violent mass action seem to support the intuitive appeal of the traditional but somewhat discredited distinction in social psychology between the "natural" (or "spontaneous") and the "artificial" (or "organized") crowd (Moscovici, 1981). If the artificial crowd is reducible to socio-economic conditions and thereby explainable in terms of a system-induced production of false consciousness that normatively underwrites the collective attitudes of the massified individuals, the natural crowd captures the empirical reality of a particular kind of large-scale group dynamic with a legitimate claim to psychological autonomy. Recent social psychology has done a convincing job of describing in great detail the typology and collective behavior of the natural crowd without, however, offering an equally satisfactory account of its normative infrastructure. The result is an explanation of crowd "phenomena" that successfully overcomes the mystical power ontology and ideological prejudices of earlier crowd psychology (Le Bon, Tarde). Yet this type of explanation ends up either deriving all normativity from the impersonal mechanics of intra-group interaction and inter-group confrontation (Graumann, 1984, Reicher 2001), or else simply dissolving normativity in the dream life of pre-logical group cognition and affectivity (Rouquette, 1994). Critical Theory on the other hand has had a long and prestigious history of making transparent the normative mechanisms of the massification process that generates highly submissive and easily deployable artificial crowds either, following Marx and Lukács, in terms of the material conditions of thinking and action that determine class consciousness, or, in the wake of Freud's application of the theory of the drives to group psychology (and drawing on the revolutionary psychoanalysis of Federn, Fromm, Reich or Broch), in terms of the relationship between the socio-economic structures of power and those of personality. However, the sociologistic tendencies of early Critical Theory have also led to a reductionist explanation of mass psychology. This means that the normative gain of the reductive analysis of mass phenomena was achieved at the price of a loss of descriptive power, which left Critical Theory unable to properly account for a wealth of collective psychological experiences whose importance for social and political life could be dismissed as a theoretical and practical distraction. As Adorno himself put it, Critical Theory lost sight of the "fluid reality of psychological life" (Adorno, 1982, p. 346).

This paper proposes one way of bridging the gap between psychological explanation and social critique by integrating the superior descriptive capacity of the psychodynamic analysis of crowd behavior into the normative account of identity formation in asymmetrical experiences of moral injury. The conceptual scheme that promises to unlock the normative potential of crowd psychology is Axel Honneth's theory of recognition (and misrecognition), which provides the theoretical standpoint for a moral explanation of crowd behavior that is pursued from within the psychologically experienced attitude of social disrespect. This

paper develops this idea in four steps. The first section clarifies the distinction between natural and artificial crowds by explaining it in terms of the more familiar notions of normative statuses and attitudes, personal and group identity, and recognition. In a second step, the paper introduces the problematic of mass or crowd phenomena as presented in the classic works of Le Bon and Tarde. This section highlights the fact that these authors dissolve the normative component of collective mental attitudes in the allegedly neutral psychological description of natural power relations. This is followed by a schematic reconstruction of early Critical Theory's involvement with mass psychology through a succinct discussion of select passages from Freud and Adorno in order to illustrate the gradual shift away from this psychology of power relations in the natural crowd and toward the socio-economic structures and institutional mechanisms of control and domination that explain the emergence of the artificial crowds (of which the group psychology of the natural crowd is only the surface expression). Lastly, the paper focuses on some aspects of Axel Honneth's theory of identity recognition that promise to reconcile the normative demands of critical social theory with the psychological insights gained from the non-reductive empirical investigation of crowd phenomena. This account is then empirically validated against some of the more recent theories of crowd behavior, and especially Stephen Reicher's.

Terminology and Conceptual Clarifications

How much theoretical authority should we grant the distinction between natural and artificial crowds? The distinction, first introduced by Gabriel Tarde (1910) and then taken up in various guises by a variety of authors, seems plausible enough on an intuitive level based on our experience with the various modes of collective behavior of certain groups of people. What we witness in riots, mobs, panics, commotions, stampedes, etc. is clearly different from the collective behavior of concert audiences, factory workers, political assemblies, religious sects or army personnel. The distinction becomes even more convincing when we try to break it down into narrower subcategories according to the various descriptors used by contemporary social psychologists to produce detailed classifications of crowds. These descriptors include non-social features such as the number of individuals involved, the density of the population and the physical proximity of the participants, or temporal dimensions of crowd action, such as duration, frequency and rapidity. They also include social aspects, such as the social significance of some types of collective action, the effects of certain historical events upon the collective memory of the group, the degree of social structuring and organization of the crowd, and the norms that regulate the behavior of the individuals who form a crowd. Finally, the descriptors try to capture the psychological dimension of crowd phenomena, that is, the motivation for action of the crowd members, considered both in isolation and as parts of the crowd (Graumann, 1984).

In addition to these, one may also consider other criteria of differentiation, also used by the early crowd psychologists, such as the cognitive faculties that are taken to be primarily involved in and therefore responsible for the collective mindedness and action of each of these two types of crowds. This is not a new idea. In fact, it reflects a methodological habit that goes back to the 17th and 18th century custom of organizing the cognitive powers into a superior faculty (judgment, reason, the understanding) and an inferior one (sensibility, imagination, the lower faculty of desire). This hierarchy of the faculties provides an anthropological foundation for much of the moral and political theory of the time (as we learn from the work of Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau, or Kant), which sought to distinguish between the modes of thinking, acting and social organization that are appropriate for a society based on rational bonds and the ones that suit an immature population that is only subject to the law of desire. When we apply this anthropological distinction to the study of crowds, the natural crowd will inevitably appear as an intuitive, imaginative, and projective form of social aggregation while the artificial crowd will generally match the ideal of rationality and reflectivity that is traditionally attributed to modern, structured societies. Thus, the natural crowd will be seen as merely reacting to external stimuli while the artificial crowd will be regarded as a form of voluntary subjection to the authority of self-imposed norms. The spontaneous crowd will appear as a unity of feeling while the organized crowd will be taken to represent a unity of willing. The natural crowd will express the power of unconscious desires, whereas the artificial crowd explains how this power is harnessed in institutionalized contexts of thinking and action.

However, if we focus on the social, psychological, and cognitive criteria of classification (as presented above), it would appear that the distinction between a natural and an artificial crowd can be distilled into a distinction between two kinds of groups based on two philosophically relevant criteria of differentiation. The first one refers to the kind of self- and group-regarding collective attitudes of the members of the group, or what Raimo Tuomela (2002, 2007) calls we-attitudes, which give the group a specific collective identity and the individual group members a social identity that is derived from the identity of the group. According to this criterion, natural crowds spontaneously generate an identity that is not based on identifiable prior collective attitudes but takes the shape of projections of future states of emotional satisfaction or gratification. These states are allegedly achieved in emotional discharges through collective action that make the solidarity of the crowd members physically palpable and their satisfaction psychologically immediate. In contrast, the artificial crowds are groups that already possess such an identity and in which all the individual members understand their membership and therefore their group identity in terms of we-attitudes.

Second, the behavior of the individual members who make up the artificial crowd is regulated by norms that each individual acknowledges as authoritative for the type of activity that is specific

to the reference group. In contrast, the behavior of the natural crowd appears to be normless (when in fact it is based in implicit norms), or based on ad-hoc rules that legitimize whatever the group happens to be doing. What makes norms authoritative for the artificial crowd is that they are derived from collective attitudes that define the identity of the group and the group identity of each of the group's members. The norms of the natural crowd, on the other hand, appear to be retroactively justificatory and thus non-regulative. As we shall see, in light of this second criterion of differentiation, the challenge for crowd psychology is twofold: to explain whether and how the behavior of natural crowds is grounded in norms of group identity that individuals internalize and act out as a result of their membership in artificial crowds; and to explain the kind of collective identity of the natural crowd in terms of we-attitudes that are grounded in the group identity of the artificial crowd.

The distinction between natural and artificial is further complicated by other, sociologically and philosophically more salient distinctions between crowd and mass and between the massified individual and mass society. This distinction is not easy to see in the work of Gabriel Tarde, for instance, who regards the artificial crowd as an instance of what he calls the public, a precursor notion to the Heideggerian idea of inauthentic "publicness" or to the concept of mass in the early critical theory of Adorno and Horkheimer. Clearly, the notion of a mass of individuals understood in this way is not reducible to the notion of a group, even though the mass includes many individuals who belong to such groups. This further means that the social mass cannot be understood as a crowd, whether natural or artificial, and conversely, that the crowd is not reducible to the mass. The notion of mass conveys the idea that the individuals who compose it are interchangeable. And they are deemed to be interchangeable because their personal and their group identity are fully dissolved in the impersonal and repeatable quantitative identity of a collection of atomized individuals. These individuals no longer posses the kind of distinctive personality features that motivate them to think of themselves as either autonomous or as participating in a group based on internalized we-attitudes that produce norms of action. As we learn from Marx' theory of alienation (and Lukács' theory of reification), the mass is the condition that characterizes individuals who possess no personal or group identity beyond the function identity they acquire in the process of satisfying needs in a social system that is designed to maintain itself by reproducing such identities. However, what is important about mass society is that the massified individuals who compose it are susceptible of engaging in the kind of collective action that is typical of natural crowds following the promptings of leaders who know how to generate the illusion that the action of the crowd is the expression of specific forms of group identity: class-based, national, racial, religious, etc.

Earlier I used the concept of identity without further qualifications. To address this lack of determinateness, one must first distinguish between individual or personal identity and group identity when analyzing crowds. But this distinction requires additional explanations. Philosophers and social psychologists who investigate the problem of identity tend to assume an individualistic notion of identity, which they often represent as a self-certifying source of theoretical and practical rationality. This notion of identity may include evaluative features that borrow from the social context of interaction without, however, being reducible to it. The early crowd psychology of Le Bon, McDougall or Park, just like the psychological theory of de-individuation of the late 60's and early 70's (Zimbardo, Diener, etc), argues that the personal identity of the individuals who participate in crowds is dissolved in the collective mental attitude of the crowd, or in the fusion of affects that produces something resembling a collective soul or affective spirit. The notion of identity used in this paper differs from the notion of identity used in such approaches. Drawing on Marx's early social theory, it insists that personal identity is a form of practical, as opposed to merely cognitive, self-relation. A practical self-relation actualizes, through recognition, self-regarding attitudes that are in turn based on interpretations of oneself in terms of the evaluative features one possesses. These features may be natural determinations such as attributes, skills, or capacities, as well as conscious value-orientations whose normative status is conferred by the evaluative framework of the reference group (ethnic, gendered, racial, life-style based, etc). Personal identity in this sense is doubly social even though it is not just a social construction. It requires the presence of evaluative features shared by the group, whose normative status is actualized through practical, as opposed to merely symbolic, attitudes of recognition by members of the in-group or the out-group. If we accept these qualifications, it would seem that what is at stake in crowd phenomena is not the dissolution of personal identity but the emphatic affirmation of group identity, a desire for the recognition of one's social identity. What is normative, then, is the group identity of the artificial crowd (as specified by the salient evaluative features), and the challenge is to explain natural crowds in terms of this normative potential.

Crowd Psychology as Natural Power Ontology

The crowd first shows up as a social philosophical problem in Hegel's mature social philosophy of mutual recognition (Hegel, 1992). But Hegel is unable to satisfactorily deal with the problem of what he calls the rabble mentality (the resentful attitude of the poor who reject the ethical norms of modern civil society yet feel entitled to its benefits), and so he decides to ignore it by treating it as a psychological aberration. There have been two, historically developed types of responses to Hegel's unsolved problem. One type of response, exemplified by Karl Marx and the Marxist tradition, emphasizes the need for a materialist reconstruction of the structures of subjectivity that would eventually result in a revolutionary type of social consciousness with which the rabble could properly identify. This type of consciousness could be granted

normative status in a radically revised system of recognition of one's species being. The other response, by Friedrich Nietzsche, reconfigures what the early Marx had called the "language of real life" in the form of a primordial unity of affectivity. This motivates individuals to engage in value-transcending forms of willing that undermine what Nietzsche criticized as "slave morality" or "herd mentality"--- the collective attitudes of mutual recognition in modern ethical life as described by Hegel. Unlike the first generation critical theorists, who tried to work out a synthesis of Marx and Freud (Nietzsche's heir), the crowd psychologists have followed Nietzsche.

After initially generating tremendous excitement, the early theories that aimed to capture the psychodynamic of crowd behavior quickly fell into disrepute. The reason for this is not very difficult to grasp. If we examine the work of Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde, the founders of this new, pseudo-scientific discipline, we immediately realize that their attempt to lay bare the natural foundations of what they called crowd psychology amounted to little more than an attempt to harness the motivational resources of an ontology of power relations in order to instrumentalize this ontology for socially and politically conservative purposes (Graumann & Moscovici, 1986, pp. 24-25). However, if we ignore this latter aspect, we would discover that for Le Bon all questions about the norms that govern the collective actions and attitudes of the social crowd must be answered in the terms provided by a neutral interpretation of what he took to be a natural phenomenon of human proximity. Here are some of the elements of this interpretation.

First, Le Bon believed that the mass represented a social entity of its own, a fusion of personalities in the spirit of the group which had to be distinguished not only from the individuals of which it is composed but also from (class-based) society. Crowd psychologists regarded the latter as a structured system of differences that could be objectively quantified according to socio-economic indicators and subjectively linked to ethical attitudes and dispositions. However, this system in their view lacked the psychological unity that could turn isolated individuals into impersonal units of a crowd. Unlike class society, which preserves class and therefore individual differences, the mass for Le Bon was a unitary mental phenomenon of collective life (Le Bon, 1952, p. 32). The mass' particular dynamism is grounded not in critical thinking and conscious reflection, but rather in the unconscious impulses of the collective, which make crowds susceptible to psychological influence and manipulation. The crowd is a unity of emotions whose motivational power is summoned by the power of the imagination, and the corresponding loss in individuality could only be accounted for by the categories of a new and autonomous discipline.

Le Bon's view that crowd and society are distinct social objects is supposedly confirmed by the direct psychological observation of crowd behavior. Crowd actions are almost never reducible to either class characteristics or ethical dispositions. As far as the latter are concerned, according to Le Bon the crowd could be impulsive and inconsistent, violent and cruel, irrational and hysterical, and perhaps even mad. But it could also be heroic and generous. Against Scipio Sighele and other legal theorists who worked under the 19th century, bourgeois assumption that the crowd is always criminal, Le Bon forcefully argued that the irrationality of the crowd is neither criminal, nor immoral. Like a natural phenomenon, the destructive energy of the crowd is fundamentally amoral. The "madness" of the crowd, Le Bon claimed, was the direct effect of the contagion caused by the exacerbated suggestibility that almost always obtains under conditions of social proximity (what the psycho-sociologist Robert Park later called "crowding"). This, however, added nothing truly pathological to the illusions of the masses, no matter how the latter ended up expressing them (Graumann, 1984, p. 530). This was also an important step in Le Bon's attempt to classify crowd behavior as an autonomous and strictly psychological phenomenon that had little to do with moral norms, historical tendencies, social factors and economic conditions. The mass was not a class, although it could easily be mistaken for one, and it was not criminal, even though it often behaved violently.

Second, Le Bon described the links between the massified individuals who make up the crowd and their leader with the help of the notion of hypnosis. One of the common accounts of what it means to be part of a crowd is that the individuals who are immersed in it find themselves under the power of a spell. They behave as if they suffered from some kind of psychological intoxication (Le Bon, 1952, p. 31). The somnambulic state of the crowd is often compared to the trance of hypnotized patients. Those who observed Charcot's work in his hospital ward came away convinced that hypnotism revealed the existence of some primordial form of psychic life, an animal magnetism that could also account for the irrationalism, primitivism, and elemental behavior of the crowd. Le Bon was no different in this respect. What explained the difference between the normal individual and the individual who was a part of the crowd was precisely what explained the difference between the conscious individual and the hypnotized patient. In Le Bon's words, "[A]n individual immerged for some time in a crowd in action soon finds himself, either in consequence of the magnetic influence given out by the crowd, or from some other cause of which we are ignorant, in a special state, which much resembles the state of fascination in which the hypnotized individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotiser" (Le Bon, 1952, p. 31) From this point on, hypnosis becomes the main model for explaining social action and reaction in crowd psychology (Moscovici, 1981, p. 88).

Third, according to Le Bon and his follower, Gabriel Tarde, what characterizes the mental life of the crowd is projection and automatic thinking. The former blurs the distinction between reality and representation through expectations that cannot be justified by the laws of natural causality or by rules of deductive reasoning. This accounts for the fact that the crowd mind is repetitive,

contradictory, illogical, and excessively dependent on the projective power of the imagination (Rouquette, 1994, pp. 68-84). This mode of thinking appeals to memory and suggestion, which makes the crowd susceptible to idealization and influence and thus to political manipulation. It was this realization that led Gabriel Tarde to gradually abandon in his work the kind of descriptive account of mass behavior that Le Bon favored in order to better focus on the psychology of the charismatic leader and the forms of communication that the leader employs to control the masses---either direct (through suggestion), or indirect (through mass communication and propaganda, a more sophisticated form of suggestion) (Tarde, 1910, p. 78). Communication and conversation for Tarde, that is, holding the attention of an audience and influencing someone's thoughts, have effects in modern societies that are similar to those of hypnosis in therapeutic relationships. Mass communication is therefore an agent of social leveling and mental uniformity that reduces individuals to automata that look just like Charcot's hypnotized patients. Ultimately, crowd phenomena for Tarde are psychological byproducts of mass communication and the best way to approach them is through a psychological investigation of communication patters in modern societies.

The efforts of the early (and even later) crowd psychologists to preserve the methodological purity of their discipline, which is exemplified by the justified refusal to collapse the notion of mass into that of social class and the notion of crowd mentality into that of class consciousness, comes at a heavy price, particularly for an emerging science that claims to provide a more lucid account of modern political phenomena. The price is the lack of a normative horizon that could elevate crowd psychology above the status of a descriptive discipline that only deals with the mechanics, so to speak, of social action and collective mindedness. Crowd psychology may well generate exciting empirical theories, but these theories rarely deal with questions of normativity explicitly, even though everything about crowds appears to be normative.

Critical Theory and the Repression of the Psychological

This all changes with Freud and early Critical Theory. Freud in particular is important because he adopts the problematic, descriptions, and typologies of classical crowd psychology but provides a different ontological explanation for mass phenomena, one that critical social theorists could appropriate within the proper normative context. In his account, the natural crowd is reduced to a mode of manifestation of the artificial crowd and, if the manifestation is violent, to pathological processes of de-sublimation that are generated from within the artificial crowd. This further enables Freud to focus on the social psychology of the group as a conceptual stand-in for the more nebulous collective mind or psyche of the earlier crowd psychologists.

Three moves seem of particular importance in Freud's 1921 essay *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, where he presents the essential ingredients of his crowd theory. First, after a careful analysis of Le Bon's book on crowd psychology, Freud concludes that Le Bon, in spite of his impressive description of mass mentality and action, ultimately fails to explain that "something" which unites the individuals in the group (Freud, 1959, p. 5). Suggestion and hypnosis themselves must be grounded in a more primordial instinctual nature, which Freud hoped to explore with the help of the notion of libido, the primitive form of pleasure that now replaces suggestion as the basic analytic tool in the study of mass phenomena. Freud therefore replaces suggestion and hypnosis as models which explain the collective mind of the group with libido, which itself becomes the explanans for the inner group attraction between the individual members and between these members and the leader of the group (Anzieu, 2001, p. 48). In his words, "Suggestion is a conviction which is not based upon perception and reasoning but upon an erotic tie" (Freud, 1959, p. 60). Hence, "Love relationships…constitute the essence of the group mind…. A group is clearly held together by a power of some kind; and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than to Eros, which holds together everything in the world" (Freud, 1959, pp. 21-2, 23).

Second (and following Tarde), Freud concentrates on the study of artificial or organized crowds, particularly those that display strong hierarchical structures like the church and the army. These two are dissimilar social entities in which the emotional ties of quasi-erotic love connect the individual members of the group to each other and to the "leader" of the group (Freud, 1959, pp. 26-7). The disintegration of these two groups, on the other hand, reveals the absence of affection between their members, which liberates the emotional energies and instincts that were held in check by the love for the leader and for each other. The violence of the crowd, as in the fear and panic of the leaderless army or the "hostile impulses towards other people" in the rudderless church, signals the collapse of an authority structure that can no longer count on libidinal ties to support it (Freud, 1959, pp. 27, 30). Love is a civilizing factor in the evolution of humankind. The violent behavior of the crowd, on the other hand, is a regressive aspect that is generated by the lack of affectivity or its pathological perversion within already disintegrating social groups.

The libidinal organization of the group around its leader is further enabled by the process Freud calls identification, where an emotional tie to an object or to another ego that is elevated to the status of a model replaces the original libidinal object relationship (Freud, 1959, pp. 39-40). This, as well as idealization, where the object "serves as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own" and thereby as a "means of satisfying our narcissism" (Freud, 1959, pp. 44-5), enables Freud to redefine hypnosis, the mechanism of group constitution in the crowd psychology of Le Bon, as the kind of love relationship from which sexual satisfaction is excluded. Here is Freud's formula for the libidinal constitution of the group: "A primary group of this kind is a number of

individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego" (Freud, 1959, p. 48).

Third, Freud seeks to link the explanation of crowd or mass psychology (which for him become interchangeable notions) to the understanding of the interpersonal relations that take root in much narrower proto-social circles, such as the "primal horde." The "primordial social instinct" of crowd psychology---the herd instinct or the group mind, a prominent category in Nietzsche's own power psychology---is in fact a more primitive instinct that occasionally surfaces in de-sublimated forms when the proper social and inter-personal conditions are met (Freud, 1959, pp. 2-3). The primal horde is also a form of group organization around a dominating male figure: "The primal father is the group ideal, which governs the ego in place of the ego ideal" (Freud, 1959, p. 59). The analysis of the mass psychology of Nazism by Fromm (1941) and Reich (1970) or that of the American fascist agitators by Lowenthal (1987) is largely based on this type of speculation. The psychological cohesion of the organized German masses and the violence and destructiveness through which they affirmed their group identity can be understood in terms of libido, repression and desublimation, as well as on the basis of the narcissistic identification with the ego and group ideal---the Führer. From this standpoint, Fascism is "not simply the reoccurrence of the archaic but its reproduction in and by civilization itself" (Adorno, 1991, p. 118).

The application of general psychoanalytic theory to crowd phenomena allowed Freud and his followers to expand his original analysis to the forms of cultural expression of historically evolved groups and to the socio-economic conditions of modern life that facilitate the emergence of crowd phenomena. It is on this ground that psychoanalysis meets Critical Theory. Adorno, for instance, in his influential essay, *Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda*, clearly identifies the potential of crowd psychology to function as a propaedeutic to a more general theory of pathological socialization: "According to Freud, the problem of mass psychology is closely related to the new type of psychological affliction so characteristic of the era which for socio-economic reasons witnesses the decline of the individual and his subsequent weakness" (Adorno, 1991, pp. 116). Adorno's entire essay can be seen as an attempt to spell out the psychological mechanisms that enable the socio-economic systems of the modern world to exert their power of domination through what Adorno calls the culture industry. For Adorno, fascism (a pathological expression of such systems) and mass culture are just two different facets of the same underlying phenomenon: "[The fascists' and the agitators'] effectiveness is itself a function of the psychology of the consumers. Through a process of 'freezing,' which can be observed throughout the techniques employed in modern mass culture, the surviving appeals have been standardized, similarly to the advertising slogans which proved to be the most valuable in the promotion of business" (Adorno, 1991, p. 128). Fascist propaganda, Adorno argues, "simply takes men for what they are: the true children of today's standardized mass culture…" (Adorno, 1991, p. 129).

These quotations make it relatively clear that Adorno---and, following Adorno, Marcuse (Marcuse, 1998, pp. 53-5)---saw crowd psychology as the surface manifestation and symptom of some deeper reaching forces of regression to which it could also be ultimately reduced. The culture industry and the psychological homogenization of individuals in large-scale, undifferentiated groups are two aspects of the same power of domination whose goal is to forestall the emancipation of individuals by preventing the emergence of practical rationality and autonomy. This is achieved by turning the capacity for individual reflection and critique into a reflexively constituted habit of responding to external commands. Adorno makes this point very forcefully: "The so-called psychology of fascism is largely engendered by manipulation. Rationally calculated techniques bring about what is naively regarded as the 'natural' irrationality of masses. This insight may help us to solve the problem of whether fascism as a mass phenomenon can be explained at all in psychological terms…. Although the fascist agitator doubtlessly takes up certain tendencies within those he addresses, he does so as the mandatory of powerful economic interests. Psychological dispositions do not actually cause fascism; rather, fascism defines a psychological area which can be successfully exploited by the forces which promote it for entirely non-psychological reasons of self-interest.… Psychology has become one element among others in a superimposed system the very totality of which is necessitated by the potential mass of resistance---the masses' own rationality" (Adorno, 1991, p. 120).

We can easily see here that for Adorno psychology and psychoanalysis could only identify the subjective, superficial side of the crowd phenomenon, whose objective dimension they ultimately fail to grasp because these disciplines explain the attitudes and actions of the masses in terms of processes of influence and suggestion as opposed to infra- and super-structural normative pressures: "What happens when masses are caught by fascist propaganda is not a spontaneous primary expression of instincts and urges"---as the crowd psychologists and Freud essentially argued---"but a quasi-scientific revitalization of their psychology---the artificial regression described by Freud in his discussion of organized groups" (Adorno, 1991, p. 130). This notion is a precise match to Adorno's argument about massification through culture. Fascist manipulation has in common with mass culture the "synthetic production of modes of behavior," as he claims in *The Schema of Mass Culture* (Adorno, 1991, p. 78). "The totality of mass culture," he says, "culminates in the demand that no one can be any different from itself" (Adorno, 1991, p. 79). Furthermore, "mass culture assiduously concerns itself with the production of those archetypes in whose survival fascistic psychology perceives the most reliable means of perpetuating the modern conditions of domination" (Adorno, 1991, p. 80). The result is, as Adorno argues in *Culture Industry Reconsidered*, that the "power of the culture industry's ideology is such that conformity has replaced

consciousness" (Adorno, 1991, p. 90). Or, as the point is made in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: "[This] mentality…is part of the system, not an excuse for it…. Individuals must use their general satiety as a motive for abandoning themselves to the collective power of which they are sated" (Adorno, 2002, pp. 96, 123).

This type of explanation leaves little room, if any, for crowd psychology as a discipline that has anything meaningful to say that is not already said, much better, by the critical theory of the power structures of late capitalism and of the normative orders that are implicit in these structures. It also rejects the distinction between natural and artificial crowds. The phenomena typically associated with the spontaneous and occasionally violent behavior of the natural crowd are now presented as a regression to nature that is the effect of social unlearning in mass society. This is an instance of de-individuation through cultural infantilization that responds to the strategic demands for control in the self-reproducing systems of the modern world. This message is reinforced by Adorno's approach in the *The Authoritarian Personality*, where the investigation of personality types, based on quantitative studies that for the most part rely on a psychoanalytic scheme of interpretation, is always pursued with a view to exposing the underlying social and economic forces that produced them in the first place (Adorno, 1982, pp. 295, 349, Lowenthal, 1987, p. 6). At this point, the sociological analysis of the process of rationalization of modern society has the upper hand, while the psychological component that prevailed in earlier crowd psychology is almost completely eliminated under the pressures exerted by the tremendous explicative appetite of critical social theory.

Crowd Psychology and Misrecognition

We have seen so far that crowd psychology fails to support its remarkable descriptive efforts with the proper conceptual infrastructure that could explain the normative dimension of mass phenomena. Critical Theory, on the other hand, is so successful in addressing this latter aspect in terms of a theory of pathological social rationalization that it ends up pushing all questions of psychology into the background. In the following I try to present, however summarily, an alternative approach that could incorporate both dimensions through a discussion of some aspects of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition and identity formation which normatively grounds crowd attitudes and behaviour in psychological experiences of moral suffering. In this respect, Honneth can be seen as also trying to re-actualize a forgotten dimension of Marx's early social philosophy.

Honneth is highly critical of the sociologism of early Critical Theory. According to Honneth, "[T]he price to pay for concentrating on the developmental logic of instrumental reason consists in two limitations in the theoretical field…. For one, this approach excludes any factors that do not stand in a more or less direct relation to the process of technical rationalization in the historical process in which totalitarianism emerges. Thus as much as Horkheimer and Adorno take account of developments such as the mass media, and as much as they take pains to account for psychic dispositions, their analysis of these events is always limited to discovering only further forms of a totalitarian forms of reason" (Honneth, 2007, p. 30). This lack of psychological depth and anthropological richness in early Critical Theory is the reason why Honneth develops an alternative account of social pathologies in terms of a theory of recognition. The critical standpoint of this theory is provided by a phenomenological analysis of the experience of moral injury, which seeks to uncover the normative potential of intersubjective identity formation by examining the psychological experiences of misrecognized individuals.

But what is recognition? Elsewhere I proposed the following definition (based on a loose reconstruction of Honneth's ideas): "Recognition designates the socially situated and historically evolving inter-subjective attitudes that institute normative statuses by means of practices thorough which agents offer and accept identity claims." (Neculau, forthcoming) Misrecognition on the other hand means attributing or granting normative status to evaluative features that an individual either does not claim or does not posses at the expense of evaluative features that individuals do posses and claim. Individuals experience this as a form of suffering or as an injury to one's attempts at successful self-realization, which makes misrecognition a contributing factor to social fragmentation (Sloterdijk, 2000). If the non-recognized or misrecognized individuals cannot develop an identity, either personal or group-based, they will be prone to finding compensation for this identity deficit in psychological experiences of violent collective action of the type that are often attributed to the natural crowd. In his writings, Honneth uncovers three types of moral injury and misrecognition that, when properly analyzed, can lead one to discover three types of positive relations to the self (or three forms of identity): self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. Each of these types of self-relation or identity is partially constituted by three matching practical attitudes of mutual acknowledgment: love, respect and solidarity (Honneth, 1992, pp. 190-191). The socially more relevant forms of misrecognition are disrespect---as in the denial of legal rights---and the lack of social esteem---as in the refusal to grant normative status to evaluative features individuals acquire or develop in the process of acculturation and group socialization. As mentioned in the first section, these features either display an orientation to value or reflect natural characteristics and abilities whose worth is explainable in terms of value: race, language, gender, sexual orientation, religion, work skills, etc.

What could Honneth's theory of recognition do to advance the study of crowd phenomena along the lines suggested in the first section of this paper? My proposal is that we understand the forms of collective behavior that match Le Bon's description of the natural crowd as a pathological form of group socialization which, instead of affirming the autonomy of socially integrated

individuals (that is, their individual and group identity), reduces them, based on the selective recognition of certain kinds of evaluative features, to the status of undifferentiated members of groups that are exclusively structured around such features. This occurs when type-specific attitudes of recognition that lead to a differentiated form of practical relation to the self are replaced by the disproportionate and perhaps also rhetorically enhanced symbolic recognition of some limited dimension of one's personality, which amounts to misrecognition. (Needless to say, the whole story is a bit more complicated than that. For individual identity, the kind that is socially or politically relevant, always comes in the shape of an instantiation of group identity, and a more developed account would have to cover both these dimensions as well as their interplay). Thus crowd phenomena, hitherto described in pure psychological terms or in terms of underlying socio-economic distortions, could be explained as collectively experienced forms of moral injury, which signal the underlying presence of some distorted, pathological forms of recognition (or misrecognition) of evaluative features. If we accept this suggestion, the normative dimension of a critical theoretical approach to crowd phenomena would be anchored in psychological experiences of injury caused by the misrecognition of evaluative features, while the analysis of the psychological dimension of crowd behavior would indicate the presence of frustrated normative expectations. This, of course, would eliminate the distinction between natural and artificial crowds and explain the spontaneous behavior and the collective mindedness (that is, the self-regarding attitudes that confer group identity) of any type of socially or politically relevant type of crowd in terms of responses to such normative attitudes of misrecognition.

The theory of recognition also helps explain how experiences of moral injury can be mobilized in the pursuit of social and political causes. The solidarity of a group that is offered in compensation for an affective loss or in response to the moral indignation that is elicited by the withdrawal or refusal of rights, or the emotional comfort of membership in a radical group that is accorded those who feel socially stigmatized strike me as some of the most salient examples of politically instrumentalized misrecognition in the current North-American context. Other examples are the political use of nationalist or religious rhetoric. To offer such compensatory forms of recognition is the job of the hypnotist, group leader, Führer or agitator, those who know how to exploit existing feelings of moral injury and use them to turn the largely inert, "massified" individuals into members of "natural" and "spontaneous," that is, politically active, crowds.

On the other hand, the notion of moral injury, when paired with the criterion of reciprocity in recognition (which must be understood as a formal criterion of achieving a fully developed social identity), also allows one to distinguish between morally qualified experiences of human suffering and experiences that are not based on the actual misrecognition of existing or legitimate evaluative features. Given that a relationship that is not transitive (or reciprocal) cannot be reflexive, an attitude of recognition that is not reciprocated cannot lead to a positive relation to oneself, that is, to the emergence of a fully developed identity. Misrecognition--that is, the attribution of inexistent or normatively indifferent evaluative features at the expense of normatively relevant ones--always prevents the emergence of such an identity by reducing it to some limitative type of evaluative feature. And, given that no form of misrecognition can be universalized (or at least generalized across all group boundaries), it follows that reciprocity of recognition can also function as a criterion for determining which types of violent collective action are based in experiences of moral injury (say, revolutions and liberation movements) and which are not (cases of political oppression or common criminal violence).

Is there some empirical basis for such philosophical speculations on the role of identity misrecognition in generating the norms that explain crowd psychology? Research conducted in social psychology over the past decades seems to confirm this hypothesis. In the early seventies, several theories offered competing but in several respects also complementary explanations for the type of phenomena that fascinated the early crowd psychologists. One of these is de-individuation theory, which, in its various versions, is premised on the notion that the loss of private and public self-awareness in the crowd leaves us unrestrained by norms (Zimbardo, 1969, Diener, 1980). Another theory is emergent norm theory, according to which the behavior of large, crowd-like groups is governed by norms that somehow emerge from the complicated webs of interaction of the crowd members, following patterns of interaction that are laid down by exemplary individuals called keynoters (Turner & Killian, 1972). Another approach was inspired by rational choice theories, according to which what appears to be the spontaneous action of the group is ultimately grounded in the preliminary normative consensus that is achieved as a result of the gradual cognitive convergence of individuals who make choices that maximize payoff based on the perceived support of the group (Berk, 1974). A fourth approach is based in self-categorization or social identity theory. On this view, crowds are norm-based groups that act out their group identity, and the challenge is to reconstitute this identity out of the multiple clues provided by the empirical analysis of the individual and group identifiers that may explain the collective motivations of the crowd members.

Each of these theories captures some essential aspect of the crowd phenomenon while at the same time failing to provide a compelling comprehensive explanation that properly accounts for the group or crowd norms. The first type of theory explains crowd behavior at the price of making it normless. Emerging-norm theories cannot establish a plausible link between the norms embodied or invoked by the keynoters and those that are supposed to emerge directly from the crowd. Rational choice theories rule out the impact of values that go beyond individual utility, while earlier versions of self-categorization theory have a difficult time explaining

social change without already locating the motivation for change in the group identity that the crowd is supposed to act out. On this view, violent groups are violent because they express norms of violent behavior that are part of the group identity, whereas non-violent groups express non-violent types of identity. The most promising of all these approaches is Stephen Reicher's version of the social identity theory (what he calls the Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behavior, or ESIM), which comes very close to capturing all the major points of Honneth's conception of recognition (Reicher, 2001). According to this model, crowd action, especially in its violent variety, is governed by norms that are traceable to miscategorization (or misidentification) by the crowd antagonist: police, government, prominent representatives of the opposing social class, ethnic or racial group, etc. These are norms of misrecognition that generate an ad-hoc, reactive solidarity, which is the likely source for the collective attitudes and actions of the individuals whose existing group identity is either violently reaffirmed as a result of misrecognition, or spontaneously created out of disparate and often even incompatible prior identifications. Either way, Reicher's research, and especially his detailed analysis of the 1980 riot of St Pauls Bristol, provide ample empirical confirmation for my attempt to use Honneth's theory of identity recognition to account for the normative foundations of crowd psychology.

In this paper I have tried to formulate a norm-based explanation of the relationship between artificial and natural crowds that is motivationally grounded in psychological experiences of identity recognition and misrecognition. The idea here is that the apparently normless behavior of the so-called natural crowd is a response to practical attitudes of misrecognition. The response makes explicit an implicit appeal to group identities that are already normatively articulated. The paper develops this idea by means of a historical reconstruction of some important moments within the Marxist tradition. The implied claim in this reconstruction is that Axel Honneth's theory of recognition can help us retrieve a psychological and anthropological dimension of social critique that goes back to the early writings of Marx.

References

Allport, F. (1924). *Social Psychology*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Adorno, T. W. et. al. (1982). *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York and London: Norton.

Adorno, T. W. (1991). *The Culture Industry*, ed. J. M. Bernstein. London: Routledge.

Anzieu, D. (2001). Freud's Group Psychology. Background, Significance, and Influence. In Ethel Spector Person (ed.), *On Freud's "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego."* Hillsdale, NJ and London: The Analytic Press.

Baier, H. (1981/1982). Die Gesellschaft---Ein langer Schatten des totten Gottes. Friedrich Nietzsche und die Entsehung der Soziologie aus der Geist der Decadence. *Nietzsche-Studien* 10/11.

Berk, R. (1974). A Gaming Approach to Crowd Behavior. *American Sociological Review*, 39, pp. 355-373.

Broch, H. (1979). *Massenwahntheorie*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Diener, E. (1980). Deindividuation: The Absence of Self-Awareness and Self-Regulation in Group Members. In. P. B. Paulus (ed.), *Psychology of Group Influence* (pp. 209-242), Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Freud, S. (1959). *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, tr. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press.

Fromm, E. (1941). *Escape from Freedom*. New York and Toronto: Reinhart & Co.

Geiger, T. (1926). *Die Masse und ihre Aktion. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Revolutionen.* Stuttgart: Enke.

Graumann, C.F. (1984). Masses, foules, et densité. In Serge Moscovici (ed.), *Psychologie sociale.* Paris: PUF.

Graumann, C. F. and Moscovici, S. (1986). *Changing Conceptions of Crowd Mind and Behavior*, New York: Springer.

Hegel, G.W.F. (1992 [1821]). *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, tr. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Honneth, A. (1992). Integrity and Disrespect. Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition. *Political Theory*, 20, 2, pp. 187-201.

Honneth, A. (2002). Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions. *Inquiry 45*, pp. 499-520.

Honneth, A. (2007). *Disrespect. The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Horkheimer, M. & Adorno, T. W. (2002). *Dialectic of Enlightenment.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Le Bon, G. (1952 [1895]). *The Crowd*. London: Benn.

Lowenthal, L. (1987). *False Prophets. Studies on Authoritarianism.* New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books.

Marcuse, H. (1998). *Technology, War, and Fascism*, Coll. Papers 1, ed. Douglass Kellner. London: Routledge.

McDougall, W. (1920). *The Group Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moscovici, S. (1985). *The Age of the Crowd*, tr. J. C. Whitehouse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Neculau, R. (forthcoming). Being Oneself in Another. *Inquiry*.

Ortega y Gasset, J. (1960). *The Revolt of the Masses*. New York: Norton.

Park, R. 1972 (1904). *The Crowd and the Public and Other Essays*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Reicher, S. (1984). The St. Pauls Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social Identity Model. *European Journal of Social Psychology 14*, pp. 1-21.

Reicher, S., Spears, R. & Postmes T. (1995). A Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Phenomena. In W. Sroebe & M. Hewstone (eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology 6*, pp. 161-198.

Reicher, S. (1997). Crowd Behavior as Social Action. In J.C. Turner et al. (eds.) *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* (pp. 171-202). Oxford: Blackwell.

Reicher, S. (2001). The Psychology of Crowd Dynamics. In M.A. Hogg & R.S. Tindale (eds.), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes* (pp. 182-208), Oxford: Blackwell.

Rouquette, M.-L. 1994. *Sur la connaissance des masses.* Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.

Reich, W. (1970). *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, tr. Vincent R. Carfagno. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux.

Sloterdijk, P. (2000). *Die Verachtung der Massen: Versuch ueber Kulturkaempfe in der modernen Gesellschaft.* Frankfurt/ Main: Suhrkamp.

Spengler, (1963 [1922]). *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*. München: Beck.

Tarde, G. (1910). *L'opinion et la foule.* Paris: Alcan.

Tuomela, R. (2002). *The Philosophy of Social Practices.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tuomela, R. (2007). *The Philosophy of Sociality.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Turner, R.H & Killian, L.M. (1972). *Collective Behavior.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Zimbardo, P.G. (1970). The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order versus De-individuation, Impulse and Chaos. In W.J. Arnold & D. Levine (eds.) *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1969* (pp. 237-307). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

ravi gokani

Marxian Currents in Latin And North American Community Psychology

By Ravi Gokani, Wilfrid Laurier University

Abstract *In this paper, I review the differential influence of Marxian theories on the development of North American Community Psychology and Latin American Community Psychology. In considering what appears to be the most glaring difference – that Marxian theories figured prominently in the latter and not at all in the former – I suggest some academic and political forces that might be responsible for the difference. In addition, I present other differences between the emergences of community psychology in Latin- and North-America. I then present what I consider to be some modern theoretical and practice-related consequences of the historical negligence of Marxian theories. I conclude the paper with a personal reflection.*

Introduction

As a farewell gesture for a course in theories and interventions in Community Psychology, my professor and all of the students, including me, agreed to hold our final class at a local café. As is typical of a graduate class in the Community Psychology programme at Wilfrid Laurier University, we engaged in a lengthy discussion, supported by the reading of various articles. It was a difficult discussion, since it was the last one and we were anxious to finish our first-year. But generally, everything was going well, until toward the middle of the discussion, when my professor did the unthinkable: she raised a question that required the class, at the very least, to gloss over Marxian theories. What appeared to me to unfold thereafter was interesting. Sly as the typical graduates, my classmates and I seemed to evade the question with characteristic suaveness. After letting five minutes pass, and perhaps after our worries about her having noticed our evasion evaporated, our professor, astute as she is, called us out on our shameless avoidance of Marx. She said, "Whenever you talk about Marx in any discussion, people typically avoid the topic, just as you have here." The point I wish to make and the one with which I begin this paper is that Marx does not seem to figure deeply in the discussions among students of Community Psychology (CP) in Canada. And judging by the apparent disappointment of my professor, Marx may not figure deeply in the discussions among professors of Community Psychology in Canada and the US, either. There is, of course, no way to know if such is true, inasmuch as I extrapolate from a handful of experiences. However, when one examines the history of Community Psychology in North America and juxtaposes that history with that of Latin America, one thing becomes clear: Marxian theories are not strange to Latin American Community Psychology. I should say that I am aware of the different developments of Community Psychology in Canada and the US, and I am aware of the fact that a nascent Community Psychology in Canada predates Community Psychology in the US. However, because US Community Psychology dominates in Canada, a fact with empirical support and one acknowledged by Canadian Community Psychologists themselves (Walsh, 1987b), I focus on the historical record of the US and use that as a focal point for my comparison.

Thus, in this paper I will review the influence of Marxian theories on Latin and North American Community Psychology. First, I give a brief overview of the historical accounts of Latin and North American Community Psychology with a focus on Marxist influence. Second, I offer two explanations for any differences between Latin and North American CP with regard to their relations to Marxism. Third, I comment on other differences, which although unrelated to Marx, are nevertheless important to consider. Then to conclude, with a focus on Marxian influence, I will explore some consequences that may be considered to have followed from the two historical developments on the current and future state of North American Community Psychology.

Comparing Histories

In comparing the histories of CP in North and Latin America,

one should consider three things. The first is the nature of the historical account, which may document either a formal or informal emergence. The second is the presence and significance of a set of ambient forces – historical, political, academic, or social. The third is the relation between the historical account and these ambient forces. In other words, what might the ambient factors tell us about the nature of the historical account? In my opinion, this third factor is perhaps the most useful in understanding what really happened at a given time and why. It is not unlike the superimposition of two images, upon which a new, richer image emerges. Understanding the ambient forces helps to understand why the nature of the historical account is such.

Marxism and the Dawn of Latin American Community Psychology

In the case of the history of Latin American CP, a formal historical record is absent, while informal influences are prominent and may even be said to constitute the entirety of the historical account. Latin American CP is widely recognized by Latin American psychologists as having multiple and various influences, and these influences are brought together to understand the developmental forces on the field (Montero, 1996).

Montero (1996) provides an account of the informal emergence of Community Psychology in Latin America by presenting various influences, including the social and political context. The initial impetus, and what seems to be the broad, over-arching spirit characteristic of academia during the 1950s and 60s, was a desire on the part of citizens and academics to make the social sciences more relevant to societal discontents. This desire was punctuated by the facts of social unrest and inequality in Latin American societies, perhaps largely due to colonial and Cold War impacts. The desire to make the social sciences and thus psychology more relevant to the concerns of citizens led first to community work by academics and others, and then to the "revitalization" of social psychology.

The revitalized social psychology, which deviated from the previously dominant natural science social psychology, was characterized by the following traits: (a) the critical study of social behavior and ideology; (b) an awareness of the historical character of phenomena studied; (c) acceptance of methodological plurality; (d) preference for research in natural settings; (e) an emphasis on individuals as the active constructors of social life, rather than as passive subjects; (f) recognition of the dynamic and dialectic character of social reality; (g) an emphasis on the relative character of knowledge as it is produced in a specific time and space; (h) a conceptualization of the psychologist's role as an active agent of change including social and political engagement; and (i) an orientation towards a "sociological Social Psychology" (Montero, 1996, p. 591).

Several of these changes seem to reflect a Marxian bent on psychology. For instance, the recognition of the historical nature of social phenomena, the dialectic as a model to understand social reality, and the role of the psychologist in social change, as opposed to simply social interpretation, arguably are all rooted in or parallel to Marxian thought.

Montero (1996) also lists several theoretical influences on Latin American CP, the second of which are "Marxian theories of alienation and ideology which assume that unequal labor relations produce a phenomenon in which the individual does not recognize him/herself as the producer of goods and sees them as more valuable than him/herself" (p. 595). Elsewhere, Montero and Varas-Díaz (2007) list *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* as "the more visible and important [theoretical] influence" in comparison to Lewinian ideas. (p. 67).

One might separate the influence of Marxist thought on Latin American CP into two categories: direct and indirect influence. The direct influence of Marxian thought on the development of Latin American Community Psychology consists of the presence of Marxist theories in the education of psychologists, such as the aforementioned *Manuscripts*. Not to be underestimated, however, are the indirect influences – the influence of Marx *through* other prominent academics and social figures. Most notable of these are eminent educator Paolo Freire (1921-1997), the late Ignacio Martín-Baró (1942-1989), and the aforementioned Kurt Lewin (1890-1947). Although the later of these three is not a recognized Marxist, the former two are, and all are recognized as having made a tremendous impact on Latin American Community Psychology (Montero & Varas-Diaz, 2007).

Marxism and the History of North American Community Psychology

In contrast to Latin American CP, there exists a well-known, formal historical record for the emergence of North American CP, that of the Swampscott Conference, which took place in 1965 in Massachusetts (Montero, 1996). The Conference consisted of 39 males, considered the founding fathers, who would define and develop the field of Community Psychology in the US. Apart from this more apparent difference, there is complete absence of Marxist theories in the formal record of the emergence of North American CP. That is, neither Marx nor any Marxist is recognized as a theoretical influence on the field. This absence includes the aforementioned Freire and Lewin.[1] Why?

1 Indeed, no theory or theorist is acknowledged as having an influence on the field. Walsh (1987a) found that the founding fathers at Swampscott chose to adopt the tenets of a school of psychology – natural science psychology – but not a formal theory as such.

Why the difference?

Here, the "parallels," to use Montero's (1996) word, between the emergence of CP in Latin and North America are important to consider. Why did Marxian theory not enter the discussion, in light of the facts that North American CP developed in the same half of the century as did Latin American CP, that a similar malaise was felt by social scientists in both regions, that the irrelevance of the social sciences and psychology to real-world issues was a recognized problem in both regions, and that the 60s and 70s were a time in which political participation and protests were a definitive characteristic of the *zeitgeist*?

Ambient Forces: Academic and Political

Above, I mentioned that the most telling history is one that superimposes ambient forces onto an historical account. I should say that this macro-level analysis of the history of Community Psychology is congruent with views recently expressed by Kelly and Chang (2008), the former being James G. Kelly, a founder of US Community Psychology. That is, "without knowing the cultural and social background of the storyteller, the utility of a historical report is limited" (p. 678). In other words, knowing the cultural and social background in which the foundations of CP were laid, might help us better understand our present situation. In addition, it helps to understand what did and did not make it into the formal record of the emergence of North American CP.

There were many forces that were present in 1965 that can serve as potential explanations not only for the exclusion of Marxist thought in North American CP, but also for some other differences of which I make mention below. These forces I have listed as academic and political. Though I have chosen to separate them, it is understood that the academic and political contexts are interdependent, and defined, if you will, by a dialectical tension.

Academic Forces

In 1967, at an invited address to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Dr. Martin Luther King outlined three societal challenges that social scientists could help overcome. Implicit in his speech was an indictment, I believe, of the academic institution and the social sciences. Dr. King stated "there are some things concerning which we must always be maladjusted if we are to be people of good will (p. 573). That same year, Noam Chomsky published a paper called, *On the Responsibility of Intellectuals*, a scathing attack on academics and the culture to which they were most certainly not "maladjusted." If we are to take Dr. King and Chomsky's perspectives as valid, then we must conclude that the American academic culture during the 60s fostered a-critical postures on the part of academics toward the status quo and establishment.

This a-critical academic culture, finally, was the culture in which US Community Psychology was founded and we can assume that the general climate of academia crept into the emergence of North American CP. More specifically, the founders of American CP were placed in an awkward limbo in between an antagonistic sub-discipline in clinical psychology and the antagonistic and incompatible paradigm of natural-science, which was then still dominant within psychology (Walsh, 1987a). On one side, there were psychiatrists, who as Klein (1987) pointed out, despite expressing a desire to practice in the community, were not sympathetic to psychologists practicing in the community with people with mental health issues. On the other side, there was the natural-science paradigm and the psychologists who defended it. Interviews conducted years after revealed that participants at the Swampscott Conference were seriously concerned about losing credibility in the eyes of the more dominant natural-science psychologists (Walsh, 1987b). In other words, they "zealously," to use Jim Kelly's word, sought acceptance from natural science psychologists (Kelly, 2002). Arguably, this concern took a place of great significance, decreasing the chance of integrating potentially taboo Marxian theory, methodology, and epistemology or developing a "born-again," social constructionist psychology.

Whereas in Latin America, "born-again" social psychologists, sociologists, community practitioners and community members were the influential agents in the development of the field, in North America by contrast, clinicians, from psychiatry and psychology, and particularly from the University of Boston, were the influential agents (Klein, 1987). Therefore, the academic context in which North American CP emerged might have made it difficult to recognize the more radical, political work of community organizers such as Saul Alinsky or the theoretical contributions of Kurt Lewin (Walsh, 1987a).

Even today, the academic contexts within which psychologists in Latin and North America work, seems to be different. In Latin America, "intellectuals are often less integrated into the state's systems," which means "a certain freedom to develop autonomous approaches that do not serve the state or oligarchy" (Burton & Kagan, 2004, p. 65). This may be a simplified view, however, since many psychologists, such as Montero, may practice from within academic contexts without some of strains experienced by their North American colleagues, but may experience the oppressive weight of their typically more challenging political environment (e.g., Chavez in Venezuela).[2]

Political Climate

In terms of the political climate, both Latin and North American CP were forged during the years of the Cold War and while the US was at war with Vietnam – both are facts not without significance. That is, the Cold War and the Vietnam War were drawn

2 Thank you to Ian Parker for pointing this out to me.

along lines of allegiance to Communism or Capitalism. Whereas Latin-America was to an extent more open to Marxism, America, on the other hand, the centre and major proponent of Capitalism and "freedom," was vehemently opposed to Marxist doctrine both ideologically and militarily. This fervent opposition to anything of a Marxian flavor, I have come to learn, found poignant expression in what can only be considered right-wing eccentricities, such as, for instance, HUAC, the House UnAmerican Activities Committee, which was a group comprised of members of the House of Representatives. In staunch opposition to anything of a communist/Marxian flavor, the members of HUAC sought to investigate such "un-American" activities on the part of US citizens. Furthermore, it is telling that two months prior to the Swampscott Conference, the first contingent of US troops landed in Vietnam; that in October of the same year, revolutionary Marxist, Ché Guevara decided to leave Cuba to pursue the spread of his work; that Columbia was undergoing a civil war, largely influenced by Cold War conflict; that less than a year prior, the US was involved in a coup d'état in Brasíl, overthrowing the democratically elected President Joao Goulart for a dictatorship; and that in 1965, US foreign investment in Latin America reached its peak. How easy would it have been for US Community Psychologists to mention or endorse Marxism when the US itself was engaging in grandiose capitalistic ventures?

Suffice it to say, there were two very different political climates, one in Latin American and the other in the US, and these climates starkly contrasted in large part with regard to their openness or opposition to Marxism. In this light, the discrepancies in the histories of Latin and North American CP are not surprising. Although only conjecture, it is not outlandish to assume that Community Psychologists in the US were afraid of being labeled "communist sympathizers," and afraid not only of losing credibility in the eyes of natural-science psychologists, but of more dire consequences from academic institutions, such as the denial of tenure. We know, for instance, that "founding U.S. community psychologists steadfastly avoided association with contemporary African American and White political activists, because they feared losing their legitimacy as scientific psychologists among their more powerful academic peers during the crucial, formative years of their subdisicpline" (Walsh, 2002a, p. 3). If Dr. Martin Luther-King, Saul Alinsky, Bayard Rustin, and Malcolm X were bad company, then surely Marx was, too.

But Not Just Marxism: Other Telling Differences

Apart from the apparent negligence of Marxian theories on the part of US Community Psychologists, however, there are other noteworthy differences, of which I have already made mention or to which I have alluded. The first among these is the place and recognition of the work of Kurt Lewin. In Latin America, Lewin's work is recognized as a primary, if not, the primary influence (Montero & Varas-Dias, 2007). In North America, Lewin's work seems to have been ignored by the "founding fathers" at the Swampscott Conference (Kelly & Chang, 2008).

The second difference concerns the sub-disciplinary "cousin" of CP. In Latin America, the closest ancestor to CP is social psychology – or rather, a "born-again" social psychology not to be confused with natural science social psychology (Montero, 2008). So important is the influence of this "born-again" social psychology, Montero and Varas-Diaz (2007) point out, that often Community Psychology is referred to as Social-Community Psychology. By contrast, in the US, the closest ancestor to CP, by which is meant the discipline or sub-discipline that exerted the most influence, is clinical psychology (Reiff, 1967, Sarason, 1976b, Kelly, 2005), or rather, an out-dated, ineffective, individual-focused, clinical psychology (Sarason, 1976b, Walsh, 1987a). Indeed, the very title of the report on the Swampscott Conference betrays this "prejudice" toward clinical practitioners: Community psychology: A report of the Boston conference *on the education of psychologists for community mental health* (Bennett, Anderson, Cooper, Hassol, Klein, & Rosenbaum, 1966, emphasis added).

But this association between clinical psychology and the new Community Psychology was not taken by all as harmless. Only two years after the conference, one prominent first-generation Community Psychologist warned that if a strong theoretical and practical foundation for North American CP was not established, then Community Psychology would haplessly denigrate as a result of its inheritance of clinical and other psychological paradigms and practices inappropriate to the needs of the field (Reiff, 1967). A decade after that, Sarason (1976a) further lamented the relationship between clinical psychology and Community Psychology, calling for a "divorce" between the two. The impact of clinical psychology on community psychology is thus well established, as is the presence and over-representation of clinicians at the Swampscott Conference (Walsh, 1987a).

The third difference between North and Latin American CP offers some explanations as to why or how this "marriage" occurred in the first place. The difference concerns the broader social ferment out of which each CP emerged, or rather, the direction from which each CP emerged. As we will see, North American CP, in a sense, descended from heaven to earth, while Latin American CP ascended from earth to heaven. In the case of Latin America, that is, CP emerged from the efforts of community organizers, activists, and community members pushing to be heard. Community Psychology was born out of political strife and the need for academics to respond to social justice issues affecting the community. Community Psychology, as such, was not presented, in other words, by academics as their own deliberate answer to political and social problems. Societal pressure facilitated the practice of community organization, political involvement by academics, involvement of community members in research and activism, the desire to address social development, and the adoption of alternative research paradigms, all of which preceded, by at least a de-

cade, the designation of Community Psychology or Social-Community Psychology (Montero, 2008). "In most places," Montero (2008) notes, "it was only recognized as community psychology at the beginning of the 1980s" (p. 664).

In contrast, Walsh (1987b) pointed out that neither political activism nor societal participation in research were acknowledged as strong influences at Swampscott and thus in the development of the field of Community Psychology in North America. This negligence was exercised despite similar political strife in North America. In addition, the founding fathers made little or no attempt to establish a collaborative relationship with members of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) (Walsh, 1987a). In North America, the Swampscott Conference and thus Community Psychology were facilitated, not through societal pressure, but out of the mental health movement and the need for clinical psychologists and psychiatrists to respond to a desire for mental health prevention (Bennett et al., 1966; Walsh, 1987a). Of course, departure from the individual-centric model to the "ecological-community" model, to use Sarason's (1976a) terms, did expose practitioners of Community Psychology to issues such as poverty. But poverty and other topics falling under the current banner of social justice were only considered in light of their influence on mental health. Moreover, an understanding of the influence of social factors on mental health was just beginning to emerge. The strongest influences on the emergence and development of North American CP were not broad community issues, such as poverty and disenfranchisement, nor political involvement by academics and community members, but rather the government – first through the federal initiative that led to the creation of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and second through legislation set in place during the Kennedy Administration. In October of 1963, in response to the recommendations of a multidisciplinary panel concerned with mental health, President Kennedy signed an amendment to the Social Security Act that would increase funding for prevention of mental illness. In addition, NIMH provided many similar funding opportunities. Kelly (2005) recognizes that "without such funding, and the opportunities and incentives that the funds created, it is unlikely that the notion of communities as resources in the treatment and prevention of mental health would have evolved within the profession of psychology" (p. 234). Would CP have emerged in North America, otherwise?

The Convenient Negligence: Theoretical and Practical Implications

Given the above, we must ask how this convenient negligence of Marx on the part of the founding members of US Community Psychology impresses upon modern-day North American CP. However, trying to tease apart the impact of one, the Marxian, factor on the state of CP is inherently problematic, in light of the other differences I have mentioned. Those differences are, again, that in the Latin American context, CP emerged out of political strife and the political participation of academics who recognized Lewin's work and were aided by a "born-again" social psychology, while in the North American context, CP emerged out of the mental health movement and the efforts of clinical psychologists who did not recognize Lewin's work nor emphasize political participation and community collaboration. If I were to make a claim as to how the negligence of Marx impresses upon US Community Psychology acknowledgment of these other factors, it would imply either that (a) no other factor (e.g., the negligence of Lewin) can be considered responsible and (b) a complex synergy is ignored. In short, claiming or implying that the state of North American CP is largely due to the lack of Marxism simplifies the development of the field. Instead, I suggest what I consider to be reasonable consequences of the negligence of Marx on North American CP. I have organized these consequences into two categories: practical and theoretical. Again, by organizing the consequences categorically, I do not mean to imply the independence of theory and practice in general or specific to the topic of this paper.

Theoretical Consequences

Among the more obvious impacts on theory are those related to the critique of psychology and the critique of Capitalism. The negligence of Marx in general might have made Marx's own critique of psychology and that of his followers unknown to Community Psychologists. Long before community-oriented psychiatrists and psychologists began to consider societal factors as important in the prevention of mental illness, Marx criticized psychology "for neglecting the socio-cultural and political-economic embeddedness of the human mind," encouraging instead the "study of concrete individuals, who lived in concrete historical societies" (Teo, 2005, p. 94). Marx's critique easily can still be considered radical, inasmuch as most studies in Community Psychology still lack a fully-developed socio-cultural, political-economic, historical perspective on phenomena of interest. Interestingly, the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, which is recognized as the most influential of Marx's works in Latin American CP, was the document in which Marx emphasized the impact of history on humanity (Teo, 2005).

Another rather obvious impact of neglecting Marx regards the criticism of Capitalism. Arguably, two of the most prominent North American Community Psychologists today, Nelson and Prilleltensky (2005) recently stated that "CP, which is concerned with social context [and social justice] needs to be cognizant of these larger global changes" – among which corporate capitalism is primary – "because they [global changes] are having enormous impacts on the mission of the field" (p. 31). Though they do not outline the exact impacts, the point is well-taken by other Community Psychologists (e.g., Dalton, Elias, & Wandersman, 2007) But such topics as social class and Capitalism remain taboo in mainstream discourse among psychologists (Walsh-Bowers,

2002a). This taboo status is probably in part a result of the impact of decreased autonomy for academics and their studies, first, as a result of government funding (Sarason, 1976b), and second, as a result of corporate influence (e.g., Aronowitz, 2000). Nevertheless, it certainly does not help that Community Psychologists remain theoretically anemic in the face of Capitalism – its critique and complexity. Sloan (2005) recently remarked that "psychology has systematically made itself irrelevant to debates in economics and politics" (p. 315).

Perhaps a less obvious impact of neglecting Marx pertains to the views Marx held on consciousness or the mind and ideology. Arguably, it is this theoretical point responsible for the distinction that most clearly severs Latin American CP from North American CP, not just because of the theoretical understanding that it lends to the world and social problems, but also because of the practical significance, about which I write below. According to Marx, consciousness was a socio-historical product. In *The German Ideology*, he remarks that life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by "life" – language, relations of production, and ideology. The concept of ideology in Marxism, though critiqued and modified, has influenced Latin American Community Psychology through the Freirian concepts of problematization and conscientization or consciousness-raising (Montenegro, 2002) and through the idea that ideology produces false-consciousness. False-consciousness, Martín-Baró (1994) bluntly states, should be the primary focus for psychologists.

In asserting that conscientización ought to be the principal feature in psychology's horizon, we are proposing that the task of the psychologist must be to achieve the de-alienation of groups and persons by helping them attain a critical understanding of themselves and their reality (p. 41).

Practice-related Consequences

This last theoretical distinction is important to consider in relation to Community Psychology practice, which Montero (2008) separates into two broad models. Both are recognized and practiced in North and Latin America today. The first model centers on the community mental health approach. According to this model, which is referred to as traditional, Community Psychologists provide assistance to communities in a top-down fashion (i.e., heaven to Earth). According to the second model, which is referred to as transformational, Community Psychologists base their work in communities. The transformational model is characterized by a bottom-up pattern (i.e,. Earth to heaven). Community psychologists, grassroots organizations and communities work "toward institutions, finding a meeting point with state institutions where dialogue and negotiation lead the relationship" (Montero, 2008, p. 666).

Though both models coexist in Latin America, the traditional model predominates in North America. From her Latin American perspective, Montero (2008) has criticized this model because it follows a paternalistic tendency. Any kind of external help to communities due to political circumstances, be it official (governmental) or private, commands lowering the head before the demands of external agencies. These sorts of circumstances can actually weaken the community and produce apathy and helplessness (p. 666).

Similarly, in North America Walsh (1987b) stated that "the underlying social philosophy of this system is benevolent protection of the public by professionals. Professionals play the role of experts dispensing solutions to the community, while resisting accountability to it" (p. 783). Interestingly, interviews of first- and second-generation Community Psychologists that Walsh (1987b) conducted found that they posed in opposition the notion of collaborative research and the pressure from the natural-science paradigm. One such paradigm encompassing collaborative research, that developed in the 70s in response to the "crisis of social psychology," falls under the transformation category, is finding a place in Latin American and European CP, and is recognized as having been influenced by Marxian theory is Liberation Social Psychology or LSP (Burton, 2004). Inherent in LSP are strong Marxian theoretical concepts such as ideology and Freirean problematization and conscientization mentioned above. Burton (2004) recognizes that LSP has the potential to address gaps in field work in Europe. Although he speaks from the European standpoint, his perspective on the value LSP holds for European psychology can be applied to the North American context.

Personal Reflection and Conclusion

Walsh-Bowers (2002b) pointed out that an ambiguity exists around the meaning of the word "social action." As a Master of Arts student I offer my own observation on the matter to conclude this paper. I think that many students, including me, enter into graduate programmes in Community Psychology because of a sense of disillusionment with natural-science psychology and its unwavering emphasis on research. Indeed, to us, the prospect of "action," or, to put it crudely, of "doing something," of "changing the world," is a fantasy we rely on in order to contend against fatalism. We enter the field somewhat "wide-eyed." For me, and I would assume, for at least a handful of my peers, CP represented a sort of last hope – in psychology, academia, and maybe even in the professional world – for anyone wanting to contribute toward a broader social justice agenda through the integration of theory and research and while receiving some sort of formal credit (e.g., a degree). Indeed, we hear about the ART, A, R, T – a catchy acronym to suit the social-activist and would-be Community Psychologist. The ART, which stands for Action, Research, Theory, for me represented a manner in which I might avoid losing faith in psychology, because it implied a fine balance between three tools of social change. However, my personal experience with

the "ART" of Community Psychology is not without a sense of disappointment.

It seems to me now that the "ART" we are told to practice, again, which stands for Action, Research, Theory, all beginning with capital letters, is more like the "aRt," action, RESEARCH, theory, with the word "research" in capital letters, bold-faced, and underlined. In other words, not unlike natural-science psychology, the emphasis in Community Psychology seems to be on research. Moreover, according to my own experience and my knowledge of the literature, critical, in-depth discussion about what "action" means, what it should mean in order to accomplish the goals of social justice, and how it can be practiced and integrated into graduate programmes, if at all, is lacking. For instance, how do we confront authority, including within the walls of our own university, and on what resources should we rely? How do we confront ourselves, any power and fears we may have when facing a difficult moral or ethical situation? How do we organize, rally, protest, and participate in the community and in politics? In short, how can we be the Socratic gadflies that at least I feel we should be, and that seem consonant with recent calls to action by Community Psychologists (e.g., Prilelltensky & Nelson, 1997)?

In my opinion, none of these questions is being sufficiently answered for students. Better yet, these questions, for the most part, are not being asked. Instead, it seems to be taken for granted that action refers to a narrow spectrum, along which is included, among other things, employment for a research organization or the government, the evaluation of programs, and conducting research that affords some power and voice to participants, as is the case with Participatory Action Research. Of course, none of these actions are completely and inherently bad, and in fact, I have seen some benefits of them all. But I find it hard to believe that these actions *alone* are sufficient to realize the stated goals of CP. The cynic in me cannot help but feel that perhaps these items are considered "action" because they are more radical than anything done by natural-science psychologists but not radical enough to effect change and seriously upset the status quo, the guardian of which is, arguably, the modern academic institution. Therefore, it seems to me that until Community Psychologists in North America and the programmes, of which they form a crucial part, choose to extend their definition of action and integrate theory that is critical of the status quo – Marxism being but one example – students of Community Psychology are destined to graduate wanting of experience in action necessary to upset oppressive situations, and will remain bystanders, forever interpreting the world, but never changing it.

I leave the reader with a favorite quote of mine, which illustrates the importance of experience in action. A Chinese philosopher once said [quote] "Even if [one] reads a music score hundreds of times, and discusses, asks, thinks, and sifts scores of times, [one] cannot know music at all. [One] simply has to strike and blow musical instruments, sing with [one's] own voice, dance with [one's] own body, and go through all these [oneself] before [one] knows what music really is."

Acknowledgments

I would like to sincerely thank Richard Walsh-Bowers, my teacher – on whose shoulders I stood for a bulk of this paper – for all of his help, time, encouragement, effort, and for sharing with me the wisdom of "AFGO." Thanks, also, to Heather Hunter, Manuel Riemer, Becky Choma, Gordon Hodson, Lisa Armstrong, Kate Klein, Lois Holzman, Ian Parker, and Michael Arfken for his helpful suggestions. Finally, a heartfelt thanks to mom, dad, Mamta, Marcus, Ricky, Barb, for letting me write a huge portion of this in her living room, and to my beloved mate, Aylah, for keeping me balanced.

References:

Bennet, C. C., Anderson, L. S., Cooper, S., Hassol, L., Klein, D. C., & Rosenblum, G. (1966). *Community psychology: A report of the Boston Conference on the education of psychologists for community mental health.* Boston: Boston University Press.

Burton, M. (2004). Viva nacho! Liberating psychology in Latin America. *The Psychologist, 17*, 584-587.

Burton, M. & Kagan, C. (2005). Liberation social psychology: Learning from Latin America. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 15*, 63-78.

Kelly, J. G. (2002). The spirit of community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 30*, 43-63.

Kelly, J. G. (2005). "The National Institute of Mental Health and the founding of the field of community psychology." In W.E. Pickren, Jr., S. F. Schneider, (2005), *Psychology and the National Institute of Mental Health: A historical analysis of science, practice, and policy* (pp. 233-259). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Kelly, J. G. & Chang, J. (2008). Pluralistic inquiry for the history of community psychology. *Journal of Community Psychology, 36*, 675-691.

King Jr., M. L. (1968). The role of the behavioral scientist in the civil rights movement. *American Psychologist, 23*, 180-186.

Klein, D. C. (1987). The context and times at Swamscott: My/Story. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 15*, 531-538.

Martín-Baró, I. (1994). *Writings for a liberation psychology*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Montero, M. (1996). Parallel lives: Community psychology in Latin

America and the United States. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 24*, 589-605.

Montero, M. (2008). An insider's look at the development and current state of community psychology in Latin America. *Journal of Community Psychology, 36*, 661-674.

Montero, M. & Varas-Diaz, N. (2007). "Latin American Community Psychology:Development, implications, and challenges within a social change agenda." In S. M. Reich, M. Riemer, I. Prilleltensky, M. Montero (Eds), *International community psychology: History and theories* (pp. 63-98), New York: Springer.

Montenegro, M. (2002). Ideology and community social psychology: theoretical considerations and practical implications. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 30*, 511-527.

Nelson, G. & Prilleltensky, I. (2005). *Community psychology: In pursuit of liberation and well-being.* New York: Palgrave.

Reiff, R. (1968). Social intervention and the problem of psychological analysis. *American Psychologist, 27*, 524-531.

Sarason, S. (1976a). Community psychology and the anarchist insight. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 4*, 243-261.

Sarason, S. (1976b). Community psychology, networks, and Mr. Everyman. *American Psychologist, 31*, 317-328.

Sloan, T. (2005). "Globalization, poverty, and social justice." In G. Nelson & I. Prilleltensky, (Eds), *Community Psychology: In pursuit of liberation and well-being.* New York: Palgrave.

Teo, T. (2005). *The critique of psychology: From Kant to Postcolonial Theory*. New York: Springer.

Walsh, R. T. (1987a). A social historical note on the formal emergence of community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 15,* 523-529.

Walsh, R. T. (1987b). The evolution of the research relationship in community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 15*, 773-788.

Walsh-Bowers, R. (2002a) Community psychology and social justice is historical perspective. In R. Walsh-Bowers (Chair), *The science-politics dialectic in psychology.* Symposium conducted at the annual meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Vancouver, Canada.

Walsh-Bowers, R. (2002b). In dubious battle: scientific psychologists historical struggles for political relevancy. In T. Tea (Chair), *Scientific psychology, social responsibility, and political engagement: Perils and possibilities.* Symposium conducted at the meeting of the Society of the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Toronto, Canada.

joanna wasiak

The Development of Development: A Post-Marxist Analysis of the Development of Hegemonic Developmental Psychology

By Joanna Wasiak, Brock University

Abstract *In this paper, using Marxist and post-Marxist theory of political economy and subjectivity, I will explore the question, 'what might a theory of developmental psychology look like if it were molded to the contours of today's contemporary social reality?' I will apply the Marxist idea of historical tendency in order to examine how hegemonic discourses that make-up mainstream North American developmental psychology have developed according to the material and social conditions in recent history. In particular, I will examine how historical tendency might have played a role in how the work of the 'father of developmental psychology,' Jean Piaget, has been interpreted and in some cases misinterpreted. I will then briefly consider a different conception of developmental psychology based on the current conditions of our political economy, which may point to a hegemonic conception of developmental psychology in the future.*

The key to Marx's method of historical materialism is that social theory must be molded to the contours of contemporary social reality. [...] Marx explains in his 1857 introduction to the Grundrisse, [...] that our mode of understanding must be fitted to the contemporary social world and thus change along with history: the method and the substance, the form and content must correspond. That means, however, that once history moves on and the social reality changes, then the old theories are no longer adequate. We need new theories for the new reality.
(Negri & Hardt, 2004, p. 140)

It is with the above philosophy in mind that I engage this writing. Accordingly, I will explore the question: What might a theory of developmental psychology look like if it were molded to the contours of today's contemporary social reality?

*I*n order to build my argument, I will first examine a brief history of developmental psychology, linking dominant theory with the material and social conditions of the time. I will trace the development of a few key hegemonic discourses that make-up mainstream North American developmental psychology. The development of these hegemonic discourses will be contextualized within a post-Marxist view of political economy and subjectivity. In Part II, I will briefly consider a different conception of developmental psychology based on the current conditions of our political economy, which may point to a hegemonic conception of the future.

There will always be people whose thoughts manage to escape the dominant subjectivity. But because these people do not fit the 'norm', it is quite likely that they will be misunderstood or misinterpreted. The history of ideas and meanings is complex. It is quite possible that what we consider as new or revolutionary ideas today have always existed but failed to take a hegemonic form and were instead, appropriated to suit dominant needs. Although there are a multitude of other influences that came to shape developmental psychology, the work of Jean Piaget can be seen as significant in shaping the overall linear and progressive structure of developmental psychology. Piaget himself is indebted to the work of others; philosophically, in many ways Piaget draws on Kantian and post-Kantian thought and biologically, Piaget's work may be viewed as rooted in Darwinism (Wartofsky, 1983). What is most interesting, however, is how the nuances and complexities of Piaget's work were/are often overlooked and/or misinterpreted by mainstream Western audiences.

Thus, I will argue that certain ideas from Piaget's theory of cognitive development were appropriated as part of mainstream developmental psychology in the early to mid 20th century when they arose in dominance. I will focus on three main hegemonic discourses of mainstream developmental psychology that these ideas were appropriated into: development as uniform and linear; development as progressive and product focused; and development as individualized. I will illustrate how these three hegemon-

ic discourses may be linked to the social, political and economical conditions of the time by applying Marxist and post-Marxist views of political economy and subjectivity.

This paper will most often engage with post-Marxist authors. As the beginning quotation informs us, capital itself can be seen as developing with its environment. Proponents of post-Marxist thought position capital further within the new and current material conditions, material conditions that Marx may have predicted to some degree, but nonetheless did not live to experience and thus could not incorporate into his work on the development of capital. In essence, post-Marxism follows and is indebted to the methodology founded by Marx, but the results and interpretations of this very methodology when applied within current conditions are inevitably different. Further, because the Marxist approach to theory is embedded within its material conditions, the theory itself can be seen to transform in the process of interpretation (Negri & Hardt, 2004).

In particular, this paper will engage with one of the primary elements of Marx's methodology: the notion of historical tendency. In their book, *Multitude* (2004), Negri and Hardt explain that the hegemonic form of production "imposes a tendency on other forms of labour, transforming them in accordance with its own characteristics, and in that sense it has adopted a hegemonic position" (p.141).[1] It is with the idea of historical tendency in mind that I seek to examine the aforementioned discourses of developmental psychology, with the corresponding modes of production of a given era driving their form and hegemony.[2]

Part I

Müller, Carpendale and Smith (2009) reveal that nearing the end of his life and career, Piaget himself felt largely misunderstood. Müller et al. (2009) speculate that this sense of misunderstanding is due to the fact that many scholars separate his epistemological, that is theoretical, framework from his empirical research, which are contingent on each other. Such a decontextualization of Piaget's work has inevitably led to misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Although Piaget's theory of cognitive development can be said to lie prominently at the heart of contemporary developmental psychology, the way his theory has been received is not always the way it originated (Burman, 1994; Müller et al. 2009; Piaget, 1995).

Undoubtedly, Piaget's most significant contribution to developmental psychology is the notion of 'stage and structure' which is largely responsible for the dominant stage theory of development (Burman, 1994; Müller et al. 2009; Kesselring, 2009). A common view of this theory is that the stages are static, discontinuous and universal structures that define a child's thinking (Müller et al. 2009; Kesselring, 2009). However, Piaget himself noted that the stages were not rigid nor homogeneous, but rather, quite the opposite. In several places, Piaget noted that variability should be expected (Müller et al., 2009).

Another key point of misinterpretation was Piaget's research methodology. Piaget utilized and encouraged a flexible, semi-structured interviewing technique. But this was often criticized as inconsistent with the scientific method and objectivity (Burman, 1994; Hsueh, 2009). In fact, the opposite philosophy in Western methodology was pursued: rigid, standardized testing (Burman, 1994). Ironically, developmental psychology utilized a 'streamlined' version of Piaget's stage theory to justify standardization and normalization in the methodology of child psychology. In both of the above misconstruals of Piaget's work by Western scholars, we see the dominant discourse of linearity and uniformity emerging and, in essence, taking over.

Such an appropriation of Piaget's work is unsurprising when contextualized within the hegemonic subjectivity and political economy of the time. In his *Twenty Theses on Marx*, Negri (1996) gives his interpretation of the class situation in contemporary times by expanding on several strands of Marxist theory, including further developments within the division of labour. Negri argues that there are two phases of the period of industrial revolution. The first phase spans 1848-1914, while the second phase is from 1914 until 1968. It is in the second phase that developmental psychology builds momentum; this phase is characterized by the hegemony of the mass worker (Negri, 1996). The mass worker is situated at the time when Fordism is instituted. The Fordist model of mass production increased efficiency and profit by making several products (originally cars) at a time, instead of one product at a time. A precursor to this production style can be seen in Marx's *Capital: Volume I*, where he describes how division of labour in manufacturing may lead to the detail labourer: "a labourer who all his life performs one and the same simple operation, converts his whole body into the automatic, specialized implement of that operation" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 390). Detail labours are then assembled together to form collective labourers, each one producing one part of the whole, forming "a class of so-called unskilled labourers" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 392). Lee (2001) further describes the Fordist model and life for the 'collective labourer,' or 'mass worker,' who in this era is now further aided by the assembly line:

1 It is important to note here that for Negri and Hardt, labour goes beyond simple employment, and reaches into immaterial realms, or forms of social labour. Social labour is further explained in Part II, as the mode of production that underlies the total subsumption of capital. (The total subsumption of capital being the new era many post-Marxist scholars argue we are currently experiencing under capitalism.)

2 In this paper, I also engage in other parts of Marx's methodology as interpreted by Negri and Hardt; however, the notion of historical tendency is most prominent in my analysis. For further insight and a more detailed explication, I would recommend reading "Excursus 1: Method: In Marx's Footsteps" - a chapter in Negri and Hardt's (2004) Multitude.

> Fordist mass production became the standard model of 'blue-collar' manual work. As long as Fordist businesses continued to be profitable, employees could look forward to very stable conditions of employment. Once one had learnt one's task on the assembly line well enough to keep up with the pace of production, one need not seek to change one's range of skills. Further, since so much capital had been invested in the factory in which one worked, according to a long-term plan, one could feel relatively confident that one would continue to work in the same place and among more or less the same people until retirement (p.11).

Thus, we see that life for the mass worker[3] is underlined by linearity and uniformity. "Fordism, with its stability, reliability and standardization of products, was not just a business strategy, it was a 'total way of life'" (Lee, 2001, p.11). As Lee (2001) further argues, "between 1945 and the early 1970s across the industrialized world, economic arrangements between businesses, governments and employees were such that once one was in employment, one could reasonably expect that one's working conditions would remain stable" (p. 12). This hegemony of linearity and security might be seen as reflected in the subjectivities of those producing ideas of mainstream developmental psychology; misinterpretations of Piaget's theory and methodology may be seen as ideas appropriated to align with the development of large-scale industry and its tendencies. This is not only seen in some interpretations of Piaget's work, but in other theories that came to dominate developmental psychology at the time. For instance, a prominent theory that would have been situated within ideologies of industrial capital is Erik Erikson's life-stage theory of human development. Erikson's ideas were first published in his widely popular book, *Childhood and Society*, published in 1950 (Erikson, 1993). Erikson's life-stage theory focused on the successful resolution of each life-stage's dilemma, or crisis, as the key to healthy development. Failure to resolve a particular life-stage's development points to personal growth being stunted (Coon & Mitterer, 2007). Erikson's theory, similarly to industrial capital, points to a desire for linear and stable development. A similar sentiment might be seen in John Bowlby's theory of attachment, which was also first developed within the time-frame of industrial capital; Bowlby began developing his theory in the 1950s (Bowlby, 1988). Bowlby's theory of attachment stresses that there are patterns of infant attachment (secure, anxious-resistant, anxious avoided and disorganized) which profoundly affect the future development of individuals (Bowlby, 1988). Although there are no stages underlying Bowlby's theory, there is a favourable outcome, with a secure attachment yielding the most successful developmental results. In general, what Bowlby's theory proposes is that certain kinds of interactions will provide certain kinds of outcomes, suggesting tthat although diverse, there is still uniformity in development.

Although ideas of linearity and uniformity were by no means new at the time, they were certainly intensified at this phase. The rise of fast-food franchises (with uniform menus and procedures), the post-war suburbanian explosion (with zoning laws dictating the uniformity of houses), and the publishing of the first DSM (the standardization of mental disorders) are only a few examples of this intensification.

It is interesting to note that the notion of uniformity in development dates back to pre-Darwinian times; however, even Darwin's ideas were misconstrued to focus upon uniformity in heredity, as opposed to variability in heredity, which was Darwin's actual focus (Burman, 1994). Here we see again how even the theory of evolution has been appropriated to fit hegemonic ideals of development of the time. On the other hand, what is accurately taken from the theory of evolution is its subscription to idea that life progresses towards an ideal: "Comparisons between child, prehistoric man and 'savage' presupposes a conception of development, of individual and evolutionary progress, as unilinear, as directed steps up an ordered hierarchy" (Burman, 1994, p. 11). This highlights the dominant discourse that development is progressive and product focused.

We see this discourse being perpetuated further in another common misunderstanding of Piaget's theory: that there is an ultimate stage of thinking that the child is trying to reach (the rational adult); that each stage is quantitatively better than the previous one. Here, the discourse of progression and the focus on an ideal end product, glosses over key nuances in Piaget's epistemological underpinnings. In Piaget's theory, "developmental levels are levels of intellectual construction; they are not levels of knowers" (Müller et al., 2009, p. 6). In other words, what Piaget's developmental levels refer to are processes, not products. As such, each level of intellectual construction would examine what one can do with any set of ideas, as opposed to examining the level of a "knower." The level of a "knower" is not referring to a process, but instead a static characteristic: what ideas does one have, instead of what one can do with any set of ideas. As Müller et al. (2009) further explain "the formal properties Piaget wanted to describe were forms of thinking, that is, different ways in which children approach the same kind of problem" (p. 7). Although, there is certainly a sense of teleology in Piaget's work, the nuances of his theory that are highlighted within dominant developmental psychology may be seen to reflect an alienated capitalist subjectivity. Such an "abstraction of developmental time is associated with that of exchange, such that developmental maturation is linked to the return on a financial investment" (Burman, 1994, p.16). Thus, Burman argues development parallels capitalism. To be more specific, however, we see that development parallels industrial capital. The idea of the "knower" can be seen as a final product that one is striving for, or a sort of 'profit' that one is

3 It should be stressed that other types of work did exist at the time, and that the mass worker was certainly not representative of the average citizen. Thus, the mass worker represented not the majority, but was rather seen as the hegemonic norm of the time creating a tendency towards its own characteristics.

relying on in terms of successful developmental maturation as Burman points to. The focus here being more so on the product of thinking (bourgeois ownership), rather than the process (proletariat productivity). In essence, with the privileging of the *product* of thinking, we see thinking separated from its labour, the *process*, and resulting in the alienation of the thinker. Such an interpretation removes us from several of Piaget's original intentions as Piaget also insisted that each form of thinking should be content and context specific (Burman, 1994; Müller et al., 2009).

This discourse of progress and end product is intertwined with the underlying discourse of individualism. Although the Fordist model of production during the time of industrial capital offered new ways of social organization for the workers – the standardized work day and workplace enabling mass mobilization – it also brought a new level of abstraction to labour which can be associated with individualism and alienation (Negri, 1996). Each individual does their part but is disconnected from the whole of production. This individualization of labour can be seen to improve efficiency and therefore the end goal, profit (Marx & Engels, 1978; Lee, 2001).

This notion can be seen in the way Piaget's stage model was widely received as having discontinuous, or individual stages. In fact, in the US, developmental research even came to focus upon the acceleration of development (known as the 'American question'), attempting to "teach children to do Piagetian-type problems at even earlier ages" (Burman, p.156). In other words, such an approach attempted to quantify Piaget's original qualitative model. Hence we see how normalization and standardization is made more 'efficient' through processes of individualization. Mainstream development focuses on producing a 'normal' child; in other words, a rational, able-bodied, male who will eventually sell his labour for the sake of profit.

Similarly, Nakata (2010) discusses how the politics of childhood rights are primarily framed around the child 'becoming adult'; in particular, the governed liberal adult citizen. Nikata (2010) quotes Nikolas Rose on how normalization plays a central role in this becoming:

> Nikolas Rose has observed that 'children [first] came to the attention of social authorities as delinquents threatening property, and security, as future workers requiring normalization and skills, as future soldiers requiring a level of fitness' and that 'childhood began to be seen as a distinct period during which bad habits could be laid down that would have a lifelong influence' (1999, 123 and 52 respectively). This reflects the government of the sinful child, in need of reform and attention before they reach adulthood so that they will become good and productive citizens (p. 11).

We see here that the norm or the ideal is reinforced by its aberrations. For Nakata this is seen in the 'sinful child.' In dominant developmental psychology we see the governance of the ideal enforced by abnormal developmental psychology (Burman, 1994). The ideal child, developing healthily towards rationality and thus production, is defined by the abnormal child, the developmentally stunted and thus, unproductive child. Or put in another way, the idea of the abnormal child allows for the disciplining of the normal child. Foucault's concept of the panopticon can be useful here. The panopticon refers to a particular architectural configuration that allows for the observance of subjects without them seeing the observer. Most notably, the formation of the panopiticon is exemplified in the prison guard's watch tower. Where the tower is situated in such a way that all prisoners can be seen, and all prisoners can see it, but cannot, however, see the observer, or prison guard. This leads to the internalization of the gaze, and hence the self-disciplining of the subject, without the observer even being present (Mills, 2003). Thus, this diagram of discipline can be seen to spread from a physical one into a social one (Skott-Myhre, 2008). Developmental psychology through the means of education is one way that we cans see the engagement with such a diagram. Skott-Myhre (2008) links the diagram of the panopticon to industrial capital: "a similar diagram was constituted in the assembly line of the Fordist factory, which extended itself from disciplining workers so they would efficiently produce goods into a deployment within the practices of education that disciplined child bodies into the habits of good factory workers" (Skott-Myhre, 2008, p. 78).

The three hegemonic discourses embedded within developmental psychology reflect and create a society of discipline that characterizes late industrial capitalism (Deleuze, 1995). Or as Burman (1994) puts it, "turning the complex disorder of individual development into orderly steps to maturity reflects explicit social interests in maintaining social control within and between social groups and nations" (p.19). The 'social control' Burman speaks of contextualized within a disciplinary society are based on sites of confinement. As the work of Foucault has explicated, the space of confinement is epitomized by the prison, but is reflected in other spaces such as the hospital, school and of course, the factory (Deleuze, 1995). The ideals behind sites of confinement include: " bringing everything together, giving each thing its place, organizing time, [and] setting up in this space-time a force of production greater than the sum of component forces" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 177).

The hegemonic discourses underlying mainstream developmental psychology can be seen to align with the ideals of spaces of confinement. We can see standardization, uniformity, and individualizaton as disciplinary forces for the sake of future production and profit[4]. Hence, developmental psychology can be seen as an

4 In other words, capital uses spaces of confinement as a way of domination and exploitation. Here we see where Deleuze (as well as Guattari) is indebted to Marxism, as Deleuze (1995) himself comments that his political philosophy always turns on "the analysis of capitalism and the ways it has developed" (p. 171).

immaterial space of confinement; confining the developing child to a hierarchical and quantifiable notion of teleological time and thus a hierarchical and quantifiable notion of value. Anything or anyone not fitting this confine is rejected as abnormal.

This confinement can further be reflected through the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of Piaget's theory which was appropriated into the rigid structure of a dominant developmental stage model. Piaget's work can be seen, in essence, to have been disciplined to fit the needs of capital at the time.

Part II

Today the theories of Piaget and other theorists of his time, would inevitably be interpreted and appropriated differently, as social conditions have changed and new needs have arisen for capital. Specifically, I will argue that had Piaget's theories arisen today for the first time[5], they might be more accurately interpreted as such interpretations may suit the hegemonic needs of today's society more effectively. Marx himself states that "consciousness can sometimes appear further advanced than the contemporary empirical relationships, so that in the struggles of a latter epoch one can refer to earlier theoreticians as authorities" (1978, p. 195). Negri (1994), along with others (Deleuze, 1995; Negri & Hardt, 2004; Hardt, 1998) argue that since 1968 there has been a new shift in the means of production. Factory manufacturing has given way to new technologies, displacing the mass worker. Industrial capitalism, the period of the mass worker, has shifted into the total subsumption of capital, in which the 'social worker' becomes hegemonic. The total subsumption of capital is the moment in which everything – material or immaterial – becomes for sale (Skott-Myhre, 2008). The total subsumption of capital experiences the deregularization of capital, and the opening up of the market to the entire world; in other words, the globalization of capital. Negri (1994) describes: "the models of regulation are extended along multinational lines, and the regulation passes through monetary dimensions which cover the world market to a continually greater extent" (Negri, 1994, p.156).

Since the globalization of capital displaces the Western mass worker to periphery spaces in which labour is cheaper, hegemonic labour in North America shifts to a different focus. The organization of labour "becomes progressively more decentralized spatially. It is instead focused on the expropriation of social knowledges, on the capitalization of the social labouring networks: in short, it concentrates on the exploitation of a working figure which extends well beyond the bounds of the factory. We call this figure the social worker" (Negri, 1994, p. 163)

The social worker's life is defined by flexibility; everything is "short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous and unbounded" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 181). As Harvey (1996) further explicates, production turnover time was accelerated by technological advances, which in turn affected labour processes in a respective manner. This, however, also sped up exchange and consumption times, creating a "general speed-up in the turnover times of capital" (Harvey, 1996, p. 495). Harvey continues on,

> In the realm of commodity production, the primary effect has been to emphasize the values and virtues of instantaneity (instant and fast foods, meals and other satisfactions) and of disposability (cups, plates, cutlery, packaging, napkins, clothing, etc.). The dynamics of a 'throwaway' society, as writers like Alvin Toffler (1970) dubbed it, began to become evident during the1960s. It meant more than just throwing away produced goods (creating a monumental waste-disposal problem), but also being able to throw away values, life-styles, stable relationships, and attachment to things, buildings, places, people, and received ways of doing and being. (...) Through such mechanisms (which proved highly effective from the standpoint of accelerating the turnover of goods in consumption) individuals were forced to cope with disposability, novelty and the prospects for instant obsolescence (p.495).

The underlying effects of such acceleration have been increased forms of control, under the guise of flexibility. With the turn over of capital being faster than human production (or a 'twinkle of an eye' as Marx would have it), people are forced to keep up with capital. In essence, capital controls us, we do not control it. These are the qualities that begin to underlie a society of control.

Instead of a society of discipline, it is argued that today we are within a society of control (Deleuze, 1995; Hardt, 1998; Negri, 1994). As Deleuze (1995) further explains, discipline is enforced through confinement: one is confined to an enclosure (the home, the hospital, the prison, the school, etc.). One moves from confinement to confinement molding herself to each one's rules and regulations. Control, on the other hand, is all encompassing. Discipline is always starting over and over, as one moves to and from each confinement; control never ends, you never finish anything. The discipline created in sites of confinement through segregation almost melts away as control is continuous, already embedded in our thoughts, speech and desires (Deleuze, 1995). This is not to say that notions of discipline no longer exist, but that they are giving way to new technologies of social control, specifically focused on technological advances in communication, as the new hegemonic worker is socially based (Deleuze, 1995; Hardt, 1998). Because of the total subsumption of capital and the rise of the social worker, capital is no longer contained, but dispersed and decentralized throughout the social world. What we have now is a "free-floating control", controlling through our means of communication, demanding that all our time be used towards capital

5 I realize this is quite a contradictory argument to make, as if Piaget's work had arisen today, it would be shaped by current times and inevitably be quite different. However, for the sake of this exploratory argument I will ignore this contradiction and imagine his theory as the same as it first might have been.

(Deleuze, 1995; Negri, 1994; Skott-Myhre, 2008). Flexible, part-time contract work reflects this shift. The day is no longer divided into work time and leisure time; all time is 'game' for exploitation and appropriation by capital. Spaces of containment premised on the structure of the prison, give way to an all encompassing space of control and surveillance premised on the structure of the online shopping mall. The notion of 'choice' dominates the market, and is conflated with increased freedom and liberation (Hardt, 1998). The illusion that freedom lies in choice-making covers up that choices are pre-made by the market and are actually an intricate control mechanism, recording and digitalizing consumer choices into traceable, and hence controllable, identities.

With such changes to the socioeconomic conditions of our time, the three hegemonic discourses structuring mainstream developmental psychology would inevitably see similar changes. A dominant view of development, if arising at this time, would most likely not be focused on uniformity and linearity[6]. In fact, we might see a greater focus on variability, as this conception better suits the demands of a society of control. Within the total subsumption of capital, linearity is no longer seen as productive, but as limiting, as it is finite. Capital has run out of room on its own playing field, and deregulates and blurs boundaries in order to progress. A population that is 'normal' and 'uniform' is not as profitable as a population which has variability. A population whose hegemonic focus is normality is a limited consumer base, or audience, for capital, as only a select few can come close to attaining this status (or as Burman (1994) points out that no one can actually attain it completely as it is a pure abstraction). Capital, in this stage, needs to target as many populations as possible in order to make profit. For this reason it could be argued, there have been strong recent movements towards inclusion of differences within certain strands of developmental psychology. This influence is exemplified in inclusive education. Although there has been some debate as to what inclusive education really is, several proponents[7] would agree that essentially "inclusion is about valuing diversity rather than assimilation" (Hick, Kershner & Farrell, 2009, p. 2). Philpott (2007) reveals that the philosophy of inclusion has become so widespread that most of the literature in the field has become "dominated by criticisms of special education and the benefits (and challenges) of inclusion" (p. 4).

Hick et al. (2009) argue that historically psychology has generally been opposed to inclusion, creating more problems and barriers for inclusive education, rather than garnering support. Their recent book, *Psychology for Inclusive Education*, brings several contributors from around the globe together in order to facilitate a more productive relationship between psychology and inclusive education, as the authors argue that psychology has much to contribute in support of inclusion and diversity. Such a shift towards inclusion and diversity can be seen not merely based on a change of attitudes within people, but this change of attitudes might be seen as a result of the shift in the economy, as in the total subsumption of capitalism capital is desperate for more consumers in order to thrive. Henceforth, we see the variability that Piaget's theory (as well as Darwin's theory of evolution) proposed coming to the forefront. Indeed, variability can be said to be a primary concern to neo-Piagetian theory (Rose & Fischer, 2009). The desire to fulfil diverse developmental needs can be seen to in fact, support the mechanisms of a society of control, as the study of detailed variability can be used to inform the market on how to diversify itself and thus create even more 'choices' to control its ever-growing consumer base.

Moreover, as capital becomes infinite, it is no longer quantifiable, nor is value (Negri, 1994). Meaning that binary divisions (i.e., normal vs. abnormal) begin to lose meaning, as qualitative and immeasurable concepts hold more value. In this way we see control in the form of language and codes, instead of binary oppositions that discipline each other. Control encompasses every individual on his or her own terms in detail, but also on a mass scale. In essence the notion of the individual breaks down into the 'dividual' (Deleuze, 1995). The dividual is infinitely divisible, as s/he is coded and digitalized and his/her value can be traced by and defined by the consumer choices he or she makes.

The concept of the dividual would certainly change the way developmental psychology is produced and maintained. For instance, instead of containing the abnormal child within the clinic in order to discipline his (apparent) 'unproductiveness', one might now take him to the mall to make him look like the masses, as he can still be a consumer and controlled. This can already be seen in a study by McKeever and Miller (2004) which examined practices of mothers of children with disabilities. Most of the mothers in the study were highly focused on normalizing the appearance of their children. "Mothers spontaneously reported that they invested enormous cost and effort to ensure their children were dressed well and fashionably regardless of each family's class position, ethnocultural background, or extent of disability" (McKeever & Miller, p. 1187). Focus is no longer on production, so who can produce; but, rather, who can consume becomes valuable (Negri, 1994). The shift to consumerism can be further illustrated by the focus of purchasing skills in adaptive community functioning for individuals with autism spectrum disorder (Cihak & Grim, 2008; Yang Ping et al., 2005). This is exemplified in the title of Marholin et al.'s (1979) study, *"I'll have a Big Mac, large fries, large coke, and apple pie,"*...or teaching adaptive community skills, where consumption is positioned as the key attribute for successful community integration.

6 It should be noted that although Marx viewed history as teleological, this form of linear progress also shifts and is reconfigured within post-Marxist theory. This especially becomes apparent within the total subsumption of capital, as the social worker's labour is no longer confined to regularized work hours, but fragments and proliferates into all time, as the social is all-encompassing. One could argue that Marx was in fact so attuned to the tendency of industrial capital in his time, that for this reason his understanding of time was situated in this very tendency.

7 See also Roach (1995), Rice (2005) and Philpott (2007).

Today, the ideas of development as progressive and with an ideal final product would most likely also dissipate. For example, continuous education is now rising in popularity, leaving the confines of the school, and affecting all individuals, child or adult (Deleuze, 1995). A static end product or ideal is no longer desirable nor profitable, as a shifting ideal affords infinite profit. This points to what Negri (1994) proposes, that scientific methodology will focus more on discontinuities and ruptures, meaning that a qualitative and individually contextualized methodology like Piaget's may become more meaningful. Furthermore, Piaget's conviction that adult behaviour cannot be understood without a developmental perspective might also be taken more seriously at this time. Flavell (1963) remarks on Piaget's disapproval of "what he sees [saw] to be an unfortunate contemporary hiatus between child psychologists and those who study only adults" (p. 16); hence, developmental psychology may see shifts towards towards a psychology that does not separate the child from the adult. We can see the blurring of these lines already occurring with the recent debates about where adolescence ends and adulthood begins. In particular, we see this reflected in Arnett's (2000) recent theory of 'emerging adulthood,' as changes in Western economies have put traditional adult roles into flux.

The above outlines a conceptualization of developmental psychology contextualized within the socioeconomic conditions of today, based on a post-Marxist perspective. A developmental psychology in a society of control might look more like a qualitative psychology focused on variability, divisibility and dividuality and infinite identity production (or is it consumption?). These are not necessarily new ideas; many of these ideas can be found underlying the peripheries of developmental psychology today, as well as the past. What the above analysis does point to, however, is the potential of such ideas to become hegemonic in our times.

Such a stance opens up many new lines of inquiry. Is this a developmental psychology that might open up more possibilities for being and becoming? Or one that might create more violent restrictions than ever? Whether or not such a model of development is desirable is unclear. As Negri (1994) questions, are these changes in our society the indicators of yet another industrial revolution or the beginnings of a true communist revolution? The outcomes are not known; however, such an analysis may provide us with clues about where developmental psychology might be heading in the future.

References

Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. *American Psychologist, 55*, 469-480.

Bowlby, J. (1988). *A secure base: Parent-child attachment and healthy human development.* London: Routledge.

Burman, E. (1994). *Deconstructing developmental psychology*. London; New York: Routledge.

Cihak, D. F., & Grim, J. (2008). Teaching students with autism spectrum disorder and moderate intellectual disabilities to use counting-on strategies to enhance independent purchasing skills. *Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 2*(4), 716-727.

Coon, D., & Mitterer, J. O. (2007). *Introduction to psychology: Gateways to mind and behaviour* (11th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.

Deleuze, G. (1995) Postscript on the societies of control. In *Negotiations*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Erikson, E. H. (1993). *Childhood and society*. New York: Norton & Company, Inc.

Flavell, J. H. (1963). *The developmental psychology of Jean Piaget*. New York: Van Nostrand Company, Inc.

Hardt, M. (1998) The withering of civil society. In E. Kaufman, and K.J. Heller, (Eds.), Deleuze and Guattari. *New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, and Culture* (pp. 23-39). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2004). *Multitude: War and democracy in the age of empire*. New York:The Penguin Press.

Harvey, D. (1996). The condition of postmodernity. In J. Appleby, E. Covington, D., Hoyt, M. Latham, & A. Sneider (Eds.), *Knowledge and postmodernism in historical perspective* (pp. 494-507). New York: Routledge.

Hick, P., Kershner, R., & Farrell, P. T. (2009). Introduction. In P. Hick, R. Kershner, and P. T. Farrell (Eds.), *Psychology for inclusive education: New directions in theory and practice* (pp. 1-10). Oxon, UK: Routledge.

Hsueh, Y. (2009). Piaget in the United States, 1925-1971. In U. Müller, J. Carpendale, and L. Smith (Eds.), *The Cambridge companion to Piaget* (pp. 344-370). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kesselring, T. (2009). The mind's staircase revised. In U. Müller, J. Carpendale, and L. Smith (Eds.), T*he Cambridge companion to Piaget* (pp. 371-399). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, N. (2001). *Childhood and society: Growing up in an age of uncertainty*. Buckingham; Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1978). *The Marx-Engels reader* (2nd ed.; R. Tucker, Ed.). New York: W. W. Norton.

Mills, S. (2003). *Michel Foucault*. New York: Routledge.

Müller, U., Carpendale, J. & Smith, L. (2009). Introduction I. The context of Piaget's theory. In U. Müller, J. Carpendale, and

L. Smith (Eds.), *The Cambridge companion to Piaget* (pp. 1-18). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nakata, S. (2010). Governing childhood: The politics of becoming adult. Paper presented at the *Australian Political Science Association Conference 2010*. Retrieved May 14, 2010, from http://apsa2010.com.au/full-papers/pdf/APSA2010_0062.pdf

Negri, A. (1996). Twenty theses on Marx: interpretations of the class situation today. In S. Makdisi, C. Casarino, and R. Karl (Eds.), *Marxism beyond Marxism* (pp. 149-180). New York: Routledge.

McKeever, P., & Miller K. (2004). Mothering children who have disabilities: a Bourdieusian interpretation of material practices. *Social Science & Medicine, 59*, 1177-1191.

Marholin, D., O'Toole, K. M., Touchette, P. E., Berger, P. L, & Doyle, D. A. (1979). "I'll have a Big Mac, large fries, large coke, and apple pie," ... or teaching adaptive community skills. *Behavior Therapy, 10*, 236-248.

Philpott, D. (2007). Assessing without labels: Inclusive education in the Canadian context. *Exceptionality Education Canada*, 17(3), 3-34.

Piaget, J. (1995). *Sociological studies.* (L. Smith, Trans. 2nd ed.). London: Routledge.

Rice, N. (2005). Guardians of tradition: Presentations of inclusion in three introductory special education textbooks. *International Journal of Inclusive Education, 9*(4), 405-429.

Roach, V. (1995). Supporting inclusion: Beyond the rhetoric. *Phi Delta Kappan, 77,* 295-299.

Rose, L.T., & Fischer, K.W. (2009). Dynamic development: A neo-Piagetian approach. In U. Müller, J. Carpendale, and L. Smith (Eds.), *The Cambridge companion to Piaget* (pp. 400-421). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Skott-Myhre, H. A. (2008). *Youth and subculture as creative force: Creating new spaces for radical youth work*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Wartofsky, Marx (1983). From genetic epistemology to historical epistemology: Kant, Marx, and Piaget. In L. S. Liben (Ed.), *Piaget and the foundations of knowledge* (pp. 1-17). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Yang Ping, X., Grasso, E., Dipipi-Hoy, C., & Jitendra, A. (2005). The effects of purchasing skill Instruction for individuals with developmental disabilities: A meta-analysis. *Exceptional Children, 71*(4), 379-400.

colleen macquarrie
emily rutledge
lorraine begley

Wresting Change as a Liberating Concept: Lessons Learned From Teen Moms in a Liberation Psychology Workshop.

By Colleen MacQuarrie, Emily Rutledge, Lorraine Begley, University of Prince Edward Island

Abstract

Injustice is an historical process that requires sustained efforts to resist. Resistance to systems of oppression through liberatory processes that analyse, understand, and dismantle the conditions for our subjugation are central for critical marxist feminist theories and the praxis of liberation psychology which seeks to address change on intrapersonal, interpersonal, and structural levels of society. We reflect on the change processes within our 8 week project with 'teen moms' that utilized the theory and practices of liberation psychology to assess the development of a 'capacity for change.' Women identified shared oppressions, supported each other's analysis, and created a safe and strong group dynamic which they identified as empowering. Understanding resistances to change is explored as a central theme throughout the project and the catalytic value of unpacking the concept of change for/with traditionally marginalized populations is explored.

Creating moments of transformation among traditionally marginalized populations is a cornerstone in social justice movements around the world. Inherent in Marxist socialism is a theory of alternatives that conceptualize injustice as a historical process which is created by humanity and can therefore be changed by humanity. As an existentialist, Marx's writing offers a protest against the historical epoch of Western industrialization with its comcomitant alienation, loss of personhood and transformation of the individual into an object. In Marx's Capital Volume 1, he details how economic structures oppress and alienate humans from themselves and from each other. His materialist method articulates how "It is not the consciousness of men [sic] that determines their social being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (p.362). Thus political and economic structures created by humans as historical moments also create conditions for our individual alienations; structures must be interrogated to understand our humanity and how to resist alienation. As for transformation, Marx is hopeful that social revolutions are integral to humanity's consummate struggle with constraining structures. This conception of historical materialism relates to a renewed spiritual center for humanity that renders the unique pursuit of the individual as a key to our fully conscious existence and as a protest against false consciousness (Fromm, 1961).

Importantly, Marx's influence has been critically modified by feminist scholars to foreground liberation from gender oppression by Marxist feminists (i.e., Benston, 1969; Fox 1980), material feminists (ie., Hennessy, 1993, 2000; Vogel 1995) and radical feminists (ie., Haraway, 1985; Harding, 1986; Hartsock 1983 a,b; O'Brien, 1981; Smith, 1974) who also particularly emphasize the psychology of women and work (ie., Chodorow, 1978, 1979, 1982; Kuhn & Wolpe, 1978; Mitchell, 1972, 1974; Ruddick, 1989). Radical approaches pioneered arguments about the intersectionality of oppressions to articulate how one's relation to the work of production and reproduction gave people at the

nexus of various identities a different way of knowing the social totality. An obvious connection for our work with teen mothers has been the linkage to radical feminist writings and liberation psychology (LP).

Liberation psychology originated in the latter half of the 20th century in the Latin Americas at a time marked by brutal dictatorships. Its' originator, psychologist and Roman Catholic priest Ignatio Martin-Baro, along with a dozen supporters were assassinated by the US backed fighters in El Salvador (Osorio, 2009, p. 17). Martin-Baro articulated a psychology of liberation whereby a people experiencing oppression identify, from dialogue among their peers, new clarity of political insight about their circumstances, tools of resistance to oppression, and liberation from the repression of the powerful elites. LP adds to Marxism a method of pursuing liberation as an ongoing dialogical process of group emancipation that stems from individual experiences of alienation. The multiple layers of oppression identified in LP align well with a Marxist socialist (Fromm, 1961) deconstruction and a radical feminist theorizing (Moane, 2011) of how political structures impact upon individual psyches and interpersonal relationships.

Central to LP is acknowledging that oppressions are multiple and intersecting, thereby creating limit situations (Moane, 2011) for individuals which are connected to group oppressions. The limit situation is not a deterministic standpoint but rather a constrained space of options. This is similar to the idea postulated by Marx and Engels in the *German Ideology* (1850), in writing about consciousness and how people's lived experiences influence their world views "…definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations…The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals…as they really are; ie as they are effective, produce materially, and are active under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will." (p.13, year). Thus the materialist conditions create limited spheres of action, awareness, and being. In LP, the populations experiencing oppressions participate in a negative spiral of disempowerment leading to increased alienation from others, isolation, and fragmentation of populations that may otherwise share an understanding of a common social solidarity. Countering these oppressive disempowering mechanisms is the positive cycle of transformation or liberation marked by an increased awareness, social identification of issues, and empowerment to challenge oppressions on personal, relational, and systemic levels. LP articulates a dynamic theory of oppression in counterpoint to liberation, identifying and opposing the structural oppressions within each historical context. While Marx believed that much of our consciousness is 'false' he nevertheless held forth that awareness was possible. LP details how awareness can be actualized through collective problematization of limit situations.

The implications of radical social theory in various contexts are not understood until diverse groups grapple with praxis and the fullness of history has provided perspective. To that end, we are interested in how liberation psychology (LP) might work with our pursuit of social justice in a small rural province in Canada. In the summer of 2009, we collaborated with four teen mothers to implement, assess, and redesign a LP workshop.

The transferability of the premises of LP to historical contexts outside of Latin America is evidenced by the work of Dr. Geraldine Moane of University College Dublin who utilizes the theory and practices of LP within the universe of post-colonial Ireland (Moane, 2009, 2011). The transferability from Ireland to a small rural province in Canada, Prince Edward Island (PEI), was examined through the work of two of the authors of this paper. We traveled to Ireland to study with Dr. Moane in February 2009. Five months later, with adaptations of Moane's work to a context relevant to teen mothers in PEI, University of Prince Edward Island ethics approval was obtained, and an eight week course in LP commenced. Previous longitudinal research with the teen mothers indicated that in PEI as elsewhere in North America, young mothers were at the nexus of a web of oppressions, creating limit situations. The intersecting oppressions, including but not constrained to gender, class, race, age, heteronormativity, marital status, and rurality, operate to undermine authority and voice in their lives (MacQuarrie, Begley, Preston, 2010). LP's transformative power over oppressions is braced against the power of community coherence to resist the dynamics of oppression. Liberation psychologists are clear that one of the ways to reverse the negative effects of oppression is to form a community among the oppressed persons; several projects have documented the beneficial aspects of collectively advocating to change oppressive situations (e.g., Watkins, M., & Shulman, H., 2008). The theory and practice of LP emerges from an oppressed community expressing the desire to change the status quo, and takes the position that an individual's psychology and their political environment are not only linked, but interactive. Therefore, not only can oppression have negative impacts on health; but resisting oppression and instigating political change can be an act of liberation, with positive psychological effects (e.g., Moane, 1999, 2011).

LP is often presented in the context of a preexisting resistance group or niche of resistance (Moane, 1999, 2011). However, the teen moms in this project had not formed as a group prior to this research, which means they had not naturally formed a group advocating for political change. As such this project works with a group of individuals who may share common oppressions, but have no preexisting rapport or organization to politically challenge those oppressions which are creating the limit situations (Moane, 2011) or material conditions for their lives (Marx & Engels, 1850). We were interested in understanding how a LP workshop might animate a previously disparate group to create transformative change on intrapersonal, interpersonal, and structural levels.

Methods

Using a participatory action research approach, our project took place over an eight week period, with one weekend-long launch session; three, three-hour evening sessions; and one day-long final session. Each participant was given a binder with some questionnaires, definitions pertaining to LP and a package by the World Health Organization about the Social Determinants of Health. The first weekend-long session included three workshops to engage the women with the model of LP. Throughout the pilot, the four women were encouraged to share and reflect on their stories, and the bulk of the project is group conversation on topics immediately pertinent to their lives. These shared stories and conversations were recorded, and amount to 25 hours of audio recorded data—the richest and most plentiful source of data generated by the pilot. Additionally, the women were asked to document what they would like to change in their lives and to keep journals where they could reflect on their learning and the process of the pilot. The last day long session included an artistic expression component where the participants were asked to create something from their experience of the pilot to pass along to the next group of participants.

The cornerstone for our analysis, methodical hermeneutics (Gergen, 1989; Heidegger, 1927/1962; Packer & Addison, 1989; Ricoeur, 1979, Rennie, 2007), is an inductive approach to understanding and interpreting people's experiences using constant comparative methods (e.g. Burnard, 1991; MacQuarrie, 2001; Pieranunzzi, 1997). As such, it is well suited to illuminating workshop experiences and processes. Two of the authors modified Dr. Moane's work, collaborated with the teen moms, facilitated the weekend workshop and were immersed in the unfolding time line of the pilot and subsequent analytical process and dialogue with participants about the results. The other author participated as part of her Honours thesis in the analytical phase of the empirical materials and the communication of the analyses back to the participants.

The LP project sessions were guided by modules focusing on specific questions but they used a dialogical research conversation format (Herda, 1999) to encourage participants to authentically generate concerns and ideas from their perspectives. The participants spoke candidly; the form of their conversations was often anecdotal and direct to the topic at hand, sometimes somewhat related, and sometimes not at all related.

Constructing a Constitutive Theme

To systematize the analysis, we created a topography of the workshop audio recordings which initially used two hierarchies: 1) the least important material was conversation where the participants were not speaking at all on topic, 2) greater importance was dedicated to conversation where the participants were speaking on topic; the scope of this category is large, and the topography is mainly dominated by this category of importance. Analysis of this material was our initial goal, however, in keeping with our openly interpretive dialectical approach we sought to understand the parts of the workshop in the context of the whole, interrogating our emergent understanding against contradictions and paradoxes. As such we paid careful attention to the parts of the workshop that went against our expectations. After considerable discussion, we decided some material in the least important 'off topic' category warranted further attention; specifically what we had categorized as "banter" often took the form of jokes, lighthearted teasing, and dramatic changes of subject. Conversations amongst the research analysis team troubled over why and when conversations were seemingly off topic; analysis honed in to examine what, if any, function was operating to the so called off topic conversations. It was through this process of categorizing off-topic conversation as *"banter"* that the theme of this paper, the problematics of the change concept was constructed. The remainder of this paper will focus on this constitutive theme for the empirical material.

Results and Discussion: The Problematics of Change

Using methodical hermeneutics we focus on the concept of change as being a problematic and misleading concept, with even more extreme difficulty for oppressed groups. We will describe and critique the concept of change as it was experienced in this LP project with teen mothers in a rural province in Canada. As Moane (1999, 2011) points out, political influence is not distributed equally in hierarchical systems. We extend this to argue that based on understanding how limit situations operate (Moane, 2011), one's capacity to change is similarly unevenly distributed with those at the bottom being more alienated from their power to effect change, a power that we all (theoretically) hold (Marx, 1844). This means that people with less relative power to effect change will imagine a smaller action universe than those with relatively more power; thus the idea that one is an agent to effect change in a substantial way is also connected with one's relative stance in relation to various limit situations or material conditions (Marx & Engels, 1850). The more constrained the limit situation in terms of the intersectionalities of oppressions the less likely one is to imagine the possibilities of change (Moane, 2011).

Within the first day of the workshop, mutual experiences of oppression were shared, and teen moms created a strong rapport of mutuality in their experiences of devaluation along gender, age, and class lines. Similarly while the group banded together, and identified with each other's analysis of each person's experiences of oppression. They also enjoyed being together and felt empowered by being in the group. The participants did not hesitate to share their experiences of oppressions that affected them in the past. To illustrate, this is a sample of flip chart data from the

pilot. Flip chart data are the empirical materials generated though group discussion and recorded on a flip chart as key points from this dialogical process:

WHAT MESSAGES AM I/ ARE WE GETTING FROM SOCIETY ABOUT TEENAGE MOTHERS?
\
- We are a tragedy.
- We are sluts/trashy.
- We are a drain on society.
- We are nothing more than just another statistic.
- We can't be good, caring parents.
- We will have kids who will be problems and are not normal.
- We get no credit for having strength.
- It's okay for fathers to walk away, and if they stay they get praised.
- Judgments are made about your choices.
- We live in a paradox: If mom works she is not at home with kids. If she goes to school she is not at home with kids. If mom stays at home she is not at school.
- We are patronized by the phrase, "Babies having babies."

This list powerfully depicts the stigmas and oppressions adolescent mothers face as they undertake the unparalleled challenges of raising children. From their experiences, it seems that society fails to support these women, offering them instead judgment and blame. Despite the "unnatural" gathering of this group for a project on LP, they indeed formed a strong group dynamic, enjoyed and felt empowered by being in a group of people in similar situations, and felt respected and more likely to share these experiences with this particular group of people. In this way LP's building block of a community of oppressed was successfully created. This is an excerpt from the first evening session to illustrate the cohesive and supportive group dynamic:

Betty: It would be cool if we did a fire dance. I mean like after this is over. Every few months.

(Some conversation and excitement about where/when to do a fire dance)

Anna: Because I don't know if you guys realize how much this has changed our lives. It's changed our lives completely because it's given us somebody that... It's the only place in my entire life that has this.

Charlotte: The only place that you can actually talk about your life.

Betty: Yeah.

Kate: And people actually listen and have the same ideas... Well not the same ideas, but…

Charlotte: Nobody's judging.

Betty: Yeah.

Anna: So we're probably benefitting from this more than you guys are!

Researcher Lorraine: Wow.

Researcher Colleen: Perhaps it's a mutual learning.

In the above excerpt, each individual in the workshop was expressing the same idea of the empowering feelings invoked by being in the group, while finishing each other's sentences in doing so. The expressions of how fulfilling and rewarding it was to be at the meetings were not unusual, and dotted the conversations throughout the meetings. Through these meetings, the group created a safe place to talk about their experiences, and would use these anecdotes from their personal lives to analyze their experiences. The group often spoke of "here" being an important, positive and safe place, unlike the outside world, which they would refer to as "there".

Anna: I feel better here. Like not smaller. Important.

Betty: Here I feel like Betty. There [outside] I feel like a 19 year old mother who should be in school who shouldn't have kids.

While the group was able to create a strong community with new connections and empowered attitudes among themselves, they experienced difficulty incorporating these changes into their daily lives. Early on, the group identified some areas of their lives that they wished were different, many on the personal, some on the interpersonal and a few on the systemic levels. For example, from the intrapersonal level, women wanted to feel strong and confident to stand up for themselves in the face of discrimination; on an interpersonal level, women wanted to change male partners' attitudes toward childcare, housework, relationships; and systemically women wanted to change social stigmas associated with being a "teen mom."

However, there are real and present barriers for young mothers who are interested in instigating change. The lack of time a new mother experiences, compounded by the unequal distribution of childcare between parents is a major obstacle to influencing change in other areas. A lack of money has further debilitating effects to those who wish to instigate changes. Women in a heterosexual relationship in our society are more likely to be in a subordinate position to their male partner's dominant status (ie.,

Coontz, 2005; Friedan, 1963; Fox, 1980; Hennessy, 2003). This hierarchy may show itself as restricting the female partner even further from access to time, resources, privacy and freedom. These together with the already noted stigmas an adolescent mother experiences do not create an accessible and friendly society. These obstacles work in tandem with an internalized oppression (Martin-Baro, 1994; Moane, 1999; Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2005) or self perception of being less worthy or undeserving of equity. Here Anna links her stigma as being labelled a "teen mom" to her perceived ineffectiveness when dealing with a confrontation with a store clerk:

> … when something like that happens … I go back to being like, a teen mom, not good enough and all that stuff comes back … Even though it has nothing to do with me being a teen mother but that's the feeling I guess I had….Yeah, things are inside of me anyway. They just start to come out as soon as I have that feeling that I might have had in one of those situations. I get the same feeling again and it all comes back and that's what I am...it doesn't take much to make me feel that way again.

Here Kate talks about her internalized oppression from being stigmatized as a "teen mom":

> I say that having my baby was "The best damn mistake I ever made" …But that's not the way I feel. I say that to assure myself. When you hear it over and over how stupid you were for having a baby so young, you have to tell yourself something.

External obstacles to being agents of change like time and money are more easily identified, whereas internalized oppressions are elusive. We don't always recognize our negative self perceptions as an internalization of oppression that keeps the status quo in place. The relationship of our negative self perceptions to the social structure is one of viewing ourselves as others see us, of internalizing the gaze of the other. In Marxist terms, this is the ultimate result of the impact of social and political structures, that our being is fractured and formed by our relationship to the structure, that our psyche is formed by the prevailing socio-political organization. Thus internalized oppressions elucidate the contour of how we have been alienated by our social structures. This notion of internalized oppressions is aligned with Marx's concept of 'false' consciousness. That we do what we do, unaware of how what we do is formed and forecast by our position in the socio-political landscape, or by our social status/class.

During analysis of audio sessions, a pattern emerged that we recognized as an expression of internalized oppression. The pattern was one of participant's resistance to the concepts of change and resistance to engaging in a systemic analysis to locate the structural oppressions operating on experiences.

It was noted that when the subject of change, especially in terms of how to change one's life, was opened up to the group, the group often reacted by drastically changing the subject, and continuing on in this new direction which was wholly unrelated to the topic of change. This emerged most notably in the workshops following the initial, weekend-long workshop after the concepts behind LP were introduced. At the beginning of the first evening session it was demonstrated that all four women had a clear grasp of the conscientization cycle as each spoke about an attempted change in her life as a practice of LP. In this way the participants were aware of the theory of LP as being analogous to activating a process of change, and engaged with it accordingly. However, it seemed apparent that when the subject of change became a difficult topic, when an attempted change did not go as hoped, the group would deflect the conversation into banter. For example, in this excerpt from the first evening session, while each of the participants at first related stories of change relatively victoriously, Charlotte did not feel that her attempt at change was a success. The group acted by unanimously avoiding the topic of what to do when a change does not go as planned:

Charlotte: …One of my things I wanted to change was to be more active, but, kinda hard to do when I was throwing up every morning *(laughs)*, so…*(pause)*. Kinda hard, and Will (other toddler) was sick all last week so it was kinda hard to be more active and get out. So…

Researcher Colleen: But you tried to do something, and now, things happened, and you, the piece of the cycle is OK, what can I maybe change in that, um. So, you sort of reflected. You said my kid was sick and I was sick, and it's really hard to exercise when you're vomiting. *[Danielle makes a face]* Sorry, Danielle, you're eating. *(laughter)*

Betty: I eat and vomit *(laughter)*.

Anna: Kinda looks like you're eating vomit. *(laughter)*

(Laughter, Food banter)

Researcher Colleen: So Charlotte you started to talk about how um, how you were trying to make some changes…

(group murmer and laughter and banter about footsies)

Researcher Lorraine: ...So as we move to change the situation that

we're in, um, we experience a sense of liberation. We've done something positive for ourselves, or for the group.

Anna: Anyone mind if I close this?

(Laughter. Banter about room organization and a piece of jewelry)

Where the change or concientization cycle seemed to falter was when reaching the "taking action" stage. There also existed a reluctance to see their personal or shared experiences as an effect of greater political systems at play. Conversations on the topics of change or structural influences were repeatedly uprooted by drastic changes of subject, often followed and sustained by banter on an unrelated topic. In thinking about how this dynamic is more than just 'dross' or off topic, it was the holistic pattern of difference from the rest of an engaged research conversation (Herda, 1999) that marked them as indicative of what might be called resistances to consciousness (Moane, 2011) and indicative of alienation (Marx & Engels, 1850). For example, at each session, the women filled out a questionnaire on the subject of change, specifically what about their lives they would like to change, and how they plan to make these changes. These questions were presented to the participants at some point in every session. The reluctance to directly answering questions about how and when to exert change in one's life is obvious to the facilitator, given the way she presents the papers to the participants.

Researcher Lorraine: Here are your stages of change papers, I know you're excited.

Betty: *(deep breathing-laughs)*

Charlotte: We have to do another one?

Some of the examples do not deal directly with the term "change", but instead, since the conscientization cycle has become analogous with change, group banter often derailed discussion around the conscientization cycle or the theory of liberation.

Researcher Colleen: …This week's challenge: Come up with another cycle of the conscientization cycle.

Anna: I like Mondays, more time to reflect.

(Banter about pregnancy, conception in stormy weather.)

The second evening session's conversation did not deal specifically with the subject of change, but instead was dominated by the topic of what expectations society puts upon women. The women were actively[1] involved, collaborating with examples and stories of where they felt that they had been discriminated against, or where people had made wrong or hurtful assumptions. These examples were filled with direct, personal experiences of sexism and ageism, among other oppressions. However, when there was a call by the facilitators to look at what political or structural measures may be in place against them, the participants again acted as a group, and with the use of banter, detracted from a structural analysis. Again, the holistic pattern in the group discussion was one of engagement and then direct, immediate diversion from the topic that was emerging from women's experiences of anger and jealousy:

Anna: I'm pretty sure that the word slut or whore was never made up by a man.

Researcher Colleen: Interesting. Who gains by horizontal oppression?

Charlotte: No one.

Anna: Nobody. At all.

Researcher Colleen: Why is it there though? How is it functioning?

Anna: Because some women, or some people haven't been able to get ahead themselves and that makes them angry, and angry to see other people getting ahead without them, when they don't have the ability to do it. Maybe?

1 The question of whether labeling actions/thoughts as internalized oppression is another way of propagating and entrenching those oppressions has been raised. One way to think about the concept is as an ideological tool for empowerment. The concept of internalized oppression is a resistance tool to excavate the insidious nature of alienation from self consciousness. Through questioning the socio-political structures as a collective, through questioning the ideologies of our historical period, oppressed groups can reframe dominant political discourses of their limit situations, and re-imagine a different present consciousness. The distinction is in the process of how internalized oppression is raised as a question for consideration rather than as an indictment of powerlessness. So to be part of the conversation about internalized oppression is a key factor in keeping this concept from becoming part of a contribution to oppression. Rather than seeing oneself as another's object, examining the idea of internalized oppression becomes a powerful tool in the hands of the oppressed. To keep internalized oppression from becoming an oppressive force, it's function as an ideological block on change needs to foreground the discussion; it's unexamined function is to maintain the status quo. By naming the process, one can be part of shifting the status quo.

Researcher Colleen: So the anger is directed at the same group.

Anna: And then they feel badly about themselves. Yes, anger and jealousy I think is huge.

Researcher Colleen: Interesting to think about how that functions.

Betty: This salad is perfect thank you.

Researcher Lorraine: Oh good *(laughs)*!

(salad dressing banter)

An oppressed person's dismissal of their ability to activate change in their life can also be seen as a form of internalized oppression. In a hierarchical system the ideology presented is that those in power are seen as naturally dominant and those in subordinate positions are deemed innately powerless (Moane, 1999, p. 27). Feminist psychologist Jean Baker Miller writes:

once a group is defined as inferior, the superior or dominant group judges them to be incapable of performing roles that the dominants value highly, and assigns them roles such as providing services which are poorly valued. The inferior capacities of the subordinates are seen as innate or natural. Stereotypes of the subordinates include 'submissiveness, passivity, docility, dependency, lack of initiative, inability to act, to decide, to think (Miller, 1986, p. 7).

In this way, dominants in a hierarchical culture would monopolize the roles of change-makers, and resist attitudes that would threaten these positions. Systemic blaming of the oppressed for their situations and stigmas are a powerful way to keep the status quo. Miller also writes "power is the ability to produce a change" (Miller, 1986, p. 10). Therefore, it would seem that effecting change is integral to being empowered. For oppressed people, who by definition lack power, there are many obstacles to producing change, not the least of which is the internalized belief that they are not able to do so. Moane writes:

Internalized oppression is a theme which recurs in writings on women, racism, colonialism, homophobia and heterosexism, and other experiences of oppression. It is associated with psychological patterns which include self-hatred, sense of inferiority, hopelessness and despair, mutual distrust and hostility, and psychological distress and madness. Internalized oppression is an obstacle to political activism, along with the obstacles posed by political and social forces (Moane, 1999, p. 20).

Indeed, the internalized avoidance to the idea of change poses a great difficulty for imagining change. How can one even start to think about change in this context of internalized avoidance of the topic? But perhaps this perspective problematizes the participant's avoidance of the concept of change, which may be considered yet another form of oppression. Rather, an analysis of the participant's experience of the word change may be more helpful. For those who live in oppressive circumstances where change is very difficult, it makes sense to problematize the very concept of change. For example, participants spoke about times when the usage of the word 'change' was a weapon used against them; perhaps the concept of 'change' has become imbued with a sense of other's judgments, associated with their oppression, and may evoke internalized oppressive feelings of guilt and self blame. To illustrate, Charlotte speaks of the terrible experience of having her child taken away from her because she was judged by others to be unfit to be a parent. The resulting legal proceedings affirmed her parental rights after months of separation from her child. Interestingly, she speaks of the judge's accusatory use of the word 'change', and further relays her offended reaction: "The judge said, 'So you don't think you need to change?' and I was like 'Well yeah, but I don't need you guys.'"

For adolescent mothers whose societal stigma implies deep shame about decisions that they have made in the past, the very idea of instigating change to one's life may hold a personally offensive, judgmental, and accusatory ring. However, LP assumes that instigating change is integral to liberation, imbuing the concept with great meaning and power. Similarly, Miller equates instigating change with power, (which is reserved for dominants). Therefore, the concept of change for those who do not have access to it may understandably seem inaccessible, daunting, and overwhelming. Oppressed people who attempt change are also likely to blame themselves for their perceived failure. Here Anna speaks about the complex process of how to deal with discrimination, that in order to deal with a passing insult, one must be able to deal with it internally first:

If you sat there and told me, I don't know, some insult, I can walk by and not acknowledge it, but it doesn't mean that I didn't go home and cry. I just… I don't know if ignoring is the antidote. You have to learn something beyond that ignoring…like inside yourself. Or if I'm angry, it just festers, I have to let go of the anger to be empowered, …So unless something changes inside of me to be able to cope with that instead of just ignoring it. .. but if I could truly learn to ignore something, it would be different….I guess that's what I'm saying, is that you would need to learn how to deal with it inside...

It is clear here that Anna does not see her anger as a tool, but rather as an impediment to change. Further she feels it is an impediment that is her responsibility alone. This suggests an important dynamic paradox between internalized oppression and a systemic analysis. Kasl, a researcher of internalized oppression and addiction claims that "transformation of addictive and other patterns requires understanding the link between these patterns

and hierarchical social organization" but warns "indeed failure to see this connection perpetuates self-blame and feelings of helplessness." (Moane, 1999, p.92). For oppressed people who blame themselves for attempts at change that are not successful, change may not be worth the effort. Pragmatically then, being presented with questions of how to change one's life becomes something to avoid.

Further, the word 'change' is often used in a misleading way especially in North America where it takes on a superficial binary that obscures the process behind it. Any examination of the phenomenon of change illustrates it does not happen instantly and it is difficult to say where it ends and begins. Our daily experiences will inevitably change us. However, the word as we know it suggests that our state of being has a duality; that one has changed or has not changed. This is especially problematic and overwhelming for those living at the bottom of a hierarchy whose self perceptions do not usually include 'change agent'; who do not generally see themselves as possessing the power to make things different and whose limit situations constrain their actions to effect changes as easily as do those dominant in the hierarchy. There is evidence of such an analysis of the term change by the participants in the pilot. Early in the pilot the participants were asked to give examples of what they would like to change. Anna suggests an introductory step to this brainstorming process. Such a suggestion can be interpreted as a deconstruction of the term change:

Researcher Colleen: Taking action is what we're talking about next. What are some things you might imagine changing based on your experiences? … What would you want to change about yourself, and or your relationships, and or the system?

Anna: Should we write about what isn't fair about it first?

Researcher Colleen: Tell me more.

Anna: Should we take a step in between to write down about what we just discussed? What's not fair, not so much what we want to change but what's not fair about it? And then maybe we can look at what we want to change.

This analysis is summarized well by Anna's quote from the first evening session, she says simply "Change takes time".

This critique of the mainstream misrepresentation of the term "change" is analogous to Miller's critique of the meaning allotted to the word "power" in our society. Power is similarly seen as possessing a binary property: Moane summarizes Miller's analysis: "For liberation there will also be a need for reconceptualizing power and self-determination. [She] points out that women have not been used to wielding power, and are therefore not practiced in the conventions which men learn from childhood. Confronting power issues, she believes, will involve changing old concepts of power which view power as 'all or none', or as a win-lose situation." (Moane, 1999, p. 91). Both power and change exist in shades of grey, but are not immediately understood in this light. Instead, a misleading dualism defines these terms, a misrepresentation especially debilitating for those not privy to the processes behind them.

For those wishing to create a community advocating for change there then remains the question of how to make change more accessible. For those working with the theory of liberation, this question may be especially pertinent since change is the cornerstone of liberation. Certainly a workshop that reinterprets the word change would be a good start where talking about what is not fair is an intermediary step. Incorporating other terminology like "transformation" may be another possibility. Further, an examination of the last session may also shed some light on a beneficial approach to the phenomenon of change.

At the last group meeting, the group's attitude to discussing both the subject of change and political influences began to shift, and great strides toward acknowledging themselves as agents of change were made on that final day. In the wrap-up session, the women were asked to do an analysis of their own writings, looking at how they filled out the sheets over time. With this self analysis there seemed to be a shift in the way the women reacted to the subject of change, and instead of avoiding the topic, they embraced it.

Researcher Colleen: So what did you notice about the past few weeks?

Charlotte: It changes your perspective of yourself. Like how to stand up for yourself. When to do it.

Kate: How you think of yourself.

Anna: You feel more powerful.

Researcher Colleen: More powerful how?

Anna: I guess it just makes you realize where your feelings are coming from and it gives you the power to change the way you're feeling about the messages that you're getting I guess? And maybe to make other people aware.

Kate: I think this group helped me realize what's more important. I wouldn't say set boundaries yet, but got me thinking about what my boundaries are.

Researcher Lorraine: And is that a good change?

Kate: Yes.

Accordingly, it was after this self-reflection that the greatest strides in structural analysis were made in the wrap-up session. The women talked in depth about the poor treatment and unfairness they had received from Child and Family Services, and also about horizontal oppression. Both of these subjects are referred to as having systemic origins.

Researcher Colleen: It's incredible how many structural things have come out of today's conversation. Amazing. You guys are talking about conscientization, policy, structural oppressions.

Betty: They're all into one so.

Researcher Colleen: It seems to me that maybe these conversations were happening before the feedback, I don't know, but…

Anna: A little bit. You're pissed off...

Kate: You stop and think.

Charlotte: Since the workshop I find myself to be more aware of those things.

Group: Yeah.

Charlotte: Now I'm like "that's unfair!" Before I was like, it happened so it happens, but not I'm like, "that's not right."

Anna: yeah, and I feel like I have the right to say it's not right now. Instead of just saying "whatever, I'm a young mom."

Betty: More confident to argue about it.

(laughter)

Researcher Colleen: So before you get pissed off, but what would you do with that?

Anna: Internalize it and say "well I'm not good enough", "shitty for me."

Researcher Lorraine: It's my fault?

Anna: Yeah

Kate: We have our voices now. Like my quote for me used to be "shit happens", but now it's more like "I have a voice and like, I can change (things)…"

There are several inferences that can be made from this dialogue. The opinions of the participants credit the idea of structural analysis and internalized oppression as being at opposite ends of a spectrum of capacity to influence change. At one end of the spectrum, they locate processes that keep the status quo. For example, they understand their previous dismissal of their experiences as status quo fixed reality; they recognize their negative self talk as sustaining the status quo. At the other end of the spectrum they see that reconstituting their experiences as rooted in historical material conditions disrupts that internalized oppression and creates the conditions for imagining change. It also speaks very positively about the self-reflection activity the participants took part in before this conversational shift. It sheds some light on the process of change when working with an especially oppressed or stigmatized group. It would seem that the women saw that they had changed over the project and were giving voice to that new reframing of their experiences. In accordance with LP, oppressed people feel powerless, disconnected from others and are not aware of the oppressive forces that keep them down. However, after a self-examination of changes that they have been able to influence, they see themselves as more powerful, and as more capable of the process of change.

Since all people have experience with the process of change in their lives, perhaps it would be helpful to include a segment in a LP workshop which asks the participants to reflect about changes that they have made in their lives in the past, and to deconstruct them. This would serve two purposes: to show change for what it is—a process; and to make it evident that each participant is already an agent of change.

Another suggested alteration to the pilot would be to give greater context and theorizing to how social structures need collective and sustained action on various aspects to effect change. While the LP theory is about the collective nature of changing structures, sometimes the lived experience of naming those structures creates undue and unfair pressure on individuals being responsible for changing a society. While the theory privileges societal change as the ultimate revolutionary practice, the praxis is important. Therefore, group analysis and discussion about limit situations is key to how to create change that is more in keeping

with people's lived experience of change. It would be beneficial to contextualize the embedded nature of social structures but not so much from a deterministic (Marx, 1850) standpoint but rather from a problematization of the limit situation approach. Encouraging changes at an intrapersonal level might make the idea of change more manageable and better understood (Moane, 2011). Also, attempted changes would be more understood if it was about personal responses and therefore less likely to be perceived as failures. With these measures, the process of change may be more accessible and therefore more likely to be discussed.

The last of the final workshop day was dedicated to creating an artistic expression of some aspect of being in the project. The group had decided to each create their own masks, and two of the women created two masks to show what they called a transformation. In addition to her masks, Diane Perry (who stated she wanted her real name attributed to her poem for this publication) also submitted a poem to pass on to the next group of women, expressing her profound experience of being involved in the project. The poem depicts the group as a source of safety and empowerment. The group is also juxtaposed with a very harsh and judgmental outside world. Diane wrote the poem before meeting for the final wrap-up session.

My world will keep on spinning, with judgment and unfair rights,
the wind will keep on blowing on those dark and saddened nights.

My head will keep on racing,
trying to conquer this maze.

But we will stick together,
and our hearts will never change.

Out in this world I am nobody,
another teen mom who has lost her way.

I need reminding of where I stand
at the end of every day.

I step into my home, my hollow,
and I see their eyes light up

You may think my life is disgraceful,
but to me it's more than enough.

I don't need you to make me smile,
and I won't let you hold me back.

I'll be the best that I can be,
I owe myself and loved ones that.

Your world I want no part of
and my world I have that right

Let your oppression try to conquer us
but we will stand up to fight

We are as one and not alone
and we are all somebody

Try if you will to break us down
we will not be oppressed or defeated by society.

-- Diane Perry, 2009

While Diane sees herself as deriving new power to "fight back" from being in the project, there simultaneously exists a sense of powerlessness toward being able to change the oppressive status quo. Holding these two seemingly contradictory attitudes toward change at the same time

may show her attitude as being in transition and that she is living a dialectic of marginalization. The masks created by the women depicted similar themes. The masks contrasted grins and lightness, beauty and sparkles with darkness and sad expressions.

Conclusions

Participants expressed a positive transition in working through the eight week project. The women in the group greatly enjoyed and felt empowered from their experiences with other adolescent mothers. They identified shared oppressions, supported each other's analysis, and created a safe and strong group dynamic by sharing in each other's company. At first they resisted the subject of change or a systemic analysis by derailing conversations on these topics through the use of banter. Since internalized oppression fragments and disempowers people, the idea of being an agent of change is particularly foreign and likely to result in self-blame. Further, the common North American usage of the word 'change' is misleading and elitist. A deep analysis around the process of change that breaks it down into a process demanding very small actions at first, may benefit future projects. This holds particular relevance for multiply oppressed groups, and particularly with groups that did not form naturally around the goal of advocating for political change. Reflection and self-analysis about what the participants have already changed, and how that happened, may act as a catalyst for liberation. Indeed, once the women in this project saw themselves as agents of change, they achieved a high level of systemic analysis which functioned as a combatant to their internalized oppression.

The pattern of reluctance toward the concept of change by oppressed people suggests that there may be a need to explore this topic more thoroughly with the participants in studies of this kind. Oppressed persons' experiences and interpretations on the process of change would be an enriching further direction for those interested in LP. A workshop module about change may be ben-

eficial to future LP projects. The workshop would need to examine and recreate the concept of change to render it accessible. We took this analysis back to our participants to discuss these ideas with them. They affirmed our analysis of their reaction of derailing the topic with banter and recognized it as a resistance worth examination. They engaged with and extended our analysis with additional insights to how to make the idea of change more accessible and more likely to result in "revolutionary practice" (Marx & Engels, 1850, p. 198). We talked about the implications together for approximately 3 hours despite the fact that we had only scheduled 2 hours together. We are looking forward to extending this project with adolescent mothers across the Province.

References

Benston, M. (1969). The Political Economy of Women's Liberation, *Monthly Review*, v. 21, n.4, September.

Brewer, P. (2004). Introduction F. Engels, [1884]. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (pp. 7 – 24). Resistance Books, El Faro Printing: Newtown, Australia.

Burnard, P. (1991). A method of analysing interview transcripts in qualitative research. *Nurse Education Today, 11*, 461-466.

Chodorow, N. (1978). *The Reproduction of Mothering*, Berkeley: University of California.

Chodorow, N. (1979). Mothering, Male Dominance, and Capitalism, in Zillah Eisenstein, ed. 1979, *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*, New York: Monthly Review Press: 83-106.

Chodorow, N. (1989). Toward a Relational Individualism, in *Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory* (London: Polity Press): 154-162.

Coontz, S. (2005) The Evolution of Matrimony: The Changing Social Context of Marriage. *Annals of the American Psychotherapy Assn,* Vol 8(4), pp. 30-33.

Emerson, R. (1995). *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Esterberg, K E. (2002). *Qualitative Methods in Social Research.* Toronto, ON: McGraw Hill.

Friedan, B., (1963). *The Feminine Mystique*. New York: Norton.

Fox, B. (Ed.) (1980). *Hidden in the Household: Women's Domestic Labour under Capitalism*. Toronto: The Women's Press.

Fromm, E. (1961). *Marx's Concept of Man*. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.

Gergen, K. (1989). Possibility of psychological knowledge: A hermeneutic inquiry. In P. Martin & R. Addison (Eds.), *Entering the Circle: Hermeneutic Investigation in Psychology* (pp. 241-260). New York: State University of New York Press.

Haraway, D., (1985). A Manifesto for Cybourgs: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 1980s, *Socialist Review*, v.15 n.2 (Mar. Apr. 1985): 65-107.

Harding, S., (1986). *The Science Question in Feminism*, Ithaca: Cornell University.

Hartsock, N. (1983a). The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism, in Sandra Harding and Merle Hintikka, eds. *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science*, Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishers: 283-310.

Hartsock, N. (1983b). *Money, Sex and Power*, New York: Longman.

Heidegger, M. (1927/62). *Being and time*. (Translated by Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.) San Francisco: Harper-Collins.

Hennessy, R. (2003). Class. In M. Eagleton, (Ed.) *A Concise Companion to Feminist Theory* (pp. 53-72). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Hennessy, R. (2000). *Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism,* New York: Routledge.

Hennessy, R. (1993). *Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse*, New York: Routledge.

Herda, E. (1999). *Research conversations and narrative: A critical hermeneutic orientation in participatory inquiry*. London: Praeger.

Kuhn, A, & Wolpe, A. (Eds.). (1978). *Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.

MacQuarrie, C., Begley, L., & Preston, A. (2010). People are just waiting for me to screw up: Instructions on

surviving oppression from teen mothers. Community Psychology Conference, Ottawa.

MacQuarrie, C. (2001). Experiences in Early Stage Alzheimer's Disease. Ph. D. Dissertation Simon Fraser University.

Martin-Baro, I. (1994). *Writings for a liberation psychology*. In A. Aron & S. Corne, (Eds.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Marx, K. [1844], Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, In Lewis S. Feuer, ed. 1989. *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy/Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels*. New York: Anchor Books.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. [1850] (1939). *German Ideology, Part I*. New York: International.

Miller, J. B. (1986). *Toward a New Psychology of Women.* 2nd edn. London: Penguin.

Miller, J. B. (1991). 'Women and Power.' In J.V. Jordan, A.G. Kaplan, J.B. Miller, I.P Stiver and J.L. Surrey, *Women's Growth in Connection: Writings from the Stone Center*. New York: Guilford Press.

Mitchell, J. (1972). *Women's Estate*, New York: Random House.

Mitchell, J. (1974). *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*, New York: Pantheon.

Moane, G. (1999, 2011). *Gender and Colonialism*. St Martin's Press, Inc.

Nelson, G. & Prilleltensky, I. (2005). *Community psychology. In pursuit of liberation and wellbeing*. New York: Palgrame-McMillan.

O'Brien, M., (1981). *The Politics of Reproduction*, London: Routledge.

Osorio, J., (2009). Praxis and liberation in the context of Latin American theory. In M. Montero & C.C. Sonn (Eds.), *Psychology of Liberation*, Peace Psychology Book Series, Springer, p. 17.

Packer, M., & Addison, R. (1989). *Entering the Circle: Hermeneutic Investigation in Psychology*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Pieranunzzi, V. (1997). The lived experience of power and powerlessness in psychiatric nursing: A Heideggerian hermeneutical analysis. *Archives of Psychiatric Nursing. XI*, (3), 155-162.

Reed, E. (1973). *Woman's Evolution from Matriarchal Clan to Patriarchal Family*, New York: Pathfinder Press.

Rennie, D. (2007). Methodical hermeneutics and humanistic psychology. *The Humanistic Psychologist, Vol 35*(1), p. 1-14.

Ricoeur, P. (1979). The model of the text: Meaningful action considered as a text. In P. Rabinow & W. M. Sullivan (Eds.), *Interpretive Social Science, A reader* (pp. 73-101). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ruddick, S., (1989). *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace*. Boston: Beacon.

Smith, D. (1974). Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology, *Sociological Inquiry*, vol. 4, n. 1 (January 1974): 1-13.

Vogel, L., (1995). *Woman Questions: Essays for a Materialist Feminism*, New York: Routledge.

Watkins, M., Shulman. H. (2008). *Toward Psychologies of Liberation*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Michael Arfken is currently Assistant Professor of Psychology at the University of Prince Edward Island in Canada. He is the director of the Marxism & Psychology Research Group (MPRG) and co-organizer (with Ian Parker) of the first international conference on Marxism and Psychology which was held at UPEI during the summer of 2010. His primary scholarly interests are in the area of critical social theory with a particular emphasis on issues that lie at the intersection of hermeneutic phenomenology and Marxism.

Lorraine Begley is research manager for studies with marginalized populations in the Department of Psychology at the University of Prince Edward Island. She has worked with the theory and practices of liberation psychology for the past three years in her research and in political and public policy work. Her research work has been with teen mothers, populations living in low socio-economic status, women survivors of breast or gynaecological cancers, populations who smoke, the Nunatukavut of Labrador, and abused women in rural areas of the Maritime provinces of Canada.

Elliott Buckland is a PhD Candidate (ABD) in the Department of Political Science at York University in Toronto. His dissertation focuses on Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno. Other areas of research interest include political economy, political culture and international relations. Currently residing in Ottawa, his hometown is Saint John, New Brunswick.

Vasi van Deventer is an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of South Africa. He is a Clinical Psychologist, a member of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology, the Psychological Society of South Africa and the Society for Industrial and Organisational Psychology of South Africa. His main area of interest is subjectivity as a self-referential system. His research draws on themes from post-modern philosophy, relativity theory and quantum mechanics in physics, and number theory in mathematics.

Gregory C. Flemming holds a BSc with an advanced major in psychology from Dalhousie University in Halifax, and an MA in Communications and Culture from York University, Toronto. He is Currently a PhD candidate in the Social and Political Thought Program – also at York University – and writing a dissertation on the relationship between the work of Karl Marx and Slavoj Žižek, entitled *A World Aware: Marx, Žižek, and Form*. He has published in *The International Journal of Žižek Studies* (2008) and *(a): The Journal of Culture and the Unconscious* (2008-9).

Ravi Gokani is a M.A. student in the Community Psychology programme at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, where he is completing a qualitative thesis on the impact of British and American imperialism on Indo-Hindu mentality, under the supervision of Dr. Richard Walsh-Bowers. He currently lives in Kitchener, Ontario, Canada with his partner Aylah and their beloved Great Dane, Marcus.

Gordana Jovanović is Professor of Psychology at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia. She teaches general psychology and personality theories, qualitative research, cultural-historical psychology. With an Alexander von Humboldt research grant she made research in Germany, at the University in Frankfurt on Main, and Free University of Berlin. 1984-1985, 1989, 2003, and 2011. The British Psychological Society awarded her a grant in 1999. She is author of *Symbolization and Rationality,* 1984 [in Serbian] and *Freud and Modern Subjectivity,* 1997 [in Serbian] and various contributions in German and English books and journals.

Steve Larocco teaches contemporary critical theory and literature at Southern Connecticut State University. He is currently working on a book that explores the complex interrelations between emotions, recognition and ethics. He has published work on forgiveness, the structure of seduction, Greek tragedy and has an essay forthcoming on imitation and trauma. He is also a union activist.

Colleen MacQuarrie, Associate Professor in the Psychology Department University of Prince Edward Island and active in feminist organizations for more than 20 years, is an academic activist /developmental health researcher. Her research integrates the perspectives of a feminist liberation psychology framework with the determinants of health to examine a range of health interventions to better understand how environments support individuals' and families' health. Her collaborative approach informs critical participatory research with survivors of childhood sexual abuse, pregnant adolescents, women leaving abusive relationships, access to reproductive justice, and aboriginal communities.

James McMahon is a PhD candidate in Social and Political Thought at York University, Toronto, Canada. With a strong interest in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, James is currently researching about the business of Hollywood film production in order to understand how a general state of mass culture is instituted according to capitalist principles.

Radu Neculau is assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Windsor in Ontario. His research interests and most recent publications are in the history of 18th and 19th century social and political philosophy and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School.

Clifford van Ommen is Director of the Centre for Psychology at Massey University's Albany campus. He is a Clinical Psychologist and member of the International Society

for Theoretical Psychology and the South African Clinical Neuropsychological Association. His primary area of interest is the nexus of neuroscience, body studies and critical psychology. In his doctorate he investigatedneuroscience's potential to contribute to the critical agenda. He co-edited *Interiors: A history of Psychology in South Africa*(2008) with Desmond Painter.

Ian Parker is Professor of Psychology in the Department of Psychology at Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU). He was co-founder in 1991, and is currently co-director (with Erica Burman) of the Discourse Unit at MMU (www.discourseunit.com). His research and writing has been in the field of psychoanalysis, psychology and social theory, with a particular focus on discourse, critical psychology, mental health and political practice. His books include *Revolution in Psychology: Alienation to Emancipation* (Pluto Press, 2007) and *Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Revolutions in Subjectivity* (Routledge, 2011),and he edited the four-volume Routledge Major Work *Critical Psychology* in 2011.

David Pavón Cuéllar is Professor of Psychology at Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo in Morelia (Mexico). He has taught psychoanalysis in the University of Paris 8 (France). He is the author of *From the Conscious Interior to an Exterior Unconscious: Lacan, Discourse Analysis and Social Psychology* (London, Karnac, 2010), *Marxisme lacanien* (Paris, Psychophores, 2009), *Le révolutio-m'être, application des notions lacaniennes à l'analyse de discours en psychologie sociale* (Paris, Psychophores, 2006), and co-author of *Configuraciones psicoanalíticas sobre espectros y fantasmas* (México, Plaza y Valdés, 2011).

Brad Piekkola received his Ph.D. in 1989 from the University of Victoria for his evaluation of theories of personality. He has taught history, theory, cognition and personality at the University of Vancouver Island since that time.

Bogdan Popa has a Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Bucharest, Romania, where he specialized in contemporary American philosophy, with a focus on the work of John Rawls. He was a visiting scholar with the Institute for Research on Women and Gender, University of Michigan, between 2009-2011. He works on a Ph.D. dissertation in the Political Science Department, Indiana University, about liberalism, John Stuart Mill and shame. Bogdan's main research interests are feminist theory, critical theory, and psychoanalysis, focusing on the intersection between relational psychoanalysis and critiques of domination.

Emily Rutledge recently graduated in Psychology from the University of Prince Edward Island with honours. Her honours work is the basis for this chapter. Although she has only just begun her career in the field of psychology, she has participated at national and international conferences. So far her research interests include Liberation Psychology, critical psychology, and women's rights with a focus on women's reproductive rights. In the fall, she will be starting a master's program at Wilfred Laurier University in Community Psychology where she will continue exploring the exciting theory and practice of Liberation Psychology.

Thomas Teo is Professor in the *History and Theory of Psychology Program* at York University (Toronto) and editor of the *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*. At the moment he is editing an *Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology.* His research in historical and theoretical psychology is based on critical-hermeneutic analyses. He has been reconstructing critiques of psychology, the history and theory of philosophical psychology, and scientific racism. He has been analyzing the historical and theoretical foundations of the social sciences, the human sciences, and psychology, and he discusses the ontological, epistemological, and ethical-political challenges to these fields.

Joanna Wasiak is an MA student in the Child and Youth Studies program at Brock University working under the supervision of Dr. Hans Skott-Myhre. She is currently working on her SSHRC-funded thesis dissertation, *Bringing Zombies Back to Life: An Autoethnographic Exploration of Alienation and Political Dis/engagement of Young Adults in North America.* In the upcoming fall, Joanna will be pursing her doctoral degree in Cultural Studies at Trent University.

ARCP 9